Jerald H. Miller, Jr. v. Tarrant County Appraisal District, Tarrant County Review Board, Tarrant County, the City of Fort Worth, and Tarrant County Tax Assessor Collector ( 2022 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00328-CV
___________________________
JERALD H. MILLER JR., Appellant
V.
TARRANT COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, TARRANT COUNTY REVIEW
BOARD, TARRANT COUNTY, THE CITY OF FORT WORTH, AND TARRANT
COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR COLLECTOR, Appellees
On Appeal from the 141st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 141-329967-21
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jerald H. Miller Jr. attempts to appeal from the trial court’s interlocutory
“Order Granting Special Exceptions.” Because the trial court’s order did not appear
to be a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order, we were concerned that we
lacked jurisdiction over this appeal. We notified Miller of this concern and warned
him that we would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction unless he or any party
desiring to continue the appeal filed a response within ten days showing grounds for
continuing it. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3.
We have jurisdiction to consider appeals only from final judgments and from
certain interlocutory orders made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v.
Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 51.014. Special-exceptions rulings are not subject to review by interlocutory
appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a); see, e.g., Nguyen v. Aventus
Ins. Co., No. 14-18-00720-CV, 2018 WL 5261141, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Oct. 23, 2018, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); Delgado v. River Oaks Police Dep’t,
No. 02-15-00205-CV, 2016 WL 6900900, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
In his response, Miller admits that the trial court’s special-exceptions order is
an unappealable interlocutory order and attempts to save his appeal from dismissal by
asking us for permission to appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 51.014(d)–(f); Tex. R. App. P. 28.3; Tex. R. Civ. P. 168. But Miller has not satisfied
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the requirements for a permissive appeal set out by statute and by the rules of
procedure. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d), (f); Tex. R. App. P.
28.3; Tex. R. Civ. P. 168. We thus deny Miller’s request. Because Miller’s response
does not otherwise show grounds for continuing the appeal, we dismiss the appeal for
want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: October 6, 2022
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