in Re Judith Shoemaker Gibson , 533 S.W.3d 916 ( 2017 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-17-00085-CV
IN RE JUDITH SHOEMAKER GIBSON
Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Moseley, Burgess, and Carter,* JJ.
Opinion by Justice Carter
_____________________________________
*Jack Carter, Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment
OPINION
The day before the statute of limitations ran, Suzanne Jean Shelby sued Judith Shoemaker
Gibson for alleged damages sustained in an October 23, 2015, motor vehicle accident. She did
not, however, properly serve Gibson until April 11, 2017. Gibson filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging that Shelby had not exercised due diligence in serving Gibson with citation. The trial
court denied Gibson’s motion. Gibson now petitions this Court for mandamus relief, asking us to
compel the trial court to dismiss Shelby’s suit. We deny Gibson’s request.
I. Mandamus Standard
To be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must show (1) that she has no adequate
remedy at law and (2) that the action she seeks to compel is ministerial, not one involving a
discretionary or judicial decision. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992); see
Cantu v. Longoria, 878 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. 1994). Before mandamus may issue, the relator
must show that the trial court had a legal duty to perform a ministerial act, was asked to do so, and
failed or refused to act. In re Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, orig.
proceeding).
In addition to showing that the trial court had no option but to have performed the act urged
by the relator, the relator must also have no adequate remedy at law. “An appellate remedy is
‘adequate’ when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.” In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). “When the benefits outweigh the
detriments, appellate courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is adequate.” Id. The
Texas Supreme Court described this balancing as “practical and prudential.” Id. While the Texas
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Supreme Court has “tried to give more concrete direction for determining the availability of
mandamus review, rigid rules are necessarily inconsistent with the flexibility that is the remedy’s
principal virtue.” Id. The Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that “an appellate remedy is
not inadequate merely because it may involve more expense or delay than obtaining an extraneous
writ.”1
II. Proceedings in the Trial Court
On March 2, 2017, the trial court notified Shelby’s counsel that the case was set for
dismissal for want of prosecution, and a hearing was scheduled on April 3, 2017. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 165a. On April 3, Shelby filed a motion to retain the case on the docket, which the trial court
granted. Two days later, she requested issuance of citation. Gibson was served on April 11, 2017.
On April 18, Gibson filed an answer and the motion to dismiss.2
The motion to dismiss sought to invoke the trial court’s inherent power and its authority
under Rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Gibson alleged (1) that Shelby failed to
exercise due diligence in serving the defendant, (2) that the plaintiff filed suit the day before
limitations ran, and (3) that because of her lack of diligence, Gibson was entitled to have the case
dismissed with prejudice.
1
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136 (quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842).
2
Texas law does not include a statutory or procedural rule governing a motion to dismiss for lack of diligence in
prosecuting a case at the behest of a party. Cf. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a.
3
Gibson did not attempt to invoke Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure regarding dismissal of baseless
causes of action. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.
3
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, neither side presented testimony or evidence;
counsel for the two sides simply presented argument to the trial court. When asked if she had been
prejudiced, Gibson offered a general statement that where there is such a delay after filing suit,
“there’s inherent prejudice to the Defendant because memories fade, and the longer it takes to try
something, the more likely there is that there will be problems remembering what happened, the
evidence will be stale, that sort of thing.” Gibson said she would like to conduct discovery.
Regarding her late service of citation upon Gibson, Shelby said:
Your Honor, we filed this action within the statute of limitations. I was working
with an adjuster for Safeco at that point in time. She told me she would accept
service after I filed the suit, so I sent her a copy via email. Didn’t really think about
it anymore after that. I assumed that an answer would be filed, and it wasn’t. After
I found out that an answer wasn’t on file, we served her.
Shelby said she was ready for trial. The trial court denied Gibson’s motion to dismiss and told the
parties to confer and set a trial date “by December.”
III. The Trial Court had Discretion to Deny the Motion to Dismiss
“Trial courts are generally granted considerable discretion when it comes to managing their
dockets. Such discretion, however, is not absolute.” In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Tex.
2015). “A trial court abuses its discretion if ‘it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as
to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law’ or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply
the law.” In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam) (quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839).
Gibson has presented this Court with no authority that the trial court had a ministerial duty
to dismiss Shelby’s suit. Gibson cited several cases where plaintiffs’ suits were dismissed for
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failure to pursue citation with due diligence. Those cases involve summary judgment
proceedings.4 In such cases, evidence was provided as to the date of service and actions taken by
the plaintiff to obtain service. In contrast, here, there are only pleadings and arguments of the
parties.
The only case involving mandamus relief cited by Shelby involves a trial court ordering a
paternity test well after the statutorily allowed date. In re Rodriguez, 248 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding). Mandamus relief was granted there, but the case is otherwise
generally inapposite to the situation between Gibson and Shelby. In Rodriguez, Husband alleged
that he was not the father of the two children born during the course of his marriage to Wife, and
he sought a paternity test to prove his allegation. Section 160.607 of the Texas Family Code
prohibits paternity challenges more than four years after a child’s birth, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.607 (West 2014), and Husband’s request for paternity testing was made more than four years
after the children were born. Husband alleged that Wife fraudulently concealed the true paternity
of the children from him and that such fraud operated to toll the four-year statutory limitation
period. The Texas Supreme Court ultimately found that Husband had offered no evidence entitling
him to the statutory exceptions that would have authorized the out-of-time testing he sought.
Since Rodriguez involved a clear statutory prohibition and there was no evidence in the
record meriting an exception to the preclusion of paternity testing after four years, the trial court
4
E.g., Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2007); Weaver v. EZ Mart, 942 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1997, no writ); Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 1990).
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clearly acted “without reference to any guiding rules and principles,”5 in ordering testing. Here,
no evidence was adduced before the trial court, and the record before us does not reveal a
ministerial duty on that court’s part. Gibson has another avenue to pursue, i.e., she could seek a
summary judgment. A summary judgment proceeding entails an established procedure whereby
both parties may present documents, depositions, and/or affidavits in support of their relative
positions. But, in the absence of conclusive evidence before the trial court, we cannot say that the
trial court had a ministerial duty to grant the motion to dismiss. A denial of a motion to dismiss is
usually not susceptible to mandamus relief. See Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d
56, 59 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).
Gibson also relied on Rule 165a as a rationale for the motion to dismiss Shelby’s suit. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a. Rule 165a, which provides a discretionary avenue for a trial court to dismiss,
states, “A case may be dismissed for want of prosecution on failure of any party seeking
affirmative relief to appear for any hearing or trial of which the party had notice.” TEX. R. CIV. P.
165a. The rule provides a procedure for a court to notify litigants of the court’s “intention to
dismiss,” along with the date and time of hearing on the matter. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a. By design,
this rule is invoked by the trial court, not the parties. At the mandated hearing, “the court shall
dismiss for want of prosecution unless there is good cause for the case to be maintained on the
docket.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a. While the rule uses the word “shall,” it is the court’s discretionary
decision to determine if good cause exists. Here, the trial court had previously exercised its
5
Garcia v. Martinez, 988 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. 1999).
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authority under Rule 165a and declined to dismiss plaintiff Shelby’s cause of action. Because the
exercise of authority was discretionary, it did not involve a ministerial duty.
IV. Denial of Dismissal not Generally Basis for Mandamus
Additionally, it is not clear that Gibson lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. “Absent
extraordinary circumstances not present here, a denial of a motion to dismiss or a plea in abatement
is a ruling incident to the ordinary trial process which will not be corrected by mandamus, but by
the legal remedy of the ordinary appellate process.” Hooks, 808 S.W.2d at 59. “[M]andamus
review is not—and should not be—an easily wielded tool, but such review of significant rulings
in exceptional cases may be essential to, among other things, ‘spare private parties and the public
the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted
proceedings.’” In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 299 (Tex. 2016)6 (quoting
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136). In J.B. Hunt Transportation, Incorporated,
mandamus was available because “[p]ermitting a case to proceed in the wrong court necessarily
costs ‘private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal
of improperly conducted proceedings.” Id. at 299 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
at 136).
Here, Gibson can appeal the trial court’s ruling after the case has been litigated. “An
appellate remedy is not inadequate because it may involve more expense or delay than obtaining
6
In J.B. Hunt Transportation, Incorporated, mandamus was conditionally granted where a Waller County court, in
which J.B. Hunt filed suit, was held to have dominant jurisdiction; the other party to the case had filed suit in Dallas
County.
7
an extraordinary writ, rather it is inadequate only when parties stand to lose their substantial
rights.” In re Lumbermen’s Underwriting All., 421 S.W.3d 289, 295 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2014, no pet.) (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842).7
In balancing the benefits versus detriments in a mandamus request, “we consider whether
mandamus will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss.” In
re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008). Further, “on rare occasions an appellate
remedy, generally adequate, may become inadequate because the circumstances are exceptional.”
In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding). We are presented here
with nothing to suggest Gibson is at risk of losing important substantive or procedural rights.
Motions for summary judgment are commonly used to present the issue confronted here;
we have found no cases resolving this issue by a motion to dismiss. In judging the benefits versus
the detriments of granting a mandamus request, we believe there is merit in utilizing the traditional
and well-established method of resolving this issue by the established procedure outlined in Rule
166a. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a.
7
Specifically, Walker stated:
We further hold that an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because it may involve more
expense or delay than obtaining an extraordinary writ. As we observed in Iley v. Hughes, the “delay
in getting questions decided through the appellate process . . . will not justify intervention by
appellate courts through the extraordinary writ of mandamus. Interference is justified only when
parties stand to lose their substantial rights.”
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 (quoting Iley v. Hughes, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Tex. 1958)).
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We can find neither that the act Gibson seeks to compel was ministerial in nature nor that
the situation at bar presents such a significant or exceptional circumstance as to require the
extraordinary relief of mandamus. See generally Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136.
We deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: October 23, 2017
Date Decided: October 24, 2017
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