Washington DC Party Shuttle, LLC, Party Shuttle Tours, LLC and Creativerse Internet Systems, LLC v. Iguide Tours, LLC, Tyree Cook, and Abise Eshetu ( 2013 )


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  • Affirmed and En Banc Opinion and En Banc Dissenting Opinion filed June
    27, 2013.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-12-00303-CV
    WASHINGTON DC PARTY SHUTTLE, LLC, PARTY SHUTTLE TOURS,
    LLC AND CREATIVERSE INTERNET SYSTEMS, LLC, Appellants
    V.
    IGUIDE TOURS, LLC, TYREE COOK, AND ABISE ESHETU, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 165th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2012-12924
    EN BANC OPINION
    In this suit arising from the alleged breach of confidentiality agreements and
    theft of trade secrets, three related companies sued two nonresident former
    employees and the foreign company that the former employees established. In this
    interlocutory appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the content and form of the trial
    court’s order granting the new company’s special appearance and a separate ruling
    partially denying their request for a temporary injunction.
    On our own motion, we have decided this case en banc in order to answer an
    error-preservation question on which courts have reached conflicting results: to
    preserve a complaint for appeal that an affidavit fails to reveal the basis of the
    affiant’s personal knowledge of the stated facts, is it necessary to object and obtain
    a ruling? We conclude that it is.
    We hold that the trial court did not err in determining that it lacked personal
    jurisdiction over the new corporation, and that the plaintiffs failed to preserve their
    complaint about the form of the order granting the special appearance.               We
    therefore affirm the trial court’s special-appearance ruling. We further hold that
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion in partially denying the plaintiffs’ request
    for a temporary injunction, and we affirm that ruling as well.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Appellants Washington DC Party Shuttle, LLC (“DC Party Shuttle”), Party
    Shuttle Tours, LLC and Creativerse Internet Systems, LLC (“Creativerse,”
    collectively “the Shuttle Parties”) filed suit against appellees IGuide Tours, LLC
    (“IGuide”), Tyree Cook, and Abise Eshetu (collectively “the IGuide Parties”),
    asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
    misappropriation of trade secrets. The Shuttle Parties also sought a temporary
    restraining order and temporary and permanent injunctions. According to the
    pleadings, DC Party Shuttle is a District of Columbia limited liability company
    with a principal place of business in the District of Columbia; Party Shuttle Tours,
    LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with a principal place of business in
    2
    Houston, Texas; Creativerse is a Texas limited liability company with a principal
    place of business in Houston, Texas. As described by the Shuttle Parties in their
    live pleadings, these entities operate through a “network of companies that do
    business as OnBoard Tours.” The record reflects that DC Party Shuttle and Party
    Shuttle Tours are primarily engaged in the business of providing sightseeing tours,
    and that Creativerse owns and markets the websites for all of the OnBoard Tours
    companies.
    The Shuttle Parties allege that Cook and Eshetu are residents of Virginia and
    former employees of DC Party Shuttle and Creativerse. According to the Shuttle
    Parties, Cook and Eshetu each signed a non-compete agreement with both DC
    Party Shuttle and Creativerse. Under the terms of these agreements, each was
    prohibited primarily from (a) engaging in a competing tour business or internet
    marketing business for three years following separation from the Shuttle Parties’
    employment, (b) misusing confidential information, or (c) soliciting and hiring
    other employees of the Shuttle Parties.       The Shuttle Parties allege that on
    December 1, 2011, Cook and Eshetu created IGuide, a competing sightseeing tour
    company, while they were still employed by two of the Shuttle Parties.
    Cook and Eshetu left their respective employment with the Shuttle Parties on
    February 15, 2012. Two weeks later, IGuide began operating sightseeing tours
    employing other former employees of the Shuttle Parties. The Shuttle Parties filed
    suit the next day and obtained a temporary restraining order.
    A.    IGuide’s Special Appearance
    In their original petition, the Shuttle Parties’ jurisdictional allegations
    against IGuide consist solely of the statements that “this proceeding arises out of
    the business done in Texas and torts committed in Texas” and that the trial court
    3
    “has personal jurisdiction over IGuide because it is conducting business in Texas
    by marketing its services in Texas through a website and because it is conspiring
    with Defendants Cook and Eshetu to commit torts in Texas.” IGuide challenged
    the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over it by filing a special
    appearance supported by an affidavit from Sewunet Habte, a current IGuide
    employee and former employee of one or more of the Shuttle Parties.1 The Shuttle
    Parties responded that the trial court should deny the special appearance for a
    variety of procedural and substantive reasons. The trial court granted IGuide’s
    special appearance.          In its signed order, the trial court stated that “[a]ll of
    Plaintiffs’ causes of action that have been or could have been asserted against
    [IGuide] are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction and
    Plaintiffs shall recover nothing from [IGuide] for the causes of action alleged or
    that could have been alleged.”
    B.      Injunctive Relief
    The Shuttle Parties obtained a temporary restraining order on the day they
    filed suit and later sought and obtained an extension of that order. The Shuttle
    Parties also sought a temporary injunction primarily to enjoin the IGuide Parties
    from using allegedly confidential internet-marketing information and from
    operating or marketing sightseeing tours in Washington, D.C. and certain other
    locations.
    At the time of the hearing on the Shuttle Parties’ request for a temporary
    injunction, only Cook and Eshetu remained as defendants. The trial court granted
    the temporary injunction in what the Shuttle Parties characterize as “a very limited
    1
    Cook and Eshetu did not dispute the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
    them.
    4
    form.” As reflected in the trial court’s order, the trial court granted injunctive
    relief to Creativerse regarding the allegedly confidential internet-marketing
    information, and denied the request for injunctive relief “regarding sightseeing,
    tour and/or shuttle bus activities in competition with” DC Party Shuttle and Party
    Shuttle Tours.
    II. ISSUES PRESENTED
    In their first issue, the Shuttle Parties contend that the trial court erred in
    granting IGuide’s special appearance. In their second issue, they argue in the
    alternative that the form of the special-appearance order is erroneous. They assert
    in their third issue that the trial court erred in rendering a temporary injunction that
    fails to maintain the status quo.
    III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
    The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the broad language of the Texas
    long-arm statute to extend Texas courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction “‘as far
    as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit.’”          BMC
    Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 
    83 S.W.3d 789
    , 795 (Tex. 2002) (quoting U-
    Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 
    553 S.W.2d 760
    , 762 (Tex. 1977)).                   Those
    requirements are fulfilled if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the
    forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
    notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
    326 U.S. 310
    , 316, 
    66 S. Ct. 154
    , 158, 
    90 L. Ed. 95
    (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
    
    311 U.S. 457
    , 463, 
    61 S. Ct. 339
    , 343, 
    85 L. Ed. 278
    (1940)). Minimum contacts
    are sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction if they show that the
    nonresident defendant has “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of
    conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
    5
    protections of its laws. See 
    id. at 319,
    66 S. Ct. at 160; Michiana Easy Livin’
    Country, Inc. v. Holten, 
    168 S.W.3d 777
    , 784 (Tex. 2005). The “purposeful
    availment” inquiry is a three-pronged test. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg,
    
    221 S.W.3d 569
    , 575 (Tex. 2007). First, only the defendant’s contacts with the
    forum are relevant. 
    Id. Second, the
    contacts on which jurisdiction depends must
    be purposeful, rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated.      
    Id. Third, “the
    ‘defendant must seek some benefit, advantage or profit by “availing” itself of the
    jurisdiction.’” 
    Id. (quoting Michiana
    Easy Livin’ 
    Country, 168 S.W.3d at 785
    );
    Motor Components, LLC v. Devon Energy Corp., 
    338 S.W.3d 198
    , 201–02 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
    Personal jurisdiction may be “general” or “specific.” Zinc Nacional, S.A. v.
    Bouche Trucking, Inc., 
    308 S.W.3d 395
    , 397 (Tex. 2010). A trial court properly
    may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant whose contacts with the forum
    state have been continuous and systematic. Moki 
    Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575
    ; BMC
    
    Software, 83 S.W.3d at 796
    . When there is a substantial connection between the
    defendant’s purposeful contacts with Texas and the operative facts of the litigation,
    a trial court properly may exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Moki
    
    Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585
    .
    A defendant challenging a Texas court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
    over him must negate all jurisdictional bases alleged. BMC 
    Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793
    ; Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 
    897 S.W.2d 769
    , 772 (Tex. 1995) (orig.
    proceeding). The plaintiff has the initial burden of pleading sufficient facts to
    bring the nonresident defendant within the provisions of the Texas long-arm
    statute. BMC 
    Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793
    ; Brocail v. Anderson, 
    132 S.W.3d 552
    ,
    556 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). If the plaintiff fails to
    do so, then proof of the defendant’s nonresidency is sufficient to negate personal
    6
    jurisdiction. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 
    301 S.W.3d 653
    , 658–59 (Tex.
    2010). If the plaintiff does allege sufficient jurisdictional facts, then the defendant
    can defeat jurisdiction in several ways. The defendant can introduce evidence
    disproving the plaintiff’s factual allegations,2 or show that the defendant’s contacts
    with the forum state “fall short of purposeful availment,”3 or demonstrate that
    “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are offended by the exercise
    of jurisdiction.”4 If specific jurisdiction is at issue, then the defendant also can
    show that the plaintiff’s claims do not arise from the defendant’s contacts with
    Texas.5
    A.     Standard of Review
    Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question
    of law we review de novo. Moki 
    Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574
    ; BMC 
    Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794
    . Where, as here, the trial court issued no findings of fact or
    conclusions of law, all facts necessary to support the trial court’s ruling and
    supported by the evidence are implied in favor of the trial court’s decision. BMC
    
    Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795
    . If the appellate record includes the reporter’s and
    clerk’s records, these implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged
    for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. Id.; Horowitz v. Berger, 
    377 S.W.3d 115
    , 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). On appeal, the
    scope of review includes all evidence in the record. 
    Horowitz, 377 S.W.3d at 122
    2
    See Parker v. Robert Ryan Realtors, Inc., No. 14-10-00325-CV, 
    2010 WL 4226550
    , at
    *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 26, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[B]oth parties can
    present evidence either proving or disproving the allegations.”) (citing 
    Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659
    ).
    3
    
    Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659
    .
    4
    
    Id. 5 Id.
                                                 7
    (citing Vosko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 
    909 S.W.2d 95
    , 99 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied)).
    We review the challenged factual findings by applying the same standards
    used in reviewing jury findings. Wiese v. Pro Am Servs., Inc., 
    317 S.W.3d 857
    ,
    860 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing Anderson v. City of
    Seven Points, 
    806 S.W.2d 791
    , 794 (Tex. 1991)). When reviewing for legal
    sufficiency, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and
    indulge every reasonable inference that supports the challenged finding. See City
    of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 827 (Tex. 2005).           We credit favorable
    evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a
    reasonable factfinder could not. 
    Id. We will
    conclude that the evidence is legally
    insufficient to support the implied finding only if (a) there is a complete absence of
    evidence of a vital fact, (b) we are barred by rules of law or of evidence from
    giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence
    offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence
    establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. 
    Id. at 810.
    In reviewing the
    implied findings for factual sufficiency, we consider all of the evidence and will
    set aside a finding only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the
    evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Meehl v. Wise, 
    285 S.W.3d 561
    , 565
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Ortiz v. Jones, 
    917 S.W.2d 770
    , 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam)).         The factfinder is the sole judge of the
    credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony. See 
    id. at 819.
    We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. Greenfield Energy,
    Inc. v. Duprey, 
    252 S.W.3d 721
    , 730 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no
    pet.). If evidence supports the implied findings of fact, we must uphold the trial
    court’s judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings.           Worford v.
    8
    Stamper, 
    801 S.W.2d 108
    , 109 (Tex. 1990); Aduli v. Aduli, 
    368 S.W.3d 805
    , 814
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
    B.    Notice of the Hearing
    The Shuttle Parties first assert that the trial court erred in granting IGuide’s
    special appearance because they received only five days’ notice of the special-
    appearance hearing instead of the six days’ notice they contend is required where,
    as here, notice of the hearing was served via fax. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21 (setting
    forth the general rule that a notice of a hearing “shall be served upon all other
    parties not less than three days before the time specified for the hearing unless
    otherwise provided by these rules or shortened by the court”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a
    (“Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act within a prescribed
    period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper
    is served upon by . . . [fax], three days shall be added to the prescribed period.”).
    The rules specifically provide, however, that the trial court may shorten the notice
    period. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21. Unless the circumstances are such that the trial
    court would abuse its discretion in going forward with the hearing on only five
    days’ notice, we will not disturb its decision to do so. See In re K.A.R., 
    171 S.W.3d 705
    , 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (no abuse of
    discretion in shortening notice period for sanctions hearing to four days).
    The Shuttle Parties have not explained why, under the circumstances
    presented here, the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the hearing to go
    forward. The Shuttle Parties did not move to continue the hearing, and they do not
    contend that they needed additional time to respond. In fact, the record shows that
    they filed (a) an eleven-page response just two days after IGuide filed its special
    appearance, (b) an additional four-page bench brief on the day of the hearing, and
    9
    (c) a further four-page post-hearing brief on the day after the hearing. Under the
    circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
    C.    Verification of the Special Appearance
    The Shuttle Parties next assert that the trial court’s order sustaining IGuide’s
    special appearance must be reversed because, as they pointed out in the trial court,
    the special appearance was not made by a sworn motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a
    (“Such special appearance shall be made by sworn motion . . . and may be
    amended to cure defects.”). Citing Casino Magic Corp. v. King,6 the Shuttle
    Parties argue that the affidavit in support of the special appearance does not
    properly verify the special appearance to which it was attached because Habte
    attested that the facts set out in the affidavit were within her personal knowledge
    and were true and correct, but she did not similarly verify the facts set out in the
    special appearance itself.
    This case is factually distinguishable from Casino Magic Corp.               The
    reviewing court in Casino Magic Corp. noted that “the special appearance included
    a number of jurisdictional ‘facts’ which the witness failed to attest to in the
    affidavit.”7 In this case, however, IGuide stated in its special appearance that
    it was formed under the laws of the State of Delaware and is
    registered in the District of Columbia;
    its members were and are residents of Maryland and Virginia at all
    times relevant to this case;
    it never has had any contractual relationship with any of the
    Shuttle Parties;
    6
    
    43 S.W.3d 14
    , 18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (sub. op.).
    7
    
    Id. 10 it
    has never sued anyone in a Texas court and has not previously
    been sued in a Texas court;
    it does not maintain offices in Texas;
    it does not conduct business here;
    it does not maintain a corporate registration in Texas with the
    Texas Secretary of State;
    it does not have an agent for service of process in Texas;
    it does not have any employees in Texas;
    it does not have bank accounts in Texas;
    it does not does not own or maintain warehouses or inventory in
    Texas; and
    it does not specifically target Texas with advertising.
    In her affidavit, Habte attested to the truth of each of these facts. On appeal,
    the Shuttle Parties do not identify any jurisdictional fact that is stated in IGuide’s
    special appearance that is not repeated and sworn to by Habte in her affidavit. We
    therefore conclude that the affidavit sufficiently verified the special appearance.
    See Haddad v. ISI Automation Int’l, Inc., No. 04-09-00562-CV, 
    2010 WL 1708275
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    D.    Timeliness of the Special-Appearance Affidavit
    The Shuttle Parties also assert that the trial court erred in holding a hearing
    on the special appearance because IGuide’s supporting affidavit was not served
    seven days before the hearing as required by Rule 120a(3). In the trial court,
    however, they did not argue that the timing of the affidavit required that the
    hearing be postponed; they argued that because IGuide served the affidavit less
    than seven days before the special-appearance hearing, its special appearance was
    converted to a general appearance. Because the complaint presented on appeal
    does not comport with the Shuttle Parties’ objection in the trial court, it has not
    11
    been preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Cajun Constructors,
    Inc. v. Velasco Drainage Dist., 
    380 S.W.3d 819
    , 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
    E.    Content of the Special-Appearance Affidavit
    In addition to their complaints about alleged procedural defects, the Shuttle
    Parties argue that the content of Habte’s affidavit was inadequate to meet IGuide’s
    burden of proof. We address each of these arguments separately.
    1.        Personal Knowledge
    The Shuttle Parties contend that Habte’s affidavit does not show that she is
    personally familiar with the facts to which she attested. On our own motion, we
    have considered this case en banc to address the question of whether a party must
    preserve such a complaint in the trial court by obtaining a ruling—or a refusal to
    rule—on a timely and specific objection. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
    The cases in which such complaints have been addressed do not provide a
    clear and consistent answer to the error-preservation question. The Texas Supreme
    Court has held that lack of personal knowledge renders an affidavit legally
    insufficient. See, e.g., Marks v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 
    319 S.W.3d 658
    , 666
    (Tex. 2010) (op. on reh’g); Kerlin v. Arias, 
    274 S.W.3d 666
    , 668 (Tex. 2008) (per
    curiam). These holdings are not new, and do not answer this error-preservation
    question. The court has stated on numerous occasions that an affidavit showing a
    lack of personal knowledge is incompetent or legally insufficient.       See, e.g.,
    Laidlaw Waste Sys., (Dall.), Inc., v. City of Wilmer, 
    904 S.W.2d 656
    , 661 (Tex.
    1995);8 Humphreys v. Caldwell, 
    888 S.W.2d 469
    , 470 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam)
    8
    There the court stated as follows:
    12
    (orig. proceeding);9 Radio Station KSCS v. Jennings, 
    750 S.W.2d 760
    , 761–62
    (Tex. 1988) (per curiam);10 Brownlee v. Brownlee, 
    665 S.W.2d 111
    , 112 (Tex.
    1984);11 Burke v. Satterfield, 
    525 S.W.2d 950
    , 954–55 (Tex. 1975).12 But the court
    also has concluded that a party must object to an affiant’s lack of personal
    knowledge and obtain a ruling on the objection to preserve error. See Grand
    The sworn statement of one Larry Conwell states only “that he is personally
    familiar” with the following “facts”: “[t]he area proposed for annexation by
    defendant exceeds the statutory maximum one-half mile limitation,” and that the
    “boundary described by the metes and bounds contained in defendant’s proposed
    ordinance does not close.” These conclusory averments would be insufficient
    even if set out in a separate affidavit. There is no indication that Larry Conwell is
    competent to testify as to either of these matters.
    Laidlaw Waste 
    Sys., 904 S.W.2d at 661
    .
    9
    There, the court stated, “An affidavit which does not positively and unqualifiedly
    represent the facts as disclosed in the affidavit to be true and within the affiant’s personal
    knowledge is legally insufficient.” 
    Humphreys, 888 S.W.2d at 470
    . The court held that the
    affidavits at issue provided no evidentiary support because “the affiant’s statements are based on
    his ‘own personal knowledge and/or knowledge which he has been able to acquire upon inquiry’
    and, hence, fail to unequivocally show that they are based on personal knowledge. Additionally,
    the affidavits provide no representation whatsoever that the facts disclosed therein are true.” 
    Id. 10 The
    court held that the affidavit of a listener to a radio station was inadequate to
    controvert an affidavit offered by the radio station where the listener’s affidavit failed to
    establish personal knowledge of the business practices of record companies or of the radio
    station. See Radio Station 
    KSCS, 750 S.W.2d at 761
    –62.
    11
    The court explained that “[u]nless authorized by statute, an affidavit is insufficient
    unless the allegations contained therein are direct and unequivocal and perjury can be assigned
    upon it.” 
    Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d at 112
    . The affidavit at issue in the case “[did] not positively
    and unqualifiedly represent the ‘facts’ as disclosed in the affidavit to be true and within [the
    affiant’s] personal knowledge. The statements made in the affidavit lack[ed] the necessary
    factual specificity.” 
    Id. 12 In
    Burke, an executrix submitted accounting supported by an affidavit that “was signed
    by her attorney and stated that he had ‘read the accounting and allegations set out thereunder and
    same are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.’” 
    Burke, 525 S.W.2d at 954
    –55. The
    court explained that the affidavit was insufficient because it “would not appear to positively and
    unqualifiedly represent the facts as disclosed in the accounting to be true and within the personal
    knowledge of the affiant.” 
    Id. at 955.
                                                    13
    Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Vaughan, 
    792 S.W.2d 944
    , 945 (Tex. 1990). In
    Vaughan, the court wrote as follows:
    It is clear from reading the entire affidavit that [the affiant] was
    testifying from personal knowledge and was competent to testify
    regarding the matters stated. Even if these elements were not shown
    on the face of the affidavit, Vaughan’s failure to object to these
    defects in form resulted in waiver.
    
    Id. (emphasis added).
    In the years since Vaughan was decided, the Texas Supreme Court has
    neither cited that case nor explicitly overruled it. Nevertheless, five years after
    Vaughan, the Texas Supreme Court—without discussing error preservation—
    agreed with the Fifth Court of Appeals in holding that the summary-judgment
    affidavits challenged in Laidlaw Waste Systems were defective for reasons that
    included the conclusory nature of the affiant’s statements and the absence of any
    indication that the affiant was “competent to testify” on the matters described in
    the affidavit.13 See Laidlaw Waste 
    Sys., 904 S.W.2d at 660
    –61. Although not
    discussed in the Texas Supreme Court, the Fifth Court of Appeals held in that case
    that “[t]o be competent summary[-]judgment evidence, an affidavit must set forth
    the basis on which the affiant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted.” 
    890 S.W.2d 459
    , 467 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, pet. granted), aff’d, 
    904 S.W.2d 656
    (Tex. 1995). The intermediate court further stated that an affidavit that fails to
    disclose that the affiant has personal knowledge of the facts asserted suffers from a
    substantive defect that may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
    Id. Because the
    challenged affidavit was not based on personal knowledge, the intermediate
    13
    See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f) (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
    personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
    show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”).
    14
    appellate court concluded that the affidavits were not competent summary-
    judgment evidence. 
    Id. The Texas
    Supreme Court did not specifically state—in Laidlaw Waste
    Systems or elsewhere—that no objection is required to preserve an argument that
    an affidavit is fatally defective if it fails to show the basis of the affiant’s personal
    knowledge of the stated facts. It did not address error preservation in Kerlin,
    Humphreys, or Brownlee, and the opinions of the intermediate appellate courts in
    these cases were silent on this point. Moreover, in the Texas Supreme Court cases
    cited above, the court either found multiple reasons to reject the affidavits, or the
    affidavit itself showed a lack of personal knowledge. See, e.g., 
    Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 666
    (statement from lawyer regarding his belief about prior lawyer’s intent
    based on review of case file is not an assertion of fact based on personal
    knowledge); 
    Kerlin, 274 S.W.3d at 667
    –68 (witness’s affidavit concerning alleged
    fraud said to have been committed in 1847 could not possibly be based on personal
    knowledge and was based on hearsay, and opposing party raised a hearsay
    objection in the trial court); 
    Laidlaw, 904 S.W.2d at 661
    (affidavit was
    conclusory); 
    Humphreys, 888 S.W.2d at 470
    –71 (affidavit was based on affiant’s
    “‘own personal knowledge and/or knowledge which he has been able to acquire
    upon inquiry’” and contained no representation that the recited facts were true);
    Radio Station 
    KSCS, 750 S.W.2d at 761
    –62 & n.3 (listener of radio station showed
    no personal knowledge as to business practices of the radio station and did not
    claim to have worked for a radio station; radio station also objected in the trial
    court to hearsay); 
    Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d at 112
    (affidavit contained legal
    conclusions, lacked factual specificity, and did not contain a positive and
    unqualified representation that the “facts” were true and within affiant’s personal
    knowledge); 
    Burke, 525 S.W.2d at 955
    (affidavit of attorney failed to show that an
    15
    accounting by another person was true and within the affiant’s personal
    knowledge).14
    The Texas Supreme Court rarely discusses error preservation, but leaving
    the subject to the intermediate appellate courts has produced conflicting results. In
    the summary-judgment context, the language of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
    166a seems to indicate that one must object to a defective affidavit. Compare TEX.
    R. CIV. P. 166a(f) (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
    knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
    show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
    therein.”) with 
    id. (“Defects in
    the form of affidavits or attachments will not be
    grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing
    party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend.”). The intermediate courts have
    concluded that a defect in the form of the affidavit must be preserved by an
    objection in the trial court, but a defect to the affidavit’s substance may be raised
    for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Stone v. Midland Multifamily Equity REIT,
    
    334 S.W.3d 371
    , 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Landry’s Seafood Rests.,
    Inc. v. Waterfront Cafe, Inc., 
    49 S.W.3d 544
    , 551 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet.
    dism’d); Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carway, 
    951 S.W.2d 108
    , 117 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
    The courts of appeals—including this one—have cited Vaughan many times,
    specifically holding that a party must object to the affiant’s lack of personal
    knowledge and obtain a ruling in the trial court to preserve error. See, e.g., Hill v.
    Tootsies, Inc., No. 14-11-00260-CV, 
    2012 WL 1694372
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—
    14
    In contrast, Habte’s affidavit shows that she was employed in a business in which she
    may well have gained personal knowledge of the asserted facts, and does not indicate that she
    lacked personal knowledge; it is simply silent on the matter.
    16
    Houston [14th Dist.] May 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Commint Tech. Servs.,
    Inc. v. Quickel, 
    314 S.W.3d 646
    , 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no
    pet.); Mallory v. Mallory, No. 14-06-01009-CV, 
    2009 WL 1886110
    , at *1 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 2, 2009, no pet.) (sub. mem. op.); Butler v.
    Hudson & Keyse, L.L.C., No. 14-07-00534-CV, 
    2009 WL 402329
    , at *2 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 19, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); Peterson
    Homebuilders, Inc. v. Timmons, No. 14-03-00400-CV, 
    2004 WL 1660936
    , at *4
    n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 27, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.); Garza v.
    Wilson, No. 14-98-00928-CV, 
    2000 WL 64052
    , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] Jan. 27, 2000 no pet.) (not designated for publication); Seitsinger v.
    City of Lake Jackson, No. 14-95-01475-CV, 
    1997 WL 334875
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] July 19, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication);
    
    Carway, 951 S.W.2d at 117
    .
    We also followed Vaughan in Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 
    26 S.W.3d 103
    , 112 & n.9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). We have
    never characterized this ruling as dicta, but instead have treated it as binding
    authority. See, e.g., Chan v. Montebello Dev. Co., No. 14-06-00936-CV, 
    2008 WL 2986379
    , at *11 n.12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 31, 2008, pet. denied)
    (mem. op.); N. Hous. Int’l, L.L.C. v. PW Real Estate Invs., Inc., No. 14-02-00078-
    CV, 
    2003 WL 22453796
    , at *3 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 30,
    2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Even when we have not specifically cited Vaughan,
    we have continued to follow its teaching, and when we addressed an appellate
    complaint that an affidavit was not based on personal knowledge, we frequently
    noted that this complaint had been preserved by an objection in the trial court. See,
    e.g., Valenzuela v. State & Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    317 S.W.3d 550
    , 552 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (noting that the trial court had overruled
    17
    the appellant’s objection that a summary-judgment affidavit was not based on
    personal knowledge); Urban v. Barker, No. 14-06-00387-CV, 
    2007 WL 665118
    , at
    *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 6, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because
    [the appellant] objected to the affidavit in the trial court below, the objection
    [regarding the lack of personal knowledge] is preserved for appeal.”).
    Our sister court, the First Court of Appeals, also has cited Vaughan many
    times, specifically holding that to preserve error, one must object to the affiant’s
    lack of personal knowledge. See Rizkallah v. Conner, 
    952 S.W.2d 580
    , 585 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).               The Rizkallah court specifically
    discussed Vaughan and Laidlaw Waste Systems and concluded that Vaughan was
    the better rule. 
    Id. The First
    Court continues to follow Rizkallah and Vaughan.
    See Underwater Servs., Inc. v. Offshore Drilling Co., No. 01-11-00889-CV, 
    2013 WL 2096640
    , at *5 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 14, 2013, no pet.)
    (mem. op.); In re Higby, No. 01-11-00946-CV, 
    2012 WL 6625028
    , at *3 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2012, orig. proceeding); Colvin v. Tex. Dow
    Emps. Credit Union, No. 01-11-00342-CV, 
    2012 WL 5544950
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Thirteenth Court of
    Appeals also has considered the split of authority and concluded that Vaughan is
    controlling. See Bauer v. Jasso, 
    946 S.W.2d 552
    , 557 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
    1997, no writ.).15 The Second,16 Fourth,17 Fifth,18 Sixth,19 Seventh,20 Tenth,21 and
    15
    See also Danevang Farmers Coop. Soc’y v. Indeco Prods., Inc., No. 13-04-445-CV,
    
    2006 WL 2885058
    , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 12, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.);
    Williams v. State, 
    114 S.W.3d 703
    , 709 n.4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Flanagan
    Bros., Inc. v. Gomez, No.13-97-050-CV, 
    1998 WL 35276220
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
    June 25, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
    16
    See Law Office of David E. Williams, II, P.C. v. Fort Worth Tex. Magazine Venture,
    LP, No. 02-10-00373-CV, 
    2011 WL 2651865
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 7, 2011, no
    pet.) (mem. op.); A.J. Morris, M.D., P.A. v. De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 2-06-430-CV,
    
    2009 WL 161065
    , at *4 & n.12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 22, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    18
    Eleventh22 Courts of Appeals all have followed Vaughan or its progeny. The
    Third23 and Eighth24 Courts of Appeals also have discussed the split of authority,
    but have resolved the conflict in favor of treating an objection based on the lack of
    personal knowledge as a defect in substance.                 Given the inconsistent results
    reached by different courts—and, no doubt, even within our own court—we
    17
    See, e.g., Marin v. Herron, No. 04-11-00352-CV, 
    2012 WL 3205427
    , at *4 (Tex.
    App.—San Antonio Aug. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Evolution Petroleum Co., 
    359 S.W.3d 710
    , 713 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, orig. proceeding); Celadon Trucking
    Servs., Inc. v. Lugo’s Sec. Agency, No. 04-05-00018-CV, 
    2005 WL 2401886
    , at *3 n.3 (Tex.
    App.—San Antonio Sept. 28, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.); Robinson v. Bank One Nat’l Assoc., No.
    04-03-00343-CV, 
    2004 WL 28367
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 7, 2004, pet. denied)
    (mem. op.); Garcia v. John Hancock Variable Life Ins. Co., 
    859 S.W.2d 427
    , 433 (Tex. App.—
    San Antonio 1993, writ denied).
    18
    See, e.g., Four D. Constr. Inc. v. Util. & Envtl. Servs., Inc., No. 05-12-00068-CV, 
    2013 WL 2563785
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7, 2013, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Dulong v. Citibank
    (S.D.), N.A., 
    261 S.W.3d 890
    , 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); Cooper v. Circle Ten
    Council Boy Scouts of Am., 
    254 S.W.3d 689
    , 697 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); Stewart v.
    Sanmina Tex. L.P., 
    156 S.W.3d 198
    , 207 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Thompson v. Curtis,
    
    127 S.W.3d 446
    , 450 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.).
    19
    See, e.g., Sundance Res., Inc. v. Dialog Wireline Servs., L.L.C., No. 06-08-00137-CV,
    
    2009 WL 928276
    , at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 8, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); Youngblood
    v. U.S. Silica Co., 
    130 S.W.3d 461
    , 468 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied); Allen v. St.
    Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
    960 S.W.2d 909
    , 913–14 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
    20
    See Calp v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Fraternity, 
    75 S.W.3d 641
    , 645 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
    2002, pet. denied).
    21
    See, e.g., Wolfe v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 
    382 S.W.3d 434
    , 452 (Tex. App.—Waco
    2012, pet. filed); McFarland v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 
    293 S.W.3d 759
    , 762 (Tex. App.—Waco
    2009, no pet.); Choctaw Props., L.L.C. v. Aledo Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    127 S.W.3d 235
    , 241 (Tex.
    App.—Waco 2003, no pet.).
    22
    See, e.g., Athey v. Mort. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 
    314 S.W.3d 161
    , 165–66 (Tex.
    App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied); Goss v. Puig, No. 11-00-00095-CV, 
    2000 WL 34234424
    , at
    *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 2, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
    23
    See Fernandez v. Peters, No. 03-09-00687-CV, 
    2010 WL 4137491
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—
    Austin Oct. 19, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    24
    Dailey v. Albertson’s, Inc., 
    83 S.W.3d 222
    , 226 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.).
    19
    determined to consider the case en banc to address the question of the correct
    error-preservation rule to follow.
    We conclude that the better course is to hold that a litigant must object and
    obtain a ruling from the trial court to preserve a complaint that an affidavit fails to
    reveal the basis for the affiant’s personal knowledge of the facts stated therein. In
    reaching this conclusion, we have been guided chiefly by two considerations.
    First, the Texas Supreme Court has stated that “[i]f a precedent of this Court
    has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
    other line of decisions, [the lower court] should follow the case which directly
    controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Va.
    Indon. Co. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 
    910 S.W.2d 905
    , 911–12 (Tex. 1995)
    (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 
    490 U.S. 477
    , 484,
    
    109 S. Ct. 1917
    , 1921–22, 
    104 L. Ed. 2d 526
    (1989)). In Vaughan, the Texas
    Supreme Court stated that an affidavit that fails to disclose the basis for the
    affiant’s personal knowledge suffers from a defect of form, and that the failure to
    object to the defect results in waiver. Although other decisions may have cast
    doubt on the court’s reasoning in Vaughan, the case has not been overruled.
    Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has pointed out that raising a complaint in the
    trial court is only one of two steps generally needed to preserve a complaint for
    appellate review. See Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery County, 
    365 S.W.3d 314
    , 317 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam). The trial court also must rule or refuse
    to rule on the request, objection, or motion. 
    Id. (citing TEX.
    R. APP. P. 33.1(a)). It
    therefore appears that to preserve a complaint that an affidavit does not show the
    basis of the affiant’s personal knowledge, a litigant must (1) object in the trial
    court, and (2) obtain the trial court’s ruling (or its refusal to rule) on the objection.
    20
    Second, this approach is consistent with the policy reasons behind error-
    preservation rules. The requirement that parties first raise their complaints in the
    trial court “conserves judicial resources by providing trial courts the opportunity to
    correct errors before appeal.” 
    Id. (citing In
    re B.L.D., 
    113 S.W.3d 340
    , 350 (Tex.
    2003)). In addition, judicial decision-making is more accurate when trial courts
    have the first opportunity to consider and rule on the complaint. 
    Id. Moreover, a
    party should not be permitted to “‘surprise his opponent on appeal by stating his
    complaint for the first time.’” 
    Id. (quoting In
    re 
    B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d at 350
    ). All
    these policies are served by requiring a litigant to object in the trial court to an
    affidavit that does not disclose the basis of the affiant’s personal knowledge, and
    two of the three policies are served by requiring that the trial court rule or refuse to
    rule on the issue.
    Here, IGuide’s special appearance was supported by an affidavit that did not
    reveal the basis of the affiant’s personal knowledge. Although the Shuttle Parties
    timely objected on this basis in the trial court, they did not secure a ruling on their
    objection. We accordingly conclude that this complaint is waived. See 
    id. 2. Failure
    to Deny that IGuide Markets Tours in Texas Through its
    Website
    The Shuttle Parties further argue on appeal that Habte’s affidavit is
    inadequate to meet IGuide’s burden of proof because she did not deny that IGuide
    “markets tours in Texas through its website.”          The Shuttle Parties produced
    affidavit testimony in the trial court that IGuide’s website “provides potential
    customers the opportunity to purchase tours through the website.” In her affidavit
    in support of IGuide’s special appearance, however, Habte attested that IGuide
    “does not specifically target Texas with advertising.” Given the absence of any
    allegation that IGuide has made a single internet sale to a person in Texas or that it
    21
    targets the Texas market, it appears to be the Shuttle Parties’ position that because
    potential customers anywhere could purchase a tour ticket through IGuide’s
    website, jurisdiction is proper everywhere—including Texas. The Shuttle Parties
    cite no authority that supports such a view, which does not accurately reflect the
    law applied by this court.
    When a plaintiff relies on a nonresident defendant’s website as a basis for
    personal jurisdiction, we have evaluated the defendant’s Texas contacts according
    to a sliding scale in much the same way as the federal district court did in Zippo
    Manfacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
    952 F. Supp. 1119
    (W.D. Pa. 1997);
    Riverside Exports, Inc. v. B.R. Crane & Equip., LLC, 
    362 S.W.3d 649
    , 655 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). The use of a sliding scale is
    appropriate   because    “the   likelihood    that   personal   jurisdiction   can   be
    constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of
    commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. “ Zippo Mfg. 
    Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124
    . At one end of the scale are “passive” websites in which the
    foreign defendant has simply posted information on a website that can be viewed
    in other jurisdictions. 
    Id. Such websites
    do not support the exercise of personal
    jurisdiction. 
    Id. (citing Bensusan
    Rest. Corp. v. King, 
    937 F. Supp. 295
    (S.D.N.Y.
    1996)). On the other end of the scale are cases in which the nonresident defendant
    has entered into contracts with residents of the forum state “that involve the
    knowing and repeated transmission of computer files” over the internet. 
    Id. (citing CompuServe,
    Inc. v. Patterson, 
    89 F.3d 1257
    (6th Cir. 1996)). In the middle are
    cases involving interactive websites in which “the user can exchange information
    with the host computer.” 
    Id. In those
    cases, we examine “the level of interactivity
    and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs” on the website.
    
    Id. 22 Here,
    there is evidence only that IGuide “does not specifically target Texas
    with advertising” and that “potential customers [have] the opportunity to purchase
    tours through the website.” Unlike the cases on which the Shuttle Parties rely,
    there are no allegations or evidence in this case that the nonresident defendant
    established continuing internet relationships with Texas residents through its
    website. Cf. 
    Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1263
    (exercising specific jurisdiction over
    software developer who contracted with a computer information service in the
    forum state to make his product available to subscribers, where agreement
    provided that it was entered into in Ohio and developer repeatedly transmitted
    software pursuant to the agreement over a three-year period); Zippo Mfg. 
    Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1125
    –26 (holding that specific jurisdiction was supported by
    defendant’s internet sales of memberships in its online news service to 3,000 forum
    residents and its contracts with seven internet-access providers in the forum state
    involving “the downloading of the electronic messages that form the basis of this
    suit”); Experimental Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. Doctor, 
    76 S.W.3d 496
    , 507 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (holding that the existence of a website
    through which nonresident defendant sold memberships to Texans and provided
    access to a “members-only” section was one of several factors that together
    supported the existence of general jurisdiction). There also is no evidence that the
    defendant in this case sold a product that was delivered to Texas or a service that
    was performed here. Cf. Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 
    998 F. Supp. 738
    , 744
    (W.D. Tex. 1998) (exercising specific jurisdiction over nonresident casino in a
    breach-of-contract and fraud case where plaintiff entered into the contract through
    the casino’s website, “played the casino games while in Texas, as if they were
    physically located in Texas, and if the Plaintiff won cash or prizes, the Defendant
    would send the winnings to the Plaintiff in Texas”).
    23
    On this record, we conclude that “the level of interactivity and commercial
    nature of the exchange of information that occurs” on IGuide’s website does not
    show that IGuide has invoked the benefits and protections of Texas laws by
    purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities here. To the
    contrary, IGuide’s only “product” is a service that can be performed only in the
    Washington, D.C. area, and IGuide could not receive payment in Texas, because
    according to the uncontroverted evidence, it has no offices or bank accounts here.
    Finally, as previously mentioned, there is no allegation or evidence that IGuide
    actually has made a single sale over the internet to a person in Texas. Cf. I & JC
    Corp. v. Helen of Troy L.P., 
    164 S.W.3d 877
    , 888 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet.
    denied) (nonresident defendants “admitted that they sold products to Texas
    stores”).   The bare possibility that a Texas resident could use the website to
    contract for services to be paid for and performed in another state is insufficient to
    support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
    3.     Failure to Deny that IGuide Markets Tours to Texas Residents
    When They Are Visiting Washington, D.C.
    In a single sentence in their brief, the Shuttle Parties also complain that in
    her affidavit, Habte does not deny that in Washington, D.C., IGuide markets its
    services to tourists who are visiting from Texas. The Shuttle Parties cite no
    authority that personal jurisdiction can be based on such a contact in another state
    with a person who happens to reside in the forum state. This argument therefore is
    waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
    4.     Reverse-Piercing of the Corporate Veil
    The Shuttle Parties additionally assert that IGuide is subject to the trial
    court’s specific jurisdiction through the doctrine of reverse-piercing of the
    corporate veil. The Shuttle Parties did not allege in their petition that this was a
    24
    basis for jurisdiction over IGuide. Cf. 
    Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658
    (“Once the
    plaintiff has pleaded sufficient jurisdictional allegations, the defendant filing a
    special appearance bears the burden to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction
    alleged by the plaintiff.”) (emphasis added). We have held, however, that the trial
    court may consider the plaintiffs’ response to the special appearance as well as its
    pleadings. Max Protetch, Inc. v. Herrin, 
    340 S.W.3d 878
    , 883 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).           In their response to IGuide’s special
    appearance, the Shuttle Parties asserted that the trial court has specific personal
    jurisdiction over IGuide as the alter ego of its members. We construe the Shuttle
    Parties’ appellate argument as an assertion that the trial court erred in failing to
    find that IGuide is the alter ego of Cook or Eshetu, neither of whom contested
    personal jurisdiction.
    Under Texas law, a corporation is presumed to be a separate entity from its
    officers and shareholders. See Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee, 
    943 S.W.2d 455
    , 458 (Tex. 1997) (refusing to disregard the distinction between a corporation
    and the individual who was its president and sole shareholder); Capital Fin. &
    Commerce AG v. Sinopec Overseas Oil & Gas, Ltd., 
    260 S.W.3d 67
    , 82 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“Settled law always presumes that
    corporations exist as separate entities, and that corporate officers are separate from
    their corporation.”). See also Amaral v. Steele, No. 14-02-00368-CV, 
    2002 WL 31427018
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 31, 2002, no pet.) (not
    designated for publication) (explaining that because parent and subsidiary
    corporations are presumed to be separate entities, it logically follows that the same
    rule would apply to an assertion of jurisdiction based on a corporation’s status as
    the alter ego of a natural person). As a result, a plaintiff who relies on the
    existence of an alter-ego relationship to ascribe one defendant’s contacts with
    25
    Texas to a distinct foreign corporation must prove that such a relationship exists.
    See Cappuccitti v. Gulf Indus. Prods., Inc., 
    222 S.W.3d 468
    , 482 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
    The Shuttle Parties do not contend that they produced evidence supporting
    this jurisdictional theory in the trial court. Instead, they assert that “[i]f [they] had
    been allowed to present the deposition testimony of [the IGuide Parties] or cross-
    examine them at the hearing on the Special Appearance,” then they would have
    produced evidence in support of this theory. They similarly contend that they
    “would have produced their own testimony” in support of this approach. They
    have not, however, identified any barrier that prevented them from introducing
    such evidence. They also did not ask the trial court for “a continuance to permit
    affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had” as they
    were authorized to do under the rule governing special appearances. See TEX. R.
    CIV. P. 120a(3). We therefore conclude that this argument is without merit.
    5.    Appellants’ Contention that IGuide has Specific Jurisdiction as an
    Actor in Concert with Cook and Eshetu in Usurping a Corporate
    Opportunity of the Shuttle Parties
    The Shuttle Parties also contend that the trial court has specific jurisdiction
    over IGuide because it is acting in concert with Cook and Eshetu “to further the
    scheme to steal away” the Shuttle Parties’ business opportunity. According to the
    Shuttle Parties, their causes of action against IGuide arise from its conspiracy with
    Cook and Eshetu to further those defendants’ breaches of contract and fiduciary
    duty.
    The Shuttle Parties have not identified any act in furtherance of an alleged
    conspiracy that was committed by IGuide in Texas or through which it
    purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum
    26
    state. Thus, the trial court did not err in rejecting this as a basis for jurisdiction.
    See, e.g., Nat’l Indus. Sand 
    Ass’n, 897 S.W.2d at 773
    (rejecting suggestion that
    jurisdiction can be based on an alleged conspiracy’s effects or consequences in the
    forum state, and restricting inquiry to whether the nonresident defendant “itself
    purposefully established minimum contacts”); Knight Corp. v. Knight, 
    367 S.W.3d 715
    , 272 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (rejecting conspiracy as
    a basis for specific jurisdiction where the plaintiff failed to allege that the foreign
    defendant committed any wrongdoing in Texas).
    We overrule the Shuttle Parties’ first issue.
    F.    Form of the Special-Appearance Order
    In the alternative to their first issue, the Shuttle Parties argue that the trial
    court erred by stating in the order granting the special appearance that “Plaintiffs
    take nothing” and that their claims are dismissed with prejudice. This is the relief
    requested in IGuide’s special appearance, in its post-hearing response to the
    Shuttle Parties’ bench brief, and in its proposed order granting the special
    appearance. At no time did the Shuttle Parties raise the argument in the trial court
    that the special appearance, if granted, did not entitle IGuide to such relief. This
    argument accordingly has not been preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P.
    33.1(a). We therefore overrule the Shuttle Parties’ second issue.
    IV. TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
    In their final issue, the Shuttle Parties argue that the trial court erred in
    denying in part their request for a temporary injunction. A temporary injunction is
    an extraordinary equitable remedy intended to preserve the status quo of the
    litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor
    Co., 
    84 S.W.3d 198
    , 204 (Tex. 2002) (op. on reh’g); Walling v. Metcalfe, 863
    
    27 S.W.2d 56
    , 57 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam); U.S. Denro Steels, Inc. v. Lieck, 
    342 S.W.3d 677
    , 685 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). The status
    quo is the last actual, peaceable, non-contested status that preceded the pending
    controversy. See Sharma v. Vinmar Int’l, Ltd., 
    231 S.W.3d 405
    , 419 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
    A.    Standard of Review
    A trial court has broad discretion to grant or refuse a request for a temporary
    injunction, and we will not reverse such a ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.
    See James v. Easton, 
    368 S.W.3d 799
    , 805 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2012, pet. denied).    We will not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s
    judgment unless the trial court’s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds
    of reasonable discretion. See 
    Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211
    . A trial court does not
    abuse its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s decision.
    See 
    id. In our
    review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we draw all
    legitimate inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
    court’s decision. See EMS USA, Inc. v. Shary, 
    309 S.W.3d 653
    , 657 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). We defer to the trial court’s decision on
    conflicting evidence because a trial court functions as finder of fact at a hearing on
    a request for temporary injunction. See 
    Sharma, 231 S.W.3d at 419
    .          When, as
    here, no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, the trial court’s grant or
    denial of injunctive relief will be upheld on any legal theory supported by the
    record. See Davis v. Huey, 
    571 S.W.2d 859
    , 862 (Tex. 1978). A party challenging
    the trial court’s ruling on the requested relief must establish that, with respect to
    resolution of factual issues, the trial court reasonably could have reached but one
    decision. See N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. St. Laurent, 
    296 S.W.3d 171
    ,
    175 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
    28
    B.    Irreparable Harm
    Generally, to obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must prove a valid
    cause of action against the defendant, a probable right to relief, and imminent,
    irreparable injury in the interim. 
    Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204
    . Here, the trial court
    enjoined Cook and Eshetu from “[d]isclosing or communicating confidential data
    they learned relating to internet marketing while they were employed for four
    months by Creativerse,” but denied the Shuttle Parties’ request for injunctive relief
    “regarding sightseeing, tour and/or shuttle bus activities in competition with” DC
    Party Shuttle and Party Shuttle Tours. The Shuttle Parties assert that the relief
    granted is too narrow, and that to preserve the status quo, Cook and Eshetu must be
    enjoined from competing with them. Among other things, the Shuttle Parties
    assert that they need broader injunctive relief to avoid irreparable harm. We
    presume, without deciding, that the Shuttle Parties satisfied the first two elements
    and focus our analysis on the third element of a probable, imminent, and
    irreparable injury.
    A party seeking a temporary injunction must show a probable, imminent,
    and irreparable injury in the interim between the temporary-injunction hearing and
    the trial on the merits. 
    Id. Probable injury
    includes elements of imminent harm,
    irreparable injury, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law for damages.
    Law v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 
    123 S.W.3d 786
    , 792 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Irreparable injuries are those for which the injured
    party cannot be adequately compensated by damages or for which damages cannot
    be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. 
    Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204
    ;
    
    Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58
    . An adequate remedy at law is one that is as complete,
    practical, and efficient to the prompt administration of justice as is equitable relief.
    
    Sharma, 231 S.W.3d at 427
    .
    29
    The Shuttle Parties assert they have sustained irreparable harm for which
    there is no adequate remedy at law because “OnBoard Tours is a relatively new
    concern, and . . . does not have an established and demonstrable history of profits,”
    and thus, money damages are difficult to ascertain. “OnBoard Tours,” however,
    consists of more than just the Shuttle Parties. According to their own pleadings,
    the Shuttle Parties “are part of the network of companies that do business as
    OnBoard Tours in New York City, Washington, DC, and Las Vegas,” but there are
    no allegations that Cook and Eshetu are wrongfully competing with any companies
    other than the Shuttle Parties, or in any city other than Washington, D.C. Thus, the
    assertion that there is no history of profits from the “network of companies” of
    which the Shuttle Parties are a part does not satisfy the burden to show that they
    cannot be adequately compensated by monetary damages.
    Although the Shuttle Parties presented evidence that they have been
    conducting sightseeing tours in Washington, D.C. for six years, the Shuttle Parties
    provided no evidence of ticket sales or a change in the volume of customers or any
    other evidence of their economic condition, either before or after Cook and Eshetu
    began operating IGuide. See N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating 
    Co., 296 S.W.3d at 177
    (providing that applicant for injunctive relief failed to carry burden to
    demonstrate irreparable harm because he produced no evidence that his future
    damages were too speculative to be calculated); Cardinal Health Staffing Network,
    Inc. v. Bowen, 
    106 S.W.3d 230
    , 235–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no
    pet.) (concluding that the evidence supported the trial court’s implicit finding that
    an employer did not suffer irreparable harm from former employee’s breach of a
    non-competition agreement because, among other things, employer produced no
    evidence of economic damages since employee’s departure).
    30
    The Shuttle Parties point to the testimony of Victoria Taylor, the managing
    director of the company conducting sightseeing tours on their behalf,25 that the
    Shuttle Parties suffer more than simply loss of revenue if customers choose IGuide
    over DC Party Shuttle, asserting, “I think it’s more than that.” Despite Taylor’s
    testimony that she observed an IGuide employee speak to guests that were meeting
    to board a DC Party Shuttle tour and that she saw a few guests walk away with the
    IGuide employee, she admitted that she did not know how or when those
    passengers had acquired tickets for IGuide. When asked whether she knew for a
    fact that IGuide’s customers would have chosen to take one of the Shuttle Parties’
    tours if IGuide were not operating, Taylor answered that she believed that they
    would have. This testimony establishes only a fear of possible injury. See Reach
    Grp., L.L.C. v. Angelina Grp., 
    173 S.W.3d 834
    , 838 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (explaining that testimony that company could be put at “great
    risk” by former employee’s competition did not support injunctive relief because it
    “‘established only a fear of possible injury’” (quoting EMSL Analytical, Inc. v.
    Younker, 
    154 S.W.3d 693
    , 697 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.))).
    An injunction is not proper when the claimed injury is merely speculative; fear of
    injury is not sufficient to support a temporary injunction. Frey v. DeCordova Bend
    Estates Owners Ass’n, 
    647 S.W.2d 246
    , 248 (Tex. 1983); Jordan v. Landry’s
    Seafood Rest., Inc., 
    89 S.W.3d 737
    , 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,
    pet. denied) (sub. op.).
    In a temporary-injunction hearing, the burden is on the applicant to prove
    that the damages cannot be calculated, not for the opposing party to disprove the
    25
    Taylor testified that she is the managing director for “OnBoard Tours DC,” but that her
    job is functionally the same as Cook’s former position. Cook was employed by DC Party
    Shuttle.
    31
    notion. See N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating 
    Co., 296 S.W.3d at 177
    . Based on the
    evidence in the appellate record, the trial court reasonably could have concluded
    that monetary damages would adequately compensate the Shuttle Parties for any
    alleged loss of business or profits as a result of Cook and Eshetu’s operation of a
    competing company. See Daily Int’l Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 
    662 S.W.2d 60
    , 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (holding that the
    trial court reasonably could conclude that loss of business and loss of profits
    caused by the wrongful appropriation and use of trade secrets was curable by
    monetary damages).
    The Shuttle Parties also assert that Cook and Eshetu are likely unable to
    respond in damages to the claims asserted. They point to the record in which the
    trial court sustained relevancy objections to their questions to Cook about his
    current net worth and about whether he had a checking account in his name when
    he was employed by the Shuttle Parties. According to the Shuttle Parties, they
    were not allowed to put on this evidence to support their claim that they lacked an
    adequate remedy at law. To preserve for appellate review any error concerning the
    admissibility of evidence, an appellant must demonstrate that it either tendered the
    evidence or made a bill of exceptions. See Brown v. Am. Transfer & Storage Co.,
    
    601 S.W.2d 931
    , 936 (Tex. 1980). The Shuttle Parties did not make an offer of
    proof or a bill of exceptions to demonstrate what the evidence would have shown
    and how it would have supported their application for injunctive relief.          We
    conclude the Shuttle Parties have failed to preserve this argument for appellate
    review.
    Under the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the trial court did
    not abuse its discretion by impliedly finding that the Shuttle Parties failed to prove
    that money damages would not adequately compensate them or that such damages
    32
    are incapable of calculation. See N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating 
    Co., 296 S.W.3d at 178
    . Absent proof of irreparable harm, the Shuttle Parties were not entitled to
    injunctive relief. See 
    id. The trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying in
    part the application for temporary injunction by DC Party Shuttle and Party Shuttle
    Tours. See 
    Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211
    (providing that a trial court does not abuse
    its discretion in granting or denying a temporary injunction if some evidence
    reasonably supports the trial court’s decision).     Accordingly, we overrule the
    Shuttle Parties’ third issue.
    V. CONCLUSION
    The trial court did not err in concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction
    over IGuide, and the Shuttle Parties failed to preserve their complaint about the
    form of the order granting IGuide’s special appearance. The trial court also did not
    abuse its discretion by denying in part the Shuttle Parties’ request for injunctive
    relief. We accordingly affirm both of the trial court’s challenged rulings.
    /s/    Tracy Christopher
    Justice
    The En Banc Court consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Frost,
    Brown, Boyce, Christopher, Jamison, McCally, and Busby. Justice Donovan is not
    participating.
    Justices Brown, Boyce, McCally, and Busby join the En Banc Opinion
    authored by Justice Christopher. Justice Frost issues an En Banc Dissenting
    Opinion in which Chief Justice Hedges and Justice Jamison join.
    33
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-12-00303-CV

Judges: Hedges, Frost, Brown, Boyce, Christopher, Jamison, Mecally, Busby, Donovan

Filed Date: 6/27/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

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