5826 Interests, LTD. and the Real Property Known as 6213 Richmond Avenue, Houston, Harris County, Texas v. City of Houston ( 2022 )


Menu:
  • Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 3, 2022.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-21-00682-CV
    5826 INTERESTS, LTD. AND THE REAL PROPERTY KNOWN AS 6213
    RICHMOND AVENUE, HOUSTON, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS,
    Appellants
    V.
    CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 334th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2021-66733
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This is an accelerated, interlocutory appeal from the granting of a temporary
    injunction against appellants 5826 Interests, Ltd. and the Real Property Known as
    6213 Richmond Avenue, Houston, Harris County, Texas (collectively 5826
    Interests).1 See 
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014
    (a)(4). Concluding
    1
    The trial court also granted the temporary injunction against TBJNO Investments, LLC,
    the operator of an after-hours sexually oriented business in the building located on 6213
    that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the temporary
    injunction, we affirm the trial court’s amended order granting temporary
    injunction.
    BACKGROUND
    TBJNO Investments operates an after-hours sexually oriented business in the
    building located on the property commonly identified as 6213 Richmond Avenue
    in Houston. 5826 Interests owns this property. The club has operated under
    various names, including “Showgirls,” and “Bella’s,” but it was operating as
    “Bunny’s Gentleman’s Club” during the times relevant to this appeal. The club
    was located in a high-crime area and Bunny’s has a general reputation as a “crime
    haven.” Bunny’s did not have a sexually oriented business permit and it could not
    receive one if it applied because it was located too close to two schools and a
    church.
    The City of Houston received a large number of complaints regarding
    criminal activity in and around Bunny’s. The complaints included drug offenses,
    criminal mischief, graffiti, theft, assaults, robberies, frequent gunfire, and a drive-
    by shooting during which the club manager at the time was shot in the leg.
    The City of Houston began an investigation of Bunny’s. Officer Domegas
    of the Houston Police Department investigated Bunny’s on October 8, 2020.
    Domegas immediately observed a large sign outside the club that said “Bunny’s
    Gentleman’s Club” with a silhouette of a woman dancing on a stripper pole. The
    investigators discovered that Bunny’s did not have a certificate of occupancy. The
    investigation also revealed serious fire code violations inside the club and Bunny’s
    was ordered to shut down immediately.
    Richmond Avenue in Houston. This entity has not appealed the temporary injunction order.
    2
    Investigators went to the club again on July 27, 2021. Bunny’s did not have
    an alcohol license, but undercover police officers were able to purchase alcohol
    while visiting the club; they also saw club employees serving alcohol, and club
    patrons consuming alcohol inside the club. In addition, Bunny’s did not have a
    sexually oriented business license but investigators discovered female entertainers
    with exposed breasts and buttocks dancing on stage in a provocative manner
    including “pole tricks” and performing “lap dances” which entailed the entertainer
    “straddling the lap of a patron and basically grinding in a sexual manner.”
    Undercover officers also discovered underage female entertainers in the club.2 The
    police arrested one female entertainer that night for failure to conspicuously
    display her personal entertainer license.3
    The police went back to Bunny’s on September 10, 2021. The undercover
    police officer discovered the same type of activities that he had seen during the
    July investigation. These included the purchase and consumption of alcohol and
    the same type of entertainment. The undercover officer also propositioned an
    entertainer for sex and they quickly agreed on a price for the act. The officer
    explained that the entertainer was not reluctant, and it was an easy transaction to
    arrange.     The entertainer was arrested and charged with prostitution.                    The
    investigators also found eight underage entertainers that night. The club manager
    was arrested for harmful employment of a minor.
    Investigators also contacted a representative of the owner of the property,
    Daniel Greenberg. Greenberg told the police they would need a “grand jury
    2
    The law changed in the summer of 2021 to require all workers inside a sexually oriented
    business to be at least 21 years of age. The police discovered several entertainers were 20 years
    old on July 27, 2021.
    3
    If a business is operating as a sexually oriented business, the business must obtain a
    sexually oriented business license and all entertainers need to obtain and wear an identification
    badge.
    3
    subpoena” if the police wanted a copy of the lease agreement. The police obtained
    the subpoena and served it on Greenberg during a meeting at Greenberg’s office on
    October 20, 2020.     Greenberg turned over several documents to the police,
    including a copy of the lease agreement. Greenberg told the police that he was
    willing to work with the police to do his part to reduce crime at the club location
    and surrounding area.      Despite that assurance, as detailed above, Bunny’s
    continued to operate as an unlicensed sexually oriented business after the October
    20, 2020 meeting. The police were able to determine who was the “only owner of
    TBJNO Investments LLC” and they scheduled a meeting with him on November
    10, 2020. The police served 38 citations on the owner, Thomas Jones.
    After the investigations, the City filed suit against TBJNO Investments LLC
    and 5826 Interests seeking a declaration that no one may obtain a permit to operate
    a sexually oriented business at 6213 Richmond because the property does not meet
    the distance requirements from schools and churches.         The City also sought
    temporary and permanent injunctions enjoining the defendants from operating any
    business at the 6213 Richmond address. After conducting a one-day evidentiary
    hearing, the trial court signed a temporary injunction against the defendants, which
    it later modified in an amended temporary injunction order. Among other findings,
    the trial court found that TBJNO Investments, 5826 Interests, and “the real
    property known as 6213 Richmond Avenue, Houston, Harris County, Texas,
    maintain a common nuisance pursuant to Chapter 125 of the Texas Civil Practice
    and Remedies Code.” 5826 Interests then timely filed this interlocutory appeal.
    ANALYSIS
    5826 Interests challenges the temporary injunction in four issues. We need
    only address its first and fourth issues because 5826 Interests admits in its opening
    brief that the trial court’s amended temporary injunction order rectified the alleged
    4
    problems raised in its second and third issues.
    I.    Standard of review and applicable law
    The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo regarding
    the subject matter of the litigation pending trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford
    Motor Co., 
    84 S.W.3d 198
    , 204 (Tex. 2002) (op. on reh’g). Litigants are not
    entitled to temporary injunctive relief as a matter of right.         Abbott v. Anti-
    Defamation League Austin, Sw. and Texoma Regions, 
    610 S.W.3d 911
    , 916 (Tex.
    2020) (per curiam) (citing Walling v. Metcalfe, 
    863 S.W.2d 56
    , 57 (Tex. 1993) (per
    curiam)).   To obtain a temporary injunction, an applicant is not required to
    establish that it will prevail in a final trial on the merits, but must plead and prove
    that it (1) has a cause of action against the opposing party; (2) has a probable right
    to the relief sought; and (3) faces probable imminent, and irreparable injury in the
    interim. 
    Id.
     However, when the applicant has shown a violation of a statute that
    authorizes injunctive relief, it need not prove imminent, irreparable injury. 8100
    N. Freeway Ltd. v. City of Houston, 
    329 S.W.3d 858
    , 861 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 210). The decision to
    grant or deny such relief is committed to the trial court’s discretion, and we will
    uphold its ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58.
    We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court’s
    action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion.
    Sharma v. Vinmar Int’l, Ltd., 
    231 S.W.3d 405
    , 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2007, no pet.). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
    court’s order, indulging every reasonable inference in its favor. 
    Id.
     An abuse of
    discretion does not exist if the trial court bases its decision on conflicting evidence.
    Id.; see Abbott, 610 S.W.3d at 916 (“In resolving evidentiary matters, a trial court
    does not abuse its discretion ‘if some evidence reasonably supports the court’s
    5
    ruling.’”). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in
    applying the law to the facts. Abbott, 610 S.W.3d at 916. Therefore, a court
    abuses its discretion if there is a clear failure to analyze or apply the law correctly.
    Id.
    II.   The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it included 5826
    Interests in the temporary injunction.
    The Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “a person who
    maintains a place to which persons habitually go for [specified illegal purposes]
    and who knowingly tolerates the activity and furthermore fails to make reasonable
    attempts to abate the activity maintains a common nuisance.” See 
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 125.0015
    . The statute then lists 28 different illegal activities
    including discharge of a firearm in a public place, prostitution, employing persons
    younger than 21 years of age for work in a sexually oriented business, and criminal
    mischief. 5826 Interests argues in its first issue that there is no evidence that it
    knowingly tolerated any of the illegal activities specified in the common nuisance
    statute. Viewing the record evidence in favor of the trial court’s order as we must,
    we disagree.
    The Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes a suit to enjoin a common
    nuisance against “any person who maintains, owns, uses, or is a party to the use of
    a place for purposes constituting a nuisance under this subchapter and may bring
    an action in rem against the place itself.” See 
    id.
     at § 125.002(b). In addition,
    section 125.004(a) provides that proof that any of the illegal activities listed in
    section 125.0015 are frequently committed at the place involved in the litigation,
    or that the place involved in the litigation is frequently used for any of the illegal
    activities found in section 125.0015, “is prima facie evidence that the defendant
    knowingly tolerated the activity.” See id. at § 125.004(a). 5826 Interests argues in
    6
    its first issue that this presumption should apply only to the occupier of the
    premises, not to an owner.
    We need not decide whether the presumption found in section 125.004(a)
    applies to owners, because even if it does not, there is evidence in the record that
    5826 Interests, the undisputed owner of the property known as 6213 Richmond
    Avenue, knowingly tolerated the common nuisance activities.           This evidence
    establishes that 5826 Interests was made aware of the unlawful activity at 6213
    Richmond Avenue no later than October 20, 2020 when Houston Police officers
    met with Greenberg, the owner’s representative. The evidence also establishes that
    the illegal activities continued for months after that notification occurred as
    demonstrated through the testimony of Officer Domegas and the undercover police
    officers who investigated Bunny’s. We conclude that the evidence supports the
    trial court’s decision to include 5826 Interests in its injunction order because it
    knowingly tolerated a common nuisance on a property it owned. See Allied Home
    Mortg. Capital Corp. v. Fowler, No. 14-10-00992-CV, 
    2011 WL 2367086
    , at *5
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 9, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that a
    trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the applicant met its burden to
    establish all requirements for a temporary injunction); Sharma, 
    231 S.W.3d at 426
    (stating that appellate courts defer to the trial court’s assessments concerning the
    weight and credibility of the evidence offered in a temporary injunction hearing).
    We overrule 5826 Interests’ first issue on appeal.
    III.   The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered that any
    violation of the Amended Temporary Injunction Order would result in
    full closure of all defendants’ business on the 6213 Richmond property.
    5826 Interests argues in its fourth issue on appeal that the trial court abused
    its discretion when it ordered that any violation of the Amended Temporary
    Injunction Order would result in the closure of the defendants’ business on the
    7
    5213 Richmond property. In essence, 5826 Interests argues that this section of the
    Amended Temporary Injunction Order is overbroad because it potentially restrains
    5826 Interests’ legal activities based on the unilateral actions of TBJNO
    Investments, LLC.
    The common nuisance statute authorizes a trial court to impose reasonable
    requirements on the enjoined parties to prevent the use of the premises as a
    nuisance pending a final trial on the merits. See 
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 125.045
    . In the present case the trial court heard evidence that 5826
    Interests knew about the illegal activities of TBJNO Investments, LLC for months
    and did nothing to stop them. Based on this evidence, the trial court exercised its
    discretion to impose, in the event the temporary injunction order was violated, a
    shutdown order on all defendants. This remedy is statutorily authorized. See 
    id.
    (listing potential remedies in the event a temporary injunction order is violated,
    including “any other legal remedy available under the laws of the state.”).
    We have addressed and rejected a similar argument before. In Sharma, we
    stated that
    [w]hile ordinarily a temporary injunction should operate as a
    corrective rather than a punitive measure, when a choice must be
    made between a failure to provide adequate protection of a recognized
    legal right and the punitive operation of the writ, the latter course
    must be taken. It is well settled that injunctive relief must, of
    necessity, be full and complete so that those who have acted
    wrongfully and have breached their fiduciary relationship, as well as
    those who willfully and knowingly have aided them in doing so, will
    be effectively denied the benefits and profits flowing from their
    wrongdoing.
    
    Id. at 429
     (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We conclude the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion when it included the challenged remedy in the
    8
    Amended Temporary Injunction Order.4 We overrule 5826 Interests’ fourth issue.
    CONCLUSION
    Having overruled all of 5826 Interests’ issues necessary to resolve this
    appeal, we affirm the trial court’s Amended Temporary Injunction Order.
    /s/       Jerry Zimmerer
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Zimmerer.
    4
    We once again note that “the most expeditious way to obviate the hardship and
    discomfiture of an unfavorable temporary injunction order is to try the case on the merits and
    secure a hearing wherein the case may be fully developed and the courts, both trial and appellate,
    may render judgments finally disposing of controversies.” Sharma, 
    231 S.W.3d at 429
    , n.16
    (citing Sw. Weather Research, Inc. v. Jones, 
    160 Tex. 104
    , 111, 
    327 S.W.2d 417
    , 422 (1959)).
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-21-00682-CV

Filed Date: 11/3/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/7/2022