Thomas Holder v. State ( 2020 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-19-00085-CR
THOMAS HOLDER,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 1
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017-3455-CR1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In one issue, appellant, Thomas James Holder, challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction for theft of property valued at $100 or more but less
than $750. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(2) (West 2019). We affirm.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole issue on appeal, Holder contends that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction for theft of property valued at $100 or more but less than $750. We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review
The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a
sufficiency issue as follows:
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Villa v.
State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires
the appellate court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly
to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our
judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must
not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the
cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although
juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries
are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long
as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary
v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting
inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony.
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct
evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and
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circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction
so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as
defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v.
State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically
correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized
by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was
tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the
statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified by the
indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665.
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
B. Discussion
Brianna Tullos testified that she met Holder at a mutual friend’s house the night
before the offense was committed in this case. Tullos invited Holder over to her
apartment the following evening. Tullos recounted that Holder arrived at her apartment
at around 7:30 p.m. that evening. While Tullos and Holder were “hanging out,” Tullos
fell asleep. Tullos noted that she fell asleep because of prescription medicine she had
taken. Nevertheless, at the time of the “date,” there was no one else inside Tullos’s
apartment.
Tullos recalled that she woke up at 9:30 p.m. that same evening to find that Holder
was no longer present in the apartment. Instinctively, Tullos checked her purse and
Holder v. State Page 3
noticed that she could not find, among other things, her keys and approximately $400 in
cash. Tullos noted that the cash was located inside a separate wallet inside her purse.
She later found her keys, but the cash was never recovered.
Tullos attempted to contact Holder by text messaging him and sending him a
Snapchat message. Despite responding to Tullos’s Snapchat and text messages the night
prior to the “date,” Holder stopped responding and blocked Tullos. However, Tullos
was able to see what Holder had posted on Snapchat. Tullos learned through Holder’s
Snapchat video post that “he was going to go out and party.” She found this “very odd”
because Holder told her during the “date” that “he had no money whatsoever, he was
broke.” Tullos denied giving Holder permission to take anything out of her purse or her
apartment, and she never heard from Holder again.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have
rationally concluded that Holder unlawfully appropriated approximately $400 in cash
from Tullos’s purse with the intent to deprive Tullos of the property. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(2); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2781; Zuniga,
551 S.W.3d at 732-33. This is especially so considering Holder was the only person in the
apartment, besides Tullos, who had access to the purse at the time of the offense and
because Holder discontinued contact with Tullos after the theft and went partying
despite testimony that he had no money when he went to Tullos’s apartment. The jury
could have reasonably inferred, based on his presence at the apartment at the time of the
Holder v. State Page 4
offense, as well as his conduct after the theft, that Holder was the perpetrator of the theft.
See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2781; Cary, 507 S.W.3d at 757; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d
at 16-17. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Holder’s
conviction in this case. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(2); see also Jackson, 443
U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2781; Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732-33.
Despite the foregoing, Holder argues on appeal that some mystery person could
have come into Tullos’s apartment and stolen the money while she was asleep. We are
not persuaded by this contention, as it is purely speculative and not supported by any
record evidence. Moreover, it is well-settled law that the State is not obligated to negate
every conceivable alternative to a defendant’s guilt. See Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154,
157-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that it is not incumbent upon the State to exclude
“every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt” for the evidence to be considered
sufficient), overruled on other grounds by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000); see also Lopez v. State, 267 S.W.3d 85, 97-98 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008,
no pet.) (citing Harris v. State, 133 S.W.3d 760, 763-65 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet.
ref’d); Richardson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.) (“[T]he
mere existence of an alternative reasonable hypothesis does not render the
evidence . . . insufficient . . . . [E]ven when an appellant identifies an alternative
reasonable hypothesis raised by the evidence, the standard of review remains the
Holder v. State Page 5
same.”); Orona v. State, 836 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.)). We
therefore overrule Holder’s sole issue on appeal.
II. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JOHN E. NEILL
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed January 8, 2020
Do not publish
[CR25]
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