Allen Frick v. Jonathan Jergins ( 2022 )


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  •                                    COURT OF APPEALS
    EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    EL PASO, TEXAS
    ALLEN FRICK,                                      §                No. 08-21-00176-CV
    Appellant,         §                  Appeal from the
    v.                                                §             85th Judicial District Court
    JONATHAN JERGINS,                                 §              of Brazos County, Texas
    Appellee.          §              (TC# 19-003364-CV-85)
    CONCURRENCE
    Because the law defining scope-of-employment analysis under the Texas Torts Claim Act
    is clear and well settled, I concur. See Alexander v. Walker, 
    435 S.W.3d 789
    , 790, 792 (Tex. 2014)
    (holding claims for assault, conspiracy, slander, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
    prosecution arose from allegedly improper conduct within law enforcement officers’ scope of
    employment); Bowen v. Comstock, No. 10-05-00295-CV, 
    2008 WL 2209722
    , at *2 (Tex.App.—
    Waco May 28, 2008, pet. dism’d) (“If a government employee acts within the scope of his
    employment in the performance of a discretionary duty and acts in good faith, he is entitled to
    official immunity even though his acts are negligent, or even illegal.”) (citing cases).
    However, when a plaintiff alleges—as Appellant does here—the state employee committed
    criminal acts, it offends fundamental notions of due process to shield him individually from suit
    and, because the TTCA does not waive immunity for intentional tort claims, effectively preclude
    the lawsuit against him in his official capacity. Because there is nothing just in this result, and
    given the recent related calls to reform the qualified immunity doctrine, 1 I write separately.
    YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice
    November 8, 2022
    Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
    1
    See, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 
    138 S.Ct. 1148
    , 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Such a one-sided approach to
    qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent
    effect of the Fourth Amendment.”); McCoy v. Alamu, 
    950 F.3d 226
    , 237 (5th Cir. 2020) (Costa, J., dissenting in part)
    (noting the “many voices critiquing current [qualified immunity] law as insufficiently protective of constitutional
    rights”), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 
    141 S.Ct. 1364
     (2021); Jamison v. McClendon, 
    476 F.Supp.3d 386
    , 391
    (S.D. Miss. 2020) (stating that qualified immunity “operates like absolute immunity”); James Craven, Jay Schweikert
    & Clark Neily, How Qualified Immunity Hurts Law Enforcement, Cato Institute (October 5, 2022),
    https://www.cato.org/study/how-qualified-immunity-hurts-law-enforcement; see also Katherine Mims Crocker,
    Qualified Immunity, Sovereign Immunity, and Systemic Reform, 
    71 Duke L.J. 1701
    -1780 (2022).
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-21-00176-CV

Filed Date: 11/8/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/10/2022