Karla Franco Herrera v. Ariel Alejandro Mata ( 2022 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-20-00170-CV
__________________
KARLA FRANCO HERRERA, Appellant
V.
ARIEL ALEJANDRO MATA, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 418th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 18-11-14838-CV
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Once a court’s plenary power over its judgment expires, the court’s
judgment may not set aside unless the court grants a “bill of review for
sufficient cause, filed within the time allowed by law[.]” 1 A bill of review
is an equitable proceeding, in which a party may ask a court to set aside
a judgment the party may no longer challenge through a motion for new
1Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f).
1
trial or through an appeal. 2 Ordinarily, a plaintiff who files a bill of
review must “plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying
cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by
the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposing party or official
mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part.”3
But “[i]f legal remedies were available but ignored,” the plaintiff is not
entitled to relief in equity in a bill of review. 4
After the divorce decree in Trial Court Cause Number 18-02-01586
filed by Ariel Alejandro Mata became final, Karla Franco Herrera filed a
Bill of Review (Bill or Bill of Review) and sought to overturn the decree.
The parties tried the issues presented in Karla’s Bill to the bench. 5 Nine
witnesses, including Karla and Ariel, testified during the seven-day trial.
Following the trial, the trial court issued written findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Among these, the trial court found that Karla
“exercised her own free will” and was “not under duress when she settled”
2WWLC Inv., L.P. v. Miraki, 624 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021).
3Id. (cleaned up).
4Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 1999).
5Karla’s Second Amended Bill of Review was her live pleading in
the trial.
2
the issues involved in her divorce. As related to Karla’s Bill, the trial
court also found that Ariel “did not commit any fraudulent, accidental, or
wrongful act th[at] prevented [Karla] from asserting any defense or
claim” incident to their divorce. And the trial court found that “[m]uch of
[Karla’s] testimony [in the proceedings on Karla’s Bill] was not credible.”
What’s more, the trial court issued more than eighty findings of fact and
fifteen conclusions of law to support its final judgment. The trial court
ordered the parties to take nothing from each other on their claims and
counterclaims when it entered the final judgment on Karla’s Bill.
After the trial court rendered, Karla appealed. On appeal, Karla’s
attorney filed a brief raising a single issue, which asserts Karla’s “due
process and other rights were not adequately respected before she was
deprived of her property and other constitutional rights.” But we
conclude Karla’s arguments lack merit, so we will affirm for the reasons
more fully explained below.
Karla’s Issues (Restated)
Karla presents her issue broadly and in one issue. Yet her brief fails
to provide the Court with points of error clearly identifying the errors she
wants the Court to review. She compounds that problem further in her
3
brief by failing to provide the Court with appropriate citations to
authorities and to the appellate record. 6
That said, most of the complaints Karla has raised concern issues
she could have pursued had she exercised due diligence in the case
involving her divorce, as we explain below. 7 For instance, Karla
complains here that she didn’t receive prior notice of the final hearing the
trial court conducted to approve the final decree in the divorce, a hearing
where the trial court merely signed the agreed Final Decree, which Karla
had signed as approved. Karla also complains that after the trial court
approved the final decree, she wasn’t notified of the fact the trial court
had entered the decree. Together with these complaints, Karla also
complains the trial court in handling her divorce violated her rights to
due process when it failed to require the final decree and a mediated
settlement agreement—all documents Karla signed—to be translated
into Spanish from English because Karla’s first language is Spanish.
In addition to the above complaints, which concern the case
involving Karla’s divorce, Karla also complains the trial court excluded
6See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f).
7See Wembley Inv. Co., 11 S.W.3d at 927.
4
relevant evidence during the trial of the claims she raised in her Bill.
Specifically, Karla argues the trial court erred in excluding her testimony
about what Carlos, her son, told her that Ariel told him. The trial court
excluded the testimony ruling it was hearsay.
Karla now claims her testimony about what Carlos told her Ariel
said would have supported her claim that Ariel committed fraud in their
divorce had her testimony been admitted in the trial. Last, Karla
complains the greater weight and preponderance of the evidence
supports a finding granting (rather than denying) her Bill of Review.
Standard of Review
In Bill of Review proceedings, the petitioner “must open and
assume the burden of proving that the judgment was rendered as the
result of the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposite party or
official mistake unmixed with any negligence of his own.”8 When, as here,
parties have tried the case to the bench, the trial court is the sole judge
of the credibility of the witnesses who have testified in the trial. 9 In a
factual sufficiency review, the evidence is viewed in a neutral light, and
8Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Tex. 1979).
9See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005).
5
the trial court’s verdict will be set aside only if it is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and
unjust. 10
If the plaintiff can establish the requirements needed to prove the
elements required to prevail on a Bill, the validity of a prior judgment
that could not otherwise be challenged in a motion for new trial or
through an appeal may be challenged by filing a Bill of Review. 11 Again,
in a Bill of Review proceeding, the petitioner must ordinarily plead and
prove (1) they have a meritorious claim or defense, (2) which they were
prevented from making by the opposing party’s fraud, accident, or
wrongful act, (3) that is unmixed with fault or negligence of their own. 12
We review the ruling of a lower court on a plaintiff’s Bill of Review
using an abuse-of-discretion standard, which occurs only when the trial
court acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding
10SeePlas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.
1989); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
11Miraki, 624 S.W.3d at 799.
12Id.
6
rules or principles. 13 On questions of law, we review the trial court’s
ruling de novo. 14
Even should the petitioner in a Bill of Review proceeding prove they
have a meritorious defense to the underlying judgment, they must also
prove they were prevented from asserting their defense to the underlying
suit due to fraud, accident, or the wrongful act of the opposing party or
an official mistake, unmixed with any fault or negligence of their own.15
As to fraud, the Bill of Review plaintiff must prove the fraud was extrinsic
to the underlying suit, in contrast to proving intrinsic fraud, which is
fraud the Bill of Review plaintiff could have raised in the underlying
suit. 16 The Texas Supreme Court explained the difference between
intrinsic and extrinsic fraud as follows:
‘Extrinsic fraud’ is fraud which denied a party the opportunity
to fully litigate upon the trial all the rights or defense [they
were] entitled to assert. ‘Intrinsic fraud,’ by contrast, relates
to the merits of the issues which were presented and
presumably were or should have been settled in the former
action. Within that term are included such matters as
13Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); In the Estate
of Curtis, No. 09-14-00242-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 9982, at *10 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Sept. 24, 2015, no pet.).
14In the Estate of Curtis, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 9982, at *10.
15See Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004).
16Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. 1989).
7
fraudulent instruments, perjured testimony, or any matter
which was actually presented to and considered by the trial
court in rendering the judgment assailed. Such fraud will not
support a bill of review, for each party must guard against
adverse findings upon issues directly presented. 17
Generally, the party with the burden of proof must direct their
factual insufficiency complaints at specific findings on appeal rather than
challenging the judgment as a whole. 18 On appeal, Karla didn’t direct her
challenges specifically at any of the trial court’s findings of fact. To be
fair, however, we understand that Karla’s argument is that the trial
court’s finding that Ariel didn’t commit any fraudulent act which
prevented her from asserting a defense to the judgment in the parties’
divorce is against the greater weight and preponderance admitted in the
trial of her Bill of Review. 19 But as to findings Karla didn’t challenge, the
trial court’s findings
17Id.
18Tinnell v. Poulson Custom Homes, Inc., No. 09-06-390 CV, 2008
Tex. App. LEXIS 1594, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 6, 2008, pet.
denied); see also 6 ROY W. MCDONALD & ELAIN GRAFTON CARLSON, TEXAS
CIVIL PRACTICE § 18:12 (2d ed. 1998).
19See Williams v. Khalaf, 82 S.W.2d 651, 658 (Tex. 1990) (noting
that broader points of error should be construed “liberally to adjudicate
justly, fairly and equitably the rights of the litigants”); Cain, 709 S.W.2d
at 176 (noting the correct standard of review for challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence requires a court of appeals to consider and
8
occupy the same position and are entitled to the same weight
as the verdict of a jury. They are binding on an appellate court
unless the contrary is established as a matter of law, or if
there is no evidence to support the findings. 20
With these standards in mind, we discuss the facts leading to the
parties’ divorce as those facts are relevant to our review of the trial court’s
verdict on Karla’s Bill and on our resolution of Karla’s appeal.
Background
The Underlying Divorce, Trial Court
Cause Number 18-02-01586
We begin with the underlying divorce between Karla and Ariel in
Trial Court Cause Number 18-02-01586. The record shows that in
February 2018, Ariel sued Karla for divorce. Ariel alleged the parties had
been married since 1997, had ceased living together, and that the
marriage had become insupportable because of discord or a conflict of
personalities that destroyed the legitimate ends of their marriage. In
response to Ariel’s suit, Karla answered and filed counterclaims. In her
answer, Karla alleged that Ariel had “committed fraud on the community
weigh all the evidence and to set the verdict aside “only if it is so contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and
unjust”).
20McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986).
9
estate.” Among Karla’s counterclaims, she alleged Ariel had “plotted and
carried out a plan to actually defraud” her of her “separate and
community estate.” In another counterclaim, Karla alleged Ariel
breached a fiduciary duty he owed her because he had her sign a
document that was in English rather than Spanish, “which she believes
divest[ed] her of her interest in their company GBA Group LLC,” . . . a
“multimillion dollar company holding millions in assets.”
Even though both parties were represented by counsel, Karla and
Ariel communicated with each other directly. Karla agreed to settle the
disputed issues in the divorce even though she was advised not to do so
by her attorney. For instance, on the night of July 4, 2018, after Karla
and Ariel engaged in private negotiations without counsel, they signed a
joint letter—the Letter Agreement—which they then sent jointly to their
attorneys. The Letter Agreement outlines the essential terms on which
Karla and Ariel agreed to settle the disputed issues in their divorce. The
Letter Agreement contains several promises, for example Ariel agreed to
pay Karla a lump sum of $50,000 upon the approval of the Final Decree
by the court. He also agreed to pay Karla spousal support annually, in a
specified amount, for a specific period of years. Even so, the parties
10
changed that amount weeks later, increasing the total payout in Karla’s
favor by around forty percent. In the Letter Agreement, the parties
further agreed that neither party committed fraud. The Letter
Agreement is typed, the record contains versions written in Spanish and
English, and the one in Spanish contains what purports to be Ariel’s and
Karla’s signatures. 21
A day after Ariel and Karla signed the Letter Agreement, Karla left
Ariel a message stating that even though her attorney had advised her
she deserved more money, she wanted to move forward with their
agreement and settle because getting more money was not worth the pain
the proceedings were causing her son, Carlos, and the people she loves.
That same day, Karla sent her attorneys a letter, in Spanish, notifying
them she was terminating their attorney-client relationship. The letter
states: “Mi decisión es irreversible.”
Less than a week later, Karla’s attorneys, by motion, asked the trial
court for permission to withdraw. In the motion, the attorneys alleged
that Karla had agreed to their request. And since Karla signed the order,
21The record includes a copy of the same letter, written in English.
However, the signatures on that letter are illegible.
11
which acknowledges she approved the attorneys’ withdrawal, the trial
court granted the motion and allowed the attorneys to withdraw.
On July 27, 2018, Ariel’s attorney sent Karla drafts of documents
resolving Ariel’s and Karla’s divorce under terms to which they had
agreed. Ariel’s attorney sent the following documents to Karla for her
review: (1) a draft Final Decree; (2) an LLC Agreement, which is related
to an entity named Karla’s Love LLC; (3) an Agreed Transfer of Property
Held by Marlow V LP, which is an agreement transferring property
owned by Ariel and Karla to Karla’s Love LLC; and (4) a Special
Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien on a home, which conveys GBA Group
LLC’s interest in certain property to Karla’s Love LLC. When Ariel’s
attorney forwarded these documents to Karla, he told her a mediation in
their divorce was tentatively scheduled for July 31, but that the
mediation could be rescheduled depending on the mediator’s availability
on other days. Karla didn’t ask to reschedule the mediation.
On the day before the mediation, Ariel’s lawyer, by email, told the
mediator he expected Karla to appear at the mediation pro se. He also
sent the mediator a copy of the draft Final Decree. Ariel’s attorney also
told the mediator that Karla “was meeting with a lawyer [that] afternoon
12
at 3:00 to go over all of the Decree and closing documents before giving
us her final approval.” Karla consulted and discussed the settlement
documents with a new attorney, whom she chose, on July 30, 2018.22 The
next day, Karla, Ariel, and Ariel’s attorney attended a mediation. The
mediation ended with Karla and Ariel signing the Mediated Settlement
Agreement, an agreement resolving the issues in their divorce. Under the
terms of the Mediated Settlement Agreement, Karla and Ariel agreed to
sign four exhibits attached to the Mediated Settlement Agreement: (1)
the Final Decree, (2) the LLC Agreement for Karla’s Love LLC, (3) the
Agreed Transfer of Interest of Property held by Marlow VP LP, and (4)
the Special Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien. Additionally, the
Mediated Settlement Agreement provides:
....
9. MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: EACH
PARTY INTENDS AND AGREES THAT EITHER
PARTY SHALL BE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON
THIS AGREEMENT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
22Karla denied that she actually met with an attorney about the
draft documents before signing them even though she agreed she did
schedule a meeting with one. Even so, the trial court found she did meet
with an attorney of her own choosing before the mediation occurred and
Karla did not challenge that finding in her appeal.
13
SECTION 153.0071 OR SECTION 6.602 OF THE TEXAS
FAMILY CODE.
10. EACH PARTY UNDERSANDS AND AGREES THAT
THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT REVOCABLE.
On July 31, 2018, Ariel and Karla signed the Mediated Settlement
Agreement and the Final Decree.
On August 20, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing to approve
the Final Decree. Ariel appeared for the hearing with his attorney. Ariel’s
attorney announced the parties had settled the case, noting that the
parties had both signed the Final Decree. Karla, however, did not attend
the hearing. During the hearing the trial court signed the decree after
learning that Karla and Ariel had both signed their names to the Final
Decree. 23
The Bill of Review Proceeding and Trial in
Trial Court Cause Number 18-11-14838
23We further note that because the Final Decree meets the
requirements of Family Code section 6.602, the agreement bound the
parties and gave Ariel the right to have a judgment on agreement
“notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule
of law.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.602(a)(c). Unlike other settlement
agreements, when parties sign an agreement subject to section 6.602,
“the trial court is not required to determine if the property division is
‘just and right’ before approving the MSA.” Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d
615, 618 (Tex. 2012).
14
In November 2018, seeking to set aside the Final Decree signed by
the 418th District Court in Trial Court Cause Number 18-02-01586,
Karla filed a Bill of Review, which the Clerk assigned to the 418th
District Court. In her Bill, Karla alleged that Ariel’s fraudulent and
wrongful acts prevented her from asserting meritorious claims she would
have otherwise raised in her divorce. As previously noted, however, Karla
alleged that Ariel committed fraud and had converted the parties’
community property during the case involving their divorce. And in the
divorce, Karla claimed that Ariel’s fraudulent conduct caused her
damages of over one million dollars. In her Bill, Karla claimed that before
she signed the Mediated Settlement Agreement, Ariel threatened to have
her jailed for adultery and to have her deported to Mexico her country of
origin if she refused to settle in their divorce.
When Ariel answered, he filed a general denial. But he also denied
that Karla was under duress when she signed the Final Decree, he denied
he procured the Final Decree through duress or fraud, and he denied he
prevented Karla from presenting a defense to the Final Decree. In
15
January 2020, the trial court called the case to trial. Nine witnesses
(including Karla and Ariel) testified in the seven-day trial.
When the trial ended, the trial court found that Karla “failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she was prevented from
making any meritorious claim or defense because of any fraud, accident
or wrongful act of [Ariel].” In addition to that finding, the trial court made
eighty-four other findings of fact together with more than ten conclusions
of law. We paraphrase the findings the trial court made as they relate to
the issues on which Karla’s appeal hinges, as follows:
• Karla and Ariel both signed the Final Decree in the
mediation on July 31, 2018, evidencing their agreement
to the terms of the divorce, both in form and in
substance.
• Since before 2018, Karla could read, write, and speak
basic English.
• Much of Karla’s testimony was not credible.
• Ariel’s testimony was significantly more credible than
Karla’s.
• Ariel did not force Karla to terminate her relationship
with any attorney.
• Karla was not under duress and exercised her free will
when settling the divorce.
• Ariel did not force Karla to settle the divorce.
• Ariel did not commit any fraudulent, accidental, or
wrongful act that prevented Karla from asserting any
defense or affirmative claim in their divorce.
16
After the trial court signed the judgment denying Karla relief in the
proceeding on her Bill of Review, Karla appealed.
Standard of Review
Analysis
On appeal, Karla argues that in the case involving the parties’
divorce, she wasn’t provided with prior notice of the hearing to approve
the Final Decree. Karla, however, presented that claim for the first time
in her appeal. To preserve error, a party must make the trial court aware
of the complaint in a timely manner and obtain a ruling. 24 Karla’s Second
Amended Petition for Bill of Review, her live pleading, doesn’t include
any claims alleging the trial court in the divorce proceeding failed to
notify her of the hearing on the final decree. Besides that, nothing in the
record shows that Karla wasn’t given proper notice of the final hearing,
which ended with the trial court in the divorce case approving the Final
Decree. Karla also could have raised her lack of notice claim in a post-
judgment motion in the case involving her divorce. Even so, we need not
24State Dep’t ofHighways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235,
241 (Tex. 1992); see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.
17
review Karla’s lack of notice claim because it was not properly preserved
for our review in the appeal. 25
Karla also complains that in the case involving her divorce, she
wasn’t properly notified of the fact the trial court entered the Final
Decree. But like Karla’s other lack of notice claim, Karla neither pleaded,
proved, or obtained a ruling from the trial court on her claim she was not
properly notified of the fact the Final Decree had been entered in her
divorce. Add to that, one of Karl’s exhibits admitted during the trial on
her Bill shows the Montgomery County District Clerk sent Karla a letter
in the case involving her underlying divorce of the fact that the trial court
had signed the Final Decree the day it was entered. Because Karla
neither pleaded nor obtained a ruling that she was not notified of the
entry of the Final Decree in the Bill of Review proceeding, she failed to
properly preserve her complaint alleging she wasn’t properly notified of
the entry of the Final Decree for the purpose of her appeal. 26
Karla also complains the trial court violated her rights to due
process by failing to require the documents she signed in the mediation
25Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, 33.2.
26Id.
18
to be translated from English into Spanish, her first language. But Karla
failed to prove that when she was in the trial court in the Bill of Review
proceeding that she asked the trial court handling her divorce to have the
settlement documents translated from English into Spanish before the
mediation occurred. Without securing a ruling from the trial court
denying her request to have the documents translated before she signed
them, Karla is not entitled to collaterally attack the judgment in her
divorce on a claim she could have but failed to raise in the trial court in
a Bill of Review. 27
Next, Karla complains the trial court erred in excluding her
testimony about what she claimed her son, Carlos, told her that Ariel told
him. The trial court sustained Ariel’s objection to Karla’s testimony about
what Carlos told her Ariel told him as hearsay. On appeal, Karla argues
the trial court “artificially imposed” rulings in Ariel’s favor excluding
Karla’s testimony, but she then never explains why the trial court abused
its discretion in sustaining Ariel’s objection. She also doesn’t cite cases to
support her argument that the testimony should have been admitted. To
27Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702.
19
top that off, Karla offers no argument to explain how the trial court’s
exclusion of Karla’s testimony about what she claims Carlos told her was
harmful in the context of a seven-day trial, a trial in which the trial court
found Karla not credible, a finding she never challenged.
Her argument claiming the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to admit her testimony is also without merit. Hearsay, an out-
of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is
generally inadmissible. 28 At trial, Karla argued that her statement about
what Carlos told her Ariel told him was admissible under Rule 803(24).29
Under the exception Karla relies on here, a trial court may admit a
hearsay statement that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position
would have made only if [the declarant] believed it to be true because
when it was made it was so contrary to [the declarant’s] pecuniary or
proprietary interest that it had a great tendency to invalidate [the
declarant’s] claim or expose [the declarant] to civil or criminal liability or
make [the declarant] an object of hatred, ridicule or disgrace. 30 Yet “[a]ll
28Tex. R. Evid. 801, 802.
29Tex. R. Evid. 801(24).
30Id.
20
hearsay exceptions require a showing of trustworthiness.”31 And as the
party who was seeking to have the hearsay declaration of a witness
admitted as an exception to the general rule, Karla had the burden to
show the evidence was within the exception she relied on in the trial.32
Given the trial court’s finding that most of Karla’s testimony was not
credible, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding Karla’s testimony about what she claimed Carlos told her Ariel
told him.
Last, we turn to Karla’s claim that the greater weight and
preponderance of the evidence supports a finding granting her Bill of
Review. We conclude that when considered as a whole, the evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that Ariel did not commit any
fraudulent, accidental, or wrongful act, which prevented Karla from
asserting any defenses or affirmative claims in the parties’ underlying
divorce.
31Robinson v. Harkins & Co., 711 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1986).
32See Skillern & Sons, Inc. v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex.
1962).
21
In a bench trial, the trial court “may believe one witness and
disbelieve others[.]” 33 Here, the trial court could reasonably have
disbelieved Karla’s testimony that Ariel falsely represented any facts
material to the parties’ property in their divorce, that he forced Karla to
sign documents transferring her interest in property she owned to others
when the documents themselves notified a person of what property they
transferred. Here, the trial court rejected Karla’s claim she didn’t
understand the documents because they are written in English and not
Spanish. The trial court also found that Karla consulted with an attorney
before she signed the documents relevant to her divorce, documents
signed in a binding mediation that resulted in a settlement of the
property dispute in the parties’ divorce.
To be sure, Karla testified during the trial that Ariel made false
representations that induced her to sign the documents in the mediation,
threatened to have her jailed for adultery, threatened to have her
deported, and that he made her terminate her attorney. But all that
conduct occurred before Karla attended the mediation and signed the
33McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d at 697.
22
Final Decree, so it was all conduct Karla could have (but didn’t) bring up
in the suit involving the parties’ divorce. Besides, Karla admitted in the
trial on the case involving her Bill that she signed the Mediated
Settlement Agreement. And that Agreement states neither party
committed fraud. Given the evidence before the court, the matters Karla
complains about concern matters that relate to intrinsic rather than
extrinsic fraud. For that reason, it was reasonable for the trial court to
find that Karla’s claims related to issues that she raised or with
reasonable diligence could have raised in the parties’ divorce.
The trial court also found the judgment in the divorce case was not
rendered under circumstances that were unmixed with negligence of
Karla’s own. 34 We agree with the trial court that there is evidence in the
record supporting that finding. For instance, the trial court heard
testimony that Karla fired the attorneys she retained to represent her
after those attorneys learned that Karla negotiated a settlement with
Ariel on her own. The trial court heard testimony that Karla’s attorney’s
told Karla after she signed the letter that they could get her more money
34See Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409.
23
if she didn’t settle. And Karla’s attorneys, when they represented her,
filed pleadings alleging Ariel committed fraud and converted property
owned by the community estate.
As the factfinder, the trial court could reasonably have concluded
that under the circumstances, Karla acted negligently by firing the
attorneys and proceeding to represent herself against someone she
alleged had engaged in fraud. Considering the record as a whole, we
cannot say the trial court’s verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.
Conclusion
We overrule Karla’s issues. The trial court’s judgment denying
Karla’s Bill of Review is
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on April 18, 2022
Opinion Delivered November 17, 2022
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
24