Adolfo Garcia Jr. v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

NUMBER 13-22-00001-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
ADOLFO GARCIA JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 36th District Court
of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
By a three-count indictment, the State of Texas charged appellant Adolfo Garcia
Jr. with: (1) burglary of a habitation, a second-degree felony; (2) aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony; and (3) assault family violence with a prior
family violence conviction, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 22.01(b)(2)(A), 22.02(a)(2), 30.02(c)(2). The indictment included an enhancement
paragraph, to which appellant pleaded “not true,” for a 1992 voluntary manslaughter
conviction. A jury found appellant guilty on all counts. Appellant elected for the trial court
to impose sentencing, and it sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment on Count
One, fifteen years’ imprisonment on Count Two, and eight years’ imprisonment on Count
Three, with each sentence to run concurrently.
By two issues, appellant argues that (1) “the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of [his] 1992 manslaughter conviction during the guilt[-innocence] stage” of trial, and
(2) the trial evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Trial commenced on October 19, 2021. We summarize the relevant testimony.
A. Officer Steven Anthoney Perez’s Testimony
Mathis Police Department Officer Steven Anthoney Perez testified that he was
dispatched to a disturbance on August 28, 2020. When he arrived at the address on North
Atascosa Street, Officer Perez encountered two women, one of whom was Maxine
Crystal Valenzuela. Officer Perez stated that Valenzuela “was distraught,” “[v]ery upset,”
and, based on the looks of Valenzuela’s swollen face, “had been in a fight or been beaten
up somehow.” Valenzuela informed Officer Perez that she was assaulted by appellant at
her nearby address on North Frio Street. She told Officer Perez that appellant had struck
her with a pole and shocked her with a taser. Officer Perez photographed Valenzuela’s
injuries 1 and, at trial, noted that the photos depict “[a] large contusion to the left side of
1 Officer Perez’s photographs of Valenzuela’s injuries were entered into the record as State’s
Exhibits one through six.
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[Valenzuela’s] face . . . , major swelling, redness and blueness to the left side of her eye,”
a contusion on her forehead, and red marks on her neck purportedly from being strangled.
Officer Perez testified that he then went to and began photographing Valenzuela’s
home. 2 Officer Perez noted that the photos of Valenzuela’s home depict (1) damage to
the front door and door frame which he believed, based on detached door lock plates
resting on the ground, had been “busted into—forced entry,” (2) a metal pole with a
concrete base left just inside the front door, (3) a couch that Valenzuela “advised that she
was sitting [on] during the assault,” (4) a taser, and (5) a bloody cloth or rug.
Valenzuela informed Officer Perez of an address on North 9th Street at which she
believed appellant would be found. Body camera footage was entered into evidence 3 and
shows appellant’s younger sister (Sister) answering the door on North 9th Street when
Officer Perez arrived. Officer Perez asked Sister if appellant was at the house. Sister
pointed to her right and asked Officer Perez if he saw a truck there; he answered
affirmatively. Sister stated that appellant was not at her house, that she “did not even see
[appellant] pull up” to her home that day, and that appellant usually parks his truck there
“and he’ll take off in a bike.” Sister informed Officer Perez that appellant would then come
back later and “whatever time it is, he’ll leave in the truck.”
B. Valenzuela’s Testimony
Valenzuela testified that she has known appellant for about seventeen years and
the two were once in an “intimate personal relations[hip].” She stated that she had once
2 Officer Perez’s photographs of Valenzuela’s home were entered into the record as State’s
Exhibits seven through eleven.
3 A portion of the body camera footage, marked as State’s Exhibit fifteen, was shown to the jury.
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lived with appellant but that she did not live with him on the day of the assault. She noted
that appellant had abused her once before, and, without objection, the State entered
appellant’s judgment of conviction in that 2005 assault case into evidence.
The State asked Valenzuela to describe what happened on August 28, 2020, and
she responded as follows:
I had been separated for awhile from [appellant]. I was laying on my
couch . . . when I heard my door bust open. And he was standing there with
a stop sign pole and a taser. When he struck me with the pole, he tased me
at the same time.
....
He started beating me. And he beat me repeatedly. And I begged
him several times to let me go. And I told him that—I lied to him. I told him
that my mom was going to come and drop off the girls to me in the morning
because my stepmom—my stepdad and my mom were going to go to San
Antonio. I made up a lie just so he would release me and let go of me.
Otherwise, I wouldn’t have known what more could have had happened to
me.
Valenzuela testified that the assault continued for “a good [twenty] minutes or longer,”
that she was certain it was appellant who attacked her, and that appellant did not have
permission to enter her home at that time. Appellant finally departed with Valenzuela’s
cell phone, and Valenzuela went to a neighbor’s house to call the police.
In her opening statement, appellant’s trial counsel informed the jury that “the
evidence will show that [Valenzuela] had her own history of assaultiveness and . . . drug[]
[use], which could have played a huge factor in what transpired on” August 28. On cross-
examination of Valenzuela, appellant sought to develop that theory. Trial counsel asked
Valenzuela why she was in custody and in jail clothing during trial, and Valenzuela
responded that she was being detained on a drug charge. The following exchange then
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took place:
[Trial Counsel]: And the drug charge is not the only time that you had a
run-in with the law, correct?
[Valenzuela]: No, ma’am.
[Trial Counsel]: Do you recall being arrested for assault on a public
servant?
[Valenzuela]: I don’t recall.
[Trial Counsel]: Do you recall being arrested for aggravated robbery?
[Valenzuela]: I do recall that one.
[Trial Counsel]: So you have your own history of being assaultive,
correct?
[Valenzuela]: Yes, ma’am.
[Trial Counsel]: And so you want this jury to believe that [appellant]
assaulted you?
[Valenzuela]: Yes, ma’am.
Following this exchange, trial counsel passed the witness, and the State requested
to approach the bench. The State informed the trial court that appellant “asked the victim
[Valenzuela] about her violent criminal history, suggesting that she can be the aggressor”
and that it “intend[ed] to ask the victim about what she knows about [appellant]’s violent
criminal history.” Trial counsel objected on Rule 403 grounds, arguing that the “prejudice
outweighs any relevant information that the State would be trying to ask about.” See TEX.
R. EVID. 403. The trial court overruled the objection.
On redirect examination, the State asked Valenzuela if she knew whether
appellant “has a violent criminal history,” and she responded, “Yes, he does.” The State
asked Valenzuela if she “know[s] what [appellant] went to the penitentiary on,” and she
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responded, “I know for killing someone out of self defense. I’m not too sure.” The State
concluded, “For killing somebody?” Valenzuela nodded her head.
On recross-examination, trial counsel asked Valenzuela, “So you really don’t know
[why he went to prison], correct?” Valenzuela responded, “I know he went to prison for
killing a man, but I don’t know what the situation was about. . . . I mean, I probably wasn’t
even born at the time. I’m not too sure. I mean, he was young when he committed that
crime.”
C. Appellant’s Testimony
Appellant testified that he and Valenzuela had an on and off relationship, that they
have a child together who is sixteen years old, and that around August 2020, he and
Valenzuela had just ended their relationship. Appellant stated that he was not at
Valenzuela’s house on August 28, 2020. He denied kicking, tasing, or hitting Valenzuela
with a pole, and he denied kicking down her door. Appellant believed Valenzuela was
lying about his involvement because she “caught [him] with someone else the day before,”
which, according to appellant, was the reason the two ended their relationship. When
asked where he was on the day of the assault, appellant replied, “Honest to God, I don’t
know. I must have been in Orange Grove[, Texas],” where he was then staying with his
cousin.
Appellant’s trial counsel concluded direct examination by asking appellant about
his “criminal history”:
[Trial Counsel]: It was mentioned . . . that you went to prison for
murder; is that true?
[Appellant]: Voluntary manslaughter.
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[Trial Counsel]: And why were you convicted of voluntary
manslaughter?
[Appellant]: This guy had a gun to my brother’s head[,] and I picked
up a gun and I shot him.
[Trial Counsel]: So . . . were you defending your brother?
[Appellant]: Yes, ma’am.
[Trial Counsel]: Do you have any other history that you know about?
[Appellant]: Yeah, I got one more—two more, I think.
[Trial Counsel]: Two more what?
[Appellant]: Felonies.
[Trial Counsel]: For what?
[Appellant]: For burglary of a building and credit card abuse.
[Trial Counsel]: Do you have any—aside from murder [sic], do you
have any assault in your history that you know about?
[Appellant]: That I know about, no.
[Trial Counsel]: Would it surprise you if there was a 2005 assault
involving you?
[Appellant]: Yes. I still can’t remember that.
On cross-examination, the State entered, without objection, appellant’s judgment
for his 1992 voluntary manslaughter conviction. Appellant objected when the State
attempted to ask him about the circumstances of the 1992 incident, and the trial court
sustained the objection.
Appellant testified that his truck was at his sister’s house on the day of the assault
but that he “do[es]n’t drive it much, because [he] do[es]n’t got [sic] insurance.” Appellant
also testified that his truck’s engine “was messed up” and he “was trying to fix it.” Given
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the condition of his truck, appellant’s cousin would drive him to and from work. When
asked about his sister’s statements to Officer Perez about his practice of leaving his truck
at her house and departing on a bike, appellant said his sister was “probably” confused,
and that his truck “was parked beside the house all the time.”
Both sides rested, and the jury found appellant guilty on all charges. The trial court
imposed its sentence on November 16, 2021. This appeal followed.
II. RULE 403
By his first issue, appellant argues that, under Texas Rules of Evidence 403 and
404, the trial court erred by allowing the State to admit evidence of his 1992 voluntary
manslaughter conviction. See TEX. R. EVID. 403 (“Excluding Relevant Evidence for
Prejudice, Confusion, or Other Reasons”), 404(b) (concerning character evidence).
However, appellant only objected to the trial court’s ruling on Rule 403 grounds, and thus,
his Rule 404(b) arguments are not preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P.
33.1; Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[A] point of error
on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”). Accordingly, we limit our
analysis to appellant’s Rule 403 argument.
A. Applicable Law & Standard of Review
Under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, relevant evidence is admissible
unless otherwise provided in the rules. See TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402. “Evidence is relevant
if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Id. R. 401.
Admissible evidence may nevertheless be excluded under Rule 403 “if its probative value
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is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Id. R. 403. “Rule 403 favors admissibility of relevant evidence, and
the presumption is that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.”
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). Once
a party lodges a Rule 403 objection, “the trial court is called upon to weigh probativeness
of the evidence against its potential for ‘unfair’ prejudice—that is, . . . its tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637,
641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (listing factors the trial court must balance while
undertaking its Rule 403 analysis).
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403 for
an abuse of discretion. Valadez v. State, No. PD-0574-19, 2022 WL 946268, at *4 (Tex.
Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2022); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. “There is no abuse of
discretion if the trial court’s ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.”
Valadez, 2022 WL 946268, at *4.
When a trial court errs by admitting evidence, “and the error is not constitutional,
we apply the harmless error standard of [Texas] Rule [of Appellate Procedure] 44.2(b)
where we disregard all errors that did not affect appellant’s substantial rights.” Gonzalez
v. State, 510 S.W.3d 10, 28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2014, pet. ref’d); see
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2; Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 38 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2011) (“Generally, if the trial court’s ruling ‘merely offends the rules of evidence,’
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the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is nonconstitutional error.” (quoting
Melgar v. State, 236 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d))),
aff’d, 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “Substantial rights are not affected by the
erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence if the appellate court, after examining the
record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but
a slight effect.” Celis, 354 S.W.3d at 38 (cleaned up); see Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d
755, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In making that determination, we consider factors such
as testimony, overwhelming evidence of guilt, the jury charge, the theories of the State
and defense, closing arguments, whether the erroneously admitted evidence was
cumulative, whether the evidence was elicited from an expert, and whether the State
emphasized the evidence. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018); Bagheri, 119 S.W.3d at 763; Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 356–57 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002).
B. Analysis
In this case, we will assume without deciding that the trial court erred by overruling
appellant’s objection to the admission of his prior voluntary manslaughter conviction into
evidence because, even so, we have “fair assurance that the error did not influence the
jury, or had but a slight effect.” 4 See Bagheri, 119 S.W.3d at 763.
A review of the record in this case reveals that the State neither emphasized
appellant’s previous conviction for voluntary manslaughter, nor mentioned the conviction
4 In his brief on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred under Texas Rule of Evidence
403, but he does not brief a harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). See TEX. R.
EVID. 403; TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2.
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in voir dire or its opening and closing arguments. In fact, the record reflects that the
allegedly improper testimony appears in about two pages total of a ninety-six page trial
transcript, that about half of the testimony was elicited by defense counsel, and that the
testimony was elicited from Valenzuela and appellant only; not an expert witness.
Compare Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373 (concluding that error was harmless because
“[t]he entirety of the [improperly admitted] evidence . . . was elicited in five pages of the
State’s thirty-two page cross-examination of Appellant”), with Mitten v. State, 228 S.W.3d
693, 697–701 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. ref’d) (finding harmful
error in trial court’s improper admission of defendant’s statement because, among other
things, the evidence was heavily emphasized by the State throughout trial and elicited
through expert testimony). Further, in her brief testimony raising appellant’s prior
voluntary manslaughter conviction, Valenzuela stated that she believed appellant shot
somebody in self-defense. And appellant reiterated in his testimony that the reason he
shot and killed somebody was to protect his brother who had a gun to his head. The jury
was thus informed of the circumstances of appellant’s voluntary manslaughter conviction
and that it was not a random homicidal act. See Williams v. State, 906 S.W.2d 58, 63
(Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, pet. ref’d) (holding that the trial court erred by allowing the State
to question defendant about his prior conviction for possession of crack cocaine, but
concluding the error was harmless because, inter alia, appellant had the opportunity to
explain to the jury the details of the conviction).
The record also lacks any evidence that the 1992 voluntary manslaughter
conviction was considered by the jury or swayed its verdict in any way. See Veliz v. State,
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474 S.W.3d 354, 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n assessing
harm, we may also review the jury’s questions asked during deliberations.” (quoting
Washington v. State, 449 S.W.3d 555, 567 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
pet.))). Indeed, during deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the trial court: the first
requested the judgment of conviction in appellant’s 2005 assault case involving
Valenzuela, and the second requested the opportunity to watch the portion of Officer
Perez’s body camera footage where he speaks with Sister. This indicates the jury’s focus
on the criminal acts germane to the three-count indictment in this case. Compare
Washington, 449 S.W.3d at 568 (holding that jury charge that improperly included modes
of party liability was harmless because notes from jury indicated it was focused on
relevant proper theories of liability), with Veliz, 472 S.W.3d at 367–68 (finding harm where
two notes from the jury requested access to improperly admitted evidence and testimony
regarding the qualifications and training of the expert witness presenting it).
Finally, Valenzuela provided firsthand testimony that she was resting on her couch
on August 28, 2020, when appellant broke into her home, beat her with a pole, and tased
her. The State, without objection, produced for the jury photographs of Valenzuela’s
injuries, photographs of the damage to Valenzuela’s home, and a copy of appellant’s
previous judgment of conviction for assaulting Valenzuela in 2005. Further, Sister’s
statements, played for the jury through Officer Perez’s body camera footage, called into
question appellant’s purported alibi evidence regarding the operability of his truck, his
modes of transportation, and his location at the time of the assault. In other words, there
was ample evidence for the jury to consider when reaching its verdict without turning to
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the 1992 conviction. See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 358 (“We hold once again that the
evidence of the defendant’s guilt is a factor to be considered in any thorough harm
analysis.”); Gonzalez, 510 S.W.3d at 29 (“We agree that the [erroneously admitted]
evidence played a large part in the State’s case. . . . Nevertheless, we conclude that the
admission of this evidence was harmless error given . . . the extent of the other evidence
of appellant’s guilt . . . .”). Given the foregoing, we have “fair assurance” that the evidence
of appellant’s prior involuntary manslaughter conviction had either no or slight effect in
this case. See Bagheri, 119 S.W.3d at 763. We thus overrule appellant’s first issue.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
By his second issue, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his conviction. Specifically, he argues the evidence “is insufficient to prove the identity of
the perpetrator, nor is it sufficient to disprove the defense alibi that [a]ppellant was residing
in Orange Grove, Texas, at the time of the incident.”
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We consider both direct and circumstantial
evidence as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence and
are not mere speculation. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017);
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We resolve any evidentiary
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inconsistencies in favor of the verdict, keeping in mind that the factfinder is the exclusive
judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to give their testimony.
Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.04.
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 856 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2020) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); see
Romano v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “The hypothetically correct
jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s
theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.” Walker, 594 S.W.3d at 336. The State has the burden of
establishing the essential elements of an offense, but does not have the burden of
disproving an a defendant’s alibi defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Drake v. State, 860
S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d).
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the person
who committed the crime charged. Johnson v. State, 673 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984); Stone v. State, 635 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021,
pet. ref’d). No formalized procedure is required for the State to prove the identity of the
accused. See Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The State
may prove the defendant’s identity by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or by
reasonable inferences from that evidence. Ingerson, 559 S.W.3d at 509 (citing Gardner
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v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
A person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation “if, without the effective
consent of the owner, [he] . . . enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to
commit a felony, theft, or an assault.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3). A person
commits the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon if he “intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another” and “uses or exhibits a deadly
weapon during the commission of the assault.” Id. §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2). A “deadly
weapon” is defined as “a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for
the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury” or “anything that in the manner of
its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Id.
§ 1.07(a)(17). A person commits the offense of assault family violence if he “intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to . . . a person whose relationship to or
association with the defendant is described by [§] 71.0021(b)[] [or §] 71.003” of the Texas
Family Code. Id. § 22.01(b)(2)(A). Texas Family Code § 71.0021(b) concerns “dating
violence,” and defines a “dating relationship” as “a relationship between individuals who
have or have had a continuing relationship of a romantic or intimate nature.” TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b). “The existence of such a relationship shall be determined based
on consideration of: (1) the length of the relationship; (2) the nature of the relationship;
and (3) the frequency and type of interaction between the persons involved in the
relationship.” Id. Section 71.003 defines a “family” relationship to include, among other
things, “individuals who are the parents of the same child, without regard to marriage.” Id.
§ 71.003.
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B. Analysis
As noted above, Valenzuela testified that she was resting on her couch when
appellant kicked down her door, entered her home without consent, and began attacking
her with a metal pole and a taser. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(17), 22.01(a)(1),
22.02(a)(2), 30.02(a)(3); Ingerson, 559 S.W.3d at 509. Valenzuela and appellant both
testified that they had an on-and-off romantic relationship that spanned about seventeen
years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(A); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b).
Appellant testified that he and Valenzuela have a sixteen-year-old child together and were
again engaged in a dating relationship until the day before the assault, when Valenzuela
broke up with him because she “caught [him] with someone else.” See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 71.0021(b)(1)–(3), 71.003. And, without objection, the State entered into
evidence appellant’s judgment of conviction for assaulting Valenzuela in 2005. Given this
evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found the elements in each of the three counts
in the indictment and appellant’s identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577; Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 856.
Nevertheless, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him
because Valenzuela had “a checkered past . . . [and] a motive to implicate [appellant] as
the person who broke into her home and attacked her,” and because “circumstantial
evidence showed that [appellant] was likely in Orange Grove, Texas” at the time of the
attack. The jury heard appellant’s testimony denying that he broke into Valenzuela’s home
or attacked her and that he “[h]onest to God” didn’t know where he was on the day of the
attack, but “must have been in Orange Grove[, Texas].” The jury also heard Officer
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Perez’s testimony and viewed his body camera footage regarding his interaction with
Sister. Officer Perez testified that on the day of the assault, he saw appellant’s truck
parked next to Sister’s house. Sister noted that she did not see appellant pull up to her
home that day and that appellant would usually park his truck at her house and “take off
in a bike.” The State argued that Sister’s statements show that appellant was lying about
the condition of his vehicle and, thus, his inability to be near the scene of the crime. In
response, appellant stated that his sister was mistaken about the condition of his truck
and his modes of transportation at the time of the assault. The jury was free to weigh the
credibility of the three witnesses’ respective testimony. See Walker, 594 S.W.3d at 335;
see also Dean v. State, No. 13-13-00370-CR, 2015 WL 5451106, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 24, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“[T]he viability of [appellant’s] alibi defense ultimately rests upon a credibility
determination.”). In this case, it evidently resolved any conflict in the testimony against
appellant. That conclusion is supported by the record, and we defer to it. See Walker, 594
S.W.3d at 335. Consequently, we overrule appellant’s second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
11th day of August, 2022.
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