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Texas Medical Board v. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas ( 2012 )


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  •                        In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    _________________________
    No. 06-11-00075-CV
    ______________________________
    TEXAS MEDICAL BOARD, Appellant
    V.
    GREG ABBOTT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 126th Judicial District Court
    Travis County, Texas
    Trial Court No. D-1-GN-10-000442
    Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
    Opinion by Justice Carter
    OPINION
    In this case of first impression, the Texas Medical Board (Board) appeals a summary
    judgment1 entered in favor of Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas (AG) requiring the Board
    to disclose the telephone and fax numbers of physicians-in-training and visiting physicians under
    the Public Information Act (PIA).2 We determine that the telephone and fax numbers of visiting
    physicians are exempted from disclosure under the Medical Practice Act, while the information
    relating to physicians-in-training is not exempted. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment with
    respect to physicians-in-training and reverse the judgment requiring disclosure of the telephone
    and fax numbers of visiting physicians.
    I.       Factual and Procedural Background
    On October 15, 2009, the Board received a PIA request from requestor Eddie McKibben
    of Optimum Healthcare for:
    [A]ll contact information (name, Company name, address, city, state, zip,
    telephone, and fax numbers) via electronic file for all of the following categories
    in the State of Texas from January 1990 to October 15th 2009:
    Physician Applicants
    Licensed Physicians
    1
    Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
    Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2005). We are
    unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant
    issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
    2
    “The attorney general shall prosecute and defend all actions in which the state is interested before the supreme
    court and courts of appeals.” T EX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 402.021 (West 2005). Thus, “where two state agencies are
    on opposite sides of a lawsuit, the attorney general is required to represent both agencies.” Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No.
    JM-28 (1983), available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/47mattox/op/1983/htm/jm0028.htm.
    2
    Physicians in Training3
    Board-Approved Fellowship Application (Word/657kb)
    Visiting Physician Temporary Permit4
    Physician Assistants
    Applicants
    Acupuncturist Applicants5
    The Board provided all of the requested information except for telephone and fax numbers
    because it believed this information was confidential pursuant to the Medical Practice Act.
    The Medical Practice Act,6 specifically Section 156.006 of the Texas Occupations Code,
    requires “license holders” to submit telephone and fax numbers to the Board so that the Board
    may contact the license holder in the event of an emergency and further provides:
    The information provided by a license holder under this section is confidential
    and is not subject to disclosure under Chapter 552, Government Code. The board
    may not publish, release, or make available information provided by a license
    holder under this section except [in the event of a public health emergency].
    TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 156.006(d) (West 2012).                       Another exemption from disclosure is
    provided in Section 164.007(c), which states:
    Each complaint, adverse report, investigation file, other investigation report, and
    other investigative information in the possession of or received or gathered by the
    board or its employees or agents relating to a license holder, an application for
    license, or a criminal investigation or proceeding is privileged and confidential
    3
    Physicians in training may perform medical acts if (1) a person participating in a graduate medical education
    training program approved by the board obtains a permit, (2) the act is performed as a part of the training program,
    and (3) the act is performed under the supervision of a physician. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.105 (West 2012).
    4
    Visiting physicians can practice medicine in a location designated as either a health professional shortage area or a
    medically underserved area under the supervision of a licensed Texas physician for a limited time. TEX. OCC. CODE
    ANN. § 155.101 (West 2012); 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 172.5 (West, Westlaw 2012).
    5
    There is no argument that the telephone and fax numbers are considered “public information.” See TEX. GOV’T
    CODE ANN. § 552.002 (West 2012).
    6
    TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 151.001 (West 2012).
    3
    and is not subject to discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for
    release to anyone other than the board or its employees or agents involved in
    discipline of a license holder. For purposes of this subsection, investigative
    information includes information relating to the identity of, and a report made by,
    a physician performing or supervising compliance monitoring for the board.
    TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 164.007(c) (West 2012). According to a December 4, 2006, Letter
    Ruling OR2006-14198 from the AG interpreting this exception, “Section l64.007(c) of the
    Occupations Code is applicable to investigatory records compiled by the board during an
    investigation of an application for license.”
    A governmental body that receives a written request for information that it wishes
    to withhold from public disclosure and that it considers to be within one of the
    exceptions . . . must ask for a decision from the attorney general about whether
    the information is within that exception if there has not been a previous
    determination about whether the information falls within one of the exceptions.
    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.301 (West 2012). The Board requested a letter ruling from the
    Open Records Division of the Office of the Attorney General.
    In a January 11, 2010, Letter Ruling OR 2010-00521, the AG determined that the
    telephone and fax numbers of all of the requested categories were to be kept confidential, except
    for the telephone and fax numbers of physicians-in-training and visiting physicians. This Letter
    Ruling reasoned that because physicians-in-training and visiting physicians have permits, not
    licenses, Sections 156.006 and 164.007 did not apply to exempt the information from disclosure.
    Believing that both physicians-in-training and visiting physicians were granted licenses to
    practice medicine, not permits, the Board filed suit in Travis County against the AG under
    4
    Section 552.324 of the Texas Government Code7 on February 11, 2010. The Board requested
    declaratory relief “that this Court find that the withheld information is confidential by law and
    therefore excepted from disclosure under the [PIA] under sections 552.101 of the Government
    Code,” and moved for summary judgment. The AG filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
    arguing that the “confidentiality provisions apply only to license holders, not permit holders.”
    The trial court denied the Board’s motion and granted the AG’s motion, prompting the Board’s
    appeal.
    II.         Standard of Review
    Both the Board and the AG filed motions for summary judgment, and each bore the
    burden of establishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. City of Garland v.
    Dallas Morning News, 
    22 S.W.3d 351
    , 356 (Tex. 2000). “When the trial court grants one motion
    and denies the other, the reviewing court should determine all questions presented” and should
    “render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered.” 
    Id. Section 552.001
    of the PIA states:
    Under the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of
    representative government that adheres to the principle that government is the
    servant and not the master of the people, it is the policy of this state that each
    person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to
    7
    Section 552.324 of the Texas Government Code states, in pertinent part:
    The only suit a governmental body may file seeking to withhold information from a requestor is a
    suit that:
    (1) is filed in a Travis County district court against the attorney general in accordance
    with Section 552.325; and
    (2) seeks declaratory relief from compliance with a decision by the attorney general . . . .
    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.324 (West 2012).
    5
    complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of
    public officials and employees.
    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.001 (West 2012). The PIA is “liberally construed in favor of
    granting a request for information,” and unless an exception applies, disclosure of public
    information is required under the PIA. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 552.001, 552.101 (West
    2012). Information is excepted from disclosure if “it is information considered to be confidential
    by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.”    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
    § 552.101.
    “[W]hether information is subject to the [PIA] and whether an exception to disclosure
    applies to the information are questions of law.” City of 
    Garland, 22 S.W.3d at 357
    (citing A&T
    Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 
    904 S.W.2d 668
    (Tex. 1995)). To make this determination, we must
    construe the PIA and asserted exemptions under the Medical Practice Act in order to determine
    the interaction between these laws. See Abbott v. Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental
    Retardation, 
    212 S.W.3d 648
    , 655 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). Under the PIA, public
    information is available upon request and may not be withheld from disclosure unless it falls
    within an exception to disclosure provided for in the PIA. In re City of Georgetown, 
    53 S.W.3d 328
    , 331 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Attorney Gen., 
    37 S.W.3d 152
    , 157 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). Exceptions to disclosure under the PIA are
    to be narrowly construed. Arlington Indep. Sch. 
    Dist., 37 S.W.3d at 157
    . In light of the PIA’s
    strong policy favoring disclosure, and consistent with the PIA’s “placement of the burden of
    proof on a governmental body when seeking an open records determination from the attorney
    6
    general, the governmental entity has the burden of proving in a judicial proceeding that an
    exception to disclosure applies.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Abbott, 
    310 S.W.3d 670
    , 674 (Tex.
    App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (citing Thomas v. Cornyn, 
    71 S.W.3d 473
    , 488 (Tex. App.—Austin
    2002, no pet.).
    Statutory construction is also generally a matter of law. Dallas Morning 
    News, 22 S.W.3d at 357
    . When interpreting statutes, we try to give effect to legislative intent, which
    remains “the polestar of statutory construction.” Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys. v.
    Abbott, 
    192 S.W.3d 862
    , 864 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied). “However, it is
    cardinal law in Texas that a court construes a statute, first, by looking to the plain and common
    meaning of the statute’s words.” 
    Id. “If the
    meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous,
    we adopt, with few exceptions, the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the
    provision’s words and terms.” 
    Id. “Further, if
    a statute is unambiguous, rules of construction or
    other extrinsic aids cannot be used to create ambiguity.” 
    Id. (citing Fitzgerald
    v. Advanced Spine
    Fixation Sys., Inc., 
    996 S.W.2d 864
    , 865 (Tex. 1999); In re Entergy Corp., 
    142 S.W.3d 316
    (Tex. 2004)).
    III.   Analysis
    Sections 156.006 and 164.007 of the Medical Practice Act only provide exceptions to
    disclosure under the PIA for “license holders.”        TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 156.006(d),
    164.007(c). The term “license” or “license holder” is not defined in the Medical Practice Act.
    7
    Therefore, the resolution of this case depends upon whether physicians-in-training and visiting
    physicians are license holders as determined by the Legislature’s intent when enacting the
    statutory framework.8
    A.       The Parties’ Arguments
    The Board argues that “because a person cannot practice medicine in Texas without
    holding a ‘license’ issued under the Medical Practice Act,” a person necessarily holds a license if
    the Board has authorized a person to engage in any of the actions described as “practicing
    medicine.” Section 151.002 of the Medical Practice Act defines “physician” and “practicing
    medicine”:
    (a)(12) “Physician” means a person licensed to practice medicine in this state. . . .
    (13) “Practicing medicine” means the diagnosis, treatment, or offer to treat a
    mental or physical disease or disorder or a physical deformity or injury by any
    system or method, or the attempt to effect cures of those conditions, by a person
    who: . . . .
    (B) directly or indirectly charges money or other compensation for those services.
    TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 151.002. However, while the definitional language clarifies that
    physicians are license holders, it is not so broad as to suggest that any person who practices
    medicine is a license holder. Indeed, even people who are unauthorized to practice by the Board
    can still engage in acts of practicing medicine under the definition (although not without
    consequence). Thus, the definitions in Section 151.002 do not resolve the question of whether
    physicians-in-training and visiting physicians are license holders or permit holders.
    8
    The Board also suggests that a permit “is a type of license.”
    8
    The AG points to distinctions between permits and license holders, which were
    previously made by the AG in a January 8, 2007, Letter Ruling OR2007-00210:
    You have not explained why section 164.007(c) should be construed to
    encompass information relating to a [physician-in-training] application or
    demonstrated how section 164.007(c) could be so interpreted. Compare Occ.
    Code § 155.105(a) (board may issue physician-in-training permit to physician not
    otherwise licensed by board) with 
    id. §§ 155.001
    (person may not practice
    medicine in this state unless person holds license issued under this subtitle),
    155.002 board may issue license to practice medicine to person who submits
    license application and meets statutory eligibility and examination requirements),
    155.0031(a) (prescribing procedures and requirements for application for license).
    In fact, the board’s rules define a [physician-in-training] permit as “a permit
    issued by the board . . . to a physician who does not hold a license to practice
    medicine in Texas.” 22 T.A.C.§ 171.3(a)(6)(A). Thus, we conclude that you
    have not demonstrated that the submitted information is confidential under section
    I64.007(c) of the Occupations Code.
    A July 11, 2006 Letter Ruling OR2006-07365 employed similar reasoning. However, “opinions
    of the attorney general are not binding on the courts.” 
    Thomas, 71 S.W.3d at 483
    . Instead, we
    turn to the statutes and the legislative intent to resolve the question at hand.
    B.       Visiting Physicians Are License Holders
    The Legislature’s language in the Medical Practice Act Section 155.101, the visiting
    physician statute, provides: “On application, the board shall grant a provisional license to
    practice medicine in a location described by Subsection (e) to an applicant for a license under
    this subtitle who is licensed in good standing as a physician in another state.” TEX. OCC. CODE
    ANN. § 155.101 (emphasis added). “The words the Legislature employed are the best indicators
    of legislative intent.” Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Samudio, No. 10-0554, 
    2012 WL 2476798
    , at *4
    (Tex. June 29, 2012). Thus, the plain and common meaning of the statute suggests that visiting
    9
    physicians are license holders, and disclosure of their telephone and fax numbers would not be
    required.9 This is consistent with the exemption under Section 164.007, which would require an
    investigation that the visiting physician does in fact hold a license in another state and is in good
    standing with that state’s medical board.
    Section 155.104 of the Medical Practice Act grants the Board authority to adopt rules.
    TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.104; see 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 161.1 (West, Westlaw
    2012). The AG argues that visiting physicians are not license holders because Board Rule 172.5,
    which describes the issuance of a “temporary permit” to visiting physicians, is limited in scope
    and duration of practice, allowing practice only “under the supervision of a licensed Texas
    physician” for up to ten days. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 172.5. While the Board uses the
    language “visiting physician temporary permit” in this Rule, which is listed under the subchapter
    entitled “temporary license,” our duty is to interpret the Legislature’s intent from statutory
    language in the Medical Practice Act, not the Board’s intent with respect to its rules, as the
    Board would not be authorized to circumvent legislative intent. See 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
    § 172.1 (West, Westlaw 2012), § 172.5.
    We find that visiting physicians are license holders under the Medical Practice Act and
    that their telephone and fax numbers were exempted from disclosure in this case.
    9
    Also, the exemptions in the Medical Practice Act state that information provided by license holders or those
    applying for licenses are confidential. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 156.006(d), 164.007(c). By definition, visiting
    physicians hold a license from another State.
    10
    C.       Physicians-in-Training Are Permit Holders
    In the case of a physician-in-training, “(b) A physician-in-training permit does not
    authorize the performance of a medical act by the permit holder unless the act is performed:
    (1) as a part of the graduate medical education training program; and (2) under the supervision of
    a physician.” TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.105(b). The physician-in-training statute is titled by
    the Legislature as a “Physician-In-Training Permit,” and is placed under a subchapter entitled
    “certain temporary licenses or permits.” TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.105(a) It reads: “(a) The
    board as provided by board rule may issue a physician-in-training permit to a physician not
    otherwise licensed by the board who is participating in a graduate medical education training
    program approved by the board.” TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.105(a).10 Again, the plain
    language of this statute controls, and suggests that physicians-in-training are permit holders. We
    presume that every word of a statute was used for a purpose and that every word excluded from a
    statute was excluded for a purpose. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 
    904 S.W.2d 656
    , 659 (Tex. 1995).
    Our ruling that the physicians-in-training are permit holders is bolstered by the
    corresponding Board Rule 171.3, located under the chapter title “Postgraduate Training Permits,”
    which reads: “[a] physician-in-training permit is a permit issued by the board in its discretion to
    a physician who does not hold a license to practice medicine in Texas and is enrolled in a
    training program. . . .” 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 171.3(6)(A) (West, Westlaw 2012). Rule
    10
    The Board suggests that the language “not otherwise licensed” acknowledges that “the permit issued to a
    physician-in-training is a type of license.” We disagree, as the plain language of the statute refers to issuance of a
    permit, which might not be necessary if a physician-in-training was otherwise licensed.
    11
    171.2 also refers to physicians-in-training with permits under 171.3 as “permit holders.” 22 TEX.
    ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 171.2 (West, Westlaw 2012).
    We find that physicians-in-training are permit holders under the Medical Practice Act and
    that their telephone and fax numbers were not exempted from disclosure in this case.
    IV.    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment with respect to physicians-in-training.       The portion of the
    judgment requiring disclosure of the telephone and fax numbers of visiting physicians is
    reversed, and judgment is rendered that visiting physicians are exempt from the sought
    disclosures.
    Jack Carter
    Justice
    Date Submitted:       August 8, 2012
    Date Decided:         September 6, 2012
    12