David Weatherspoon v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )


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  •                                 In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    __________________
    NO. 09-20-00130-CR
    __________________
    DAVID WEATHERSPOON, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    __________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 1A District Court
    Tyler County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 13,226
    __________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In this appeal, we need only decide whether the appellant, David
    Weatherspoon, complied with the rule of error preservation, which
    requires that parties first raise the complaint in the trial court before
    1
    they may later complain about the error in an appeal. 1 Because we
    conclude Weatherspoon failed to comply with that rule, we will affirm.
    Background
    In a single issue, Weatherspoon argues the trial court abused its
    discretion when, in January 2020, it appointed an attorney pro tem to
    prosecute him in Trial Court Cause Number 13,226. Weatherspoon
    argues the trial court’s appointment of the attorney pro tem violated the
    separation of powers clause, Article II, section 1 of the Texas
    Constitution.2
    Article II, section 1 provides:
    The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be
    divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall
    be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those
    which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to
    another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no
    person, or collection of persons, being of one of these
    departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to
    either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly
    permitted. 3
    1Tex.  R. App. P. 33.1. (requiting that parties generally make their
    complaint known when in the trial court through a timely request,
    objection or motion and obtain a ruling on the request as a prerequisite
    to presenting the complaint for appellate review).
    2Tex. Const. art. II, § 1.
    3Id.
    2
    Turning to the record, it shows that in June 2018 and August 2018,
    the interim District Attorney of Tyler County, Anne Pickle, deputized two
    assistants to act as assistant district attorneys, Nick Moutos and Ekua
    Assabill, authorizing each to perform any and all acts of the District
    Attorney’s Office in Trial Court Cause Number 13,226. 4 In November
    2019, Lucas Babin, who was by then the duly elected District Attorney of
    Tyler County, re-deputized Moutos as an assistant district attorney in
    the case. That said, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Babin
    terminated Assabill’s authority to act as another assistant based on her
    appointment by Pickle in 2018. Even so, in January 2020, the record
    shows that Assabill signed an oath of office stating that she would
    “faithfully execute the duties of the office of CRIMINAL DISTRICT
    ATTORNEY PRO TEM of the State of Texas[.]” Although we have no
    4While   not in the record, we are aware of and judicially notice that
    the elected District Attorney of Tyler County was removed from office in
    2018 and that after that happened, Pickle became the interim DA.
    https://www.12newsnow.com/article/news/local/tyler-county-da-removed
    -from-office/502-587254455 (last checked August 19, 2022); See Office of
    Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 
    878 S.W.2d 598
    , 600 (Tex.
    1994) (“A court of appeals has the power to take judicial notice for the
    first time on appeal.”); see also Tex. R. Evid. 201(b) (allowing a court to
    judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute).
    3
    reporter’s record showing that Assabill appeared in court and that the
    trial court appointed her attorney pro tem or even acknowledged her
    purported role as attorney pro tem, we note the record does contain a
    typed entry on the trial court’s docket sheet, dated January 17, which
    states: “OATH OF OFFICE (EKUA ASSABILL)/AC[.] Even so, the
    initials “AC,” which are typed next to the entry “Oath of Office,” are not
    the initials of the District Judge who presided over Trial Court Cause
    Number 13,226. Instead, the initials “AC” appear to be those of a clerk.
    In March 2020, the trial court called the case against Weatherspoon
    to trial. Moutos and Assabill appeared and prosecuted the case based on
    the authority delegated to them by the interim and elected District
    Attorneys of Tyler County. On appeal, Weatherspoon argues that the
    trial court erred in appointing Assabill to act as an attorney pro tem in
    his case because she did not meet the conditions required of that office
    under article 2.07(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 5 Under
    article 2.07, a trial court is authorized to appoint an attorney pro tem
    whenever “an attorney for the State is disqualified to act in any case or
    proceeding, is absent from the county or district, or is otherwise unable
    5See   Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.07(a).
    4
    to perform the duties of the attorney’s office, or in any instance where
    there is no attorney for the state[.]”6 Because Weatherspoon claims that
    none of these requirements were met, he concludes the trial court’s
    appointment of Assabill as an attorney pro tem constructively removed
    Babin as the elected District Attorney and affected his substantial rights
    under the separation of powers clause, and he claims he is entitled to a
    ruling from this Court vacating the judgment of conviction and ordering
    the case dismissed since we must, he says, presume he was harmed.
    Analysis
    On this record, it’s not clear that an attorney pro tem even
    participated in Weatherspoon’s prosecution. The record contains no
    motion seeking a recusal of Babin as the District Attorney in Trial Court
    Cause Number 13,226, no order by the District Court approving Babin’s
    recusal, and no order by the District Court appointing Assabill to act as
    attorney pro tem in the case. Based on what is in the record before us, it
    appears Assabill acted at all times in Weatherspoon’s case under her
    appointment as an assistant special prosecutor, first by interim District
    Attorney Pickle, and then by elected District Attorney Lucas Babin since
    6Id.
    5
    nothing appears in the record to show that he withdrew the permission
    Pickle extended allowing Assabill to participate as an assistant special
    prosecutor in Weatherspoon’s case.
    Even if Assabill prosecuted Weatherspoon after the trial court’s
    purported appointment of her to the office of attorney pro tem (which we
    doubt), Weatherspoon failed to preserve his complaint that Assabill did
    not qualify for that office under article 2.07 because he failed to raise his
    complaint with the trial court and obtain a ruling on his complaint when
    the trial court could have possibly corrected any procedural deficiency
    with her appointment. 7 Citing Marin v. State, Weatherspoon claims he
    was not required to bring the alleged error to the trial court’s attention,
    and he suggests the trial court’s purported error appointing Assabill as
    attorney pro tem may be reached by the Court despite his lack of objection
    because the trial court’s error amounts to “the denial of absolute,
    systemic requirements which def[ies] a harm analysis.”
    We disagree. Almost every right—whether constitutional or
    statutory—is waivable unless the party objects, moves for relief, or
    7Tex.   R. App. P. 33.1.
    6
    requests relief the record shows the court below denied. 8 Even so, the
    general rule requiring error to be preserved in the trial court is subject
    to two relatively small exceptions, as follows: “violations of ‘rights which
    are waivable only’ and denials of ‘absolute systemic requirements.’”9
    Waivable-only rights are “‘rights of litigants which must be
    implemented by the system unless expressly waived.’” 10 That said, when
    we examine the language in article 2.07 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure, we find nothing in it revealing any legislative intent to excuse
    a party from objecting should a court err in the procedures set out in the
    statute for appointing someone to act in a case as an attorney pro tem.11
    And as to absolute systemic requirements, the Court of Criminal Appeals
    has explained these requirements exist “only in a very limited class of
    cases: a total deprivation of the right to counsel, lack of an impartial trial
    judge, unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant’s race, the right to
    8Smith   v. State, 
    721 S.W.2d 844
    , 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
    9Saldano v. State, 
    70 S.W.3d 873
    , 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
    (quoting Marin v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 275
    , 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993),
    overruled on other grounds by Cain v. State, 
    947 S.W.2d 262
     (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1997)).
    10Mendez v. State, 
    138 S.W.3d 334
    , 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
    (quoting Marin, 
    851 S.W.2d at 279
    )); Saldano, 
    70 S.W.3d at 888
    .
    11Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.07.
    7
    self-representation at trial, the right to a public trial,” and in cases where
    the trial court gave the jury an erroneous instruction defining the
    term reasonable doubt.12 Those are not the types of alleged errors that
    Weatherspoon claims were made here.
    Finally, this Court has already explained that article 2.07 is subject
    to the general rule of error preservation, a rule that requires the party to
    preserve error by making his objection known to the trial court before he
    will be allowed to raise it the first time in his appeal. In Modica v. State,
    we held that article 2.07 “does not appear to be the type of evidentiary or
    procedural rule that belongs to an accused which must be protected by
    the system unless expressly waived, unlike the language of the rule at
    issue in Marin.” 13 So even assuming the trial court did not follow the
    procedures set out in article 2.07 when appointing Assabill to act as an
    attorney pro tem in Weatherspoon’s case, by failing to object to the
    appointment, Weatherspoon preserved nothing for our review. 14 For all
    these reasons, we overrule Weatherspoon’s sole issue.
    12Mendez,   138 S.W.3d at 340.
    13Modica   v. State, 
    151 S.W.3d 716
     (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet.
    ref’d).
    14Tex.   R. App. P. 33.1(a); Modica, 
    151 S.W.3d at 721
    .
    8
    Conclusion
    Having overruled Weatherspoon’s issue, the trial court’s judgment
    is
    AFFIRMED.
    _________________________
    HOLLIS HORTON
    Justice
    Submitted on March 23, 2022
    Opinion Delivered August 31, 2022
    Do Not Publish
    Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
    9