in Re Gyanendra Patra ( 2020 )

Opinion issued December 22, 2020
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-20-00651-CV
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IN RE GYANENDRA PATRA, Relator
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Gyanendra Patra was held in contempt of the trial court’s March 6, 2020
agreed final judgment and injunction and ordered confined by the trial court’s July
20, 2020 order of contempt and commitment. Patra seeks a writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that he is being illegally restrained under the trial court’s July 20, 2020
order which he contends is invalid.1 The trial court suspended commitment and
ordered Patra released on bond of $100.00 subject to his compliance with certain
conditions.2 Because we conclude that Patra is illegally restrained, we grant the writ,
vacate the trial court’s contempt and commitment order, and order Patra released
from custody.
Background
This case arises from a lawsuit filed by real parties in interest, Clare Schoene
and her husband, Adam Hampton, against Gyanendra Patra alleging claims of
stalking, intentional infliction of emotional distress, private nuisance, and tortious
interference with business relations or employee relations. Problems began soon
after Patra was first employed by Schlumberger as a software architect in March
2019. Schoene was another Schlumberger employee and soon after Patra began
working at Schlumberger, Schoene complained that Patra was harassing her by
giving her unwanted attention, leaving her gifts, making inappropriate comments,
1
The underlying case is Clare Schoene and Adam E. Hampton v. Gyanendra Patra,
cause number 20-DCV-271333, pending in the 400th District Court of Fort Bend
County, Texas, the Honorable Maggie Jaramillo presiding.
2
Pending the outcome of this Court’s ruling on Patra’s habeas, the trial court granted
Patra’s request to suspend the imposition of commitment and released Patra on $100
bond with the following restrictions: (1) he must wear a GPS tracking device on his
ankle; (2) he must remain in his home from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Monday through
Friday; (3) he must remain in his home between the hours of 6:00 p.m. Friday
through 6:00 a.m. Monday; (4) he is to be supervised by the fort Bend county
Pretrial Services.
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and refusing to leave her alone at the office. Because Patra’s behavior made her
uncomfortable, Schoene complained to the Schlumberger Human Resources office.
Patra was subsequently fired in part because he told the HR officer that he believed
Schoene was going to leave her family and run away with him.
Patra’s conduct continued even after his termination from Schlumberger.
Patra began sending emails to Schoene’s work email address and later to her personal
email address. Schoene complained that Patra had followed her from work to a
restaurant and to a gas station. On one occasion, he drove by and attempted to talk
to Schoene while she was walking near her home with her small children. Hampton
also discovered that Patra had put a tracking software on his emails allowing him to
know when someone opened and read his emails.
Schoene and Hampton filed suit seeking an injunction to stop Patra’s
harassment of Schoene. The trial court initially entered a temporary restraining
order against Patra, but on March 6, 2020, the trial court entered an agreed final
judgment and injunction, prohibiting Patra from contacting or communicating with
Schoene and Hampton, from contacting or communicating with certain co-workers
of Schoene’s, from coming within 500 feet of Schoene’s workplace, and from
coming within 500 feet of Schoene and Hampton and their home.
On June 17, 2020, Schoene and Hampton filed a motion to show cause,
claiming that Patra had violated the order by coming within 500 feet of their home.
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The trial court held a hearing at which Schoene and Hampton testified. Patra was
sworn in at the beginning of the hearing along with all other witnesses, but when he
was called to the stand, he asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. On
July 20, 2020, the trial court signed an order holding Patra in contempt for violating
the March order and for commitment to county jail. The trial court suspended the
commitment and ordered bond, which Patra posted.
Analysis
Patra claims the contempt order is void because (1) the trial court violated
Patra’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by forcing Patra to be
called as a witness, and (2) by holding him in contempt without proof of a willful
violation of the March order. Patra also contends that the commitment order is
insufficient and violates Patra’s due process rights.
An original habeas proceeding is the vehicle for collaterally attacking a
commitment order. See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2005); In re
Denson, No. 01-19-00653-CV, 2020 WL 425291, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Jan. 28, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
“A writ of habeas corpus will issue if the trial court’s contempt order is void, either
because it is beyond the court’s power or because the relator has not been afforded
due process.” Henry, 154 S.W.3d at 596. The contempt order is presumed valid
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unless the relator discharges his burden of showing entitlement to relief. See In re
Parr, 199 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding).
No Fifth Amendment Violation
Patra first complains that the contempt order is void because the trial court
forced Patra to be sworn and called as a witness in violation of his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. Patra did not testify, but he asserts that the trial
court violated his Fifth Amendment right merely by requiring him to be sworn as a
witness after he had asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Criminal contemnors have a privilege against self-incrimination. See Ex parte
Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976); Ex parte Bowers, 886 S.W.2d 346, 351
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ dism’d w.o.j.). If an alleged criminal
contemnor asserts his privilege against self-incrimination, or his counsel asserts the
privilege for him, the contemnor should not be sworn in and compelled to testify.
See Werblud, 536 S.W.2d at 548; Bowers, 886 S.W.2d at 351.
The record shows that Patra did not assert his Fifth Amendment right before
he was sworn. The record of the hearing reveals that all witnesses were sworn as a
group before the recording of the hearing began. Neither Patra’s attorney nor Patra
raised the privilege against self-incrimination at that time and did not object to the
trial court swearing Patra in as a witness. When counsel for real parties in interest
stated that he intended to call Patra as a witness, the trial court observed that Patra
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had previously been sworn and admonished him in detail about his rights and the
possible consequences of testifying given that the hearing concerned criminal
contempt. After the trial court’s admonishments, counsel for real parties in interest
asked Patra if he intended to answer questions and Patra asserted his Fifth
Amendment right for the first time. No further questions were asked.
Because the record shows that Patra did not assert his Fifth Amendment right
until he was called to the stand, and that no questions were asked after he asserted
his privilege, Patra has not established that the contempt order is void based on a
violation of his Fifth Amendment right.
No Improper Shifting of the Burden of Proof
Patra next claims that the trial court improperly required him to show good
cause for his alleged violations of the March judgment when the law clearly places
the burden of proof on the movant for contempt.
Contempt orders that involve commitment are considered “criminal”
contempt orders and must be supported by proof “beyond a reasonable doubt of:
(1) a reasonably specific order; (2) a violation of the order; and (3) the willful intent
to violate the order.” Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. 1995) (orig.
proceeding); see In re Braden, 483 S.W.3d 659, 664 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding). In an original proceeding, “the appellate court cannot
weigh the evidence supporting the trial court’s contempt finding, but the court can
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determine whether the contempt judgment is void because there is no evidence of
contempt.” Braden, 483 S.W.3d at 664.
An order is “reasonably specific” if the terms are clear, specific, and
unambiguous such that a person who is charged with obeying the order will readily
know the obligations imposed upon him. See Chambers, 898 S.W.2d at 260. “A
court order is insufficient to support a judgment of contempt only if its interpretation
requires inferences or conclusions about which reasonable persons might differ.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
The March judgment, which was admitted into evidence, contained
reasonably specific provisions stating the behaviors or actions that were prohibited.
For example, the March judgment requires Patra to “refrain from coming within five
hundred (500) feet of CLARE SCHOENE and/or ADAM[] HAMPTON’s person,”
to “refrain from coming within five hundred (500) feet of CLARE SCHOENE and/or
ADAM[] HAMPTON’s residence located at [address specified],” and to “refrain
from coming within five hundred (500) feet of CLARE SCHOENE’s place of
business located at [address specified].” The March judgment also required Patra to
refrain from texting or emailing Schoene and other specified persons.
Real parties next had to establish a violation of the order and the willful intent
to violate the order. Schoene and Hampton testified that Patra had come within 500
feet of their residence and their persons, and that Patra had texted and emailed
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Schoene. Patra does not challenge the finding of a violation of the injunction.
Instead, he claims that there was no proof of willfulness or intent to violate the March
order. But “[n]oncompliance with an unambiguous order of which one has notice
will ordinarily raise an inference that the noncompliance was willful.” Chambers,
898 S.W.2d at 261.
Patra interprets the trial court’s order to have improperly shifted the burden of
proof of this element to him. But Patra had notice of an unambiguous court order,
shown by his signature on the order, which the trial court found he violated. See id.
Because noncompliance raises an inference of willfulness, and Patra did not rebut
the inference, proof of noncompliance with the trial court’s March 6, 2020 order was
sufficient and Patra has not established that the trial court improperly shifted the
burden of proving intent or willfulness to Patra.
The Commitment Order Contains No Express Directive to Sheriff
Patra next complains that his right to due process was violated by the trial
court’s insufficient order of commitment. Specifically, Patra claims that the order
does not satisfy the requirements for a proper commitment order.
A valid commitment order is essential to satisfy due process. See Ex parte
Wilson, 797 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding). “A commitment order is
the warrant, process, or order by which a court directs a ministerial officer to take
custody of a person.” See In re Dotson, 981 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston
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[1st Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding). A commitment order may be included in the
contempt order, but for the commitment order to satisfy due process, it must direct
the sheriff to detain the contemnor. See Ex parte Hernandez, 827 S.W.2d 858, 858–
59 (Tex. 1992).
In Hernandez, the trial court’s order held Hernandez in contempt and ordered
him confined in the county jail for 180 days, but it did not direct the sheriff to take
him into custody or direct the clerk to issue a writ of attachment or commitment to
the proper officer. See id. at 858. The Texas Supreme Court granted the writ and
ordered Hernandez discharged because there was no directive to the sheriff or
separate order for attachment or commitment. See id. at 859.
The trial court’s July 20, 2020 order in this case provides:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED THAT Defendant Patra be placed into
confinement for the term of forty-five (45) days in the Fort
Bend County Jail. Said term is to be accrued on a day for
day basis. Defendant PATRA shall turn himself into the
Fort Bend County Jail on or before Monday July 20, 2020
at 5:00 p.m.
The first sentence of this order is very similar to the language in the Hernandez
order. The first sentence orders Patra to be “placed into confinement for the term of
forty-five (45) days in the Fort Bend County Jail,” but the order does not include a
directive to a sheriff and does not order the clerk to issue a writ of attachment or
commitment separately from the contempt order.
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Although the first sentence of the order is practically identical to the language
in Hernandez, real parties claim that this Court has previously distinguished
Hernandez and upheld a similar order in Dotson. See 981 S.W.2d at 238. Although
real parties are correct in asserting that this Court upheld an order that committed
the contemnor to the Galveston County Jail without an express directive to the
sheriff or other ministerial officer to take Dotson into custody, the order in Dotson
contained slightly different language than the order in Hernandez. See Dotson, 981
S.W.2d at 238. The contempt order in Dotson ordered the relator “committed to the
county jail of Galveston County . . . .” Id. (emphasis added) (distinguishing language
from that in Hernandez, and stating “[w]hle this language is not explicitly directed
to a sheriff or other ministerial officer, it has been held sufficient as commitment”).
Moreover, the last sentence in the commitment portion of the order
distinguishes it from orders in other cases because it not only does not contain a
directive to the sheriff to take Patra into custody, it directs Patra to turn himself into
the county jail. Based on the requirement in Hernandez that a commitment order
contain a directive to the sheriff, or at least include an attachment that directs another
officer to issue a writ of commitment or to take the contemnor into custody, this
order cannot serve as a commitment order and without an order of commitment,
Patra is not validly confined. See Hernandez, 827 S.W.2d at 858–59.
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Attorney’s Fees
Finally, Patra contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees in the July order. Arguing that real parties did not plead statutory or
contractual authority for an award of attorney’s fees, Patra asserts that the trial court
lacked authority to impose them.
In response, real parties state that they waive their claim for attorney’s fees.
Thus, we need not address the validity of Patra’s contention.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we grant the writ, order Patra discharged, and order the award
of attorney’s fees deleted from the order.
Richard Hightower
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.
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