in Re Daimler Trucks North America LLC ( 2020 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-20-00145-CV
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IN RE DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC
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Original Proceeding
260th District Court of Orange County, Texas
Trial Cause No. D160258-C
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this wrongful death products liability case, Daimler Trucks North America,
LLC (“DTNA”) seeks mandamus relief from a trial court order, signed on May 12,
2020, in Trial Court Case No. D160258-C, Robert W. Doiron, et al., v. Daimler
Trucks North America, LLC, et al., (hereinafter Doiron). The trial court ordered
DTNA to produce certain discovery items that had previously been produced in a
different lawsuit that was filed in West Virginia, styled Wanda Francis Lawrence,
et al. v. Daimler Trucks North America, LLC f/k/a Freightliner, LLC and LTD
Logistics, Inc., (hereinafter Lawrence). In Doiron, DTNA objected to the discovery
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requests and to having to produce the Lawrence discovery. A law firm that had
represented DTNA in the Lawrence case then submitted the Lawrence discovery
items by providing two memory devices with thousands of documents and images
to the Doiron trial court for an in-camera review.
The Lawrence case involved an accident that occurred in 2010 and involved
a 2009 Columbia Freightliner truck manufactured by DTNA that was involved in a
collision. As a result of the collision, the side mounted fuel tank on the driver’s side
of the truck ruptured, the truck caught on fire, and the passengers and driver died. In
Lawrence, the plaintiffs alleged that the 2009 Freightliner was defective because of
the side mounted, unguarded fuel tanks and fuel system which was used on all Class
8 semi tractors and that it was subject to post collision fires from impacts that were
foreseeable, and that the defects related to the battery, the fuel tank design that
allowed fuel to escape, that it lacked a fire suppression system or shielding, that the
location of the fuel tanks was not safe, that the sleeper compartment lacked an exit
door, and it was made of highly combustible materials. The Lawrence case was tried
to a jury and the jury found in favor of the defendants. The discovery and items
produced in the Lawrence case were subject to a protective order entered by the West
Virginia trial court.
The Doiron plaintiffs alleged in their Fourth Amended Petition that in 2014,
Mr. Doiron was riding as a passenger in the sleeper compartment of a 2006 Columbia
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120 Freightliner truck when the Freightliner was involved in a collision and the truck
caught on fire, causing Mr. Doiron to suffer burns to a large percentage of his body
and eventually causing his death. The Doiron plaintiffs allege that the 2006 truck
was manufactured by DTNA and that the design and manufacture of the 2006 truck
was unreasonably dangerous because of alleged defects in the placement of the fuel
tank immediately behind the front wheels and under the doors of the passenger
compartment, inadequate shielding of the fuel tanks; the design of a fuel tank system
with components that are compromised under survivable collision forces that expose
occupants to post-collision fuel fed fires, burns, and death; and the failure to equip
the truck with emergency exit doors to allow occupants to exit through the sleeper
compartment. Real Parties in Interest, Plaintiffs Robert Doiron and Tracy Doiron,
individually and as representatives of the Estate of Adam Doiron (“the Doiron
Plaintiffs”), assert claims against DTNA for strict product liability, negligence,
breach of implied warranty, and gross negligence.
The Doiron Plaintiffs sent requests for production asking DTNA and the
attorneys that represented DTNA in the Lawrence suit to produce all documents,
expert reports, and depositions from the Lawrence suit. DTNA filed objections to
the discovery arguing that the discovery was overbroad on its face and the Doiron
Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel with the trial court. After conducting an initial
hearing and reviewing one memory stick of the Lawrence discovery, the trial court
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sent the parties a letter dated March 6, 2019, itemizing the materials that the trial
court had concluded were or were not subject to discovery and asking the parties to
try and reach some agreement on the production of the documents. At some point
thereafter, an additional memory stick of items from the Lawrence suit was provided
for in-camera inspection. The trial court appointed a Special Master to review all the
Lawrence items and then to make recommendations to the trial court. After receiving
the recommendations of the Special Master, the trial court sent another letter dated
March 9, 2020, outlining the items that should or should not be produced. And on
May 12, 2020, the trial court entered an Order requiring production of “discovery
documents” from the Lawrence suit.
DTNA filed a petition seeking mandamus relief in this Court. We stayed
production of the documents temporarily while we considered the petition and the
responses filed by the Real Parties, the plaintiffs, Robert W. Doiron and Tracy
Doiron, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Adam Doiron
(“Doiron”), and an intervenor, Great Midwest Insurance Company (“GMIC”). See
Tex. R. App. P. 52.10.
DTNA contends that the trial court erred by requiring it to produce items from
the Lawrence suit because the trial court’s order included documents concerning
other incidents of post-collision fires, expert and corporate witness depositions from
other litigation, and documents that belong to a non-party corporate affiliate of
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DTNA. DTNA argues the requests made by the plaintiffs for the documents were
impermissibly overbroad. DTNA contends that the trial court erred in ordering the
production of the Lawrence documents because the documents are not discoverable
due to differences between Doiron and Lawrence concerning state law, the products
at issue, the factual allegations, and the experts and witnesses, and also because the
Lawrence discovery includes some documents not within DTNA’s possession or
control.
The Doirons argue that DTNA is not entitled to mandamus relief because
DTNA failed to establish that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal, the trial court
and the special master narrowly tailored the discovery of documents from Lawrence,
and the documents the trial court ordered to be produced go to the heart of the case,
which the Doirons argue is DTNA’s knowledge of the defect in the vehicle at issue
in Doiron. The Doirons argue the Lawrence documents are relevant because the two
vehicles used the same fuel delivery system. GMIC argues the protective order in
Lawrence does not prohibit the discovery ordered in Doiron, the discovery ordered
in Doiron falls within the scope of discovery permitted under the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, and DTNA had sufficient control over the Lawrence documents
produced by its parent, Daimler AG, to permit production in Doiron.
Mandamus will issue only when the petition and record establish a clear abuse
of discretion for which the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re
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Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or
principles or when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Downer v.
Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.1985). “[An] order that
compels overly broad discovery ‘well outside the bounds of proper discovery’ is an
abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the proper remedy.” Dillard Dep’t Stores,
Inc. v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding). There is no
adequate remedy by appeal when an appellate court cannot remedy a trial court’s
discovery error. In re Dana Corp., 138 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3 permits a party to “obtain discovery
regarding any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or the claim or defense of any other party.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(a).
Requests for production must be “reasonably tailored to include only matters
relevant to the case.” In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998)
(orig. proceeding). “A central consideration in determining overbreadth is whether
the request could have been more narrowly tailored to avoid including tenuous
information and still obtain the necessary, pertinent information.” In re CSX Corp.,
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124 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding). “Overbroad requests for
irrelevant information are improper whether they are burdensome or not[.]” In re
Allstate Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). “It
is the discovery proponent’s burden to demonstrate that the requested documents fall
within the scope-of-discovery of Rule 192.3.” In re TIG Ins. Co., 172 S.W.3d 160,
167 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, orig. proceeding).
Whether discovery is overbroad in a products liability case depends on
whether the order covers products relevant to the case and is reasonable in its scope.
In re Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 598, 600-01 (Tex. 2006) (orig.
proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is no apparent connection
between the alleged defect and the discovery ordered. Id. at 601. Requests that are
not tied to the product at issue in the case and the time period when the use occurred
are overbroad. Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d at 713.
DTNA argues the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery
responsive to requests for virtually all of the documents from Lawrence, but, as
DTNA acknowledges, the trial court carved out some categories of case-specific
Lawrence documents that the trial court concluded were irrelevant to the present
case. When a party propounds overly broad requests, the trial court must either
sustain the objection or act to narrowly tailor the requests. In re Mallinckrodt, Inc.,
262 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, orig. proceeding). We review
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the trial court’s discovery order for an abuse of discretion. In re Deere & Co., 299
S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). In Deere, the Texas Supreme Court
conducted a mandamus review of the discovery ordered by the trial court, not the
discovery requested by the plaintiff. 299 S.W.3d at 821. The Court considered the
trial court’s effort to be a “proper effort to narrow discovery[.]” Id. Accordingly, we
consider Relators’ complaints regarding overbroad discovery requests as tailored by
the trial court in its order of May 12, 2020.
In a product liability case, evidence of other incidents involving a product may
be relevant if the incidents occurred under reasonably similar conditions. Kia Motors
Corp. v. Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d 865, 881 (Tex. 2014). The Doirons allege DTNA’s 2006
Columbia 120 Tandem Axle truck, which was involved in the 2014 accident that
resulted in Doiron’s death, was unreasonably dangerous due to defects including:
(1) placement of the fuel tanks immediately behind the vehicle’s front
wheels and under the doors to the passenger compartment, (2)
inadequately shielding the fuel tanks to protect the integrity of the fuel
tank system; (3) otherwise designing and manufacturing the fuel tank
system of the vehicle model with components that are compromised
under survivable collision forces that then expose vehicle occupants to
post-collision fuel fed fires, the extreme risk of burn injuries, and death;
and (4) failing to equip the subject truck with emergency exit doors to
allow egress from the sleeper compartment in the event of an
emergency.
The Real Parties argue that information about other accidents is relevant to
their claim that the product was unreasonably dangerous. The product at issue in
Doiron is a 2006 Columbia 120 Tandem Axle truck, and the Doiron accident
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occurred in 2014. The product involved in the Lawrence case was a 2009 Columbia
truck. In Lawrence, the accident occurred in 2010, and generally the plaintiffs
alleged the 2009 Columbia truck was unreasonably dangerous because it lacked a
sleeper access door, had a battery system located where it was likely to be damaged
in a collision, and had a fuel tank that was not equipped with a fire suppression
system and that was located in an unsafe position. The allegations in Lawrence
concerned a similar product and at least one defect that was alleged to be the cause
of the injury in Lawrence has also been alleged as a defect in Doiron. That said, the
scope of discovery the trial court permitted in Lawrence included documents from
twenty-two other suits, only some of which involved a Columbia truck. The
documents from the other cases that were produced in the Lawrence case did not
involve the same product as the product involved in the accident in Doiron.
Furthermore, in Doiron the plaintiffs have alleged the Columbia truck was defective
due to the placement of the fuel tank, inadequate shielding of the fuel tanks,
flammable components, and failing to equip the truck with emergency exit doors.
The relevance of evidence of other accidents would further depend upon whether
each accident involved the same product in an accident under the same or
substantially similar conditions. See Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d at 881. Only discovery
produced in cases with at least one of the Doiron allegations would bear any
relevance to the case before the trial court.
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We conclude that the scope of the discovery ordered by the trial court in the
May 12, 2020 Order is overbroad because it requires production of documents from
cases that did not involve a Columbia truck with one of the four defects identified in
the Doirons’ petition. As explained above, those suits are not substantially similar to
this case. Id.; see generally Graco, 210 S.W.3d at 601 (there must be an apparent
connection between the alleged defect and the discovery ordered). Only documents
relating to the Columbia truck and with a common alleged defect are discoverable
by the Doirons. See In re Caterpillar, Inc., No. 09-13-00106-CV, 2013 WL
1932819, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (A
request for all records in other lawsuits was overly broad because it was not limited
to information about the component common or similar to the machine in both
lawsuits.).
Even though Doiron and Lawrence may have both concerned a post-collision
fuel-fed fire, that does not mean that discovery produced in Lawrence from cases
that are not substantially similar to Doiron would be discoverable. Nor would such
information necessarily be relevant for purposes of showing a safer alternative
design. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 82.005(b) (“‘[S]afer alternative
design’ means a product design other than the one actually used that in reasonable
probability: (1) would have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of the
claimant’s personal injury, property damage, or death without substantially
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impairing the product’s utility; and (2) was economically and technologically
feasible at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller by the
application of existing or reasonably achievable scientific knowledge.”). The trial
court abused its discretion by ordering discovery regarding products with no
apparent connection between the alleged defect and the discovery ordered. See
Graco, 210 S.W.3d at 600-01.
DTNA also argues the trial court clearly abused its discretion by ordering
production of expert reports, expert depositions, and DTNA corporate representative
depositions from Lawrence because the trial court circumvented the procedure
established by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for expert discovery. See Tex. R.
Civ. P. 194 and 195.1. “The Rules of Civil Procedure define the scope and methods
of discovery about expert witnesses.” In re Ford Motor Co., 427 S.W.3d 396, 397
(Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding). Information relied upon by a testifying expert is
discoverable only through a request for disclosure or through depositions and reports
of the testifying expert. See In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 532 S.W.3d 794, 814 (Tex.
2017) (orig. proceeding). The Doirons suggest information from expert reports in
similar cases could be used to impeach DTNA’s witnesses in Doiron, but the
mandamus record does not show that a testifying expert in this case relied on the
testimony and reports of expert witnesses in any of the other lawsuits. The Doirons
suggest that information gleaned from the other case may or may not impact their
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experts’ opinions, but this argument sounds like a fishing expedition, which is not
allowed. See Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d at 713. We conclude the trial court
abused its discretion by requiring production of the Lawrence expert reports, expert
depositions, and DTNA corporate representative depositions. See Nat’l Lloyds, 532
S.W.3d at 814; Ford Motor Co., 427 S.W.3d at 397.
DTNA also complains that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by
ordering DTNA to produce documents that are in the possession of its parent
company, Daimler AG. DTNA contends Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 205 provides
the exclusive vehicle for obtaining discovery in the trial court from a non-party such
as Daimler AG. See generally Tex. R. Civ. P. 205.1 (A party may compel discovery
from a non-party only by obtaining a court order or by serving a subpoena.). DTNA
further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of
Daimler AG’s documents when the documents are not relevant to this lawsuit.
The documents produced by Daimler AG in Lawrence concern Mercedes
trucks, not the Freightliner Columbia truck that is the product at issue in the Doirons’
lawsuit against DTNA. Under the facts of the Doiron suit, the only Daimler AG
documents produced in the Lawrence suit that are discoverable in the Doiron suit
would be those documents relating to the product and common alleged defect. The
trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of other Daimler AG
documents. See Caterpillar, Inc., 2013 WL 1932819, at *2.
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For the reasons explained above, we conditionally grant DTNA’s request for
mandamus relief and lift the stay that we issued to stop the proceedings in the trial
court pending our resolution of the mandamus petition. We are confident the trial
court will vacate the May 12, 2020 discovery order. A writ of mandamus shall issue
only in the event the trial court fails to comply.
PETITION CONDITIONALLY GRANTED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on June 12, 2020
Opinion Delivered December 10, 2020
Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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