PNC Bank, N.A. v. RPCG-GP I, LLC ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • Dismiss; Opinion Filed March 27, 2020
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-19-00411-CV
    PNC BANK, N.A., Appellant
    V.
    RPCG-GP I, LLC, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-01763
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Pedersen, III, Reichek, and Carlyle
    Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III
    This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying appellant’s special
    appearance. Appellee, RPCG-GP-I, LLC, filed a petition pursuant to Rule 202 of the
    Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain pre-suit discovery from appellant, PNC
    Bank, N.A. Appellant filed a special appearance, asserting that it lacked minimum
    contacts with Texas to support specific or general personal jurisdiction. Appellant
    also opposed the Rule 202 petition on the merits. After a hearing, the trial court
    issued an order denying appellant’s special appearance. The following day, the trial
    court issued an order denying appellee’s Rule 202 petition.
    Appellant appeals the order denying its special appearance. It asserts that the
    trial court erred in denying its special appearance because appellant is a non-resident
    corporation that is neither incorporated nor domiciled in Texas and does not conduct
    substantial operations in Texas. In response, appellee asserts that this appeal is moot
    because the trial court’s denial of its Rule 202 petition disposed of all claims for
    relief among the parties.
    Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question that is
    reviewed de novo. See Tex. Nat. Resource Conservation Comm’n v. I.T.-Davy, 
    74 S.W.3d 849
    , 855 (Tex. 2002). The mootness doctrine implicates a court’s subject
    matter jurisdiction. See Trulock v. City of Duncanville, 
    277 S.W.3d 920
    , 924 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
    An appellate court is prohibited from deciding a moot controversy. See Nat’l
    Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 
    1 S.W.3d 83
    , 86 (Tex. 1999). “This prohibition
    is rooted in the separation of powers doctrine in the Texas and United States
    Constitutions that prohibits courts from rendering advisory opinions.”
    Id. An appeal
    becomes moot if the controversy between the parties ceases to exist or any decision
    rendered by the appellate court would not affect the parties’ rights. Heckman v.
    Williamson Cty., 
    369 S.W.3d 137
    , 162 (Tex. 2012) (court cannot decide case that
    has become moot).
    There are two exceptions that allow an appellate court to address issues that
    are otherwise moot: (1) issues that are capable of repetition yet evading review; and
    –2–
    (2) issues implicating the collateral consequences doctrine. See 
    Trulock, 277 S.W.3d at 924
    (citing Gen. Land Office of State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 
    789 S.W.2d 569
    ,
    571 (Tex. 1990)). “ʻCapable of repetition yet evading review’ is a rare exception to
    the mootness doctrine.” Texas A & M University–Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 
    347 S.W.3d 289
    , 290 (Tex. 2011). It is limited to situations where the following
    circumstances are simultaneously present: (1) the challenged action was in its
    duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, or the party
    cannot obtain review before the issue becomes moot; and (2) there is a reasonable
    expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
    again.
    Id. This exception
    is further limited because it has only been used to challenge
    unconstitutional acts performed by the government. OXY 
    U.S.A., 789 S.W.2d at 571
    ;
    
    Trulock, 277 S.W.3d at 924
    . The “collateral consequences” exception has been
    applied when prejudicial events have occurred “whose effects continued to
    stigmatize helpless or hated individuals long after the unconstitutional judgment had
    ceased to operate.” In re Sierra Club, 
    420 S.W.3d 153
    , 158 (Tex. App.—El Paso
    2012, orig. proceeding); see also OXY 
    U.S.A., 789 S.W.2d at 571
    .
    In this case, the only controversy between the parties was appellee’s petition
    for pre-litigation discovery under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
    When the trial court denied appellee’s Rule 202 Petition, the controversy between
    the parties ceased to exist. Because the controversy no longer exists, this appeal is
    moot. See 
    Trulock, 277 S.W.3d at 924
    . Appellant urges this Court to determine
    –3–
    whether the trial court’s denial of its special appearance will have a preclusive effect
    in any future litigation between the parties. However, appellant makes no allegation
    that would bring the appeal of its special appearance within either exception to the
    mootness doctrine.
    Having determined that the controversy between the parties is moot and no
    exception to the mootness doctrine applies under the facts of this case, we overrule
    appellant’s issues. Appellant’s interlocutory appeal is dismissed. TEX. R. APP. P.
    42.3(a).
    /Bill Pedersen, III//
    BILL PEDERSEN, III
    JUSTICE
    190411f.p05
    –4–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    PNC BANK, N.A., Appellant                    On Appeal from the 160th Judicial
    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-19-00411-CV          v.               Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-01763.
    Opinion delivered by Justice
    RPCG-GP I, LLC, Appellee                     Pedersen, III. Justices Reichek and
    Carlyle participating.
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is
    DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
    It is ORDERED that appellee RPCG-GP I, LLC recover its costs of this
    appeal from appellant PNC BANK, N.A.
    Judgment entered this 27th day of March, 2020.
    –5–