Renato Acain v. International Plant Services, LLC, Noureddine Ayed, Karim Ayed, Richard Dale Johnston, Adrienne Wilson, and Leysander Bustamonte , 449 S.W.3d 655 ( 2014 )

Opinion issued October 28, 2014
In The
C ourt of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-13-00310-CV
RENATO ACAIN, RANDY AGOSTO, EFREN ALIVIANO, ARTEMIO
ANZALE, GREG BA-ANG, JEFFREY BATAC, FERDINAND BELLIDO,
DENNIS BICERA, VERGINIO BOLAMBOT, ANATALIO CAANG,
ROMEO CANDILADA, ARNEL CASTANEDA, LIEZELLITO CLORIBEL,
LEONILO COLINA, ARTURO CONCLARA, ELLESER CRISTOBAL,
LUDOVICO DEFACTO, JORGE DENAQUE, ELMER DOMINGO,
SIMEON DOMINGO, AARON ESTRERA, FELIX EDUARDO, ALFREDO
FARINA, CARLITO FIDEL, JAYGEN GENON, FELIPE GUTIB, ALLAN
GUILLARTES, EDITO LAURITO, GILBERTO LAURIQUEZ, EDGAR
LEONOR, CAMILO LUMAGSAO, JOHNNY MACARAIG, NICASIO
MANGILIMOTAN, GABINO LABADLABAD, LADISLAO MELGAR,
BENJAMIN NAGUE, SERGIO NATAD, ZOSIMO OLIMBA, NILO
PALAMILLO, ALEJANDRO PANTALITA, EDUARDO PATUPAT,
BIENVENIDO PERALTA, HERMOGENES PUNZALAN, ANTONIO
REDOLOZA, ALFREDO ROSALES, FELICIANO SANTOS, ALEJANDRO
SANTIZAS, GIOVANNE SARAMOSING, FLORENTINO SAYAGO,
FELIPE SIAPNO, ROSELLIER SOMOZA, ROY TALLEDO, LARRY
URBANO, BENJAMIN VILLEJO, BALTAZAR VILLEJO, AND
FRANKLIN VILLAREAL, Appellants
V.
INTERNATIONAL PLANT SERVICES, LLC, NOUREDDINE AYED,
KARIM AYED, RICHARD DALE JOHNSTON, ADRIENNE WILSON,
AND LEYSANDER BUSTAMONTE, Appellees
On Appeal from the 113th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2011-32519
OPINION ON REHEARING
Fifty-seven Filipino former employees of International Plant Services, LLC
(IPS), a Texas company, sued IPS, MBC Human Resources Development
Corporation (the Filipino agency that recruited them to work for IPS in Texas), and
various individual defendants who owned or worked for IPS and MBC, alleging
that they had been subjected to human trafficking by the defendants, and asserting
various tort and contract claims arising out of their employment with IPS. The
defendants moved to dismiss the case based on principles of international comity.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. On
original submission, we reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Appellees filed a motion for rehearing. We deny appellees’
motion, but sua sponte withdraw our opinion and judgment of August 12, 2014, to
2
omit unserved defendants MBC Resources Development Corporation and Nida
Sarmiento, and issue this opinion and corrected judgment in their stead. Our
disposition remains unchanged.
Background
Beginning in 2006, MBC recruited the plaintiffs in the Philippines to work
for IPS in Texas. The plaintiffs signed employment contracts with IPS each year.
The 2006 contracts stated that they will be “construed” in accordance with the law
of Harris County, Texas, while the post-2006 contracts stated they were to be
“constructed” in accordance with the law of the Philippines. In May 2011, the
plaintiffs sued in Texas state court, alleging that the defendants had subjected them
to a human-trafficking scheme by fraudulently inducing them to sign the contracts
and then failing to abide by their terms. They alleged that the defendants:
• Misled and induced them to pay “placement fees” by representing that
they would have jobs waiting for them in the United States, when there
were no jobs;
• Misled and induced them to sign contracts guaranteeing payment, and
then refused to pay them, and instead provided them with a monthly
“allowance” that had to be repaid, which resulted in debt bondage;
• Intimidated those who complained by threatening, among other things,
deportation and “black listing;”
• Prevented them from seeking employment with other companies in
Texas; and
• Refused to pay unpaid wages after they left IPS.
3
They alleged claims for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion,
theft, and conspiracy. They requested actual, mental anguish, and exemplary
damages.
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims based upon
principles of international comity. They argued that the plaintiffs had been
employed under a highly regulated overseas employment program governed by the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 and that the Filipino National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate their
claims. In support of this contention, they pointed to Section 10 of the Act, which
provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, . . . NLRC . . .
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages.
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, Republic Act 8042, § 10
(2004) (Phil.). The defendants also presented evidence that one of the plaintiffs
had filed a complaint with the NLRC regarding his employment with IPS. The
defendants asserted that both MBC and IPS are licensed and registered by the
Philippines to participate in the overseas employment program, and are thus
4
subject to regulation by the Philippines Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). 1
The defendants pointed to the existence of the POEA and its mandate, as well as to
various other Filipino departments and Filipino labor laws to argue that the
Philippines’ “interest in the parties and issues in this case outweighs by a
substantial margin the interests of the United States.” Because the Philippines has
“extensively legislated both the laws governing the rights of the parties . . . and the
procedures for resolution,” the trial court should refrain from exercising subject-
matter jurisdiction.
In response to the motion, the plaintiffs emphasized that the defendants
conceded that dismissal was not required by any contract, treaty, or statute, and
that the trial court had discretion to deny the motion and exercise jurisdiction.
They argued that Section 10 of the Act, at most, indicated that the Philippines had
concurrent jurisdiction over their claims, and other parts of the Act, in particular
Section 22, indicated that the Philippines recognized that workers should make
claims through a host country’s dispute mechanisms, if they were available. The
plaintiffs argued that they elected to sue in Texas because most of them still live in
the United States, many live in Texas, the contracts were performed in Texas, they
suffered harm in Texas, and the Filipino legal system was known to be corrupt.
1
According to the defendants, the POEA regulates recruiting agencies and the
foreign employers who contract with those agencies to hire Filipino workers.
5
They argued that deferring to the Philippines based upon comity principles would
undermine Texas public policy against human trafficking, and that the cases cited
by the defendants in support of dismissal were legally and factually
distinguishable. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs submitted the
declaration of Melchor Dizon, a Director of the POEA, in which he averred that
“[u]nder the facts and circumstances unique to this case, it appears that the Texas
courts are in a good position to resolve this case.”
On March 11, 2013, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion and
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims based on principles of international comity.
Discussion
In a single issue, the appellants, who were the plaintiffs below, contend that
the trial court erred in deferring to the Philippines and dismissing their claims.
A. Standard of Review
The parties dispute the standard of review to be applied here, where the trial
court dismissed the appellants’ claims based upon principles of international
comity. The appellants argue that whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction
over a case is a legal question and, therefore, our review should be de novo. See
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004).
The appellees argue that dismissal based on comity is “voluntary and not
6
obligatory,” and therefore the trial court’s decision to decline to exercise
jurisdiction should be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Griffith
v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d 43, 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.).
Although the appellees titled their motion a “Motion to Dismiss For Lack of
Jurisdiction,” they requested in the motion that the trial court decline to exercise
jurisdiction based upon principles of international comity. Accordingly, we agree
that the applicable standard of review is the abuse-of-discretion standard. See
Surgitek, Bristol–Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999) (“[W]e
look to the substance of a motion to determine the relief sought, not merely to its
title.”); Griffith, 341 S.W.3d at 54 (“application of comity vests in the sound
discretion of the tribunal of the forum”); see also Perforaciones Exploracion Y
Produccion v. Maritimas Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V., 356 Fed. Appx. 675, 680 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“A district court’s decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction in the
face of possible international comity concerns is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.”); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Webb, 809 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1991, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“We do not find an abuse of discretion by the
Texas trial court in protecting its jurisdiction [by rejecting comity argument] under
these circumstances.”).
7
Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily,
unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles. See Wagner &
Brown., Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 428–29 (Tex. 2008). In matters
involving factual disputes, however, a trial court does not abuse its discretion “if it
bases its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports its
decision.” See Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009)
(citing In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. 1998)).
B. Applicable Law
“Texas courts are bound to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by the Texas
Constitution and cannot delegate their judicial prerogative where jurisdiction
exists.” Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 606 (Tex. 2013).
However, in some circumstances, Texas courts may defer to the sovereignty of
foreign nations according to principles of international comity. See K.D.F. v. Rex,
878 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tex. 1994). Comity is a doctrine grounded in cooperation
and mutuality. Id. It “is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164, 16 S. Ct. 139, 143 (1895); see Hawsey v. La. Dep’t of
8
Social Servs., 934 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ
denied) (“Comity is a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to
the laws of another state or extend immunity to a sister sovereign not as a rule of
law, but rather out of deference or respect.”).
“Dismissal of a suit on international comity grounds may sometimes be
appropriate when there is litigation pending in a foreign forum or, even absent such
litigation, when allowing a case to proceed in the United States would intrude on
the interests of a foreign government.” Perforaciones Exploracion, 356 Fed.
Appx. at 681. However, the mere fact that a foreign country’s law vests exclusive
jurisdiction over a complaint in a tribunal within its borders does not support a
U.S. court’s decision to decline to hear the complaint under principles of
international comity. See Randall v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 778 F.2d 1146, 1150
(5th Cir. 1985).
To determine whether dismissal based on principles of international comity
is appropriate, federal courts apply Sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. See Torres v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 908 (S.D. Tex. 1996). One Texas court has also
applied Sections 402 and 403 to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction
violated principles of international comity. See Webb, 809 S.W.2d at 904
9
(concluding that exercise of jurisdiction by Texas district court was not
unreasonable under Section 403(2)). In Webb, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
held that the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction was not unreasonable under
Section 403 and that principles of international comity did not require the trial
court to refrain from entering an injunction preventing Owens-Illinois from
seeking injunctive relief in Canada. See id. at 905.
Section 402 provides:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to
(1)
(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within
its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside
as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals
that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited
class of other state interests.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, § 402 (1987). Section 403 sets forth the
following limitation on a state’s jurisdiction:
Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a
person or activity having connections with another state when the
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
10
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, § 403(1) (1987). Thus, when a basis for
jurisdiction under Section 402 is present, the trial court may dismiss only if it
concludes that its exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. See Webb, 809
S.W.2d at 904.
Section 403(2) sets forth a number of factors to be considered in determining
whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. They are: (a) the link
of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable
effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or
economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated,
the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be
protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the
international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the
regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the
extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
11
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations, § 403(2).
C. Analysis
The appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing
their claims, because they reside or resided in Texas when the allegedly wrongful
conduct occurred, some of the appellees continue to reside in Texas and the United
States, the conduct about which they complain occurred in Texas, and the
Philippines has not expressed any objection to the trial court exercising jurisdiction
over these claims. The appellees argue that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion because the Philippines has extensive legislation governing the rights of
Filipino workers and those who recruit and employ them overseas, as well as
procedures for resolving these disputes.
Although the Texas Supreme Court has not adopted Sections 402 and 403,
we, like the Texarkana Court of Appeals and the federal courts, conclude that these
provisions set forth the proper framework within which to review the trial court’s
dismissal. See Webb, 809 S.W.2d at 904. Accordingly, we consider the Section
403 factors in determining whether the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
this case would be unreasonable.
12
Under the first factor, we examine the extent to which the activity
complained of occurred in or has an effect upon Texas. The appellants alleged that
all or substantially all of the wrongful conduct alleged in this case occurred in
Texas, while they were in Texas working for IPS, a Texas company. However,
they acknowledge that their initial recruitment, which they contend was fraudulent,
occurred in the Philippines. And the appellants do not dispute that IPS, their
Texas-based employer, was required to work with MBC, the Philippines-based and
Philippines-regulated recruiting agency, to obtain their services. In short, a
substantial part, but not all, of the conduct about which the appellants complain
allegedly occurred in Texas.
With respect to the second factor, we consider the connections, such as
nationality, residence, or economic activity, between Texas and the parties. Eight
of the 57 appellants hold green cards and 26 have been granted T-1 visas. IPS is a
Texas company, and four of the individual appellees reside in Texas. The
appellants also point out that other employees of IPS in Texas, who are not named
defendants, will be called as witnesses. On the other hand, at least one individual
appellee is a Filipino resident, and MBC is a Filipino company. Further, all of the
appellants are Filipino nationals who came to work for IPS by virtue of the Filipino
overseas employment program. Thus, although some evidence supports each
13
side’s argument, it does not support a conclusion that the trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
Under the third and fourth factors, we examine the character and importance
to Texas of regulating the complained-of activity, the desirability of such
regulation, and the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by Texas’s regulation of the activity. The Texas legislature has indicated a
desire to regulate and protect Texas employees from human trafficking. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 98 (West Supp. 2013) (creating private right of
action for damages arising from trafficking). The appellants point to State
Department reports showing that the Philippines is slow to punish traffickers and
argue that the Filipino legal system suffers from rampant corruption; this, they
contend, favors jurisdiction in Texas. On the other hand, the evidence shows that
the Philippines has a comprehensive legal and regulatory regime governing
Filipino recruiting agencies and overseas employers of Filipino workers. At least
one of the appellants has availed himself of that regulatory scheme by filing a
parallel proceeding before the NLRC complaining about his employment with IPS.
The appellees argue that the district court should not exercise jurisdiction because
some conduct about which the appellants complain is actually required by Filipino
laws and regulations.
14
In their motion to dismiss, the appellees relied heavily upon Section 10 of
the Migrant Workers Act to argue that the NLRC has exclusive jurisdiction and is
a strong expression of the Philippines’ interest in this case. While Section 10 is
one fact that weighs in favor of dismissal insofar as it demonstrates that the
Philippines regulates the complained-of activity, contrary to the appellees’
argument, Section 10, alone, does not support dismissal of the appellants’ case.
See Randall, 778 F.2d at 1150 (holding that the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of
Saudi Arabia’s Labor Law cannot deprive an American court of subject matter
jurisdiction, “reject[ing] outright the notion that the law of a foreign country can
unilaterally curtail the power of our . . . courts to hear a dispute” unless some other
agreement or treaty requires that result). On balance, some evidence relevant to
the third and fourth factors supports each side’s arguments, but the evidence does
not support a conclusion that the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.
Under the fifth and sixth factors, we consider the importance of the
regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system and the extent to
which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system.
Regarding these factors, the appellees argue that the appellants improperly are
trying to convert a straightforward employment dispute into a trafficking case,
15
absent any evidence that the appellees ever restrained the appellants. The
appellants, on the other hand, argue that Texas has a strong interest in preventing
exactly this type of exploitation of migrant workers. While we express no opinion
about the merits of the appellants’ claims, at this stage of the litigation, we are
required to construe the pleadings liberally in their favor and accept as true the
factual allegations in the pleading. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. Thus, the
appellees’ contention that the appellants have improperly pleaded contract claims
as trafficking claims does not support dismissal.
Under the seventh and eighth factors, we examine the extent to which
another state may have an interest in regulating the activity and the likelihood of
conflict with regulation by another state. The record contains no evidence that the
Philippines has expressed any objection to Texas’s exercise of jurisdiction over the
appellants’ claims. The appellants argue that both the United States and the
Philippines have jurisdiction over human trafficking, and therefore there is no
conflict. They also point to the declaration of Melchor Dizon, a director of the
POEA, in which Dizon averred that Texas courts are in a good position to handle
the claims. The appellees, on the other hand, argue that the Philippines has a
“greater interest” in the conflict, as illustrated by the fact that the appellants were
employed under a regulated Filipino overseas employment program and the
16
Philippines has many laws and regulations regarding the treatment of overseas
workers and disputes with their employers. While the Philippines has some
interest in ensuring compliance with its regulations and protecting Filipino
workers, the evidence relevant to the seventh and eighth factors does not support a
conclusion that it would be unreasonable for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction
over this case.
The appellees principally rely upon three federal cases to argue for
affirmance. See Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir.
1994); Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996);
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994). According to the
appellees, these cases support the trial court’s conclusion that the Philippines’
interest in adjudicating the appellants’ claims outweighs that of the United States.
In Turner, the federal district court denied the German defendants’ motion to
dismiss or stay the litigation and granted a temporary injunction requested by the
American plaintiff, Turner. Turner, 25 F.3d at 1519. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that, under principles of international comity, the federal district court
suit should be stayed pending the resolution of the first-filed German suit, because
the German court, which was a competent court, had already rendered a judgment
on the merits, and there was no evidence that the judgment was fraudulent or
17
repugnant to fundamental principles of justice. Id. at 1520–21. Turner is unlike
this case, because, here, there is no judgment on the merits from a Filipino court
and only one of the 57 appellants has filed a claim in the Philippines.
In Sequihua, the federal district court concluded that “none of the
[Restatement] factors” favored jurisdiction, and dismissed on comity grounds. In
that case, residents of Ecuador sued in Texas state court over alleged
environmental contamination in Ecuador, seeking monetary relief and an
injunction against further contamination. The federal district court concluded that
dismissal based on principles of international comity was proper because:
The challenged activity and the alleged harm occurred entirely in
Ecuador; Plaintiffs are all residents of Ecuador; Defendants are not
residents of Texas; enforcement in Ecuador of any judgment issued by
this Court is questionable at best; the challenged conduct is regulated
by the Republic of Ecuador and exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
would interfere with Ecuador’s sovereign right to control its own
environment and resources; and the Republic of Ecuador has
expressed its strenuous objection to the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court.
Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 63.
Finally, in Torres, residents of Peru sued the operator of a copper mining
and smelting operation, along with the operator’s shareholders and financiers, for
injuries allegedly caused by toxic emissions in Peru. The only connection to Texas
shown by the plaintiffs was that one of the corporate defendants, the controlling
18
shareholder of the operator, “conduct[ed] operations” in Texas, but the shareholder
was not a Texas corporation and did not have its principal place of business in
Texas. The federal district court followed Sequihua and dismissed based on
principles of international comity, noting:
The challenged activity and the alleged harm occurred entirely in
Peru; Plaintiffs are all residents of Peru; enforcement in Peru of any
judgment rendered by this Court is questionable; the challenged
conduct is regulated by the Republic of Peru and exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court would interfere with Peru’s sovereign right
to control its own environment and resources; and the Republic of
Peru has expressed strenuous objection to the exercise of jurisdiction
by this Court.
Torres, 965 F. Supp. at 909. 2
In summary, having considered the Section 403 factors, we conclude that
Sequiha and Torres do not compel affirmance here because, in those cases, none of
the Restatement factors favored jurisdiction. Turner likewise is significantly
different from this case. Here, many of the Restatement factors—including the
Texas residence of some appellants and appellees, the fact that a substantial part of
2
The appellees also rely upon Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d
898 (5th Cir. 2005) and Marinechance Shipping, Ltd. v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216,
220 (5th Cir. 1998) to argue that the trial court’s decision to abstain from hearing
the case should be upheld “because the Philippines has extensively legislated both
the laws governing the rights of the parties to this dispute and the procedures for
resolution of the parties’ dispute under the Migrant Workers Act.” But those cases
are of limited utility because they did not address comity and, instead, involved
the enforcement of forum selection clauses in Filipino seamen’s contracts. See
Lim, 404 F.3d at 900; Marinechance, 143 F.3d at 220.
19
the alleged wrongful conduct is alleged to have occurred in Texas, and Texas’s
interest in preventing human trafficking within Texas—support the exercise of
jurisdiction in Texas. And although some factors—the Filipino regulatory scheme
regarding the overseas employment program, the residence in the Philippines of
some appellants and appellees, and the fact that some of the wrongful conduct (the
alleged fraudulent inducement) is alleged to have occurred in the Philippines—
favor jurisdiction in the Philippines, the question here is whether it was
unreasonable for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over this case. See
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, § 403(1); Webb, 809 S.W.2d at 904.
Based on the record in this case, we conclude it would not be.
Texas law on forum non conveniens supports our conclusion. Section
71.051(e) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code signals an intent that
Texas courts exercise jurisdiction in cases involving legal residents of Texas. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(e) (West 2008). And even in cases
in which Section 71.051(e) does not prohibit dismissal, we note that dismissal is
proper only if the balance of factors weighs heavily against Texas and in favor of
the alternative forum. See Vinmar Trade Fin., Ltd. v. Util. Trailers de Mex., S.A.
de C.V., 336 S.W.3d 664, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.)
(“The defendants bear the burden of proof on all elements of the forum non
20
conveniens analysis and must establish that the balance of factors strongly favors
dismissal.”); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S. Ct. 839, 843
(1947) (“[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”). Considering all of the Section 403
factors in light of this standard and the principle that Texas courts must not
“delegate their judicial prerogative where jurisdiction exists,” Masterson, 422
S.W.3d at 606, we conclude that exercise of jurisdiction over this case by Texas is
not unreasonable, and, accordingly, that the trial court erred in dismissing the case.
See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, § 403(1); see also Webb, 809
S.W.2d at 904 (applying Restatement Sections 402 and 403 and concluding that
exercise of jurisdiction by Texas court was not unreasonable).
We sustain the appellants’ sole issue.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Huddle.
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