James Craig Wiegand v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )


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  •                         NUMBER 13-21-00157-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    JAMES CRAIG WIEGAND,                                                   Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                      Appellee.
    On appeal from the 24th District Court
    of Jackson County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
    Appellant James Craig Wiegand was convicted by a jury on two counts of
    aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, second-degree felonies enhanced to first-
    degree felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.42(b), 22.02(a)(2). The jury assessed
    James’s punishment at ninety-nine years’ imprisonment for each count, with the
    sentences to run concurrently. See id. §§ 12.32, 12.42(b). In a single issue, James
    contends the evidence was insufficient to prove that he used or exhibited a deadly
    weapon during the commission of one of the assaults. We affirm as modified.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    On September 7, 2019, James and his wife, Virgie Wiegand, were driving home
    from a visit with their daughter and grandchildren. Virgie testified that during the car ride,
    James was “kind of crying” and told her that when they got home, he was “going to get
    on his four-wheeler, drive out in the back pasture, take his gun[,] and . . . shoot himself.”
    Virgie recounted feeling “shocked” when James said this. She tried driving James to a
    hospital, but when he noticed Virgie diverted from their ordinary route home, James
    threatened to “grab that steering wheel . . . [and] flip th[e] car.”
    According to Virgie, when they got home, James took his four-wheeler for a drive.
    Virgie called 911 and requested a welfare check. Robbie Sparks, a family friend, testified
    that James visited his home that evening. He also testified that he called Virgie to inform
    her of James’s whereabouts. Officer Steve Thompson of the Jackson County Sheriff’s
    Office testified that he drove to the Sparks residence to check on James. According to
    Sparks, although James was initially emotional during his visit, Sparks thought James
    had “calmed down” by the time Officer Thompson arrived. Officer Thompson testified that
    he discussed the idea of going to the hospital with James, but James insisted he just
    wanted “to go home and go to bed.” Officer Thompson agreed to drive James back to his
    home.
    Virgie testified that when Officer Thompson brought James home, Officer
    Thompson told her to “just let him go in there, take a shower, you know. He’ll be fine. . . .”
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    Virgie related that James went inside, took a shower, and lay down in bed. Virgie, too,
    eventually lay down and fell asleep.
    According to Virgie, she awoke in the middle of the night to James “yelling at [her]
    to get up.” James began asking her “where’s the dog, where’s the dog.” Virgie told James
    that she did not know, and James started “yelling what have you done with the dog[,]
    almost like [she] did something” to the dog.
    Virgie testified that she got out of bed and started looking around the house for the
    dog. When she went to the front door, she saw both James and the dog exit their travel
    trailer, which was situated outside the house. From this, Virgie surmised the dog had been
    inside the travel trailer, “[b]ut the dog had been in the house when [they] went to bed.” At
    this point, “with all of this behavior,” Virgie thought it might be best for her to leave the
    house.
    She left through the back door as James was entering the home through the front
    door, but James “caught up with” Virgie before she could reach her car. James “grabbed
    at” Virgie and “he flung [her] back around and he just jerked [her] back really hard.” James
    “pushed [her] down on the ground and fell over the top of [her.]” He was “laying across”
    her, and her “leg was hurting really bad.” Virgie testified that she “thought he had broke[n]
    [her] leg at that point.”
    Virgie stated that she kept asking James to “just let [her] go,” but he “said no, you
    ain[’]t going anywhere.” James then pulled her “into the house with—with his hands” while
    Virgie “was on [her] hands and knees . . . trying to get up.” When they got inside the
    house, James told Virgie to “get into the bedroom.” She “was walking like on [her] tippy
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    toes limping because it hurt a lot.” As she was moving towards the bedroom, she saw
    that there was “a long brown gun” on the couch that she did not “remember being there
    before.” Virgie testified that she “had been sitting in that spot” earlier, and she “didn’t know
    how it showed up or why it was there.” Virgie stated that she reached for the brown gun,
    but James pushed her and grabbed it before she could. Virgie explained that this
    sequence of events “seemed to happen all at one time.”
    According to Virgie, when the two got back into the bedroom, James said, “I guess
    this one is jammed,” referring to the gun he was wielding. He then tossed the brown gun,
    picked up “a black gun,” and said, “oh well. . . . this will take more bullets[,] but it will get
    the job done.” Virgie testified that James then told her he was going to kill her while
    pointing the black gun at her. He then fired the gun “at least seven times,” missing Virgie
    each time.
    Virgie testified that James then took her into the living room and told her to write a
    letter to her children. Virgie also recounted that James “did at all times have the gun as
    he had kept it with him.” The letter Virgie wrote was admitted into evidence at trial and
    reads, “I’m sorry for what ever [sic] I may have done to bring this on our family[.]” Virgie
    testified that James wrote his own note, which was also admitted into evidence at trial,
    and reads:
    I asked her & asked her[.] I even told her what was going to happen tonight.
    But as usuall [sic] no belivefs [sic]. But as you can see some should have
    listened[.] Especially Virgie. I[’]m going to . . . ask forgiveness before the
    sin. Lord I am very sick but can[’]t get anyone to listen[.] Well now I don[’]t
    have to hear the voices anymore.
    After writing the letter, Virgie told her husband that she needed to use the restroom.
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    James “grab[bed] [her] arm” and took her to the bathroom but told her not to shut the
    door. Virgie flushed the toilet to cover the sound of her opening the glass window in the
    bathroom. She “went through and out the window and fell on the ground.” Virgie headed
    towards her neighbors’ residence but had to go through a barbed wire fence to get to their
    house. The neighboring couple eventually helped her inside, called the police, and waited
    with her for their arrival. Officer Thompson responded to this call, as well.
    James was arrested on September 8, 2019. The jury convicted James of two
    counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See id. § 22.02(a)(2). This appeal
    followed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02.
    II.    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    James argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that the assault and the use
    or exhibition of a deadly weapon occurred simultaneously, because “any acts that could
    cause a ‘bodily injury,’ for the purposes of Count 1 as plead[ed] in the indictment, did not
    occur when a firearm was present, used[,] or exhibited.”
    A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law
    “The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by comparing the evidence produced
    at trial to ‘the essential elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct
    jury charge.’” Curlee v. State, 
    620 S.W.3d 767
    , 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Malik
    v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    , 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “A hypothetically correct jury
    charge ‘accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
    unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s
    theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
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    defendant was tried.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Malik, 
    953 S.W.2d at 240
    ).
    In reviewing evidence for sufficiency, we consider all the evidence presented in the
    light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the trial court was justified in
    finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 899 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)).
    This generally means that we resolve “any ambiguities in the evidence in the
    prosecution’s favor.” Brooks v. State, 
    634 S.W.3d 745
    , 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
    “The testimony of a single eyewitness can be sufficient to support a conviction.”
    Arrellano v. State, 
    555 S.W.3d 647
    , 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d).
    And a jury may believe only certain portions of a witness’s testimony. 
    Id.
     We defer to the
    jury’s credibility and weight determinations because they are the sole judge of the
    witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. 
    Id.
    Here, to prove that James committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as
    alleged in Count 1, the hypothetically correct jury charge required a showing that he: (1)
    intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, (2) caused bodily injury to Virgie,1 and (3) exhibited
    or used a deadly weapon during the assault, to wit, a firearm.2 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    1 Although the indictment specifically alleged that James caused the injury to Virgie by making
    contact with her with his hand, the hypothetically correct jury charge need not include the manner and
    means by which the injury was caused. See Hernandez v. State, 
    556 S.W.3d 308
    , 316 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2017) (holding that a variance concerning “the manner and means by which the bodily injury was caused”
    is not material unless “it converts the offense proven at trial into a different offense than what was pled in
    the charging instrument”); Johnson v. State, 
    364 S.W.3d 292
    , 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (nothing that
    aggravated assault is a “result-of-conduct crime with the focus or gravamen being the victim and the bodily
    injury that was inflicted” and “[t]he precise act or nature of conduct in this result-oriented offense is
    inconsequential”).
    2 The indictment and jury charge also alleged that James committed this act against someone with
    whom he shared a dating or family relationship as defined by the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE
    ANN. §§ 71.0021(b), 71.003. However, the indictment and jury charge did not also allege or require a finding
    that James caused serious bodily injury to Virgie, as would be required to transform an aggravated assault
    with a deadly weapon charge into an aggravated assault on a family member charge. See TEX. PENAL CODE
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    §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2).
    An aggravated assault occurs when a person commits a simple assault and uses
    a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. See id. §§ 22.01(a), 22.02(a)(2);
    Wade, 951 S.W.2d at 889. “[T]he offense is result oriented and . . . the gravamina of the
    offense are the victim and the bodily injury that was inflicted.” Hernandez v. State, 
    556 S.W.3d 308
    , 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “Bodily injury” means “physical pain, illness, or
    any impairment of physical condition.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8). “Any physical
    pain, however minor, will suffice to establish bodily injury.” Garcia v. State, 
    367 S.W.3d 683
    , 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “[A] factfinder may infer that a victim actually suffered
    physical pain, and no witness—including the victim—need testify that the victim felt pain.”
    Coleman v. State, 
    631 S.W.3d 744
    , 751 (Tex. App.—Houston 2021, pet. ref’d). “The
    existence of a cut, bruise, or scrape on the body is sufficient evidence of physical pain
    necessary to establish ‘bodily injury’ within the meaning of the statute.” Arzaga v. State,
    
    86 S.W.3d 767
    , 778 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.).
    One “uses” a deadly weapon during the commission of an assault if the deadly
    weapon was “utilized, employed, or applied in order to achieve its intended result: ‘the
    commission of a felony offense.’” Safian v. State, 
    543 S.W.3d 216
    , 223 (Tex. Crim. App.
    ANN. §§ 22.02(a)(2), (b)(1).
    Although the caption of the indictment charges James with violating Texas Penal Code
    § 22.02(b)(1), the body of the indictment only meets the required elements for a violation of Texas Penal
    Code § 22.02(a)(2). See id. §§ 22.02(a)(2), (b)(1). “[W]hen the caption [of an indictment] lists a different
    offense from the one alleged in the body of the indictment, . . . the body of the indictment controls.” Villarreal
    v. State, 
    504 S.W.3d 494
    , 507 n. 6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, pet. ref’d). We assume
    without deciding that the State was also required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that James had a
    dating and/or familial relationship with Virgie to prove that James committed aggravated assault with a
    deadly weapon. However, James does not complain on appeal about the inclusion of this superfluous
    element, nor does he challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding it. Therefore, we do not discuss
    it further. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
    7
    2018) (quoting Patterson v. State, 
    769 S.W.2d 938
    , 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
    Exhibiting a deadly weapon “only requires that a deadly weapon be consciously shown,
    displayed, or presented to be viewed during ‘the commission of a felony offense.’” 
    Id.
    (quoting Patterson, 
    769 S.W.2d at 941
    ). Using a deadly weapon extends to “any
    employment of a deadly weapon, even its simple possession, if such possession
    facilitates the associated felony.” 
    Id.
     at 223–24 (quoting Patterson, 
    769 S.W.2d at 941
    ).
    The court of criminal appeals has noted that “one can ‘use’ a deadly weapon without
    exhibiting it, but it is doubtful that one can exhibit a deadly weapon during the commission
    of a felony without using it.’” Id. at 224 (quoting Patterson, 
    769 S.W.2d at 941
    ).
    B.     Analysis
    James does not challenge the conviction on Count 2, which stems from James
    repeatedly firing the gun in Virgie’s direction. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(2)
    (defining simple assault to include “intentionally or knowingly threaten[ing] another with
    imminent bodily injury”), 22.02(a) (including § 22.01 in the definition of aggravated
    assault). Rather, James argues that any assault that resulted in bodily injury, as alleged
    in Count 1, was too far removed from his wielding of a gun to sufficiently show he
    committed a second aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
    Officer Thompson testified that when he arrived on the scene after Virgie’s
    neighbors called the police, Virgie “told [him] that James had assaulted her and
    threatened to kill her with a rifle.” Virgie testified that after she wrote her letter, James
    “grab[bed] her arm” and took her to the bathroom. She stated that James “did at all times
    have the gun as he had kept it with him.” Photos of Virgie were taken that same evening
    8
    and show what appears to be bruising on her arm. Officer Thompson testified that when
    he spoke to Virgie, she described “her knee pain and her arms being bruised up.” The
    jury could have concluded that the gun was used in facilitating the assault because “its
    presence was used by appellant to instill in the complainant apprehension, reducing the
    likelihood of resistance during the encounter.” McCain v. State, 
    22 S.W.3d 497
    , 503 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2000).
    James attributes Virgie’s injuries mainly to “the fences and other obstacles [she]
    encountered” when escaping to her neighbors’ residence. Although Virgie stated that she
    “cut [her] leg up pretty good” when she went through the barbed wire fence, she did not
    testify that her arms were injured during her escape. Bearing in mind the evidence
    presented at trial and the reasonable inferences the jury could have drawn from it, we
    conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support James’s conviction on Count 1. See
    Coleman, 631 S.W.3d at 751; Arzaga, 
    86 S.W.3d at 778
    .
    We therefore overrule James’s sole issue on appeal.
    III.   MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT
    Lastly, in his brief, James notes that the judgment for Count 1 lists the “Statute for
    Offense” as “Sec. 22.02(b)(1)–Penal Code,” but the record reflects he was convicted of
    violating Texas Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2),
    (b)(1). James asks this Court to modify the judgment to correct this discrepancy. We grant
    this request and modify the “Statute for Offense” section on the judgment for Count 1 to
    list the statute James violated as “Sec. 22.02(a)(2)–Penal Code” instead. See Asberry v.
    State, 
    813 S.W.2d 526
    , 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (discussing the
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    authority of an appellate court to reform incorrect judgments).
    Additionally, both judgments incorrectly list James’s sentence as “NINETY (99)
    YEARS IN TDCJ.” We modify this portion of each judgment to read “NINETY-NINE (99)
    YEARS IN TDCJ.” See 
    id.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
    GINA M. BENAVIDES
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Delivered and filed on the
    11th day of August, 2022.
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