Ex Parte Timothy Michael Barnett ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                                 IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-13-00339-CR
    EX PARTE TIMOTHY MICHAEL BARNETT
    From the 19th District Court
    McLennan County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2013-2468-1
    OPINION
    Timothy Michael Barnett appeals the trial court’s denial of his pretrial
    application for writ of habeas corpus in which he requested the trial court to declare
    section 30.04(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code unconstitutional. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    § 30.04(b)(2) (West 2011). Specifically, Barnett contended in his application that an
    amendment raising the base penalty range of the statute from a state jail felony to a
    third degree felony was unconstitutional. Because Barnett’s pretrial habeas proceeding
    was not an appropriate avenue for raising his claim in the trial court, we dismiss his
    appeal.
    A pretrial habeas, followed by an interlocutory appeal, is an "extraordinary
    remedy," and appellate courts should be careful to ensure that it is not “misused to
    secure pretrial appellate review of matters that in actual fact should not be put before
    appellate courts at the pretrial stage." Ex parte Ellis, 
    309 S.W.3d 71
    , 79 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2010); Ex parte Doster, 
    303 S.W.3d 720
    , 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Consequently,
    whether a claim is even cognizable on pretrial habeas is a threshold issue that should be
    addressed before the merits of the claim may be resolved. 
    Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79
    .
    Generally, a claim is cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if, resolved in
    the defendant's favor, it would deprive the trial court of the power to proceed and
    result in the appellant's immediate release. Ex parte Smith, 
    185 S.W.3d 887
    , 892 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2006); Weise v. State, 
    55 S.W.3d 617
    , 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). However,
    pretrial habeas is not available to test the sufficiency of the charging instrument or to
    construe the meaning and application of the statute defining the offense charged. An
    exception to this rule is when the applicant alleges that the statute under which he is
    prosecuted is unconstitutional on its face. 
    Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79
    ; 
    Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620
    . If the statute is unconstitutional on its face, the statute is not valid and, thus, the
    charging instrument is void. 
    Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620
    .
    Relying on the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in Weise, 
    id., Barnett contends
    that because he challenged the constitutionality of the statute “on its face,” a pretrial
    writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle to use. On the facts of this case, we disagree.
    Ex parte Barnett                                                                      Page 2
    Although Barnett contends he made a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
    the statute under which he is being prosecuted, we cannot determine that he did so.
    The instrument charging the offense is not a part of this record on appeal. When
    Barnett’s application for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the trial court, it was given a
    new case number. A copy of the charging instrument was not transferred into the new
    trial court number. Although at the hearing it appeared the trial court had the criminal
    charge file in front of him because he was also being asked to reduce Barnett’s bond, no
    one introduced the charging instrument or asked the judge to take judicial notice of it.
    Thus, it is not a part of the record of this appeal. Consequently, without the actual
    charging instrument showing the statute under which he is to be prosecuted, we cannot
    say that Barnett’s challenge is cognizable as a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. See 
    Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620
    .
    Further, even if we had the charging instrument, it does not appear that Barnett’s
    claim is otherwise cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus because he does not
    request an immediate release from custody. See Ex parte Smith, 
    185 S.W.3d 887
    , 892
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Rather, he asks the trial court to hold that the proper base
    penalty range for the offense is a state jail felony rather than a third degree felony.
    Barnett seems to concede that even if the statute is found to be defective as argued, the
    trial court would, nevertheless, have the jurisdiction to proceed to trial on a felony
    charge with a different base punishment range. But even in the cases relied on by the
    Ex parte Barnett                                                                      Page 3
    Weise court in discussing that a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is
    cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus, the applicant had either requested a
    discharge from custody, or, in the cases in which it was unclear whether a discharge
    was requested, was actually discharged from custody by the reviewing court. See Weise
    v. State, 
    55 S.W.3d 617
    , 620 n. 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
    Accordingly, we conclude that Barnett’s pretrial habeas proceeding was not an
    appropriate avenue for raising his claim regarding the proper base penalty range for
    section 30.04(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code, and this appeal is dismissed. See Ex parte
    Doster, 
    303 S.W.3d 720
    , 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (court of appeals opinion affirming
    trial court’s denial of writ of habeas corpus vacated and appeal dismissed).
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Appeal dismissed
    Opinion delivered and filed March 13, 2014
    Publish
    [OT06]
    Ex parte Barnett                                                                    Page 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-13-00339-CR

Judges: Gray, Davis, Scoggins

Filed Date: 3/13/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024