James Lewis Coquat v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

NUMBER 13-21-00266-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JAMES LEWIS COQUAT, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 156th District Court
of Live Oak County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
A jury convicted appellant James Lewis Coquat of continuous sexual abuse of a
child, a first-degree felony. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02. Appellant elected for the
1 The four-count indictment also charged appellant with two counts of sexual assault of a child and
trial court to assess punishment, and it sentenced appellant to fifty years’ incarceration in
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ). See
id. § 12.32. By seven issues, appellant argues the trial court erred by: (1–5) admitting
extraneous offense evidence under Rule 404(b); (6) misapplying the Rule 403 balancing
test in admitting the extraneous offenses; and (7) improperly instructing the jury on
character conformity “in violation of [Rule] 404(b).” We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Trial commenced on June 22, 2021. We summarize the relevant testimony.
A. The Charged Offense
Count One in the indictment alleged that between January 2009 and January 2015,
appellant, then over the age of seventeen, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse
against a child under the age of fourteen, namely: with intent to gratify his sexual desire,
engaged in sexual contact with Hannah, 2 a child younger than fourteen years of age, by
touching, digitally penetrating, and placing his mouth on Hannah’s genitals.
Hannah testified that she was born in 2002 and is appellant’s daughter. She stated
that she lived at home with appellant, her mother, and her two brothers. Hannah noted
that appellant had sexually abused her throughout her childhood. She depicted multiple
instances of abuse during which appellant would perform oral sex on her. She specified
that the abuse occurred at home and at appellant’s work at the family’s Aransas Pass
indecency with a child by contact—each a lesser-included offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child.
After the jury found appellant guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State filed a motion to dismiss
the remaining counts, which the trial court granted.
2 To preserve the privacy of the minor, we identify certain parties by pseudonyms. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 9.8.
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ranch. At the ranch, appellant would take Hannah into a barn, stack and arrange hay into
“a fort,” enter the fort with Hannah, and proceed to perform oral sex on her or insert his
fingers into her genitalia. On other occasions, under the guise of cleaning Hannah,
appellant would lead his daughter into the bathroom and pour water on and rub her
genitalia. In some cases, he would sit with Hannah on the couch and “rub on [her] and
touch . . . [her] breasts and . . . [her] butt and [her] female genitalia.” Hannah testified that
while at first the abuse did not occur “too often,” “as [she] got older[,] it got more often to
where it was almost every day or every other day.”
When she was fourteen years old, during a sleepover at her friend’s house,
Hannah informed her friend that appellant was sexually abusing her. The friend related
Hannah’s outcry to the friend’s mother who, in turn, contacted the Live Oak Sheriff’s
Department, which assigned Investigator Daniel Caddell to the case. Investigator Caddell
testified that he interviewed Hannah, appellant, and Hannah’s brothers during his
investigation. He stated that as the investigation progressed, multiple witnesses came
forward for interviews. Those witnesses included, among others, Sophie—Hannah’s older
half-sister from appellant’s first marriage—and four of appellant’s female first-cousins:
(1) Luna; (2) Skylar; (3) Ruby; and (4) Lexi.
B. Extraneous Offense Evidence
The State informed appellant before trial that it would seek to introduce extraneous
offense evidence from multiple witnesses under Rule 404(b) of the rules of evidence and
Article 38.37 of the code of criminal procedure. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.37. In accordance with Article 38.37, a hearing was held outside the
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presence of the jury to determine whether the jury could find the extraneous offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37. Investigator
Caddell testified at the hearing and described what each of the extraneous offense
witnesses would claim. Following Investigator Caddell’s testimony, the trial court ruled
that the extraneous offense evidence would be admissible under Rule 404(b). See TEX.
R. EVID. 404(b). The trial court restated its ruling before the extraneous offense witnesses
testified on the second day of trial.
1. Sophie’s Testimony
Sophie testified that at the time of Hannah’s outcry, she was then living at a ranch
in Aransas Pass and running a business there boarding horses, giving horseback riding
lessons, leading horseback rides, and putting on “pony painting parties” for girls aged
about two to sixteen. After Hannah’s outcry, appellant asked Sophie if he could move to
the ranch, and she agreed. Sophie testified that appellant would assist with various
repairs and improvements during his stay at the ranch. She stated that things were ok
when appellant arrived at the ranch but that it was somewhat “awkward” because
appellant asked Sophie if he had ever done anything to her. Sophie noted that in response
to appellant’s question, she “started questioning if [their] relationship had been . . . normal
or not.”
At some point, Sophie noticed that appellant “started getting a little too close to
[her] clients.” She testified that appellant would sit and watch her clients without saying
anything and that he “liked to hug them really tightly for an abnormally long period of time,
like a minute.” Sophie stated that it “was uncomfortable” for her, and her clients would
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approach and tell her “that they were uncomfortable with how [appellant] was acting, as
well.” Sophie told appellant at least three times not to talk to or touch her clients, but he
“ignored” her. Eventually, Sophie asked appellant to leave the ranch.
Sophie testified that she began receiving professional counseling in 2018 and
recognized that, in fact, her relationship with her father while growing up “was not normal.”
She noted that appellant would give her “showers every evening and . . . put his hands
all over [her] body, in between [her] legs.” Sophie testified that she told appellant not to
shower her anymore when she was about thirteen years old and that the nightly showers
“had been happening for years before that.” Sophie also described how appellant would
tickle her for extended periods and, sometimes, his “hands would go up into [her] crotch.”
She further testified that, every morning in his truck on the way to school, appellant “would
stick a hand . . . in between [her] leg[s] and his hand was up inside [her] crotch.” Sophie
specified that by “crotch” she was referring to her vagina, and that when appellant’s hands
were between her legs during the showers and car rides, his finger would be inside her
vagina. Finally, Sophie testified that, on one occasion, she was “walking down the hall
going to [her] room and [appellant was] in his bedroom completely naked standing in the
doorway staring at [her].”
2. Luna’s Testimony
Luna testified that she is ten years younger than appellant. Luna noted that her
mother and appellant’s mother are sisters, that her mother was one of six children, and
that, when she was younger, the entire extended family would gather at her
grandmother’s ranch for holidays and various occasions. She recounted an instance
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when she was about ten years old where she and some other cousins were climbing a
fig tree with appellant. Appellant “was laying on his side” and gave the younger cousins
an “uncomfortable look” that she described as “lustful.” One of the cousins looked at
appellant and said, “That’s gross. You’re disgusting.” All the cousins then “scattered.”
3. Skylar’s Testimony
Skylar testified that she is ten years younger than appellant. She stated that
appellant is the oldest cousin and that the younger cousins looked up to him. Skylar
testified that when she was about eight or nine years old, appellant was asked to run an
errand off the ranch, and he asked her to join him “so he didn’t have to travel alone.”
While riding in his truck, appellant asked Skylar to move closer to him. When Skylar did,
appellant “started fondling [her].” Skylar specified that appellant “had his hands inside
[her] underwear and he was touching [her] genitals with his fingertips.” On another
occasion, also when Skylar was eight or nine years old, appellant visited Skylar’s family
in Houston and took Skylar into a bedroom. While inside, the two laid down on the bed,
appellant covered Skylar with the bed covers, and he again “reach[ed] inside [Skylar’s]
underwear and rub[ed] [her genitals] with his fingers.” Skylar noted that when appellant
subsequently “went to rol[l] over on top of [her],” she had the realization that she needed
to “get up” and “get away.” She testified that she never “put [her]self in that position again.”
4. Ruby’s Testimony
Ruby testified that she is fourteen years younger than appellant. She stated that
when she was four or five years old, appellant would fondle her at her grandmother’s
ranch. She testified that, on “at least a handful of times,” appellant would take her into a
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bedroom for a nap. Rather than napping, however, appellant “would rub [her] vagina and
labia. He would touch himself, then touch [her].” Ruby recalled seeing appellant’s penis
during these instances of abuse. Ruby also noted that all the cousins would often swim
in the river near her grandmother’s ranch. She testified that because she was young and
short, she would need to hold onto somebody while swimming in the river, and usually
hung onto appellant. Ruby stated that when hanging on to appellant, he would have her
“stroke his penis . . . under [the] water.”
5. Lexi’s Testimony
Lexi testified that she is nine years younger than appellant. She stated that they
grew up nearby each other but on separate ranches and that their families would often
spend time together. Lexi testified that at some point between first and third grade,
appellant started touching her inappropriately in the barn and while swimming in a
reservoir. She described how appellant would stack hay into a fort, ask her if she “want[ed]
to play nasty,” and proceed to fondle her. Lexi noted that on certain occasions in the fort,
appellant would anally penetrate her with various objects, including bobby pins and straws
of hay, and in other instances, he would have Lexi touch him “manually and occasionally
orally.” Lexi testified that while the two were swimming in the reservoir, appellant would
touch her vagina under the water and have her touch his penis.
C. Verdict and Sentence
On June 25, 2021, the jury found appellant guilty of continuous sexual abuse of
Hannah. On August 5, 2021, the trial court sentenced appellant to fifty years’ incarceration
in TDCJ. This appeal followed.
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II. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
By his first five issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting the
testimony of Sophie, Luna, Skylar, Ruby, and Lexi under Rule 404(b). The State argues
that the extraneous evidence was otherwise proper under Article 38.37, so appellant’s
extraneous offense arguments are without merit.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Patterson v.
State, 606 S.W.3d 3, 33 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2020, pet. ref’d). A trial
court abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside the “zone of reasonable
disagreement.” Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 427; Patterson, 606 S.W.3d at 33.
Generally, “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). However, when the defendant is
tried for committing a sexual offense against a child that was under the age of seventeen
at the time of the offense, the State may introduce evidence, notwithstanding Rules 404
and 405 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, that the defendant has committed separate
sexual offenses against other children “for any bearing the evidence has on relevant
matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with
the character of the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(b); see
Jeansonne v. State, 624 S.W.3d 78, 95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.)
(noting that Article 38.37 “supersedes” Rule 404). To introduce such evidence, the trial
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court must first hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury and find that the evidence
in question will adequately support a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the separate offense, and the State must give notice of its intent to
introduce evidence under Article 38.37 to the defendant at least thirty days before trial.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, §§ 2-a, 3.
We will reject “a claim of reversible error on direct appeal . . . if the trial court’s
ruling is correct ‘on any theory of law applicable to the case’ even if ‘the trial court did not
purport to rely on that theory’ and the prevailing party did not explicitly raise the theory.”
State v. Castanedanieto, 607 S.W.3d 315, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (quoting State v.
Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 85–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).
B. Analysis
In his opening arguments at trial, appellant’s defense counsel spoke of a number
of “stories”: “[appellant’s] story; the State’s story; [and] the witnesses’ stories.” Defense
counsel told the “story” of appellant’s grandparents who owned a large ranch. When the
grandparents died, the ranch was split into six separate properties, which caused
“dissension” within the extended family. Defense counsel spoke of Hannah’s “story” as
well; a story of a young girl who was upset that her father wouldn’t allow her to have
sleepovers with her friends, to ride with her boyfriend to school, or to “have the kind of fun
life she thinks a teenager ought to have.” Defense counsel stated that after Hannah made
the accusation, and after appellant was forced out of her home, Hannah “[got] what she
want[ed].” Defense counsel concluded his opening statement, and the State requested to
approach the bench. There, the State argued that trial counsel’s opening statement
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opened the door for extraneous offense evidence to rebut what the State considered a
fabrication defense. The trial court noted that it would wait until the State wanted to offer
the relevant extraneous offense testimony and would then address the issue outside the
presence of the jury. Ultimately, the Article 38.37 hearing with Investigator Caddell
resulted, and the trial court ruled the evidence was all admissible under Rule 404(b).
Appellant’s first five arguments on appeal center exclusively on the trial court’s
ruling that appellant’s trial counsel’s opening arguments opened the door to the admission
of extraneous offense evidence under Rule 404(b)(2) to rebut appellant’s defensive
theory. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (non-exhaustive list of permitted uses of extraneous
matter evidence). But we need not assess whether the extraneous evidence was proper
under Rule 404(b)(2) because it was proper under Article 38.37. See Castanedanieto,
607 S.W.3d at 327; Jeansonne, 624 S.W.3d at 95.
In compliance with Article 38.37, the trial court held a hearing outside the presence
of the jury to determine whether the extraneous offense testimony would support a finding
by the jury that appellant previously committed separate sexual offenses against children.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2-a. As detailed above, the trial court was
informed that Sophie, Skylar, Ruby, and Lexi would each testify that they were sexually
abused as minors, and that appellant was an adult during the abuse. That evidence
sufficed to support a finding under Article 38.37, § 2-a. See id.; Deggs v. State, 646
S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref’d) (“An alleged victim’s testimony
standing alone without corroboration can be, and was in this instance, sufficient to prove
an offense [under Article 38.37 §2-a(1)].”). Arguably, Luna’s testimony regarding the fig
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tree affair did not alone prove an extraneous offense under Article 38.37. But appellant
lumps his 404(b) issues together and does not argue that Luna’s testimony would have
itself violated Rule 404(b) or Article 38.37 or constituted reversible error, so we do not
address that contention. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The [appellant’s] brief must contain
a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to
authorities and to the record.”), 44.2(b) (setting out the non-constitutional error standard
in criminal cases). Finally, while appellant never objected to a purported failure of notice
of the State’s intent to use extraneous offense evidence, we note that the State filed its
final amended notice of intent to use the extraneous offense evidence on May 19, 2021—
over thirty days before trial commenced. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 3
(notice requirements).
In sum, the proper procedures to admit extraneous offense evidence under Article
38.37 §§ 2 and 3 were followed: the trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the
jury and concluded that the evidence could support a jury’s finding that appellant
committed prior sex offenses against multiple minors, and the State informed appellant
over thirty days before trial of its intent to use the relevant extraneous offense evidence
for character conforming purposes. The evidence was thus proper under Article 38.37.
See id.; Castanedanieto, 607 S.W.3d at 327.
Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first five issues.
III. RULE 403(b)
By his sixth issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred “in applying [the
Rule] 403 balancing test because it is clear that the probative value of all of the extraneous
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evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice from th[e]
evidence.” See TEX. R. EVID. 403. The State argues that the Rule 403 balancing test does
not apply to evidence admitted under Article 38.37.
Relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise proscribed per Rule 402. See
id. R. 401, 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Id. R. 401. Admissible evidence may nevertheless be excluded
under Rule 403 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” Id. R. 403. “Rule 403 favors admissibility of relevant
evidence, and the presumption is that relevant evidence will be more probative than
prejudicial.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on
reh’g). Contrary to the State’s contention, “[t]he admission of evidence pursuant to Article
38.37, [§] 2(b) is limited by Rule 403’s balancing test.” Deggs, 646 S.W.3d at 925.
However, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must make a timely
objection stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought, and the trial court must rule
on that objection. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 844 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014). And a “point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made
at trial.” Yazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at 844; see Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847, 857 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007) (holding that a Rule 403 objection was not preserved for review where only a
Rule 404 objection was raised at trial). In this case, the record reflects that appellant
broadly objected to the extraneous offense evidence as improper only under Rule 404(b)
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and Article 38.37. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37. We
thus conclude that appellant’s Rule 403 argument as to “all of the extraneous evidence”
was not preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Yazdchi, 428 S.W.3d
at 844; Berry, 233 S.W.3d at 857.
The record does reflect two instances where appellant objected to specific
testimony under Rule 403, which the trial court overruled: first when the State asked
Investigator Caddell whether appellant was older or younger than Luna and then when it
asked the same about Skylar. On appeal, appellant does not specify how merely asking
whether appellant was older or younger than Luna and Skylar was unduly prejudicial and
resulted in reversible error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i), 44.2(b); Yazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at
844. Nevertheless, even if appellant preserved his claim as to the two questions, and
even assuming the trial court erred by overruling appellant’s objections thereto, we
conclude the alleged error did not constitute reversible error.
Appellate courts disregard all nonconstitutional errors that did not affect an
appellant’s “substantial rights.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2; see Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 38
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2011) (“Generally, if the trial court’s ruling ‘merely
offends the rules of evidence,’ the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is
nonconstitutional error.” (quoting Melgar v. State, 236 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d))), aff’d, 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
“Substantial rights are not affected by the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence
if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the
error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Celis, 354 S.W.3d at 38 (cleaned
13
up); see Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In making that
determination, we consider factors such as testimony, overwhelming evidence of guilt,
the jury charge, the theories of the State and defense, closing arguments, whether the
erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative, whether the evidence was elicited from
an expert, and whether the State emphasized the evidence. Gonzalez v. State, 544
S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Bagheri, 119 S.W.3d at 763; Motilla v. State, 78
S.W.3d 352, 356–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). After considering those factors in the context
of the whole record, including over seven hundred pages of trial testimony, we conclude
that admitting evidence that Luna and Skylar were younger than appellant did not
constitute reversible error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d 373.
We thus overrule appellant’s sixth issue.
IV. JURY CHARGE
By his seventh and final issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by “overruling
appellant’s objection to the jury charge with the end result being that the jury was
improperly instructed in violation of [Rule] 404([b]) that they could consider all of the
extraneous offense evidence to determine if appellant acted in conformity with his
character.” Appellant’s contention arises from the trial court’s rulings admitting some
evidence under Rule 404(b), which disallows evidence to be considered for purposes of
character conformity, and other evidence under Article 38.37, which allows for evidence
to be so considered.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
The jury charge must “distinctly set[] forth the law applicable to the case.” TEX.
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CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14. In analyzing a jury charge issue, we first determine
whether error exists. Hernandez v. State, 533 S.W.3d 472, 481 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 174 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g)). If we find error, then we consider whether the error was
harmful under the appropriate standard. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2020) (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171). If there is error and the defendant
preserved the alleged error by objecting to the jury charge at trial, then we must reverse
if we find it caused the defendant “some harm.” Jordan, 593 S.W.3d at 346; Almanza,
686 S.W.2d at 171.
As noted above, under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). But, under
circumstances relevant here, Rule 404 is superseded by Article 38.37 of the code of
criminal procedure, which states that in certain criminal prosecutions for sex offenses
against children, evidence of a separate sex offense of a minor is admissible “for any
bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant
and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(b); see Jeansonne, 624 S.W.3d at 95.
B. Analysis
In this case, appellant was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a child, an
offense subject to Article 38.37. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 1(a)(1)(A).
As previously noted, all of the extraneous matter evidence complained of on appeal was
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admissible under § 2 of the statute for character conforming purposes. See id. art. 38.37,
§ 2(a)(1). The jury charge in this case read in relevant part as follows:
The Defendant is on trial solely on the charges contained in the indictment.
However, evidence of extraneous crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the
Defendant may be admitted for certain limited purposes.
You are instructed that if there is any testimony before you in this
case regarding the defendant having committed offenses, wrongs, or bad
acts, if any, other than the offense alleged against him in the indictment in
this case, you cannot consider said testimony for any purpose unless you
find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
such other offenses, wrongs[,] or bad acts, and even then you may only
consider the same for the following purposes:
1. for its bearing on the state of mind of the defendant and the child,
[Hannah]; or,
2. for its bearing on the previous and subsequent relationship
between the defendant and the child, [Hannah]; or,
3. for its bearing on any relevant matters, including the character of
the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the
character of the defendant; or,
4. to determine the defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or lack
of accident.
These instructions fully comply with Article 38.37. The trial court explained the purposes
for which the jury could consider the extraneous offense evidence and that the jury was
required to find that appellant committed the extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt before considering the evidence for the allowable purposes set out in Article 38.37.
See id. § 2(b); see also Doss v. State, No. 05-21-00533-CR, 2022 WL 3040668, at *5
(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 2, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(holding that the charged offense was subject to Article 38.37 and, thus, a jury charge
similar to the one in this case was proper); Price v. State, No. 05-18-00243-CR, 2019 WL
162223600, at *5 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 23, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (same). We thus conclude that the trial court did not err in instructing the
jury with respect to the extraneous offense testimony.
Because we conclude that all of the complained-of testimony was admissible under
Article 38.37 and that the trial court properly instructed the jury under the statute, we do
not conduct a harm analysis. See Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015) (“Because we conclude that the charge was not erroneous in this case, we do not
conduct a harm analysis.”).
We overrule appellant’s seventh issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
30th day of August, 2022.
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