H. Glenn Gunter v. Empire Pipeline Corporation ( 2013 )

DISMISS; Opinion issued ,January 9, 2013.
In The
No. 05-12-00249-CV
H. GLENN GUNTER, Appellant
V.
EMPIRE PIPELhNE CORPORATION, EMPIRE EXPLORATION L.P., AND EMPIRE
EXPLORATION CORPORATION, Appellees
On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 06-01629-K
OPINION
Before Justices O’ Neiil, Fitzgerald, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice O’Neill
The parties bring this agreed interlo.cutory appeal pursuant to section 51.014(d) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In this appeal, the parties seek review of the trial court’s order
granting appellees’ Empire Pipeline Corporation, Empire Exploration, L.P., and Empire Exploration
Corporations "Motion to Quash Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum and Subpoena" and "Motion for
Protection." In the trial proceedings, appellant sought to depose Jennifer Keefe, an attorney that had
previously represented him in this same case, to obtain evidence to show a mediated settlement
agreement should be vacated. Appellees sought to quash the subpoena and moved for protectton
asserting appellant’s attempt to depose his own attorney was: (1) an attempt to "invade" the privilege
Ior statements made in mediation, (2) the discovery period was closed, and (3) any statements made
during mediation were not relevant. The trial court’s "’Order Permitting Agreed Interlocutory
Appeal" states the trial court was granting permission to appeal the "’Order Granting" the motion to
quash.
Article 51.014(d) provides that a trial court may permit an appeal of an order not otherwise
appealable if (1) the order appealed from involves a "controlling question" of law as to which there
is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (2) an immediate appeal from the order would
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. 8,[ REM. CODE
AttN. § 51.014(d) (West 20:08). Rule 28.2 of the rules of appellate procedure requires the notice of
appeal in such an appeal contain, among other things, ( 1 ) a statement that all parties agree that the
order appealed from involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground
for a difference of opinion, (2) a brief statement of the issues or points presented, and (3) a concise
explanation of how an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of this
litigation. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.2(c).~
Appellant’s notice of appeal stated that the parties agreed the appeal involved a "controlling
question of law" as to which there was a substantial ground for difference of opinion. The notice
further stated that the point presented for appeal concerned whether the trial court erred in granting
the motion to quash and for protection precluding plaintiff from deposing Keefe. The notice finally
claimed the appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation because the trial
court would be required to rule on the admissibility of testimony regarding statements made during
mediation at trial and that Keefe’s testimony may be material to the enforceability of the mediated
I This case was filed before Scptembm" I 201 I. therefore rule 28.2 applies. See rule 28.2. Note~ and Comments.
stillmerit a~rccm~t.
October 18.2012. we requested the parties to file jurisdictional briefs addressing whether
Ihis agrced interlocutory appeal of a discovery dispute meets the jurisdictional requirements. To
date, I~either appellant nor appellees have responded to our request. After reviewing the record, we
conclude this appeal does not meet the requirements of an agreed interlocutory appeal.
In its motion to quash, Etnpire asserted Gunter could not depose his own attorney because
it would allow Gunter to obtain facts obtained during mediation in violation of article 154.073(a)
of the civil practice and remedies code. The trial court granted the motion. To invoke this court’s
jurisdiction, the notice of appeal states an immediate appeal from the discovery ruling may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation because the testimony of Keefe "may be material"
to the question of enforceability of a ~nediated settlement agreement and the trial court will be
required to "rule on admissibility" of her testimony at trial.
A trial court’s determination on a motion to quash is not a determination as to admissibility,
but concerns a parties ability to acquire information that might lead to admissible information.
Gunter has not asserted he needed to depose of his own attorney to obtain the information he seeks.
Nor is there anything in the record to suggest Keefe has failed to disclose information to her former
client she obtained while representing him at mediation. Thus, unlike the mandamus brought in in
re Empire Pipeline, 323 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Tex. App.JDallas 2010, orig. proceeding), the issue is
not one of disclosure of confidential information, but rather whether testimony about the mediation
would ultimately be admissible at trial. It thus appears the parties are attempting to use an order on
a motion to quash as a vehicle for obtaining a pretrial evidentiary ruling as to the ultimate
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admissibility of evidence. However. whcthcr the tcstimony about the mediation in general, and
Kcefe’s tcstimony in particular, would be admissible at trial was not the issue before the trial court,
:rod is not the issue before us. indeed, any determination as to admissibility at this time is premature.
See. e.g., h~ re Chrisms Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 445 (Tex. 2007). We conclude the
trial court’s determination of the motion to quash is neither a controlling question of law nor would
it materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Consequently, we dismiss this
appeal.
JUSTICE
120249 F. P05
JUDGMENT
H. GLENN GUNTER, Appellant Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District
Court of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No.
No. 05- ! 2-00249-CV 06-01629- K).
Opinion delivered by Justice O’ Neill,
EMPIRE PIPELINE CORPORATION, Justices FitzGerald and O’Neill
EMPIRE PIPELINE EXPLORATION, L.P., participating.
AND EMPIRE EXPLORATION
CORPORATION, Appellees
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS this appeal. We ORDER each
party bear their own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered January 9, 2013.
JUSTICE