in the Interest of A.A. and A.A., Children ( 2022 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-22-00058-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.A. AND A.A., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Lamar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 90069
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The sole question posed in this appeal from the termination of Mother’s parental rights to
her children, A.A. and A.A., is whether the trial court had jurisdiction when it terminated those
rights.1 Because the trial court had jurisdiction, we affirm the termination.
The Department of Family and Protective Services brought a petition for protection of a
child, for conservatorship, and for the termination of Mother’s parental rights. Following a
bench trial, the trial court found that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the
children’s best interests, and it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
161.001(b)(1), grounds (D), (E), (I), (N), (O) and (P). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (I), (N), (O), (P). Mother appeals, maintaining that, although the trial
court properly extended, by 180 days, the one-year deadline for disposition of the case, it did not
dispose of the case within that extended period of time. Mother therefore contends that the trial
court was without jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights to her children.2 We disagree and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The controlling statutory language is in Section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code:
(a) Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits or granted an
extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1), on the first Monday after the first
anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the
department as temporary managing conservator, the court’s jurisdiction over the
suit affecting the parent-child relationship filed by the department that requests
1
To protect the children’s privacy, we refer to appellant as Mother and to the children by initials. See TEX. R. APP. P.
9.8(b)(2).
2
At trial, Mother made no objection to the trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction. However, “[j]urisdiction may be
raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the appellate court.” See In re A.W., 623 S.W.3d 519, 521
(Tex. App.—Waco 2021, no pet.) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex.
1993).
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termination of the parent-child relationship or requests that the department be
named conservator of the child is terminated and the suit is automatically
dismissed without a court order. Not later than the 60th day before the day the
suit is automatically dismissed, the court shall notify all parties to the suit of the
automatic dismissal date.
(b) Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits, the court may not
retain the suit on the court’s docket after the time described by Subsection (a)
unless the court finds that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child
remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that
continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator
is in the best interest of the child. If the court makes those findings, the court may
retain the suit on the court’s docket for a period not to exceed 180 days after the
time described by Subsection (a). If the court retains the suit on the court’s
docket, the court shall render an order in which the court:
(1) schedules the new date on which the suit will be automatically
dismissed if the trial on the merits has not commenced, which date must
be not later than the 180th day after the time described by Subsection (a);
(2) makes further temporary orders for the safety and welfare of the
child as necessary to avoid further delay in resolving the suit; and
(3) sets the trial on the merits on a date not later than the date specified
under Subdivision (1).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a), (b) (Supp.) (emphasis added). Here, the Department was
granted temporary managing conservatorship of the children on January 26, 2021. At that point
in the proceedings, the deadline for dismissal would have been the first Monday following
Wednesday, January 26, 2022, which was Monday, January 31, 2022. See id.
On November 3, 2021, the trial court entered a permanency hearing order before final
order in which it found that, pursuant to Section 263.401(b), there existed “extraordinary
circumstances” that required the children to remain in the temporary managing conservatorship
of the Department and that it was in the children’s best interests to make that finding. See TEX.
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FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b). Based on those extraordinary circumstances, the trial court
ordered an extension of not more than 180 days and retained the case on its docket. The trial
court correctly determined in its order that the new dismissal date would be July 30, 2022. On
July 27, 2022, the trial court commenced and concluded the trial on the merits, some three days
before the dismissal date of July 30, 2022. Consequently, the trial court retained its jurisdiction
to enter its order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Yet, Mother contends that the case was not concluded within the 180-day extension of
the disposition deadline. Mother calculates the relevant date as follows: “An initial order was
entered on January 26, 2021, the one-year and 180 days extended deadline therefore ended on
July 26, 2022, and the trial commenced . . . July 27, 2022.” Consequently, according to Mother,
the trial court lost jurisdiction one day before the commencement of trial. We disagree.
Mother overlooks the language in Section 263.401(a) stating that the initial dismissal
deadline falls on the first Monday following the one-year anniversary of the entry of the order
granting the Department temporary managing conservatorship of the children, which, in this
case, was Monday, January 31, 2022. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a). It was from that
date that the extension of 180 days was counted, resulting in the July 30, 2022, deadline. This is
made evident by the reference to subsection (b), which states that “the court may retain the suit
on the court’s docket for a period not to exceed 180 days after the time described by Subsection
(a).” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b) (emphasis added).
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Because the trial on the merits commenced, and was disposed of, before the extended
dismissal deadline of July 30, 2022, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order terminating
Mother’s parental rights to her children, A.A. and A.A. We overrule Mother’s point of error.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: November 1, 2022
Date Decided: November 9, 2022
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