Camille Mason v. State ( 2020 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00226-CR
___________________________
CAMILLE MASON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1555502
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel, J.; and Lee Ann Dauphinot (Senior Justice, Retired,
Sitting by Assignment)
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Dauphinot
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant Camille Mason of the misdemeanor offense of
making a false report to a peace officer. The parties agreed on a sentence of 90-days’
incarceration in the Tarrant County jail, with imposition of the sentence suspended
and Appellant placed on community supervision for 18 months. In addition, the
parties agreed on the imposition of a fine of $250 and a requirement that Appellant
serve 30-days’ confinement in the Tarrant County jail as conditions of community
supervision. The trial court accepted the agreement and sentenced Appellant
accordingly.
Appellant brings a single point on appeal, contending, “The trial court
reversibly erred when it allowed a reasonable doubt instruction in the Jury Charge on
guilt/innocence that was redundant, confusing and logically flawed.” Because the trial
court committed no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jury Charge
We dispense with a discussion of the facts of the underlying offense because
they are not relevant to Appellant’s sole point on appeal, which complains of alleged
jury-charge error. We review all such complaints, regardless of whether the appellant
preserved the complaint at trial.1
Here, the trial court instructed the jury,
1
Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
2
The prosecution has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty,
and it must do so by proving each and every element of the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the
Defendant.
It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all
possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes [sic]
all “reasonable doubt” concerning the Defendant’s guilt.
Appellant acknowledges that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a trial
court does not err by including this exact instruction in a jury charge2 even though it
has said that it is “the better practice” not to do so.3 She presents this issue, she
explains, in order to advocate for a change or reversal in the law and to preserve it for
further review.
No matter how inviting, and no matter how logically flawed the portion of the
definition of reasonable doubt provided to the jury may be, we must decline
Appellant’s request to hold contrary to the Court of Criminal Appeals’s controlling
authority.4
We therefore overrule Appellant’s sole point on appeal and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Pope v. State, 161
2
S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
3
Sierra v. State, 157 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 218
4
S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
3
/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
Lee Ann Dauphinot
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: December 10, 2020
4