Clifford Clark v. State ( 2020 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-19-00051-CR
CLIFFORD CLARK, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 102nd District Court
Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 17F1154-102
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Clifford Clark was convicted after a bench trial of arson of a building and sentenced to
twenty years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a)(2)(A). The trial court ordered
the sentence to run concurrently with two other arson convictions Clark appeals in companion
cause numbers 06-19-00033-CR and 06-19-00034-CR, and consecutively with two convictions
for harassment while in a correctional or detention facility, which Clark appeals in companion
cause number 06-19-00023-CR. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.11(a). The trial court also
ordered Clark to pay $234.00 in court costs for all five convictions even though the charges were
consolidated for trial.
Clark’s brief raises an issue common to his appeals in this case and in cause numbers 06-
19-00033-CR and 06-19-00034-CR. Specifically, Clark argues that the trial court erred in
admitting the hearsay testimony of a deputy fire marshall. For reasons stated in our opinion in
cause number 06-19-00033-CR, we find that Clark was unharmed by error, if any, in the admission
of the testimony.
Clark has also filed a brief in which he raises issues common to all of his appeals. He
argues that (1) the record does not contain sufficient evidence showing his competence to stand
trial was evaluated by a qualified psychologist, (2) the trial court erred in finding him competent
to stand trial, (3) his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request an evaluation of
his sanity at the time of the offense, (4) his oral waiver of a jury trial was invalid and unintelligently
made on the trial court’s representation that all sentences would run concurrently, (5) each
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judgment mistakenly references the existence of a plea bargain, and (6) the trial court erred in
assessing duplicative court costs.
We addressed these issues in detail in our opinion of this date on Clark’s appeal in cause
number 06-19-00023-CR. For the reasons stated therein, we likewise conclude that Clark’s first
complaint is meritless and unpreserved, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Clark
competent to stand trial, and Clark failed to meet his burden to show counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. We also find Clark’s jury trial waiver valid because he was not harmed by the lack of
a written waiver and the record fails to show Clark’s waiver was based on misinformation that his
sentences would not be stacked.
However, because we sustain Clark’s last two points of error, we modify the judgment by
deleting the phrase “Terms of Plea Bargain” and delete the assessment of court costs. As modified,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Ralph K. Burgess
Justice
Date Submitted: November 13, 2019
Date Decided: January 6, 2020
Do Not Publish
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