Ronald C. Toler v. Vicky Lynn Sanders, F/K/A Vicky Toler ( 2012 )

Opinion issued May 17, 2012.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-11-00126-CV
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RONALD C. TOLER, Appellant
V.
VICKY LYNN SANDERS, F/K/A VICKY TOLER, Appellee
On Appeal from the 312th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2009-80785
OPINION
After eleven years of marriage, Ronald C. Toler (Ron) and Vicky Lynn
Sanders (Vicky) began divorce proceedings. They decided to resolve any conflicts
relating to their division of community property with a mediator’s assistance and
entered into a mediated settlement agreement (MSA). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 6.602 (West 2006). After signing the MSA, however, Ron claimed that the
writing did not reflect the parties’ agreed division of the retirement benefits earned
during the marriage. Ron fought to have the MSA set aside and to have the issue
returned to the mediator, but the trial court entered judgment on the MSA and
denied Ron’s motion for new trial. In his appeal, Ron contends that the trial court
erred in doing so because the MSA provision apportioning the retirement benefits
contains an ambiguity and a mutual or unilateral mistake renders the provision
unenforceable as written. Ron also contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding Vicky her attorney’s fees for defending the MSA’s
enforcement in the post-judgment proceedings. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
Ron’s main complaints concern the meaning of the MSA provision granting
a portion of Ronald’s retirement benefits to Vicky. That provision recites:
Parties agree to award wife 50% of the community property of Ron’s
Rail Road Retirement benefits, with a stop date of September 27,
2010.
Documentation produced by Ron before mediation explains that his monthly
railroad retirement benefits derive from two sources: (1) “Tier I,” the railroad
retirement benefit component,” constituting about 57% of the total monthly
benefit, and “Tier II,” the “[d]ivisible railroad retirement benefit components,”
further described as “supplemental annuity, dual benefits,” constituting about 43%
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of the total monthly benefit. A handwritten insertion adds “Retirement” to the
provision, and both parties’ handwritten initials appear at the bottom of the page.
The first page of the MSA recites in boldfaced print, “THIS AGREEMENT
IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVOCATION, AND MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS
OF SECTION 154.071, TEXAS FAMILY CODE TX CIVIL PRACTICE
REMEDIES CODE [sic].” This recital is followed by the divorcing spouse’s
initials and another boldfaced notice declaring “A PARTY TO THIS
AGREEMENT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THIS MEDIATED
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT [sic],” again followed by the parties’ initials.
Following the text on the last page, the MSA states “APPROVED,” followed by
the parties’ full signatures, as well as the signatures of the mediator and the parties’
attorneys.
A week after the MSA’s execution, Ron noticed that the provision did not
reflect his understanding of the agreement. The parties addressed this issue with
the mediator but were unable to reach a resolution. Before the final hearing for
entry of the decree, Ron moved to set aside the MSA and refer the matter back to
the mediator. The trial court denied the motion, and Ron renewed his request to set
aside the MSA and decree in a motion for new trial. Vicky opposed the motion
and requested that she be awarded $3,390 for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred
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in responding to the motion. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and
awarded Vicky $1,500 for fees and expenses.
Discussion
Mediated Settlement Agreement
Relying on his own sworn statement recounting the events at mediation,
Ronald maintains that the MSA provision at issue should have limited the award to
his “Tier I Rail Road Retirement Benefits,” and, because it does not, it results in a
different, larger award than he intended.
Resolution of this issue turns on the nature of the MSA and its interpretation.
Texas law provides divorcing spouses various ways to handle an agreed division of
their community property. Section 7.006 of the Family Code prescribes one such
method: it allows the parties to a execute settlement agreement that “may be
revised or repudiated before rendition of the divorce” and that must be approved by
the judge presiding over the divorce case. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006 (West
2006). Alternatively, divorcing spouses may choose to execute a settlement
agreement that
(1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in
boldfaced type or capital letters or underlined, that the
agreement is not subject to revocation;
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(2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and
(3) is signed by the party’s attorney, if any, who is present at the
time the agreement is signed.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.602(b), 6.603(d), 6.604(b), 153.0071(d) (West 2006).
When the agreement complies with these three requirements, it “is binding on the
parties” as soon as it is executed, and a party is “entitled to judgment on the
agreement notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another
rule of law.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.602(b(c), 6.603(d); 6.604(c),
153.0071(e); Cayan v. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); see In re Joyner, 196 S.W.3d 883, 890–91 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (noting that, by complying with requirements, “the
parties elect to make their agreement binding at the time of execution rather than at
the time of rendering, thus creating a procedural shortcut for the enforcement of
those agreements”). The Family Code does not authorize a court to modify an
MSA, to resolve ambiguities or otherwise, before incorporating it into a decree.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.604(9b)–(d); see also Beyers v. Roberts, 199 S.W.3d
354, 362 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (observing that trial
court’s modifications to settlement agreements are grounds for reversal where
modifications “add terms, significantly alter the original terms, or undermine the
intent of the parties”). A mediated settlement agreement under section 6.602 is
“more binding than a basic written contract” because, except when a party has
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procured the settlement through fraud or coercion, nothing either party does will
modify or void the agreement “once everyone has signed it.” Joyner, 196 S.W.3d
at 888; see Boyd v. Boyd 67 S.W.3d 398, 404–05 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no
pet.) (upholding trial court’s judgment setting aside MSA where husband failed to
disclose substantial community assets); see also Mullins v. Mullins, 202 S.W.3d
869, 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (“Unilateral withdrawal of consent
does not negate the enforceability of a mediated settlement agreement in divorce
proceedings.”).
The MSA at issue in this case meets the requirements of section 6.602 of the
Family Code. Mindful of the unique attributes the Family Code confers on the
MSA, we apply contract principles to interpret its meaning. Chapman v. Abbot,
251 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see Shanks v.
Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. 2003). We construe the entire writing in an
effort to harmonize and give effect to the decree as a whole. Shanks, 110 S.W.3d
at 447; Chapman, 251 S.W.3d at 616. We accord contract language its plain,
grammatical meaning unless it definitely appears that the intention of the parties
would thereby be defeated. Chapman, 251 S.W.3d at 616.
If the words used in the written instrument can be given a certain or definite
legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will construe
the contract as a matter of law. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983);
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Chapman, 251 S.W.3d at 616. Courts must enforce an unambiguous contract as
written and may not consider extrinsic evidence, such as Ron’s sworn statement,
for the purpose of creating an ambiguity or giving the contract a meaning different
from that which its language imports. David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d
447, 450 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam), cited in Tellepsen Builders, L.P. v.
Kendall/Heaton Assocs., Inc., 325 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Dyer v. Cotton, 333 S.W.3d 703, 718 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
Ambiguity
Ronald contends that the trial court should have set aside the MSA because
it is ambiguous. If a divorce decree’s terms are ambiguous, the court may consider
evidence in the record along with the decree to aid in its interpretation. Chapman,
251 S.W.3d at 617. A mere disagreement about the proper interpretation of an
agreement, however, does not make an agreement ambiguous; the instrument is
ambiguous only if, after application of the rules of construction, the agreement is
reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning or if its meaning is uncertain or
doubtful. Id.
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The term “50% of the community property of Ron’s Rail Road Retirement
Benefits” is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning: it
unambiguously entitles Vicky to that share of all of the retirement benefits earned
for the specified period under the railroad retirement plan. Ronald clearly would
have preferred to have limited Vicky’s share to 50% of the Tier I benefits under the
plan, but his urged construction does not emerge from the provision as written; to
convey that meaning would require additional language that would substantively
alter the provision’s plain meaning. A party’s request for an order altering or
modifying a property division in a final decree constitutes an impermissible
collateral attack. See Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. 2009). The trial
court, therefore, properly denied Ron’s request.
Mistake
Ron also contends that the trial court should have set aside the MSA based
on a mutual or unilateral mistake. Mutual mistake occurs when the parties to an
agreement have a common intention, but the written instrument does not reflect
that intent. Dyer, 333 S.W.3d at 718. Ron asserts “that the MSA does not reveal
the intent of both parties,” but absent from this assertion—and the record as a
whole—is any showing that the mistake was mutual. Notably, Vicky nowhere
indicated that she, too, meant to limit her share of Ron’s railroad retirement
benefits to the Tier I benefits. Ron’s sworn statement concerning the events at
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mediation, therefore, was not properly before the trial court. Under the parol
evidence rule, courts may not consider extrinsic evidence that varies or contradicts
the express or implied terms of the written agreement absent a showing of fraud,
accident, or mutual mistake. See id.; DeClaire v. G&B McIntosh Fam. Ltd. P’ship,
260 S.W.3d 34, 45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no. pet.).
In a footnote in his brief, Ron also alludes to the rule that a court may set
aside a contract based on unilateral mistake if the party shows that (1) the mistake
is of so great a consequence that to enforce the contract would be unconscionable;
(2) the mistake relates to a material feature of the contract; (3) the mistake
occurred despite ordinary care; and (4) setting aside the contract does not prejudice
the other party except for the loss of the bargain. See Ledig v. Duke Energy Corp.,
193 S.W.3d 167, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Ron,
however, cannot make the required showing. “A party who signs a document is
presumed to know its contents . . . .” In re Lyon Fin’l Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d
228, 232 (Tex. 2007). Ron initialed the bottom of the page containing the
retirement benefits provision—which has a handwritten revision—and signed off
on the MSA as a whole. He cannot avoid the provision by alleging that he simply
failed to notice it until after signing. See In re U.S. Home Corp., 236 S.W.3d 761,
764 (Tex. 2007). Based on Ron’s failure to adduce any proof of a mistake, the trial
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court thus properly refused to consider Ron’s extra-contractual statements in
upholding the plain meaning of the MSA provision.
The language apportioning a share of Ron’s railroad retirement benefits to
Vicky is unambiguous, and Ron has not shown a mutual or unilateral mistake. We
therefore hold that the trial court properly denied Ron’s motion to set aside the
MSA. For the same reasons, we further hold that the trial court was entitled to
construe the MSA as a matter of law and thus did not err by denying Ron’s request
to refer this dispute to the mediator.1
Attorney’s fees award
Ron complains that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Vicky
her attorney’s fees on the basis the trial court’s underlying decision on the merits is
erroneous. Because we have upheld the trial court’s ruling, this complaint lacks
merit, and Ron does not advance any other ground for reversing the attorney’s fee
award. As a result, we leave the attorney’s fee award undisturbed.
1
Ron points to language in the MSA that, according to his reading, required
that the trial court refer the dispute to the mediator for resolution. See
Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. 2010). The record shows the
mediator already attempted to assist the parties in resolving this dispute, but
does not contain any document from the mediator following that attempt.
We do not agree that the language he relies on requires the trial court to refer
every dispute over the MSA’s interpretation to the mediator. This case
differs from Milner in that the challenged language is unambiguous, and in
that the mediator did not resolve the dispute when presented with it.
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Conclusion
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying Ronald Toler’s motion for
new trial or in awarding Vicky Sanders her attorney’s fees. We therefore affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Sharp. Justice Sharp concurs in the
judgment only.
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