Wesley Dale Mason v. State ( 2020 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-19-00132-CR
WESLEY DALE MASON, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 259th District Court
Jones County, Texas
Trial Court No. 011574, Brooks H. Hagler Presiding
January 9, 2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ.
Appellant, Wesley Dale Mason, appeals his conviction for murder. Through a
single issue, he contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his
methamphetamine use the day before the murder. We affirm.1
1 Because this appeal was transferred from the Eleventh Court of Appeals, we are obligated to
apply its precedent when available in the event of a conflict between the precedents of that court and this
Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
Background
At trial, witnesses testified that, on March 4, 2017, they observed a man standing
in front of a blue Dodge pickup and firing a shotgun thrice at another individual. The latter
was then seen falling or jumping into a bar ditch. The victim called his wife and told her
that “Bandido Booom just shot me in the chest,” and to come quickly. Upon arrival, the
victim’s wife unsuccessfully attempted to assist him, and the victim was pronounced dead
at the hospital. The shooter (i.e., appellant) was a member of the Bandidos motorcycle
club, while the victim was a member of a motorcycle club known as “Kinfolk.”
Appellant drove from the scene in the blue Dodge pickup. It was found a short
distance away on the roadside, inoperative, and without occupants. However, a shotgun
lay on its front seat. In learning that a Bandido member and the group’s “clubhouse” was
within a short distance from the crime scene, officers went to that location. They
encountered appellant with a minor wound on his foot.
While awaiting transport to the hospital, appellant stated to the officers: “Don’t tell
me he’s dead.” At the medical facility, he underwent treatment. It included the garnering
of background information explaining the reason for his seeking treatment and a blood
draw. A toxicology report of the draw revealed the presence of methamphetamine in
appellant’s blood while the medical records contained his statement that he had ingested
the substance a day earlier.
The aforementioned medical records were admitted into evidence, at trial.
Counsel for appellant had objected to their admission on Rule 403 and 404(b) grounds,
2
as well as hearsay.2 The trial court overruled the objection. The witness through whom
the records were offered said nothing of the drug in front of the jury.
Methamphetamine was mentioned, though, during the State’s examination of the
investigating official who interviewed appellant. The Ranger was asked if during the
interview appellant “appeared to be somewhat in a lethargic mood.” His answer was
“correct.” Several other questions relating to methamphetamine use were asked of the
witness. Little else was said of the drug thereafter.
Sole Issue – Admission of Methamphetamine Use
Appellant contends that “[t]he trial court erred in admitting evidence of
methamphetamine use by [him] the day before the incident.” Assuming arguendo that
admitting the evidence was error, we find the decision harmless.
When the error is nonconstitutional, the improper admission of evidence is harmful
when it affects appellant’s substantial rights. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 280 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010). It fails to do so where it did not influence the jury or had but a slight
effect upon its deliberations. Id. And, in making that determination, we examine the entire
trial record and calculate, as best as possible, the probable impact of the error. Id. This
includes the testimony, physical evidence, jury instructions, both the State’s and
defendant’s theories, closing arguments, and voir dire, if applicable. Schmutz v. State,
440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Factors to consider include the nature of the
evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error and how it might be
2 Texas Rule of Evidence 403 states that although relevant, evidence may be excluded “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
TEX. R. EVID. 403. Rule 404(b) states that: “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
with the character.” TEX. R. EVID 404(b).
3
considered in connection with other evidence in the case, and may include whether the
State emphasized the error and whether overwhelming evidence of guilt was present. Id.
Here, the guilt/innocence phase of the trial lasted approximately four days, and the
State called eighteen witnesses. The witness through which the medical records and
toxicology report were admitted was the eleventh witness to testify. In relationship to the
entire trial, the time spent on admitting those records was nominal. The witnesses who
preceded and included witnesses who saw the shooting, a Texas Ranger who
investigated it, the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy on the victim, and
another Ranger who reconstructed the events for the jury, among others. Their testimony
was rather detailed and graphic. Through it, the jurors heard about numerous topics other
than appellant’s toxicology level or use of methamphetamine. Those topics included the
shooting, motorcycle clubs, the involvement of both appellant and the victim in them, how
the victim was shot, where he was shot, and reference to appellant lying in wait for the
victim. This scenario leads us to conclude that little time was expended on the topic of
the methamphetamine usage, which topic was submersed within other more informative
and attention-grabbing evidence.
Also of note is the lack of attention the State afforded the evidence in question
during its closing argument. Little was said of it.
Furthermore, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was substantial. He argued that he
acted in self-defense. Yet, the evidence of his guilt also included his own statement to
an investigating official about the shooting being “purely personal” because the victim had
allegedly been “messing” with appellant’s girlfriend or fiancée.
4
Given the circumstances of record, we cannot say that appellant’s substantial
rights were affected by the admission of the medical records and toxicology report. So,
even if the trial court erred in ruling as it did, the error was harmless.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
5