in Re E.C., F.C., T.C., and Cleburne Metal Works, LLC D/B/A Cleburne Sheet Metal ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00235-CV
IN RE E.C., F.C., T.C., AND RELATORS
CLEBURNE METAL WORKS, LLC
D/B/A CLEBURNE SHEET METAL
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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
TRIAL COURT NO. 96-268349-13
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OPINION
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I. INTRODUCTION
Relators E.C., F.C., T.C., and Cleburne Metal Works, LLC d/b/a Cleburne
Sheet Metal filed a petition for writ of mandamus complaining that the trial court
had abused its discretion by overruling their assertions of confidentiality and
privilege and ordering them to produce documents from the file of Dr. Dick Miller,
a clinical psychologist who was hired as a consultant by E.C’s defense attorneys
in his juvenile proceeding. We hold that Dr. Miller’s file and opinions are not
confidential and that any privileged information has been waived through
voluntary disclosure. Accordingly, we will deny the petition.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND1
Sixteen-year-old E.C. was involved in an automobile accident late one
night in June 2013 after he lost control of the truck that he was driving while
intoxicated. Four people died and a number of others sustained injuries. E.C.
hired defense attorneys “[w]ithin hours of the accident,” and the defense
attorneys then retained Dr. Miller as a consultant. According to a document filed
by Real Parties in Interest K.M. and A.M., individually and as next friends for
L.M., a minor (collectively, RPIs), Dr. Miller spent approximately fifty hours
treating E.C. and his parents after the accident.
In September 2013, the State filed a petition alleging that E.C. had
engaged in delinquent conduct by committing four violations of penal code
section 49.08 and two violations of penal code section 49.07. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. §§ 49.07 (intoxication assault), 49.08 (intoxication manslaughter)
(West 2011). According to RPIs, E.C. ultimately “pled guilty” to four counts of
intoxication manslaughter. Although initially hired as a consultant, Dr. Miller
testified at the subsequent disposition hearing and “freely discussed the case, his
treatment of [E.C.], and his role in the defense.” The juvenile court sentenced
E.C. to ten years’ probation.
1
All facts contained herein are taken from documents within the mandamus
record. We do not attempt to correct any terminology that may be inconsistent
with the Juvenile Justice Code.
2
A civil lawsuit was filed against Relators in September 2013 to recover
damages for injuries sustained as a result of Relators’ alleged negligence and
gross negligence in connection with the accident. Other parties intervened in the
coming months, including RPIs. Relators have settled all of the claims alleged by
all of the plaintiffs and intervenors, except for those of RPIs.
In March 2014, RPIs issued to Dr. Miller (1) a subpoena for production of
documents and (2) a notice of deposition by written questions, both seeking
Dr. Miller’s records pertaining to E.C.’s juvenile proceeding. Relators responded
by filing motions for a protective order. RPIs later noticed Dr. Miller’s deposition,
which Relators moved to quash. Relators argued in briefing that Dr. Miller’s file
and his thoughts and opinions generated as part of E.C.’s defense in the juvenile
proceeding are confidential under family code sections 51.13(b) and 58.005;
privileged under the work-product, attorney-client, and mental-health privileges;
and irrelevant.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Relators’ motions and signed an
order on May 29, 2014,
(1) finding that family code sections 51.13(b) and 58.005(a)
were inapplicable to the records and testimony of Dr. Miller;
(2) finding that Relators’ claims of work-product privilege,
attorney-client privilege, and mental-health privilege had been
waived;
(3) granting Relators’ motions as to certain records; and
(4) ordering Relators to submit the rest of Dr. Miller’s
records for an in-camera inspection.
3
Relators filed a motion for rehearing, asking the trial court to perform an in-
camera review of Dr. Miller’s file in order to assess their assertions of
confidentiality and privilege, and E.C.’s defense counsel submitted Dr. Miller’s file
to the trial court for an in-camera inspection. On July 22, 2014, the trial court
signed an order requiring Relators to produce certain documents from Dr. Miller’s
file (identified by Bates numbers) within fourteen days of the order. Relators filed
this mandamus petition, and we granted their emergency motion to stay the
May 29 and July 22, 2014 orders pending our consideration of the petition.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when
there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas,
290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). A trial court clearly abuses
its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly
analyze or apply the law. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 888
(Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding).
IV. CONFIDENTIALITY ARGUMENTS
Relying primarily on family code sections 51.13(b) and 58.005(a), Relators
argue that Dr. Miller’s file and opinions regarding E.C.’s juvenile case are
confidential and not discoverable in a subsequent civil proceeding such as this
one. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 51.13(b), 58.005(a) (West 2014). They
contend that juvenile proceedings are treated differently than adult criminal
4
proceedings and civil proceedings, that all records and files of the juvenile in
conjunction with a juvenile proceeding are confidential, and that “[t]here is only
one conceivable exception that could allow disclosure (or at least discovery) of
Dr. Miller’s opinions here: if [Relators] were to designate Dr. Miller as their own
retained testifying expert in this civil proceeding,” which has not happened.
Relators’ confidentiality arguments therefore require us to construe family code
sections 51.13(b) and 58.005(a).
Our primary objective when construing a statute is to ascertain and give
effect to the legislature’s intent. State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex.
2006). We seek that intent “first and foremost” in the statutory text. Lexington
Ins. Co. v. Strayhorn, 209 S.W.3d 83, 85 (Tex. 2006). Particularly important here
is that we must consider the words in context, not in isolation. See Jaster v.
Comet II Constr., Inc., No. 12-0804, 2014 WL 2994503, at *4 (Tex. July 3, 2014);
State v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002); see also Tex. Gov’t Code
Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 2013) (providing that words and phrases shall be read
in context). Thus, in determining the meaning of a statue, a court must consider
the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from
each construction. Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.
1991). A court should not assign a meaning to a statutory provision that would
be inconsistent with other provisions of the same act, even though it might be
susceptible to such a construction standing alone. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.
Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002). Indeed, “[i]nterpretations of statutes
5
which would produce absurd results are to be avoided.” Sharp, 815 S.W.2d at
249. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the statute’s words and then
consider the apparent meaning of those words within their context. Statutory
construction presents a question of law that we review de novo. Shumake, 199
S.W.3d at 284.
A. Family Code Section 51.13(b)
The Juvenile Justice Code is found in Title 3 of the family code. Chapter
51 includes a wide range of general provisions, including such topics as
jurisdiction, waiver of rights, and polygraph examinations. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§§ 51.04, .09, .151 (West 2014). Section 51.13 address the “[e]ffect” of an
adjudication or disposition. Id. § 51.13. In particular, subsection (a) provides that
an order of adjudication or disposition is not a conviction of a crime and does not
disqualify a child in any civil service application or appointment, subsection (c)
prohibits a child from being committed or transferred to a penal institution or
other facility that is used primarily to execute the sentences of persons convicted
of a crime, and subsection (d) explains when a particular adjudication is a final
felony conviction for purposes of the habitual offender statute. Id. § 51.13 (a),
(c), (d). Section 51.13(b) provides as follows:
(b) The adjudication or disposition of a child or evidence adduced
in a hearing under this title may be used only in subsequent:
(1) proceedings under this title in which the child is a party;
(2) sentencing proceedings in criminal court against the
child to the extent permitted by the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1965; or
6
(3) civil commitment proceedings under Chapter 841,
Health and Safety Code.
Id. § 51.13(b). Subsection (b) is appropriately found in section 51.13 because it
identifies one “[e]ffect” of an adjudication or disposition; specifically, when (1) the
adjudication or disposition of a child or (2) evidence adduced in a hearing under
this title (3) may be used: in a subsequent (i) proceeding under this title in which
the child is a party, (ii) sentencing proceeding in criminal court against the child
as permitted, or (iii) civil commitment proceeding. Id.
There are several reasons why section 51.13(b) has no application here.
First, RPIs are not seeking to use E.C.’s adjudication, his disposition, or any
evidence adduced at a hearing under this title. They are seeking to discover
Dr. Miller’s file and opinions. Dr. Miller’s file and opinions are not an adjudication,
a disposition, or evidence adduced at a hearing under this title. Section 51.13(b)
is therefore inapposite.
To the extent that Relators conflate Dr. Miller’s file and opinions with
evidence adduced at a hearing—because his testimony reflected his opinions
and various matters contained in his file—section 51.13(b) nonetheless does not
render Dr. Miller’s file confidential. A proper construction of section 51.13(b)
cannot ignore that the legislature chose the verb “used” and followed it by setting
out three different subsequent “proceedings.” Id. Statutory construction rules
“require that the words employed by the legislature shall be taken in their
ordinary and popular acceptation, unless technical terms are used, or unless it
clearly appears from the context that the words used were not intended to be
7
understood in their ordinary and popular signification.” Engelking v. Von Wamel,
26 Tex. 469, 469 (1863). The legislature did not define the word “used,” but
because three subsequent “proceedings” are immediately identified thereafter,
we can gather that the legislature intended for the word “used” to be construed in
its technical sense: specifically, prior adjudications, dispositions, and evidence
adduced in a hearing under the Juvenile Justice Code are “used” when they are
admitted for some purpose. See, e.g., George E. Dix and John M. Schmolesky,
43A Texas Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 46:31 (citing section
51.13(b) and discussing the admissibility of juvenile adjudications in subsequent
criminal prosecutions). Thus, it clearly appears from the context of section
51.13(b) that the intent of the legislature was to limit the formal instances, or
“proceedings,” in which an adjudication, a disposition, or evidence adduced at a
hearing under the Juvenile Justice Code could be admitted, or “used,” for
whatever purpose it may be.
RPIs here are not attempting to “use[]” Dr. Miller’s file because they are not
attempting to admit it in some proceeding for some purpose; rather, RPIs are
merely trying to discover it pretrial. It is well understood in the civil context that
there is a fundamental difference between the discoverability of evidence and the
admissibility of evidence at trial or some proceeding.2 See, e.g., In re Pilgrim’s
Pride Corp., 204 S.W.3d 831, 835 n.8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, orig.
2
Relators implicitly acknowledge this distinction when they state
disjunctively that Dr. Miller’s file is not “discoverable, pursuable or usable.”
[Emphasis added.]
8
proceeding [mand. dism’d]) (“Relevance should not be confused with
admissibility. Admissibility is not required for information to be discoverable.”).
Relators argue that this construction “is inefficient because it allows discovery of
information and materials which cannot be used in the civil proceeding.”
However, an inefficient result is not analogous to an absurd result, which is what
we seek to avoid when construing a statute. Moreover, the rules of civil
procedure contemplate some level of inefficiency. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(a)
(stating that information that might not be admissible is nevertheless
discoverable if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence). Accordingly, even if we assume that
Dr. Miller’s file and opinions somehow constitute evidence adduced at a hearing,
section 51.13(b) is inapposite because RPIs are not seeking to “use[]” Dr. Miller’s
file.
B. Family Code Section 58.005(a)
Relators’ arguments implicating section 58.005(a) founder for a related,
context-deficient reason. Section 58.005(a), entitled “Confidentiality of Records,”
provides as follows:
(a) Records and files concerning a child, including personally
identifiable information, and information obtained for the purpose of
diagnosis, examination, evaluation, or treatment or for making a
referral for treatment of a child by a public or private agency or
institution providing supervision of a child by arrangement of the
juvenile court or having custody of the child under order of the
juvenile court may be disclosed only to:
(1) the professional staff or consultants of the agency or
institution;
9
(2) the judge, probation officers, and professional staff or
consultants of the juvenile court;
(3) an attorney for the child;
(4) a governmental agency if the disclosure is required or
authorized by law;
(5) a person or entity to whom the child is referred for
treatment or services if the agency or institution disclosing the
information has entered into a written confidentiality
agreement with the person or entity regarding the protection of
the disclosed information;
(6) the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the
Texas Juvenile Probation Commission for the purpose of
maintaining statistical records of recidivism and for diagnosis
and classification; or
(7) with leave of the juvenile court, any other person,
agency, or institution having a legitimate interest in the
proceeding or in the work of the court.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 58.005(a) (emphasis added). Relators broadly construe
the terms “[r]ecords and files,” as that term is used in the statute, to refer to all
records and files in existence, including the files of a person hired as a consultant
by defense counsel, like Dr. Miller. But Relators perform no statutory-
construction analysis to support their proposed interpretation; they merely cite
section 58.005(a), construe it in isolation from the remainder of the chapter, and
argue that the statute means what they say it does. A proper construction
demonstrates that the legislature had something else in mind when it used the
words “[r]ecords and files.”
10
Chapter 58 of the Juvenile Justice Code contains many statutes
addressing numerous aspects of juvenile records, including who must keep
records, what type of information must be kept, and who can access records. Id.
§§ 58.001‒.405 (West 2014). Subchapter A of chapter 58 is actually titled
“Records.” Of the fourteen statutes contained in that subchapter, only two define
the term “records.” See id. §§ 58.0051 (“‘Educational records’ means records in
the possession of a primary or secondary educational institution that contain
information relating to a student . . . .”), 58.0071(a)(2) (“‘Physical records and
files’ include entries in a computer file or information on microfilm, microfiche, or
any other electronic storage media.”). The other statutes in subchapter A simply
refer to “records,” “files,” or both, including section 58.005(a). Nonetheless, we
can gain insight into what the legislature meant when it used the words “[r]ecords
and files” in section 58.005(a) by examining the context in which the same terms
are used throughout the subchapter. For example:
•section 58.003(g)(1) provides that on entry of a sealing order, “all law
enforcement, prosecuting attorney, clerk of court, and juvenile court
records ordered sealed shall be sent” timely to the court that issued the
order. Id. § 58.003(g)(1) (emphasis added).
•section 58.003(m) provides in part that “[o]n request of the Department of
Public Safety, a juvenile court shall reopen and allow the department to
inspect the files and records of the juvenile court.” Id. § 58.003(m)
(emphasis added).
•section 58.007(b) provides that “the records and files of a juvenile court, a
clerk of court, a juvenile probation department, or a prosecuting attorney
relating to a child who is a party to a proceeding under this title may be
inspected or copied only by” various individuals or entities. Id. § 58.007(b)
(emphasis added).
11
•section 58.007(c) addresses “law enforcement records and files
concerning a child.” Id. § 58.007(c) (emphasis added).
•section 58.007(g) permits a juvenile court that is in possession of the
record of a defendant’s adjudication to provide the record to a prosecuting
attorney. Id. § 58.007(g).
•section 58.007(i) addresses when a juvenile probation department may
release information contained in its records without leave of the juvenile
court. Id. § 58.007(i).
•section 58.0071(c) identifies who may authorize the destruction of
physical records and files relating to a closed juvenile case: “a juvenile
board in relation to the records and files in the possession of the juvenile
probation department,” “the head of a law enforcement agency in relation
to the records and files in the possession of the agency,” and “a
prosecuting attorney in relation to the records and files in the possession of
the prosecuting attorney’s office.” Id. § 58.0071(c) (emphasis added).
The pattern here is apparent: when using the undefined terms “records”
and “files,” the legislature is referring to records and files in the possession of or
belonging to individuals or entities closely associated with the juvenile court
system—a juvenile court, a prosecuting attorney, a court clerk, or a law
enforcement agency. When section 58.005(a) is read in context, the “[r]ecords
and files concerning a child” are those records and files in the possession of or
belonging to the same individuals or entities identified throughout the subchapter.
There is absolutely nothing in chapter 58 to indicate that unlike the other statutes
contained therein, the legislature intended the terms “[r]ecords and files” to refer
to all records and files in existence everywhere, including the records and files of
a person hired as a consultant by defense counsel in a juvenile proceeding.
While the terms might be susceptible to that construction when standing alone,
there can be no doubt that such a construction is inconsistent with other
12
provisions of the chapter and the intent of the legislature. See Needham, 82
S.W.3d at 318. Accordingly, Dr. Miller’s files are not “[r]ecords and files” as that
term is used in section 58.005(a), and like section 51.13(b), the statute is
inapposite to the discovery dispute in this case.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that family
code sections 51.13(b) and 58.005(a) were inapplicable to the records and
testimony of Dr. Miller. We overrule all of Relators’ confidentiality arguments that
are premised upon the family code.
V. PRIVILEGE ARGUMENTS
Relators argue that Dr. Miller’s file and opinions are protected by the work-
product, attorney-client, and mental-health privileges. At the hearing on Relators’
motions for protection, RPIs argued that to the extent Dr. Miller’s file and opinions
were privileged, the privileges had been waived because Dr. Miller testified about
his opinions in open court at E.C.’s disposition hearing and gave several
televised interviews during which he discussed his opinions. RPIs argued
similarly in their response. The trial court agreed, specifically finding in its
May 29, 2014 order that Relators had waived their claims of work-product
privilege, attorney-client privilege, and mental-health privilege as to Dr. Miller’s
file and opinions. In light of the trial court’s order finding waiver, we presume
(without deciding) that Dr. Miller’s file and opinions are privileged and proceed to
consider whether the privileges have been waived.
13
Privileges may be waived by voluntarily disclosing or consenting to the
disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter, unless such disclosure
itself is privileged. Tex. R. Evid. 511(1). Rule of evidence 511 begins by stating,
“A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives
the privilege . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, rule 511 applies to each of
Relators’ claimed privileges, including the mental-health privilege, which is found
in the immediately preceding rule. See Tex. R. Evid. 510. The burden of proof to
establish the existence of a privilege rests on the one asserting it. Jordan v.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist., 701 S.W.2d 644, 648‒49
(Tex. 1985).
We do not have the record from E.C.’s disposition hearing, nor have we
requested to review the documents that the trial court ordered Relators to
produce, but we may consider whether waiver has occurred here because there
is no dispute between the parties that Dr. Miller (1) testified at the disposition
hearing and (2) disclosed a significant amount of information that would have
otherwise been protected by the attorney-client, work-product, or mental-health
privileges.3 See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g) “(In a civil case, the court will accept as
true the facts stated unless another party contradicts them”). Considering that
we are presuming that Dr. Miller’s file is privileged, the question then is whether
3
According to RPIs, Dr. Miller testified that E.C.’s killing of four and injuring
others was a product of “affluenza,” a mental condition that prevented him from
linking his behavior with consequences. RPIs set out additional testimony of
Dr. Miller, but we do not repeat it here.
14
Dr. Miller’s testifying at E.C.’s disposition hearing about matters that would have
otherwise been privileged constituted a waiver of Relators’ claimed privileges.
This court has held that a party waived privileged information by previously
disclosing it in open court. See Stroud Oil Props., Inc. v. Henderson, No. 02-03-
00003-CV, 2003 WL 21404820, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 19, 2003, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). We set out the following facts in Stroud Oil Properties:
Appellants are plaintiffs and counter-defendants in a lawsuit
against Appellees in Brazos County arising out of a dispute over an
oil and gas development agreement. At the same time as the
Brazos County suit was pending, Appellees apparently had an
internal disagreement about how to operate their business. The
dispute was focused primarily at how Appellees could best respond
to Appellants’ suit in Brazos County.
Appellees filed suit in Tarrant County to resolve their dispute.
Throughout the suit, Appellees allegedly disclosed privileged
information in open court. Appellees settled the suit and filed a rule
76a motion to seal the record in an effort to prevent the privileged
information from becoming public. After a hearing, the trial court
sealed the record.
Appellants learned of the suit in Tarrant County and attempted
to gain access to the records claiming that the suit was held in open
court and had to have some relationship with the suit in Brazos
County. When Appellants discovered that the court sealed the
records, Appellants intervened in the case in an attempt to unseal
the record. . . . After [a] hearing, the trial court ruled to keep the
record sealed, and Appellants appealed.
Id. at *1. We held that “Appellees waived any alleged privileged information
when they voluntarily disclosed it in open court.” Id. at *3.
Stroud Oil Properties is on point. The trial court could have reasonably
concluded that E.C. waived any privilege as to Dr. Miller’s file or opinions by
eliciting his testimony on those matters in open court at the prior disposition
15
hearing. See Tex. R. Evid. 511; see also In re Ortuno, No. 14-08-00457-CV,
2008 WL 2855028, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 24, 2008, orig.
proceeding [mand. denied]) (“A party waives a privilege if it voluntarily discloses
the privileged information to an open court.”); see also Nat’l Polymer Prods., Inc.
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1981) (beginning analysis
“with the well-established principle of American jurisprudence that the release of
information in open trial is a publication of that information and, if no effort is
made to limit its disclosure, operates as a waiver of any rights a party had to
restrict its further use”); Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 213 F.R.D. 528,
532‒35 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that party had waived attorney-client and work-
product privileges by revealing protected information in earlier mandamus
petition to circuit court).
Relators argue that Dr. Miller’s testifying at the disposition hearing did not
waive any privileges because a privilege is not waived by disclosure if the
disclosure itself is privileged, and under family code section 51.13(b), “testimony
at a juvenile proceeding is and remains confidential,” and there is no exception
for subsequent civil proceedings. See Tex. R. Evid. 511; Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 51.13(b). We already discussed section 51.13(b) above, and that analysis is
equally applicable here. Section 51.13(b) does not state that “testimony at a
juvenile proceeding is and remains confidential”; it identifies subsequent
“proceedings” in which evidence adduced at a juvenile trial may be “used.” We
reject Relators’ broad interpretation of section 51.13(b) as some kind of a
16
catchall, blanket provision that renders juvenile proceedings confidential in every
potential context imaginable, aside from the three set out in the statute.
Relators argue that Dr. Miller could not have waived the privileges by
testifying at E.C.’s disposition hearing because only a party could have waived
the privileges. See Tex. R. Evid. 511; In re Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc.,
224 S.W.3d 806, 814 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding)
(“A client unquestionably has the right to waive the attorney-client privilege.”).
Relators included in the mandamus record an affidavit signed by F.C. stating that
he did not authorize Dr. Miller to speak publicly about his work with E.C.
However, while F.C. may not have consented to Dr. Miller’s disclosure of
otherwise privileged information, E.C. certainly did when he called Dr. Miller to
testify at the disposition hearing.
Relators have not met their burden to show that the claimed privileges
have not been waived. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by finding that Relators’ claims of work-product privilege, attorney-
client privilege, and mental-health privilege had been waived.4 We overrule
Relators’ privilege arguments.
4
Relators argue that the relevance exception contained in rule of evidence
510(d)(5) does not apply to except Dr. Miller’s file and opinions from the mental-
health privilege. See Tex. R. Evid. 510(d)(5). We need not reach this argument
because we presumed that Dr. Miller’s file is protected by the mental-health
privilege (and that the exception therefore did not apply) but concluded that the
privilege had been waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We deny relators’ petition for writ of mandamus and lift the stay previously
ordered by this court on August 4, 2014.
/s/ Bill Meier
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DELIVERED: September 16, 2014
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