Owings v. Commerce Farm Credit Co. , 1930 Tex. App. LEXIS 657 ( 1930 )

BLAIR, J.

Appellant sued appelíees, Commerce Farm Credit Company and E. K. Hall, for dam ages for personal injuries sustained by appellant as tbe result of a collision between an automobile owned by said credit company, driven at tbe time by its agent Hall, and an automobile in wbicb appellant was riding, belonging to and being driven at tbe time by Jack Owings, appellant’s adopted son. As grounds of negligence appellant alleged that Hall was operating tbe car at a rate of speed in excess of 60 miles per bour; and that be failed to give appellant one-half tbe road, but suddenly , veered his car to tbe loft of tbe center of tbe road, causing it to collide with tbe car in wbicb appellant was riding, inflicting tbe injuries and damages complained of by her. Appellee answered by a demurrer and a general denial, and specially that tbe accident occurred on a narrow one-car-drive bridge; that tbe car driven by Hall got on tbe bridge and was halfway across before tbe car in which appellant was riding approached from tbe opposite direction, but in gross violation of tbe rules and custom of tbe road tbe driver of said car drove same on tbe bridge and struck appellee’s car, knocking.it off tbe bridge and into tbe ravine; and that Owings’ failure to stop and yield passageway to Hall caused tbe collision.

Tbe jury found in response to special issues: (a) That Hall was driving in excess of 35 miles per bour at tbe time of the collision ; (b) but that tbe rate of speed at wbicb Hall was driving was not tbe proximate cause of tbe collision; (c) that Hall did not veer bis car to tbe left of the center of tbe road at tbe place of the collision; (d) that the accident was not unavoidable; . and (e) that tbe collision did not occur on tbe ’bridge as alleged by Hall, but off tbe bridge on tbe side which Hall was approaching after Owings’ car bad crossed. Judgment was for appellees ; hence this appeal.

Appellant contends that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the jury’s findings that tbe collision did not occur on tbe bridge and that Hall’s car did not veer to to tbe left of tbe center of tbe road at tbe time of tbe collision, and especially so when viewed in tbe light of the jury’s additional findings that the accident was not unavoidable and was not the proximate result of tbe high rate of speed at wbicb tbe jury found Hall was driving at tbe time of tbe accident. We find no such conflict; nor do we sustain appellantrs remaining contention that tbe jury’s adverse findings on tbe issues of interest to appellant are against tbe uncontrovert-ed evidence. The jury simply found that tbe accident did not occur on the bridge as contended for by appellees, and also found that Hall did not veer his car to tbe left of tbe center of tbe road as contended by appellant. There is evidence to support both of these findings and accounts for tbe accident in another way. It shows that tbe cars were approaching tbe narrow one-car-drive bridge from opposite directions, both running at an admitted rate of about 35 miles per bour, and tbe evidence also showing that each was going at tbe rate of 50 or 60 miles per bour. Tbe parties saw each other for about one-half mile before they reached tbe bridge. A few feet- before Hall reached tbe narrow bridge be applied bis brakes, tbe rear end of bis ear skidding toward tbe center of the road. Owings came onto and across the bridge without checking tbe speed of his car in the least, and the rear end of tbe Hall car side-swiped or collided with Owings’ car, striking it near tbe back of tbe left front fender, knocking Hall’s car off tbe road into tbe ravine near the bridge, and Owings’ car passed on down tbe road some 93 feet before it stopped. This evidence supports tbe findings of tbe jury that tbe excessive rate of speed at which Hall was driving bis car was not tbe proximate cause of tbe collision, but would rather support a jury finding that tbe excessive rate at wbicb Owings was driving bis car and bis failure to check bis speed on approaching and crossing the bridge was tbe proximate cause of tbe collision.

We affirm tbe judgment of tbe trial court.

Affirmed.