Janos Farkas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. And Brice Vander Linden & Wernic, P.C. N/K/A Buckley Madole, P.C. ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-14-00716-CV
4961709
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
4/20/2015 6:23:29 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-14-00716-CV
In the Court of Appeals FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
for the AUSTIN, TEXAS
Third Court of Appeals District Court of Texas
4/20/2015 6:23:29 PM
Sitting at Austin, Texas JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
Janos Farkas, Appellant
vs.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. n/k/a
Buckley Madole, P.C., Appellee
On Appeal from the 201st District Court
Travis County, Texas
Appellee’s Brief,
Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C.
Buckley Madole, P.C.
Sammy Hooda SBN: 24064032
Luke Madole SBN: 12801800
14841 Dallas Parkway, Suite 425
Dallas, Texas 75254
Telephone: (972) 643-6600
Facsimile: (972) 643-6699
Email: sammy.hooda@buckleymadole.com
Attorney for Appellee
Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a
Buckley Madole, P.C.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
No. 03-14-00716-CV
In the Court of Appeals
for the
Third Court of Appeals District of Texas
Sitting at Austin, Texas
Janos Farkas, Appellant
vs.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. n/k/a
Buckley Madole, P.C., Appellee
On Appeal from the 201st District Court
Travis County, Texas
Appellee’s Brief,
Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C.
Buckley Madole, P.C.
Sammy Hooda SBN: 24064032
Luke Madole SBN: 12801800
14841 Dallas Parkway, Suite 425
Dallas, Texas 75254
Telephone: (972) 643-6600
Facsimile: (972) 643-6699
Email: sammy.hooda@buckleymadole.com
Attorney for Appellee
Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a
Buckley Madole, P.C.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV
Page: 1
Table of Contents
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................2
Identity of the Parties and Counsel ............................................................................3
Index of Authorities ...................................................................................................4
Statement of the Case.................................................................................................6
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ........................................................................7
Issues Presented for Review ......................................................................................8
1. Whether trial court erred in denying Frakas’ partial motion for summary
judgment, and in granting Brice’s traditional and no-evidence motion for
summary judgment on Farkas’ claims for violations of the Texas Debt Collection
Act, Texas Finance Code and Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. .......................................................................................................................8
Statement of Facts ......................................................................................................9
Summary of the Argument.......................................................................................10
Argument and Authorities........................................................................................11
I. Standards of Review .......................................................................................11
A. Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment ...............................................11
B. No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment ............................................11
II. The trial court did not err in granting Brice’s traditional and no-evidence
motion for summary judgment on Farkas’ claims for violations of the Texas Debt
Collection Act, Texas Finance Code and Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. ....................................................................................................12
A. Brice is entitled to the affirmative defense of attorney immunity as to
Farkas’ TDCA and TFC claims. ........................................................................13
B. Farkas’ CPRC Chapter 12 violation claims fail as a matter of law. ...........16
Conclusion and Prayer .............................................................................................19
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................21
Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................21
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV
Page: 2
Identity of the Parties and Counsel
(1) Appellant Represented by:
Janos Farkas William D. Davis
(Plaintiff in the underlying action) Bar No. 00796444
bdavis@capital-ip.com
DAVIS & ASSOCIATES
P.O. Box 1093
Dripping Springs, Texas 78620
512-858-9910 (Telephone)
512-858-2357 (Fax)
(2) Appellee Represented by:
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. B. David Foster
(Defendant in the underlying action) Bar No. 24031555
dfoster@lockelord.com
Susan A. Kidwell
Bar No. 24032626
skidwell@lockelord.com
LOCKE LORD, LLP
600 Congress Ave. Suite 2200
Austin, Texas 78701
512-305-4700 (Telephone)
512-305-4800 (Fax)
(3) Appellee Represented by:
Brice, Vander Linden, P.C., Sammy Hooda
n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C. Bar No. 24064032
(Defendant in the underlying action) sammy.hooda@buckleymadole.com
Luke Madole
Bar No. 12801800
luke.madole@buckleymadole.com;
BUCKLEY MADOLE, P.C.
14841 Dallas Parkway, Suite 425
Dallas, Texas 75254
972-643-6600 (Telephone)
972-643-6699 (Fax)
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV
Page: 3
Index of Authorities
Cases
Butler v. Lilly, 533 S.W.2d 130, 131-34 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1976, writ dism’d).................................................................................................12
Campbell v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al., 2012 WL
1839357 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012) .....................................................................13
Dolcefino v. Randolph, 195 S.W.3d 906, 917 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied)..................................................................................................11
Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W3d 48, 493 (Tex. 2001) ................................17
Iqbal v. Bank of America, N.A., et al., 559 Fed. Appx. 363 (5th Cir. 2014) ...........13
Kiggundu v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 2606359, at *7 (S.D.
Tex. June 30, 2011)...............................................................................................16
Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1910, writ ref’d) .......12
Marsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 888 F. Supp. 2d 805, 812-14 (W.D. Tex.
2012) .....................................................................................................................15
Mart. v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) .....................................................................................................12
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985) .........................10
Purported Lien or Claim Against Bond v. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel,
LLP, No. G-12-188, 2013 WL 1619691, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2013) ........18
Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995) ............10
Rojas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 2014 WL 2547770 (5th Cir. June 6, 2014)
...............................................................................................................................13
Taco Bell Corp. v. Cracken, 939 F. Supp. 528, 532 (N.D. Tex. 1996) ....................12
Statutes
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 12.002..................................................................19
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 12.002(a) .............................................................17
Rules
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).............................................................................................11
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) .............................................................................................11
TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.1(d).................................................................................................................... 17
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV
Page: 4
Constitutional Provisions
Tex. Const. Art. XVI § 50(r)....................................................................................18
Legislative History
House Comm. On Criminal Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1185, 75th
Leg., R.S. (1997) ...................................................................................................18
Senate Jurisprudence Committee, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1185, 75th Leg., R.S.
(1997) ....................................................................................................................18
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV
Page: 5
Statement of the Case
Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C. (“Brice”),
is a law firm hired to assist banks with the foreclosure process. In this case, Brice
was retained by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) to assist in the foreclosure
of 6315 Farmdale Lane, Austin, Texas 78749 (“Property”). Appellant, Janos Farkas’
(“Farkas”) had failed pay his residential mortgage as contractually agreed. In
discharging its duties as Wells Fargo’s attorney, Brice sent Farkas notices advising
of the default on his residential mortgage and, ultimately, Brice filed an expedited
foreclosure proceeding under Rule 736 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on
behalf of Wells Fargo.
The trial court rightly granted Brice’s traditional and no-evidence motion for
summary judgment and rightly denied Farkas’ partial motion for summary
judgment. Below, Farkas failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact or present
more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his claims against Brice. Furthermore,
Brice asserted the affirmative defense of attorney immunity. Texas law is clear –
attorneys are immune from claims like those asserted by Farkas, and must remain
immune in the interest of orderly administration of the civil justice system. Thus,
Brice now submits its Appellee’s Brief in support of trials court’s judgment granting
its motion for summary judgment against all of Farkas’ claims.
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Statement Regarding Oral Argument
Appellee, Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a Buckley Madole,
P.C., does not request oral argument in this matter.
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Issues Presented for Review
1. Whether trial court erred in denying Frakas’ partial motion for
summary judgment, and in granting Brice’s traditional and no-evidence motion for
summary judgment on Farkas’ claims for violations of the Texas Debt Collection
Act, Texas Finance Code and Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV
Page: 8
Statement of Facts
On January 11, 2007, Farkas executed a Wells Fargo Home Equity Account
Agreement and Disclosure Statement (“Account Agreement”) and a Texas Deed of
Trust (the “Deed of Trust”) securing a home equity line of credit of $103,441.00.
[CR 47-61, 70-83] The Account Agreement and Deed of Trust will collectively be
referred to as the “Loan.”
Farkas subsequently defaulted on the Loan in September 2010, and Brice,
acting as foreclosure counsel on behalf of Wells Fargo sent a Notice of Default and
Intention to Accelerate to Farkas on April 21, 2011. [87-88] Farkas failed to cure the
default, and Brice then sent Farkas a notice on June 23, 2011 that the debt was being
accelerated. [CR 90-91] On September 15, 2011, Brice sent Farkas notice of its
application for an order allowing foreclosure. [CR 92-149] The Rule 736 proceeding
filed regarding the Property was subsequently abated and dismissed by operation of
law when Farkas filed an independent lawsuit on December 5, 2011, which is the
subject of this appeal. TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.11(c).
Farkas does not dispute that he is in default. Instead, Farkas challenges Wells
Fargo’s ability to foreclose and alleges Brice violated the Texas Debt Collection Act
(“TDCA”), Texas Finance Code (“TFC”) § 382.001 et seq., and Chapter 12 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code (“CPRC”). [CR 9-12] The trial court did not err
because Brice was entitled to summary judgment on all of Farkas’ claims.
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Summary of the Argument
The trial court did not err in granting Brice’s motion for summary judgment
while denying Farkas’ motion for partial summary judgment. In its motion for
traditional and no-evidence summary judgment Brice successfully disproved an
element of Farkas’ causes of action and/or specifically (and successfully) challenged
the evidentiary support for an element of Farkas’ claims. The summary judgment
evidence conclusively established Brice’s affirmative defense of attorney immunity
on all of Farkas’ claims demonstrating that all actions taken by Brice were during
the course of its representation of Wells Fargo and solely in its capacity as legal
counsel for Wells Fargo in furtherance of protecting Wells Fargo’s interest in the
Property at issue herein.
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Argument and Authorities
Fakas’ brief as to Appellee Brice, focuses on Brice’s inability to assert
attorney immunity as an affirmative defense against the claims alleged by Farkas.
Thus, Brice’s brief is limited in response to it being entitled to the affirmative
defense of attorney immunity on all of Farkas’ claims.
I. Standards of Review
A. Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment
A party who moves for traditional summary judgment must establish that no
genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d
546, 548 (Tex. 1985). If the movant seeks summary judgment on a claim for which
movant does not bear the burden of proof, the movant may meet its burden by either
conclusively negating at least one essential element of the respondent’s claim or by
pleading and conclusively establishing each element of an affirmative defense to the
claim. Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995).
B. No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment
A party may move for summary judgment “on the ground that there is no
evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which the
adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). A no-
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evidence motion for summary judgment must specifically state the elements for
which there is no evidence. Id. “The court must grant the motion unless the
respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material
fact.” Id. Any such evidence must be competent. Dolcefino v. Randolph, 195 S.W.3d
906, 917 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
II. The trial court did not err in granting Brice’s traditional and no-
evidence motion for summary judgment on Farkas’ claims for violations of
the Texas Debt Collection Act, Texas Finance Code and Chapter 12 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Farkas’ asserted claims against Brice for violations of the Texas Debt
Collection Act (“TDCA”), Texas Finance Code (“TFC”) § 382.001 et seq., and
Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (“CPRC”), relying entirely on
one or more of the following allegations: 1) various notices incorrectly name Wells
Fargo Home Equity as either current mortgagee or mortgage servicer and there is no
evidence in the property records of a transfer from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to Wells
Fargo Home Equity; 2) the notice of default and acceleration reference the wrong
loan number and therefore are ineffective; 3) various notices improperly refer to a
potential non-judicial foreclosure of Farkas’ home equity loan; and 4) various
notices misstate the amount of the debt. [CR 4-12]
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A. Brice is entitled to the affirmative defense of attorney immunity as
to Farkas’ TDCA and TFC claims.
In general, attorneys are immune from suits by their client’s adversaries for
conduct undertaken in their capacity as attorneys. See, e.g., Butler v. Lilly, 533
S.W.2d 130, 131-34 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism’d) (an
attorney enjoys “qualified immunity,” with respect to non-clients, for action taken
in connection with representing a client in adversarial circumstances). Based on
overriding public policy, Texas courts have consistently held that an opposing party
“does not have a right of recover, under any cause of action, against another attorney
arising from his discharge of his duties in representing a party.” See Taco Bell Corp.
v. Cracken, 939 F. Supp. 528, 532 (N.D. Tex. 1996). Attorneys have an absolute right
to “practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or
supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” See Kruegel v.
Murphy, 126 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1910, writ ref’d). The courts have
also held that attorney immunity applies whether the attorney is providing his serves
within the context of litigation, or simply in a business transaction; the immunity
extends to non-litigation conduct as well as litigation conduct. See Martin v. Trevino,
578 S.W.2d 763, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Texas
law is clear – attorneys are immune from claims like Plaintiff’s and must remain
immune in the interest of orderly administration of the civil justice system.
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Farkas argument that Brice is not entitled to attorney immunity is premised
on the fact that Brice is not an “attorney-at-law” and no attorney has been named as
a defendant. Farkas further claims that qualified immunity is only applicable for
attorneys in litigation, and the Brice’s conduct complained of relates to actions
outside of litigation. However, Texas law holds opposite of both of these theories
and as such these theories fail as a matter of law. There are three leading cases on
point that have developed the attorney immunity defense in the foreclosure context.
See Rojas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 2014 WL 2547770 (5th Cir. June 6,
2014); Iqbal v. Bank of America, N.A., et al., 559 Fed. Appx. 363 (5th Cir. 2014);
Campbell v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al., 2012 WL
1839357 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012).
All three of these cases arose from foreclosure proceedings being pursued by
banks against homeowners that were in default under the terms of their mortgages.
The banks retained legal counsel to assist them in pursuing their rights to foreclose
and within that process a lawsuit was filed naming numerous parties, including the
attorneys and/or the law firms representing the banks. In all three cases the courts
reached the conclusion that the attorneys and law firms representing the banks during
the foreclosure process were protected by attorney immunity from the plaintiffs’
claims. See Iqbal, 559 Fed. Appx. at 365 (“they [plaintiffs] contend their claims
against BDFTE [law firm] were viable because BDFTE [law firm] did not qualify
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for attorney immunity. We disagree. BDFTE [law firm] was retained to assist in the
foreclosure, and the action complained of by the Iqbals [plaintiffs] are within the
scope of their [law firm] representation. The Iqbals [plaintiffs] argue that attorney
immunity applies only in the ligiation context, but that stance is not in line with
Texas law”); Rojas, 2014 WL 2547770 at *2 (“attorneys are generally immune from
suits brought under Texas law against them by their adversaries if the action arises
out of the duties involved in representing a client. We have previously held that
BDFTE [law firm] has immunity for its acts as foreclosure counsel”)
Similarly, Brice is entitled to attorney immunity against all of the claims
asserted by Farkas, because all conduct complained of was performed by Brice
during the course of their representation of Wells Fargo and solely in its capacity as
legal counsel for Wells Fargo in furtherance of protecting Wells Fargo’s interest in
the Property at issue. Iqbal, 559 Fed. Appx. at 365 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing, Campbell,
No. 03-11-00429-CV, 2012 WL 1839357, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Austin, May 18,
2012) (affirming dismissal on grounds of attorney immunity in wrongful foreclosure
case against attorneys retained by Wells Fargo to assist in foreclosure)). Brice was
retained by Wells Fargo to assist in the foreclosure of the Property. The only
communication Brice had with Farkas was in its capacity as “legal counsel for Wells
Fargo in an adverse relationship with Plaintiff.” [CR 352-353] The actions Farkas
complains of herein were within the scope of Brice’s representation of Wells Fargo
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in the foreclosure proceeding against the Property. Therefore, under Texas law Brice
is immune from suits brought against it by its clients’ adversaries (i.e., Farkas) if the
action arises out of the duties involved in representing a client. Rojas, 571 Fed.
Appx. at 278 (5th Cir. 2014) (“We have previously held that BDFTE [a law firm
defendant] has immunity for its acts as foreclosure counsel”). Thus, Farkas’ claims
against Brice for violations of the TDCA and TFC § 382.001 et seq., fail as a matter
of law.
B. Farkas’ CPRC Chapter 12 violation claims fail as a matter of law.
Frakas’ claims that the notices and correspondences sent by Brice on behalf
of Wells Fargo violates CPRC Chapter 12 also fails as a matter of law because the
notices and correspondence: 1) do not create a lien or claim against real property;
and 2) were never recorded. [CR 10-12]
First, section 12.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code only
applies to documents which create a fraudulent lien or claim, not to documents
pertaining to when, where, how, or by whom a valid lien may be enforced. See Marsh
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 888 F. Supp. 2d 805, 812-14 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
Under Chapter 12, a person “may not make, present, or use a document” with
knowledge that it is a “fraudulent lien or claim against real or personal property or
[against] an interest in real or personal property,” and with intent that it “be given
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the same legal effect as . . . a valid lien or claim.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
12.002(a). A necessary element of Farkas’ section 12.002 claim, therefore, is that
the document alleged to be fraudulent is (or purports to be) a “lien or claim.”
Though, Farkas’ brief does not expressly state the actions taken by Brice in
violation of CPRC 12, Farkas does insinuate (and has argued in the summary
judgment evidence included in the record) that Brice’s filing of the Rule 736
application seeking an order to allow foreclosure violated CPRC 12. Brice, on behalf
of Wells Fargo, sent Plaintiff notices and correspondence related to the default on
the Loan. Thereafter, Brice, on behalf of Wells Fargo, filed a Rule 736 application
and included the statutory notices that were sent to the Farkas as required by the
rules. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.1(d). Thus, the notices and correspondence sent herein
are, at best, documents relating to the enforcement of a valid lien and do not
themselves create a lien or claim against real property. See Kiggundu v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 2606359, at *7 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2011)
(documents used to foreclose on real property are not actionable under section
12.002 if the underlying note and deed of trust are valid).
Farkas would have this Court believe that filing a proceeding required under
the Texas Constitution and provided for by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is a
violation of CPRC 12. If this is the rule then every Rule 736 application that is filed
can be abated by filing an independent lawsuit alleging CPRC 12 violations. Surely,
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this was not the intent of the Texas Legislator and the Texas Supreme Court, and
surely that is not the plain meaning of CPRC 12. Under Texas rules of statutory
construction, the Court “must construe statutes as written and, if possible, ascertain
legislative intent from the statute’s language. Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47
S.W3d 48, 493 (Tex. 2001).
The legislative history provides that the purpose of this section was to “create
a private cause of action against a person who files fraudulent judgment liens or
fraudulent documents purporting to create a lien or claim against real or personal
property in favor of a person aggrieved by the filing.” House Comm. On Criminal
Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1185, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (emphasis
added); see also Senate Jurisprudence Committee, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1185,
75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
The filing of the Rule 736 application is contrary to the plain meaning and the
legislative intent of CPRC 12. The Rule 736 application is filed pursuant to the rules
promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court, which power is derived from the Texas
Constitution. See Tex. Const. Art. XVI § 50(r). Its purpose is to enforce, not create,
the lien. It is unimaginable that the Texas Legislators and the Texas Supreme Court
were oblivious to the fact that creating Rule 736 will allow every application to be
in violation of CPRC 12. The 736 application filed herein was filed to obtain a court
order required to proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure sale against Plaintiff’s real
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property. See Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 813 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (“the Court concludes
in order to state a fraudulent lien claim under Section 12.002, a party must allege the
challenged instrument purported to create a lien or claim against property”). Thus, it
is absurd to purpose that by following the rules, Brice subjected itself to liability for
violation of CPRC 12.
Lastly, Farkas’ fraudulent lien claim fails because Brice did not file nor record
either of the documents at issue; rather, they were simply mailed to Farkas. [CR 4-
8, 10-12] This is fatal to a section 12.002 claim because Chapter 12 (which governs
"Liability Related to a Fraudulent Court Record or a Fraudulent Lien or Claim Filed
Against Real or Personal Property") only applies to documents that are filed or
recorded in the public property records. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 12.002; see also Purported Lien or Claim Against Bond v. Barrett Daffin Frappier
Turner & Engel, LLP, No. G-12-188, 2013 WL 1619691, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22,
2013) ("Section 12.002 prohibits a person from filing fraudulent documents under
certain circumstances. . . .") (emphasis added).
Conclusion and Prayer
As shown above the trial court did not err in granting Brice’s traditional and
no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Farkas has not shown that he has
evidence to support all of the elements on any of his cause of action, Farkas did not
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produce summary judgment evidence that raised a genuine issue of material fact,
and Brice is entitled to the affirmative defense of attorney immunity as a matter of
law on all of Farkas’ claims.
Appellee, Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a Buckley Madole,
P.C., prays that this Honorable Court affirm the judgment of the trial trail court
rendered in its favor on all of Farkas’ claims, that all costs of the appeal be taxed
against Farkas, and for such other relief, general and special, legal and equitable, to
which it may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Sammy Hooda
Sammy Hooda SBN: 24064032
Luke Madole SBN: 12801800
Buckley Madole, P.C.
14841 Dallas Parkway, Suite 425
Dallas, Texas 752542
Telephone: (972) 643-6600
Facsimile: (972) 643-6699
Email:sammy.hooda@buckleymadole.com
Attorney for Appellee
Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., f/k/a
Buckley Madole, P.C.
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV
Page: 20
Certificate of Compliance
I certify that the foregoing Brief of Appellee Brice, Vander Linden &
Wernick, P.C. n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C. contains 2,682 words (excluding the
sections expected under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1)).
Certificate of Service
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on the
following counsel of record, in accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.5, on this 17th day of April, 2015.
VIA Electronic Service
Bill Davis
Davis & Associates
P.O. Box 1093
Dripping Springs, Texas 78620
bdavis@capital-ip.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
JANOS FARKAS
VIA Electronic Service
Dave Foster
Locke Lord, LLP
600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2200
Austin, Texas 78701
dfoster@lockelord.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
/s/ Sammy Hooda
Sammy Hooda
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV
Page: 21