State v. Jonathan Michael Munsey , 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 2307 ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00610-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
V.
JONATHAN MICHAEL MUNSEY APPELLEE
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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF WICHITA COUNTY
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OPINION
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I. INTRODUCTION
The State appeals from the trial court’s written order granting Appellee
Jonathan Michael Munsey’s motion to suppress evidence. The State argues that
the trial court incorrectly applied Texas Transportation Code section 545.058(a) to
the facts of the case and failed to recognize Munsey’s traffic violation under Texas
Transportation code section 545.101. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.058(a)
(West 2011) (captioned, “Driving on Improved Shoulder”), § 545.101 (West 2011)
(captioned, “Turning at Intersection”). We will reverse.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Patrick Timms stopped Munsey
after witnessing his truck make a wide left turn onto the improved shoulder of
northbound FM 369 from eastbound FM 367 in Wichita County. Munsey was
charged with driving while intoxicated as a result of the stop. He filed a motion to
suppress, alleging that the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion that Munsey
had committed a traffic offense. At the suppression hearing, the State offered in
evidence Trooper Timms’s testimony and a videotape of the stop taken from the in-
dash camera in his vehicle.
Trooper Timms testified as follows. At approximately 8:50 p.m. on a clear
night, he was traveling northbound on FM 369 in Wichita County, approaching the
intersection of FM 369 and FM 367. Both farm-to-market roads are two-lane roads
with one lane of travel in each direction, and both roads have improved shoulders.
The intersection is a four-way stop with blinking red lights.
As Trooper Timms approached the stop sign on northbound FM 369,
Munsey’s Ford pickup truck approached the stop sign on eastbound FM 367.
Munsey had the right-of-way, having stopped at the stop sign first. Munsey’s truck
entered the intersection and turned left onto northbound FM 369.
Trooper Timms testified that Munsey “made an unsafe turn and drove onto the
shoulder. All four tires made it onto the shoulder.” Trooper Timms described the
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turn: “The vehicle accelerated rapidly, and it seemed to me like [Munsey] was going
to continue on 367, and then at the last minute [he] yanked the wheel and went
north on 369 and then drove onto the shoulder.” Trooper Timms said that the turn
was unsafe due to “[t]he way that [Munsey] accelerated rapidly [and] then made a
sudden turn.”
Trooper Timms opined that there was no reason that made it necessary for
the truck to travel on the right shoulder of FM 369. Trooper Timms had a clear and
unobstructed view of the intersection and of the first fifty yards of northbound FM
369. There were no puddles of water, mud, or debris in the intersection or on FM
369 that made it unsafe or difficult to drive in the lane, and the lines of the
intersection were clearly marked. No traffic was traveling southbound on FM 369
approaching the intersection. Trooper Timms testified that driving on an improved
shoulder to the right of a roadway when it is either unnecessary or unsafe to do so
violates transportation code section 545.058(a). He also testified that the manner in
which Munsey turned left onto FM 369 violated section 545.101 of the transportation
code.
On cross-examination, Trooper Timms testified that that there were no
obstructions in the shoulder of FM 369, that Munsey did not “spin out his wheels”
when he turned, that he did not hit anything, and that his tires did not “squeal out” or
throw rocks at the trooper’s windshield. Trooper Timms testified that there is
nothing inherently unsafe about driving on the shoulder.
3
The videotape from Trooper Timms’s in-dash camera begins with him driving
on FM 369 for just under two minutes before approaching the intersection of FM 369
and FM 367.1 The videotape shows Munsey’s truck approach and stop at the stop
sign on eastbound FM 367, enter the intersection of FM 367 and FM 369, and turn
left to go northbound on FM 369. The improved shoulder of northbound FM 369 is
marked with a solid white line on both sides of the intersection with FM 367. The
videotape shows that Munsey made a wide turn onto FM 369, turning almost entirely
(if not entirely) onto the shoulder of FM 369 just before the solid white line that
demarcates the shoulder begins. Munsey continued driving on the improved
shoulder, to the right of the solid white line, briefly before entering the northbound
lane of FM 369.
The trial court granted Munsey’s motion to suppress and entered findings of
fact and conclusions of law. After the State appealed, we abated the appeal and
remanded the case to the trial court for additional findings of fact.2
1
Trooper Timms drove over the white line into the right shoulder twice during
those two minutes. On cross-examination, Trooper Timms testified that he thought
it was necessary to do so because he had once worked a double fatality at the
particular curve where he drove on the shoulder and “it’s a habit of [his] to go over
on the shoulder to give [himself] a little bit of [room].” He did not explain his reason
for crossing the white line the second time.
2
See State v. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)
(instructing appellate court to remand to trial court for additional findings on
credibility and to clarify ambiguous factual findings); State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667,
676–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (instructing appellate court to remand to trial court
for additional findings on dispositive issue). We set out those original and
supplemental findings and conclusions in our analysis below.
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LAW ON REASONABLENESS OF TRAFFIC STOPS
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In
reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual review.
Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v. State, 118
S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole
trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), modified on other
grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Therefore, we
give almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical
fact, even if the trial court’s determination of those facts was not based on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions
that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673;
Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v.
State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We review a trial court’s
determination of historical facts that is based on a videotape under the same
deferential standard. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);
Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). But when application-of-
law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses,
we review the trial court’s rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d
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at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68
S.W.3d at 652–53.
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether
the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818–19. We then review the trial
court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the
record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. at 818. If the appellate court
determines that the trial court’s findings are ambiguous or insufficient to resolve the
legal issue, then the case should be remanded to the trial court to make findings of
fact with greater specificity. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d at 670.
When the trial court grants a motion to suppress and files accompanying
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the sole witness at the motion to
suppress hearing is the arresting officer, the only question before us is whether the
trial court properly applied the law to the facts it found. See State v. Gray, 158
S.W.3d 465, 467, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 86–87, 89.
When a police officer stops a defendant without a warrant and without the
defendant’s consent, the State has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
stop at a suppression hearing. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9–10 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986), disapproved of on other grounds by Handy v. State, 189 S.W.3d 296,
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299 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention
when he has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law.
See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable
suspicion exists if the officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with
rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a
particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity.
Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The State need not
establish with absolute certainty that a crime has occurred but must elicit testimony
of sufficient facts to create reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. Id.; Garcia v.
State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
IV. REASONABLE SUSPICION OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 545.058
Transportation code section 545.058(a), captioned “Driving on Improved
Shoulder,” provides,
(a) An operator may drive on an improved shoulder to the right of the
main traveled portion of a roadway if that operation is necessary and
may be done safely, but only:
(1) to stop, stand, or park;
(2) to accelerate before entering the main traveled lane of traffic;
(3) to decelerate before making a right turn;
(4) to pass another vehicle that is slowing or stopped on the
main traveled portion of the highway, disabled, or preparing to
make a left turn;
(5) to allow another vehicle traveling faster to pass;
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(6) as permitted or required by an official traffic-control device;
or
(7) to avoid a collision.
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.058(a). Thus, section 545.058 allows for driving on
an improved shoulder if it can be done safely and if it is necessary to achieving one
of the seven approved purposes. See id. In Lothrop v. State, the court of criminal
appeals examined section 545.058 and explained,
[T]he offense of illegally driving on an improved shoulder can be proved
in one of two ways: either driving on the improved shoulder was not a
necessary part of achieving one of the seven approved purposes, or
driving on the improved shoulder could not have been done safely.
Merely driving on an improved shoulder is not prima facie evidence of
an offense. Thus if an officer sees a driver driving on an improved
shoulder, and it appears that driving on the improved shoulder was
necessary to achieving one of the seven approved purposes, and it is
done safely, that officer does not have reasonable suspicion that an
offense occurred.
372 S.W.3d 187, 191 (2012) (emphasis added).
Here, the trial court originally entered the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
 Timms testified that there was nothing inherently unsafe about driving a
vehicle on an improved shoulder;
 Timms admitted that he drove his vehicle on the improved shoulder in a safe
manner when he was approaching the intersection of FM 367 and FM 369;3
 Timms did not testify that Munsey failed to use his turn signal prior to turning
his pickup left from FM 367 to FM 369;
3
“Timms had previously worked a double fatality motor vehicle crash on that
road.”
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 Munsey did not spin his tires when he pulled his pickup into the intersection of
FM 367 and FM 369;
 Munsey did not execute an unsafe left hand turn from FM 367 to FM 369;
 Munsey drove his pickup on the improved shoulder of FM 369 in a safe
manner as he accelerated before his pickup entered the main traveled lane of
traffic on that road;
 Timms lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Munsey’s pickup;
 Munsey’s motion to suppress should be granted.
After the State appealed, we abated the appeal and remanded the case to the
trial court for additional findings of fact. We explained in our abatement order that
the trial court did not make specific findings of fact about the necessity
requirement of section 545.058—that is, findings related to whether
driving on the improved shoulder was a necessary part of achieving
one of the seven approved purposes under section 545.058. See
Texas Transp. Code § 545.058(a); Lothrop, 372 S.W.3d at 191. The
trial court did not make a finding of fact with respect to the credibility of
Trooper Timms’s testimony as to the lack of necessity, see Elias, 339
S.W.3d at 676 (instructing that appellate court should have remanded
to trial court for credibility determination), or other any findings of fact
about whether driving on the improved shoulder was a necessary part
of achieving one of the statutorily-approved purposes under section
545.058.4
The trial court then made the following additional findings of fact:
1. Trooper Patrick Timms was driving a marked patrol vehicle
southbound on FM 369 in Wichita County, Texas, on the night of
February 4, 2012;
4
See Munsey v. State, No. 02-12-00610-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec.
20, 2013 order), available at http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.asp
x?MediaVersionID=800d89016b164ea98e22e3430d002379&coa=coa02&DT=Or
der&MediaID=8c330aa1-7983-4e50-9151-6040c8d0261f (last visited Feb. 21,
2014).
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2. Trooper Patrick Timms stopped at the intersection of FM 369
and FM 367;
3. Trooper Patrick Timms’[s] in-car camera was operating on the
night of February 4, 2012;
4. As he approached the intersection Trooper Patrick Timms
observed a pickup truck driving west on FM 367 which stopped
at an appropriate location prior to entering the intersection;
5. Trooper Patrick Timms later determined that the defendant
Jonathon Michael Munsey was the driver of the pickup truck;
6. Trooper Patrick Timms did not testify that the defendant
Jonathon Michael Munsey failed to use his turn signal prior to
entering the intersection and turning left;
7. The defendant Jonathon Michael Munsey did not spin his tires
when he drove his pickup truck into the intersection;
8. The defendant Jonathon Michael Munsey did not execute an
unsafe left hand turn from FM 367 to FM 369;
9. The defendant Jonathon Michael Munsey failed to turn the
pickup truck left so as to arrive in a lane lawfully available to
traffic moving in the direction of the vehicle on FM 369—the
roadway being entered;
10. The defendant Jonathon Michael Munsey drove the pickup truck
on the improved shoulder of FMM 369 in a safe manner as he
accelerated before his pickup truck entered the single lane of
traffic going south on that road;
11. Trooper Patrick Timms’[s] testimony regarding the lack of
necessity for the defendant Jonathon Michael Munsey to drive
the pickup truck on the improved shoulder of FM 369 was
credible;
12. While Jonathon Michael Munsey drove his pickup on the
improved shoulder of FM 369 in a safe manner as he
accelerated before his pickup entered the single lane of traffic
going south on that road, it was not a necessary part of
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achieving one of the seven approved purposes set out in Section
545.058 of the Texas Transportation Code.
[Footnotes omitted.]
We will defer to the trial court’s specific fact finding that Munsey drove his
truck on the shoulder in a safe manner as supported by the record. See Kelly, 204
S.W.3d at 818–19. Trooper Timms testified that there is nothing inherently unsafe
about driving on an improved shoulder and that there were no obstructions in the
shoulder of FM 369. Trooper Timms did not testify to any specific, articulable facts
that would lead him to reasonably conclude that it was unsafe for Munsey to drive
on the improved shoulder of FM 369. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. The videotape
also shows no obstructions or other facts making it unsafe to drive on the improved
shoulder. Thus, Trooper Timms did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that
Munsey violated section 545.058 by driving on the improved shoulder in an unsafe
manner. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.058(a).
But section 545.058 is also violated if a driver drives on an improved shoulder
when doing so is not a necessary part of achieving one of the seven approved
purposes, even when driving on the improved shoulder may be done safely. See
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.058(a); Lothrop, 372 S.W.3d at 191. We will defer to
the trial court’s supplemental findings on lack of necessity as supported by the
record. See Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818–19. Trooper Timms testified that there was
no reason whatsoever for Munsey to drive on the shoulder; he explained that it was
a clear night, that there were no puddles of water, mud, or debris in the northbound
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lane of FM 369, and that there were no vehicles traveling southbound on FM 369
toward the intersection with FM 367. The trial court found Trooper Timms’s
testimony to be credible. The videotape also shows that there was no debris or
obstacle in the intersection or on FM 369 and no traffic traveling southbound on FM
369 approaching the intersection. Nothing in the record shows that driving on the
improved shoulder of northbound FM 369 was necessary for Munsey to accelerate
before entering the main traveled portion of FM 369 or for any other purpose set
forth in section 545.058(a). See Lothrop, 372 S.W.3d at 190 (explaining that section
545.058 does not require that driving on the shoulder be “absolutely necessary” to
achieve one of the seven approved purposes but requires that driving on the
shoulder be necessary to achieving one of the seven approved purposes); see also
Maldonado v. State, No. 04-12-00228-CR, 2013 WL 2126383, at *5 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio May 15, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to believe driver had violated section
545.058(a) when record contained no evidence that driver’s crossing over fog line to
drive on improved shoulder was necessary for any statutory purpose listed in
section 545.058(a)); State v. Dietiker, 345 S.W.3d 422, 425–26 (Tex. App.—Waco
2011, no pet.) (same); Tyler v. State, 161 S.W.3d 745, 749–50 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2005, no pet.) (same).
We hold that Trooper Timms had reasonable suspicion to believe that Munsey
violated section 545.058(a) by illegally driving on the improved shoulder when it was
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not a necessary part of achieving any of the approved statutory purposes.5 See
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.058(a); Abney, 394 S.W.3d at 548. Consequently,
we hold that the trial court erred by granting Munsey’s motion to suppress. We
sustain the State’s sole issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Having sustained the State’s sole issue, we reverse the trial court’s order and
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
PUBLISH
DELIVERED: February 27, 2014
5
Having so held, we need not address the other alleged basis for the
reasonable suspicion under transportation code section 545.101.
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