Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and Post Oak Clean Green, Inc. v. Guadalupe County Groundwater Conservation District ( 2022 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-21-00087-CV
POST OAK CLEAN GREEN, INC., and
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality,
Appellants
v.
GUADALUPE COUNTY GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT,
Appellee
From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. 19-1245-CV-C
Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding
OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Opinion by: Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: October 12, 2022
REVERSED AND RENDERED
In this interlocutory appeal, appellants Post Oak Clean Green, Inc. and Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) challenge the trial court’s order denying their pleas to the
jurisdiction in the underlying declaratory judgment action brought by the Guadalupe County
Groundwater Conservation District (the “District”). We conclude the trial court lacks jurisdiction
over the District’s declaratory judgment action under the redundant remedy doctrine. Accordingly,
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we reverse the trial court’s order denying the pleas to the jurisdiction and render a dismissal of the
District’s declaratory judgment action.
We deny the motion for rehearing filed by the District. However, we withdraw our opinion
and judgment issued June 15, 2022, and substitute this opinion and judgment in its place to clarify
our analysis.
BACKGROUND
Under the Solid Waste Disposal Act (“SWDA”), TCEQ has the authority to “control[] all
aspects of the management of municipal solid waste.” See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 361.011(a), (b). To carry out these responsibilities, TCEQ has authority to issue permits
authorizing and managing the construction, operation, and maintenance of municipal solid waste
landfills. Id. § 361.061. TCEQ is also the “principal authority in the state on matters relating to
the quality of the water in the state.” TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.127(a). TCEQ must consider
“water pollution control and water quality aspects” in matters relating to municipal solid waste
management. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.011(d). TCEQ requires applications for
municipal solid waste permits to contain information concerning groundwater protection and
provides for the monitoring of groundwater once landfills are operational. See 30 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 330.61(c), (d), (j), (k) (application requirements); id. § 330.63(f), § 330.401(a), (b), (e),
(f) (monitoring requirements).
The Guadalupe County Groundwater Conservation District was created by the Legislature
in 1997, and approved by the voters in 1999, to conserve, preserve, protect, and recharge
groundwater as well as to prevent waste and degradation of groundwater. See TEX. CONST. art.
16, § 59; Guitar Holding Co. v. Hudspeth Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1,
263 S.W.3d 910, 912 & n.1 (Tex. 2008). Under the authority granted in Chapter 36 of the Water
Code, groundwater conservation districts have broad authority to fulfill their purposes through
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rulemaking. Guitar Holding, 263 S.W.3d at 912; TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (groundwater
conservation districts’ rules are “the state’s preferred method of groundwater management”).
Section 36.102 grants conservation districts the authority to enforce their rules “by injunction,
mandatory injunction, or other appropriate remedy in a court of competent jurisdiction.” TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.102(a). In 2001, the District adopted a series of rules for the purpose of
carrying out its powers and duties under Chapter 36 of the Water Code. One of the rules adopted
by the District is Rule 8.1 pertaining to “Solid, Hazardous or Radioactive Waste.” In relevant part,
Rule 8.1 states, “In no event may waste or sludge be permitted to be applied in any manner in any
outcrop area of any aquifer within the . . . District.”
In 2013, Post Oak filed an application with the TCEQ for a permit to construct and operate
a municipal solid waste landfill located “within the outcrop area of the Carrizo-Wilcox aquifer
recharge zone” in the District’s area. The District submitted an objection to TCEQ that the location
of the proposed landfill would violate its Rule 8.1. During the next five years, Post Oak and other
intervening parties, including the District, participated in the TCEQ administrative review process
of Post Oak’s permit application which consisted of the submission of additional documents and
information concerning the hydrogeology of the site and other matters, public comments and
TCEQ responses, public meetings, and two contested case hearings.
On August 27, 2018, TCEQ issued a final order granting a permit authorizing Post Oak to
construct and operate the landfill at the proposed location. As authorized by the SWDA, the
District filed a suit for judicial review of the TCEQ order granting the permit in Travis County
district court. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.321. The administrative appeal
remains pending. See Stop Post Oak Dump, Guadalupe County Groundwater Conservation
District, City of Schertz, City of Seguin, and the Schertz-Seguin Local Government Corp. v. TCEQ,
Cause No. D-1-GN-18-007000, pending in the 201st Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas.
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In 2019, the District filed the instant lawsuit against Post Oak seeking a declaratory
judgment that its Rule 8.1 prohibits construction and operation of the permitted landfill at the
proposed site. 1 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004 (“UDJA”). TCEQ filed a
petition in intervention. Post Oak and TCEQ filed pleas to the jurisdiction alleging the trial court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction because TCEQ has exclusive jurisdiction over the siting and
permitting of municipal solid waste landfills pursuant to the pervasive regulatory scheme set forth
in the SWDA and Water Code. 2 Post Oak and TCEQ also asserted the trial court lacks jurisdiction
because the District must first exhaust its administrative remedies and its declaratory judgment
action seeks substantially the same relief as its administrative appeal of the permit order and is
therefore barred by the redundant remedies doctrine. Neither party attached any evidence to their
plea to the jurisdiction.
After a hearing, the trial court signed a general order on February 24, 2021 denying the
pleas to the jurisdiction. The order expressly adopts and incorporates a portion of a prior summary
judgment order signed by the trial court on January 16, 2015, before TCEQ issued its order
granting the permit in 2018. The incorporated portion of the January 16, 2015 order held: (1) a
UDJA action may be used to interpret conservation district rules for enforcement purposes; (2)
TCEQ’s authority under the SWDA does not impliedly preempt the District’s authority to make
or enforce its Rule 8.1; and (3) the District’s Rule 8.1 is not unconstitutionally vague. Post Oak
and TCEQ both appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8).
1
The District first sought the same declaratory relief in 2014, but we held the controversy was not ripe because TCEQ
had not yet granted the landfill permit. We therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying the pleas to the
jurisdiction filed by Post Oak and TCEQ and dismissed the District’s lawsuit without prejudice. See Tex. Comm’n on
Envtl. Quality v. Guadalupe Cnty. Groundwater Conservation Dist., No. 04-15-00433-CV, 2016 WL 1371775 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Apr. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2
Post Oak asserted in the alternative that TCEQ has primary jurisdiction to interpret and apply its own rules based on
its expertise and the need for uniformity. See Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221
(Tex. 2002) (explaining primary jurisdiction doctrine).
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DISCUSSION
On appeal, Post Oak and TCEQ argue the trial court erred in denying their pleas to the
jurisdiction because TCEQ has exclusive jurisdiction over siting and permitting decisions for
municipal solid landfills under the SWDA. Post Oak and TCEQ also argue the District has not
exhausted its administrative remedies and its declaratory judgment action is barred by the
redundant remedies doctrine. The District disagrees, arguing that its suit for declaratory judgment
pertains only to interpretation of its own Rule 8.1 for purposes of enforcement, and does not
interfere with TCEQ’s authority over the siting of landfills.
Plea to the Jurisdiction
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges a trial court’s authority to determine the subject matter
of the suit. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Whether the trial
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the District’s claim for declaratory relief is a question of
law that we review de novo. City of San Antonio v. Smith, 562 S.W.3d 75, 79 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2018, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
226 (Tex. 2004)). “Our ultimate inquiry is whether the particular facts presented affirmatively
demonstrate a claim within the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. “A plea to the
jurisdiction is a dilatory plea [used] to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims
asserted have merit.” Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554.
Redundant Remedies Doctrine
TCEQ and Post Oak argue the trial court erred in denying their pleas to the jurisdiction
because the District’s UDJA claim is barred by the “redundant remedies” doctrine. “Under the
redundant remedies doctrine, courts will not entertain an action brought under the UDJA when the
same claim could be pursued through different channels.” Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing &
Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015). The power of a court to issue a declaratory judgment
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in the face of administrative proceedings is limited. Kuntz v. Khan, No. 03-10-00160-CV, 2011
WL 182882, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 21, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[W]hen a plaintiff
invokes a statutory means of attacking an agency order, the trial court lacks jurisdiction over an
additional claim under the UDJA that would merely determine the same issues and provide
substantively the same relief as the statutory remedy.” Tex. Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’
Compensation v. Brumfield, No. 04-15-00473-CV, 2016 WL 2936380, at *5 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio May 18, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Cervantes v. N.H. Ins. Co., No. 04-12-00722-CV,
2013 WL 3486824, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 10, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“When
a statute provides a method for attacking an agency order, a declaratory judgment action directed
at that order will not lie.”) (citation omitted); Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist.,
212 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (en banc) (“When a statute provides an
avenue for attacking an agency order, a declaratory judgment action will not lie to provide
redundant remedies.”).
Under the SWDA, the Legislature provided a statutory remedy of judicial review of a
TCEQ final order on a permit application for a municipal solid waste landfill in a contested case.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.321(a); see TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.351
(authorizing judicial review of acts by TCEQ); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.171
(authorizing an aggrieved party who has exhausted all administrative remedies within a state
agency to seek judicial review of a final decision in a contested case). The District has availed
itself of the statutory right to judicial review and seeks reversal of the Post Oak permit order. See
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174 (in a judicial appeal of an administrative order, the court may
affirm or reverse the agency decision in whole or in part or may remand the case for further
proceedings before the agency). As noted, supra, the administrative appeal is pending.
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In its UDJA suit, the District seeks a declaration that Post Oak’s operation of the permitted
landfill at the proposed site will violate its Rule 8.1 – because the landfill site is over an aquifer
recharge zone. Specifically, the District seeks a declaration that “Rule 8.1 prohibits [Post Oak]
from operating a solid waste disposal facility . . . at its proposed site . . . [because it is] on the
outcrop of the Carrizo-Wilcox Aquifer recharge area.” On appeal, the District asserts the two
proceedings are not redundant because the administrative appeal is directed at the findings of fact
and conclusions of law underlying TCEQ’s permit order, while the declaratory judgment action
merely seeks a judicial interpretation of Rule 8.1 for purposes of later enforcement. See TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.102(a) (authorizing a groundwater conservation district to enforce its
rules “by injunction, mandatory injunction, or any other appropriate remedy in a court of
competent jurisdiction”). In its UDJA petition, the District does not expressly request injunctive
relief from the trial court based on its interpretation of Rule 8.1. At the hearing on the pleas to the
jurisdiction, counsel for the District noted that, “an injunction would be next” if the District
prevails in its UDJA suit.
The UDJA generally authorizes claimants whose rights, status, or other legal relations are
affected by a statute to have the construction or validity of the statute determined and to obtain a
declaration of rights under the statute. TEX. PRAC. & CIV. REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a). The
UDJA does not, however, enlarge a trial court’s jurisdiction, but is “merely a procedural device
for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355
S.W.3d 618, 621-22 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer
Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011)). A litigant’s “couching its requested relief in terms of
declaratory relief does not alter the underlying nature of the suit.” Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d at
388; see McLane Co. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 514 S.W.3d 871, 876 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2017, pet. denied) (same).
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Here, the District’s UDJA claim seeking a declaration that Rule 8.1 prohibits operation of
the landfill ultimately seeks “substantively the same relief” as its administrative appeal – to block
Post Oak’s operation of a solid waste landfill at the proposed site. See Brumfield, 2016 WL
2936380, at *5; Cervantes, 2013 WL 3486824, at *2; see also McLane, 514 S.W.3d at 877-78(holding appellant had a statutory channel by which to obtain same the relief sought through its
UDJA ultra vires claims, i.e., production of the information under the Public Information Act, and
so its UDJA claims were redundant and not justiciable); Optimal Utils., Inc. v. Smitherman, No.
13-16-00385-CV, 2017 WL 3431788, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 10, 2017,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that both the administrative appeal and the UDJA suit sought the
same remedy, “reversal of the Commission’s final order to shut in the Duncan well”).
The District argues its UDJA action is not redundant of its administrative appeal because
the remedies it seeks in the two cases are not identical, i.e., it only seeks construction of Rule 8.1
in the UDJA suit and seeks reversal of the permit order in the administrative appeal. However,
the distinction is illusory. Whether the District obtains a reversal of TCEQ’s permit order through
its administrative appeal or obtains a declaratory judgment stating operation of the permitted
landfill is prohibited by Rule 8.1, it will have obtained substantially the same relief – the landfill
will not be operated. In that sense, the District’s declaratory relief is “directed at” the TCEQ’s
order overruling the District’s objections and granting the permit to Post Oak. If the District
prevailed in both the UDJA action and the administrative appeal, the ultimate relief would be the
same – no landfill at that site. See Cervantes, 2013 WL 3486824, at *2. As Post Oak asserts,
“Despite couching the relief sought as a declaration of rights, the effective purpose of the
declaratory action is to deny Post Oak the ability to use the permit that has been lawfully issued
by the Commission.”
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In sum, a decision favorable to the District in the administrative appeal would reverse the
TCEQ order and therefore would obviate the need for the declaratory relief the District seeks with
respect to Rule 8.1. Thus, the substantive relief sought by the District in the administrative appeal
and its UDJA action is the same – prohibiting operation of the landfill at the site. Because the
declaration sought by the District that Rule 8.1 prohibits Post Oak’s operation of a landfill at the
site does not extend beyond the relief provided by a reversal of the agency’s permit order, we hold
the District’s UDJA action is redundant of its administrative appeal; therefore, the trial court lacks
jurisdiction over the UDJA suit. See SWEPI LP v. R.R. Comm’n, 314 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (the redundant remedies doctrine is jurisdictional and a plea to
the jurisdiction may be granted solely on that basis).
Based on our disposition of the appeal on the redundant remedies ground, we do not reach
the other appellate issues raised by Post Oak and TCEQ.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the pleas to the
jurisdiction filed by Post Oak and TCEQ, and render judgment dismissing the District’s UDJA
lawsuit.
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
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