Javara Price v. State , 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9152 ( 2016 )


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  • Affirmed and Opinion filed August 23, 2016.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-15-00263-CR
    JAVARA PRICE, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 232nd District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1408375
    OPINION
    Appellant Javara Price appeals his conviction of aggravated robbery, raising
    two issues. Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay
    testimony of statements made by the complainant to the responding police officer;
    and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because it is based
    solely on the complainant’s unreliable out-of-court identification of appellant.
    We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s
    conviction for aggravated robbery. We also hold that the trial court did not abuse
    its discretion in admitting the complainant’s out-of-court statements to the police
    officer because the record supports admission of the first set of statements under
    the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and the second set of statements
    was non-hearsay under Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(1)(C).
    BACKGROUND
    According to testimony of the complainant, Joel Fraustro, he walked outside
    his apartment one evening to retrieve his daughter’s homework from his
    girlfriend’s vehicle. While he searched the vehicle, two men approached him.
    One of the men held a shotgun to his head and demanded Fraustro give them his
    cell phone and money. After Fraustro told the two men that he had neither, they
    patted him down, told him to turn around and start walking, and threatened to
    shoot him if he looked back. Fraustro complied and began walking away from the
    vehicle. Left with the keys to the vehicle, the two men drove away.
    Fraustro returned to his apartment and knocked on the front door. Fraustro
    testified that his girlfriend initially did not let him in because he was “hysterical”
    and she did not recognize his voice. Fraustro proceeded to tell his girlfriend what
    occurred, and she immediately called the police. Approximately six to ten minutes
    later, HPD officers Cabrera and Rodriguez arrived and spoke with Fraustro.
    Officer Cabrera testified that Fraustro was “visibly upset” and “[h]is hands were
    shaking.” Over defense counsel’s objection, Officer Cabrera related to the jury
    what Fraustro told him about the robbery and the identity of the two men he
    alleged robbed him.1
    1
    Defense counsel’s objections were based on hearsay and denial of confrontation. The trial
    court overruled the objections, but granted defense counsel a running objection to the State’s line
    of questioning. On appeal, appellant challenges admission of the statements on hearsay grounds
    only.
    2
    According to Officer Cabrera’s testimony, he and Officer Rodriguez left the
    apartment and began searching the area for the stolen vehicle. They subsequently
    parked their patrol car at a gas station located at the corner of Broadway Street and
    Morley Street, near Fraustro’s apartment. While Officer Cabrera was completing
    the offense report, he saw the stolen vehicle traveling east on Morley Street. The
    officers followed the vehicle and observed two men inside the vehicle who
    matched Fraustro’s description of the robbers. The officers confirmed the license
    plate number and made a traffic stop.
    The driver accelerated the stolen vehicle and attempted to flee but soon lost
    control and flipped the vehicle, which landed on the driver’s side. After detaining
    the two occupants, the officers searched the vehicle. Officer Cabrera testified that
    when he approached the vehicle, he observed a shotgun laying beneath the driver’s
    side window. He described the shotgun as dark in color and missing the butt.
    After securing the weapon, officers removed three unfired slug shells from the
    shotgun.
    As the officers secured the scene, Fraustro and his family passed by on their
    way to a friend’s house and recognized their vehicle. Officer Cabrera testified that
    Fraustro was “very upset” when he arrived on the scene and saw the damaged car.
    He also estimated that about thirty-five to forty-five minutes had passed since the
    robbery.
    Because Fraustro was present and a relatively short amount of time had
    passed since the robbery, Officer Cabrera decided to conduct a “show up”
    identification at the scene of the accident. Officer Cabrera read Fraustro the
    witness admonishment form and proceeded to present the suspects to Fraustro for
    identification.   Over defense objection, Officer Cabrera testified as to what
    Fraustro told him during the show up, including his positive identification of
    3
    appellant.2
    Fraustro also testified during the trial. Fraustro testified that he identified
    appellant at the accident scene as the person who robbed him while pointing a
    shotgun at his head. According to Fraustro, he was “enraged” when he arrived at
    the scene and saw the damaged car. The officers told him to wait by the gas
    station until they were ready to have him identify the suspects at the scene. The
    officers later showed him each suspect individually. Fraustro testified that he was
    able to identify the two men as the robbers. Fraustro then identified appellant in
    the courtroom as the man who held the shotgun to his head.                   Fraustro also
    identified the shotgun police recovered from the vehicle as the same shotgun
    appellant used in the robbery.
    The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery and assessed
    punishment at confinement for 19 years. This appeal followed.
    ANALYSIS
    Appellant presents two issues on appeal. We address appellant’s second
    issue first because it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and seeks rendition
    of a judgment of acquittal.
    I.     Sufficient evidence supports appellant’s conviction of aggravated
    robbery.
    Appellant’s second issue on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support his conviction. We hold that a rational trier of fact could have
    concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed aggravated
    robbery.
    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we
    2
    Defense counsel repeated his objection on hearsay and confrontation grounds. The trial court
    overruled his objection and granted a running objection to the line of questioning.
    4
    determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnson v. State, 
    364 S.W.3d 292
    , 293–94
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)).
    In making this review, an appellate court considers all evidence in the record,
    whether it was admissible or inadmissible. Winfrey v. State, 
    393 S.W.3d 763
    , 767
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Dewberry v. State, 
    4 S.W.3d 735
    , 740 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1999)). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight afforded their testimony. Montgomery v. State, 
    369 S.W.3d 188
    , 192 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2012). The jury may reasonably infer facts from the evidence as it sees
    fit. See Canfield v. State, 
    429 S.W.3d 54
    , 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2014, pet. ref’d). The jury alone decides whether to believe eyewitness testimony,
    and it resolves any conflicts in the evidence. Bradley v. State, 
    359 S.W.3d 912
    ,
    917 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). Therefore, the testimony
    of a single eyewitness can be enough to support a conviction. 
    Id. (citing Aguilar
    v.
    State, 
    468 S.W.2d 75
    , 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)).
    A person commits aggravated robbery if, (1) in the course of committing
    theft, and (2) with intent to obtain or maintain control of property, (3) he
    knowingly or intentionally (4) threatens or places another in fear of imminent
    bodily injury or death, and (5) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code
    Ann. §§ 29.02(a), 29.03(a)(2) (West 2011). A firearm is a deadly weapon. 
    Id. § 1.07(a)(17)
    (West Supp. 2015).
    Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding
    that he was one of the two men who committed the aggravated robbery. Because
    appellant was not identified by any other witnesses and did not make any
    incriminating statements to the police, appellant argues that the conviction rests
    5
    solely on Fraustro’s unreliable identification of him at the scene of the accident.
    Appellant contends on-the-scene identifications are generally unreliable due to
    their suggestive nature. Appellant also attacks the quality of the evidence, pointing
    to inconsistencies in the description of the suspects Fraustro gave police and the
    physical characteristics of appellant upon arrest.
    Although this Court acknowledged in Fite v. State that on-the-scene
    identifications have “some degree of suggestiveness,” we concluded that “their use
    is necessary in cases, such as this one, where time is of the essence in catching a
    suspect and an early identification is aided by the fresh memory of the victim.” 
    60 S.W.3d 314
    , 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d); see Garza v.
    State, 
    633 S.W.2d 508
    , 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 
    388 U.S. 293
    , 302 (1967)). Fraustro’s identification of appellant at the scene of the
    accident was, therefore, not categorically unreliable. See Neil v. Biggers, 
    409 U.S. 188
    , 198 (1972) (stating that admission of evidence from show-up identification
    should    not     be   excluded      without     additional     evidence      of   unnecessary
    suggestiveness).3
    Whether Fraustro’s on-the-scene identification of appellant meets the
    reliability standard of Neil is not an issue we must resolve in addressing appellant’s
    3
    In Neil, the US Supreme Court listed these five non-exclusive factors that should be “weighed
    against the corrupting effect of any suggestive identification procedure in assessing reliability
    under the totality of the circumstances”:
    (1) The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
    (2) The witness’ degree of attention;
    (3) The accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal;
    (4) The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and
    (5) The length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
    
    Id. at 199–200.
    6
    sufficiency challenge.4 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider
    all evidence in the record, whether it was admissible or inadmissible. 
    Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 767
    .        Applying this standard, we consider Fraustro’s on-the-scene
    identification of appellant as well as the other evidence that linked appellant to the
    robbery.
    Appellant was apprehended only a few blocks from the crime scene thirty
    minutes after the robbery occurred. Appellant was riding in the stolen vehicle and
    matched Fraustro’s description of the suspect. A shotgun was found lying beneath
    the vehicle’s window. Fraustro testified that appellant held the shotgun to his head
    and at one point threatened to shoot Fraustro if he did not cooperate. Fraustro also
    positively identified appellant in the courtroom and identified the shotgun
    recovered from the accident scene as the same shotgun appellant used to commit
    the robbery.
    Appellant’s other challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is based on
    inconsistencies in Fraustro’s description of appellant.               For example, Officer
    Cabrera testified that Fraustro described the robbers as wearing “dark clothing.”
    When Fraustro testified, he told the jury that one man wore a gray shirt and the
    other wore a white shirt. This discrepancy, however, does not require reversal of
    appellant’s conviction. See 
    Bradley, 359 S.W.3d at 917
    (“It was the jury’s role to
    decide whether that testimony was credible, and we will not disturb the jury’s
    decision.”). The jury may resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.
    Id.; Garcia v. State, 
    57 S.W.3d 436
    , 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), cert. denied, 
    537 U.S. 1195
    (2003). The jury was therefore not required to disregard Fraustro’s
    testimony simply because parts of it were inconsistent with other testimony. See
    4
    The record also shows appellant did not file a motion to suppress the on-the-scene
    identification or object to its admission on reliability grounds, thereby failing to preserve any
    complaint for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
    7
    Lee v. State, 
    176 S.W.3d 452
    , 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d,
    
    206 S.W.3d 620
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    On this record, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have concluded
    beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed aggravated robbery. We
    therefore hold the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction, and we
    overrule his second issue.
    II.   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Officer Cabrera
    to testify to Fraustro’s out-of-court statements.
    Appellant contends in his first issue that the trial court committed reversible
    error by improperly admitting hearsay evidence under the excited utterance
    exception. Specifically, appellant challenges two lines of testimony that he argues
    contain inadmissible hearsay: (1) Officer Cabrera’s testimony regarding Fraustro’s
    account of the robbery and description of the suspects, which Fraustro gave Officer
    Cabrera shortly after his arrival at Fraustro’s apartment; and (2) Officer Cabrera’s
    testimony regarding Fraustro’s identification of appellant at a “show-up”
    identification conducted at the scene of the vehicle accident.
    We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the first
    line of testimony because the record supports the trial court’s finding that the
    statements were admissible as an excited utterance under Rule of Evidence 803(2).
    We also conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the second line of
    testimony because Fraustro’s statements were non-hearsay under Texas Rule of
    Evidence 801(e)(1)(C).
    A.     Standard of review and applicable law
    We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
    discretion. Zuliani v. State, 
    97 S.W.3d 589
    , 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A trial
    court abuses its discretion only if “the trial judge’s decision was so clearly wrong
    8
    as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.” Cantu
    v. State, 
    842 S.W.2d 667
    , 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).               If the trial court’s
    evidentiary ruling was correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling, we
    must affirm the ruling. Gomez v. State, 
    380 S.W.3d 830
    , 836 n.9 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing De La Paz v. State, 
    279 S.W.3d 336
    ,
    344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
    The Texas Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a statement, other than one
    made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence
    to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Although hearsay
    is generally inadmissible, Rule 803 provides an exception for admitting excited
    utterances: statements “relating to a startling event or condition made while the
    declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”
    Tex. R. Evid. 803(2); see 
    Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595
    –96. The basis for the excited
    utterance exception is “a psychological one, namely, the fact that when a man is in
    the instant grip of violent emotion, excitement or pain, he ordinarily loses the
    capacity for reflection necessary to the fabrication of a falsehood and the ‘truth will
    come out.’” Evans v. State, 
    480 S.W.2d 387
    , 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
    In determining whether a hearsay statement is admissible as an excited
    utterance, the court should consider whether “(1) the ‘exciting event’ [is] startling
    enough to evoke a truly spontaneous reaction from the declarant; (2) the reaction to
    the startling event [is] quick enough to avoid the possibility of fabrication; and (3)
    the resulting statement [is] sufficiently ‘related to’ the startling event, to ensure the
    reliability and trustworthiness of the statement.” McCarty v. State, 
    257 S.W.3d 238
    , 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The court may also consider the time elapsed
    and whether the statement was in response to a question. Salazar v. State, 
    38 S.W.3d 141
    , 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). These factors are not dispositive,
    9
    however. 
    Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596
    . The critical determination is “whether the
    declarant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the
    event” or condition at the time of the statement. McFarland v. State, 
    845 S.W.2d 824
    , 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
    The Texas Rules of Evidence also define as non-hearsay certain types of
    statements that would otherwise constitute hearsay.           One of these hearsay
    exclusions provides that a statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at trial
    and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is
    one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person. Tex. R. Evid.
    801(e)(1)(C); see Thomas v. State, 
    811 S.W.2d 201
    , 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Smith v. State, 
    830 S.W.2d 328
    , 330 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.) (holding detective’s testimony regarding declarant’s
    pretrial identification of defendant in photo array and lineup was not hearsay
    because declarant testified at trial, was subject to cross examination, and her
    statement pertained to identification of person made after perceiving him).
    Applying these standards, we examine the two lines of testimony appellant
    challenges on appeal.
    B.     The trial court did not err in admitting Officer Cabrera’s
    testimony of the statements the complainant made at the
    apartment.
    Appellant’s first complaint relates to Officer Cabrera’s testimony regarding
    what Fraustro told him shortly after Officer Cabrera arrived at Fraustro’s
    apartment. Fraustro told Officer Cabrera the details of the robbery and gave the
    following description of the suspects:
    Q.    And did [Fraustro] provide you with a description of the
    suspects?
    A.     He did.
    10
    Q.     What was that description?
    A.     Two young black males 19 to 23, dark clothing, short haircuts.
    ....
    Q.     Did you ask him how good a look he got at the two suspects?
    A.     They were very close to him when the robbery occurred so he
    got a good look at the suspects and he said that he would be able to
    identify if he saw them again.
    Appellant argues that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.
    The trial court’s ruling is supported by the record, which contains evidence
    that Fraustro was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the
    robbery when he made the statements to Officer Cabrera. Officer Cabrera testified
    that he arrived at Fraustro’s apartment about six minutes after receiving the call for
    service and proceeded to meet with Fraustro. He described Fraustro as “visibly
    upset.” Officer Cabrera noticed Fraustro’s “hands were shaking” and he appeared
    “just generally upset that he had just been robbed.”
    The fact that Fraustro’s statements were made in response to Officer
    Cabrera’s questions does not make the statements inadmissible under the excited
    utterance exception; it is only a factor to consider. See 
    Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596
    ;
    Amador v. State, 
    376 S.W.3d 339
    , 344 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012,
    pet. ref’d). The key question is whether the declarant was still dominated by the
    emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event. 
    Id. Given the
    traumatic nature of
    the robbery, his girlfriend’s testimony that Fraustro was “hysterical” afterwards,
    Officer Cabrera’s description of Fraustro as “visibly upset” and “shaking” at the
    time of the statements, and the relatively short time between the robbery and his
    statements, it was not outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the trial
    court to conclude that Fraustro was still under the stress of the robbery when he
    11
    made the statements. Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court did
    not abuse its discretion in admitting this hearsay testimony under the excited
    utterance exception.
    C.     The trial court did not err in admitting the complainant’s out-of-
    court statements made at the scene of the vehicle accident.
    Appellant also challenges the trial court’s admission of a second line of
    Officer Cabrera’s testimony, in which he was permitted to testify about what
    Fraustro told him during the on-the-scene identification of appellant.
    Q.     Was [Fraustro] able to identify [appellant’s co-defendant]?
    A. Yes he was.
    Q.     Was it a positive identification?
    A.     It was a positive identification.
    ....
    Q.     . . . was he confident that it was the correct person?
    A.     He was confident.
    ....
    Q.     Now, after the witness identified [appellant’s co-defendant] did
    you attempt to see if he could identify [appellant]?
    A.     Yes.
    Q.     And was he able to?
    A.     Yes.
    ....
    Q.   And did he explain to you what the - - what [appellant’s] role in
    the robbery was?
    A.     Yes he did.
    12
    Q.     And what did he tell you?
    ....
    A.     He stated he was the suspect with the gun, with the shotgun.
    Q.     Okay. And was that also a positive identification?
    A.     Yes it was.
    Appellant relies on Williams v. State, 
    531 S.W.2d 606
    , 611 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1975), which held that a police officer’s testimony recounting the complainant’s
    statements was inadmissible hearsay designed to bolster the complainant’s
    unimpeached identification testimony. Inferring that the same rule should apply
    here, appellant argues that Officer Cabrera should not have been permitted to
    testify that Fraustro positively identified appellant.
    Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive, however, because bolstering is no
    longer a valid objection to a witness’s identification of a defendant given the Rule
    801(e)(1)(C) hearsay exclusion.5 Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(1)(C); Jackson v. State, 
    846 S.W.2d 411
    , 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (“[Rule
    801(e)(1)(C)] has eliminated bolstering as a valid objection in that such testimony
    is no longer hearsay.”); 
    Thomas, 811 S.W.2d at 208
    (holding that, under Rule
    801(e)(1)(C), bolstering declarant’s identification with police testimony is
    permissible if declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination concerning
    statement).
    Here, Officer Cabrera’s testimony of Fraustro’s out-of-court statements
    5
    Williams was decided prior to the adoption of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence in 1985
    and the unified Texas Rules of Evidence in 1998. See Rivas v. State, 
    275 S.W.3d 880
    , 885–86
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Rule 801(e)(1)(C) provides that a statement is not hearsay if the
    declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about the prior statement, and the
    statement identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier. Tex. R. Evid.
    801(e)(1)(C).
    13
    identifying appellant as the man who robbed him was non-hearsay under Rule
    801(e)(1)(C) because Fraustro later testified, was subject to cross-examination, and
    the statement identified appellant as someone Fraustro perceived earlier. See Hill
    v. State, 
    392 S.W.3d 850
    , 858 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. ref’d); Cuevas v.
    State, No. 14-12-00480-CR, 
    2013 WL 4007814
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] Aug. 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). This
    exclusion from the hearsay rule also extends to other statements Fraustro made to
    Officer Cabrera during the identification, such as his description of appellant’s role
    in the robbery. See Delacerda v. State, 
    425 S.W.3d 367
    , 393 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d.) (“[L]imiting admissible testimony under the
    identification exclusion to the hearsay rule solely to the declarant’s naming of the
    identified individual and not allowing testimony regarding what the declarant
    identified the individual as doing is unduly restrictive.”). In Delacerda, the First
    Court of Appeals concluded that Rule 801(e)(1)(C) permitted the law enforcement
    officer to testify not only to the complainant’s identification of the individual in the
    lineup, but to his actions during the crime as well. 
    Id. at 391–393.6
    The Rule
    applies equally here.        Officer Cabrera was permitted to testify to Fraustro’s
    positive identification of appellant as well as his description of appellant’s role in
    the robbery—holding the shotgun. Admitting Fraustro’s statements surrounding
    the identification provided context to the fact-finder and avoided confusion over
    which of the two suspects threatened Fraustro with the shotgun.
    Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
    6
    Delacerda approved of other jurisdictions’ rationale for allowing testimony regarding what the
    declarant identified the individual as doing. The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, construed
    “statement of identification” under the Rule to include “the entire identification process,” People
    v. Tisdel, 
    775 N.E.2d 921
    , 926–27 (Ill. 2002); the D.C. Circuit of Appeals held that identification
    “must have context” to be understandable and probative. Johnson v. United States, 
    820 A.2d 551
    , 559 n.4 (D.C. 2003).
    14
    either the first or second line of Officer Cabrera’s testimony. Appellant’s first
    issue is overruled.
    CONCLUSION
    Having overruled each of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    /s/    J. Brett Busby
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Christopher, McCally, and Busby.
    Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: NO. 14-15-00263-CR

Citation Numbers: 502 S.W.3d 278, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9152, 2016 WL 4445013

Judges: Christopher, McCally, Busby

Filed Date: 8/23/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024

Authorities (20)

Neil v. Biggers , 93 S. Ct. 375 ( 1972 )

Rivas v. State , 2009 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 98 ( 2009 )

Cantu v. State , 1992 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 138 ( 1992 )

Dewberry v. State , 1999 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 115 ( 1999 )

Garcia v. State , 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 ( 2001 )

Jackson v. Virginia , 99 S. Ct. 2781 ( 1979 )

De La Paz v. State , 2009 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 426 ( 2009 )

Smith v. State , 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 1115 ( 1992 )

Salazar v. State , 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 3 ( 2001 )

Lee v. State , 2006 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1005 ( 2006 )

Zuliani v. State , 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 26 ( 2003 )

Thomas v. State , 811 S.W.2d 201 ( 1991 )

Fite v. State , 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 7151 ( 2001 )

Johnson v. State , 2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 479 ( 2012 )

Jackson v. State , 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 3158 ( 1992 )

Aguilar v. State , 1971 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1948 ( 1971 )

McCarty v. State , 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 759 ( 2008 )

Evans v. State , 1972 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1978 ( 1972 )

Bradley v. State , 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 1076 ( 2012 )

McFarland v. State , 1992 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 251 ( 1992 )

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