Sylvester Davis v. Samuel Boyd and Boyd & Associates, P.C. ( 2022 )

Affirmed and Opinion Filed September 20, 2022
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-21-00154-CV
SYLVESTER DAVIS, Appellant
V.
SAMUEL BOYD AND BOYD & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Appellees
On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-13920
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Nowell
Opinion by Justice Osborne
This is an appeal of a final judgment confirming an arbitration award. In two
issues, appellant Sylvester Davis argues that the trial court erred by compelling
arbitration and by rendering judgment confirming the award because his claims did
not fall within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.
Concluding that Davis agreed to arbitrate his claims, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment. Because all matters are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
Appellee Samuel Boyd is an attorney and a principal of appellee Boyd &
Associates, P.C.1 Appellant Sylvester Davis at one time worked as a software
engineer at Lockheed Martin Corporation. In 2005, Davis retained Boyd to represent
him in a qui tam lawsuit against Lockheed (the “Underlying Lawsuit”).2 The parties’
current dispute arises from this attorney-client relationship.
On August 26, 2010, Davis and Boyd signed a fee agreement (“Fee
Agreement”) referencing the Underlying Lawsuit and containing an arbitration
clause:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Any dispute arising out of, in connection with, or in relation to the
interpretation, performance or breach of this Agreement—including
any claim of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty or similar
claim and any claim involving fees or expenses—shall be resolved
by final and binding arbitration conducted in Dallas, Texas,
administered by and in accordance with the then-existing JAMS
Streamlined Arbitration Rules and Procedures, and any judgment upon
any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered by any state or
federal court having jurisdiction to do so.
By so agreeing, you and we are waiving the right to a jury trial. You
understand that arbitration provides only limited discovery and that
courts will enforce an award in arbitration without reviewing it for
errors of fact or law.
(Emphasis added).
1
As the parties do, we refer to Boyd and Boyd & Associates, P.C. together as “Boyd.”
2
The Underlying Lawsuit is captioned United States ex rel. Sylvester Davis v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
No. 4:09-CV-645-Y in the United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division. Davis’s claims
in the Underlying Lawsuit were made under the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729–3732.
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About two years later, Boyd and Davis sought and obtained additional
financing for the Underlying Lawsuit from J. Steve Mostyn. The funds from this
financing are at issue in this lawsuit.
On March 14, 2012, Davis signed a letter agreement with Mostyn (the
“Mostyn Letter”), under which Mostyn agreed to advance Davis a total of
$2,750,000. The Mostyn Letter referenced the Underlying Lawsuit and was
addressed to Davis “c/o Boyd & Associates” and “Attn: Sam Boyd,” on Mostyn’s
letterhead. The letter began,
RE United States of America ex rel. Sylvester Davis,
Individually v. Lockheed Martin Corp., U.S.D.C. N.D.
Tex. (Fort Worth) Civil Action No. 4:09-cv-00645-Y
Dear Mr. Davis:
As I believe you know, Sam Boyd contacted me to inquire as to
whether I might be able [to] assist him in locating a source of
financing for your continued prosecution of the above-referenced
law suit (the “Claim”). I have informed Mr. Boyd that I would be
willing to advance you the funds you need on the terms set forth in this
letter.
(Emphasis added.)
The Mostyn Letter specifically referenced the Fee Agreement between Davis
and Boyd. Mostyn stated his understanding that the Fee Agreement allocated fifty-
five percent of any recovery in the Underlying Lawsuit to Davis. Mostyn required
Davis to “represent and warrant” that he had not assigned and would not assign that
fifty-five percent to anyone else. Mostyn agreed to advance the first $1,000,000 of
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the funds when Davis signed the Letter and the remaining funds on completion of
due diligence.
Davis’s repayment of the loan from Mostyn was contingent on his success in
the Underlying Lawsuit. The Mostyn Letter included a formula for the calculation,
and also provided:
As security for your payment obligations, you will assign to me your
rights under the Fee Agreement and you will execute all other security
instruments I may reasonably require you to execute. You also agree,
by signing this letter, to designate Sam Boyd or Boyd & Associates or
such other party as we may direct to act as escrow agent to receive your
share of any recovery from the Claim and to disburse the proceeds in
accordance with the final written agreements between us.
Davis filed this lawsuit on June 22, 2018, in Harris County. He pleaded that
in March 2012, Boyd assisted him in obtaining the $2.75 million loan from Mostyn.
Davis alleged that based on Boyd’s false representations about the loan’s
requirements, Davis paid Boyd $1.25 million from the loan. Davis pleaded causes
of action for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, seeking damages “over
$1,000,000.00,” costs, interest, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages.
Davis specifically pleaded that his claims against Boyd were not related to the
Underlying Lawsuit:
7. At the time that Mr. Boyd was assisting Mr. Davis in obtaining the
$2.75 million loan, Mr. Boyd was representing Mr. Davis in another
legal matter, involving a qui tam lawsuit. Mr. Boyd’s representation of
Mr. Davis in obtaining the subject loan was outside of his
representation of Mr. Davis in the qui tam lawsuit and not a part of that
representation.
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Boyd’s response to the lawsuit included an objection to venue in Harris
County, a motion to transfer venue, a motion to compel arbitration, a plea in
abatement, and, subject to those matters, an original answer, affirmative defenses,
and counterclaims for fraud and breach of contract. The Harris County district court
denied Boyd’s motion to compel arbitration and plea in abatement, but granted
Boyd’s motion to transfer venue to Dallas County.
After transfer, Boyd filed a “Motion to Reconsider Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Plea in Abatement.” Davis responded and also filed a supplemental
petition, adding claims for common law negligence, gross negligence, and negligent
misrepresentation. The record also includes documentation of the Mostyn loan and
two sworn declarations by Davis.
In one of the declarations, Davis explained that his claims in this lawsuit
“involve[ ] the Defendants’ wrongful taking of my money,” specifically,
$1.25 million of the $2.75 million loan from Mostyn “and his related company”
Equitas Finance Company, LLC. Davis stated that Boyd “act[ed] as my agent” in
negotiating the loan, but Boyd “had no written agreement with me” and there was
“no agreement with an arbitration clause regarding [Boyd’s] negotiation of my
$2.75 million loan3 from Mostyn/Equitas.”
3
In his August 10, 2019 declaration, Davis explained that the transaction was referred to as a “loan”
for simplicity, but was actually a non-recourse assignment of his property interest in the Underlying
Lawsuit.
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In his response to Boyd’s motion to reconsider, Davis argued “there is no
written agreement between [the parties] regarding negotiation of a loan.” Davis
relied on the Fee Agreement’s definition of “Claims,” arguing it was too narrow to
include claims regarding Mostyn’s loan. Davis highlighted the Fee Agreement’s
language that Boyd agreed to represent him “in connection with the above-captioned
False Claims Act lawsuit . . . including the retaliation claims you have raised in that
lawsuit and any breach of contract counterclaim brought against you.” Davis also
quoted the Fee Agreement’s “scope of engagement” paragraph providing that
“[u]nless specifically requested by you and agreed to in writing by us, you agree that
we do not represent you in any other legal matter.”
Davis argued that there would have been a separate agreement, in writing, if
Boyd was to represent him in the Mostyn loan transaction. He also cited the Fee
Agreement’s provision that Boyd would advance on Davis’s behalf all costs and
litigation expenses, and Boyd would be reimbursed for those expenses out of any
recovery, for which Davis granted Boyd a lien. He argued that the Fee Agreement
“does not pertain” to Boyd’s negotiation of the loan from Mostyn because it is not
part of the “Claim” as defined in the Fee Agreement and is specifically excluded
under the Fee Agreement’s terms. He concluded that his claim in this lawsuit does
not fall within the Fee Agreement’s arbitration clause, and urged the trial court to
deny Boyd’s motion to reconsider.
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After a hearing, the trial court granted Boyd’s motion to reconsider and
ordered abatement of the case. The parties proceeded to arbitration before Harlan A.
Martin of JAMS Dispute Resolution Center. In a written ruling dated October 6,
2020, Martin made findings and conclusions in favor of Boyd and ruled that Davis
“shall take nothing on all claims stated.”
Back in the trial court, Boyd filed a motion to lift abatement and to confirm
the arbitration award. Boyd attached the arbitrator’s award and the Fee Agreement
to the motion.
On February 22, 2021, the trial court signed a “Final Judgment Confirming
Arbitration Award” reciting that “no motion to vacate, modify, or correct the award
has been filed.” The court confirmed the award and ordered that Boyd recover the
$16,611.95 awarded by the arbitrator. On October 11, 2021, the trial court signed a
“Final Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc Confirming Arbitration Award.” Davis now
appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In two issues, Davis contends the trial court erred by (1) granting Boyd’s
motion to compel arbitration, and (2) rendering judgment confirming the arbitrator’s
award.
Orders compelling arbitration may be reviewed after final judgment in the
case. Chambers v. O’Quinn, 242 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (citing
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000)). “A trial court that is
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asked to evaluate the scope of a contract’s arbitration clause may summarily decide
whether to compel arbitration, based on affidavits, pleadings, discovery, and
stipulations.” Am. Emp’rs’ Ins. Co. v. Aiken, 942 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1997, no writ). We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to compel
arbitration under an abuse of discretion standard. Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d
111, 115 (Tex. 2018). Under that standard, we defer to the trial court’s factual
determinations when they are supported by evidence, but review de novo the trial
court’s legal determinations. Gray v. Ward, No. 05-18-00266-CV, 2019 WL
3759466, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Whether
disputed claims fall within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement is a question
of law that we review de novo. Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115.
DISCUSSION
1. Order compelling arbitration
Davis pleaded that Boyd “took $1.25 million” from the Mostyn loan and in
doing so, breached his fiduciary duty and defrauded Davis. Davis contends he did
not agree to arbitrate those claims. In his first issue, Davis complains that “there was
no basis for the trial court to compel this matter to arbitration,” and no agreement to
arbitrate under section 171.001 of the Texas Arbitration Act (“TAA”). See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.001 (validity of arbitration agreements).
Boyd bore the burden to establish (1) the existence of an arbitration agreement
and (2) that Davis’s claims at issue fall within the scope of that agreement. See
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Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115. Here, Davis disputes only the agreement’s scope. He
acknowledges he agreed to arbitrate claims arising from the Underlying Lawsuit, but
contends that the loan from Mostyn—and particularly Boyd’s actions regarding the
loan proceeds—were unrelated to the Underlying Lawsuit. He contends that his
claims arising from “the negotiation and funding of the subject loan” are “separate
and apart from” Boyd’s representation of him in the Underlying Lawsuit. And he
argues that the parties’ “agreement in the loan negotiation/funding matter” did not
contain an arbitration agreement.
“Once a valid arbitration agreement is established, a ‘strong presumption
favoring arbitration arises’ and we resolve doubts as to the agreement’s scope in
favor of arbitration.” Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 850 (Tex. 2013). “When
determining whether claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, we
look to the factual allegations, not the legal claims.” Id.“When the contract contains a broadly written arbitration clause, so long as
the allegations touch matters, have a significant relationship with, or are inextricably
enmeshed or factually intertwined with the contract, the claim will be arbitrable.”
Barantas Inc. v. Enter. Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 05-17-00896-CV, 2018 WL 3738089, at
*7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotation
omitted). However, if the facts alleged in support of the claim “stand alone,” are
“completely independent of the contract” containing the arbitration provision, and
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“the claim can be maintained without reference to the contract,” then the claim is not
subject to arbitration Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Davis does not dispute that Boyd acted as his “agent” in negotiating the
Mostyn loan. Davis concedes that Boyd contacted Mostyn in the first instance and
negotiated the loan’s terms. But he argues that the Fee Agreement is specifically
limited to the “Claims” it specifically defines, that is, claims “in connection with the
above-captioned False Claims Act lawsuit . . . including the retaliation claims you
have raised in that lawsuit and any breach of contract counterclaim brought against
you . . . .” He further explains that the Fee Agreement required Boyd to pay expenses
in the Underlying Lawsuit and granted Boyd a lien for fees and expenses, “but only
to the extent of the ‘Claims,’” and the “Claims” did not include negotiating the
Mostyn loan.
Davis also relies on the Fee Agreement’s “Scope of Engagement” paragraph,
providing that “[u]nless specifically requested by you and agreed to in writing by us,
you agree that we do not represent you in any other legal matter.” He contends that
the “Scope of Engagement” paragraph makes clear that Boyd represented him only
with regard to “his False Claims Act (qui tam) claims and his retaliation claims
related thereto.” He concludes that if Boyd were to represent him on any other
matter, including the negotiation and financing of a loan, “then there had to be a
separate written agreement, and there was none.”
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Davis has pleaded, however, that he trusted and relied on Boyd’s statements
and representations because of the parties’ fiduciary relationship as attorney and
client. As Boyd argues, that relationship was created here by the Fee Agreement.
The Fee Agreement provides that the parties agree to arbitrate “[a]ny dispute arising
out of, in connection with, or in relation to the interpretation, performance, or breach
of this Agreement,” explicitly “including any claim of legal malpractice, breach of
fiduciary duty or similar claim and any claim involving fees or expenses.” The
supporting documentation for the Mostyn loan—proffered in the trial court and
relied on by Davis—showed that the purpose of the loan was to finance the
Underlying Litigation. Every document on which Davis relies refers to the
Underlying Lawsuit.
Davis’s claims are for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence arising from
Boyd’s allegedly false representation that Boyd “was entitled to” $1.25 million from
the Mostyn Loan. As Davis himself explained in his August 10, 2019 declaration,
the transaction with Mostyn was not actually a “loan.” It was a non-recourse
transaction that Davis had no obligation to repay unless he recovered on his claim in
the Underlying Litigation.4 The Mostyn letter provided that Mostyn would be repaid,
if at all, with a percentage of any proceeds Davis recovered in the Underlying
4
Further, in Davis’s assignment of interest to Equitas, the parties “expressly agree[d] that the
transaction contemplated by this Agreement is not properly characterized as a loan because, in the event
that there are no Proceeds, Davis will not be obligated to repay Equitas any portion of the Assignment
Consideration.”
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Litigation. The funds were for Davis’s use both “in financing the Litigation” and “in
paying his personal expenses and living costs during the pendency of the Litigation,”
according to Davis’s “Assignment of Interest” to Equitas made pursuant to his
agreement with Mostyn.
Davis agreed to arbitrate “any claim of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary
duty or similar claim and any claim involving fees and expenses” “arising out of, in
connection with, or in relation to” Boyd’s performance or breach of the Fee
Agreement. Davis has asserted such a claim in this lawsuit. We conclude that the
parties’ written agreement to arbitrate is enforceable under TAA § 171.001 and that
Davis’s claims fall within the agreement’s scope. See Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 850.
We decide Davis’s first issue against him.
2. Judgment confirming arbitration award
In his second issue, Davis contends the trial court erred by rendering judgment
confirming the arbitration award. He argues that “[s]ince there was no basis in law
or fact which permitted [the] trial court to order this matter [to] arbitration, the trial
court is prohibited from confirming an arbitration award.”
Boyd initially responds that Davis has waived his complaint because he did
not file a response to the motion to confirm and did not object to the judgment or file
a motion for new trial. Boyd then argues that the trial court did not err by rendering
judgment because Davis’s claims fell within the agreement’s scope.
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Assuming Davis preserved his complaint, we have concluded that the trial
court did not err by ruling that Davis’s claims were within the agreement’s scope
and by granting Boyd’s motion to compel arbitration. For the same reasons, we also
conclude the trial court did not err by rendering judgment confirming the arbitration
award. We decide Davis’s second issue against him.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s “Final Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc Confirming
Arbitration Award.”
/Leslie Osborne//
210154f.p05 LESLIE OSBORNE
JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
SYLVESTER DAVIS, Appellant On Appeal from the 68th Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-21-00154-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-13920.
Opinion delivered by Justice
SAMUEL BOYD AND BOYD & Osborne. Justices Myers and Nowell
ASSOCIATES, P.C., Appellees participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellees Samuel Boyd and Boyd & Associates, P.C.
recover their costs of this appeal from appellant Sylvester Davis.
Judgment entered this 20th day of September, 2022.
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