in the Estate of Ronald Craig Burns ( 2020 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-19-00284-CV
IN THE ESTATE OF Ronald Craig BURNS, Deceased
From the County Court, Karnes County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017-006047
Honorable Polly Jackson Spencer, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: January 22, 2020
AFFIRMED
Appellants appeal the trial court’s order and judgment dismissing their petition for
declaratory relief filed in the underlying probate proceeding for lack of standing. We affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
Background
This appeal arises from a dispute over the estate of Ronald Burns. Ronald died testate and
without issue in 2017. Appellants Anne P. Anderson and Joyce “Jean” Rowell are Ronald’s first
cousins. Appellants are the co-executrices of the estate of their late sister Susan “Lynn” Petrey,
who died in 2012, as well as the beneficiaries of Lynn’s estate and co-trustees of the Lynn Petrey
Testamentary Trust. Appellees Sharon Lechner, Marcus Burns III, and Matthew Burns are
Ronald’s niece and nephews. Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America (“Travelers”)
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is also an appellee. The following is a graphical depiction of the relevant parties and family
members:
Ronald executed his last will and testament in 2007. In addition to specific gifts of property
to his former step-children, Ronald gifted the bulk of his estate, including the residuary estate, to
his cousin Lynn. The will named Lynn the independent executrix and Ronald’s former step-son
William Lee Alves the first alternate independent executor. However, both Lynn and William pre-
deceased Ronald.
Ronald’s niece Sharon filed an application to probate Ronald’s will in Karnes County, and
the trial court admitted the will to probate. Noting that Lynn and William predeceased Ronald, the
trial court granted Sharon letters of administration and appointed her administratrix of Ronald’s
estate.
Appellants, who are Lynn’s surviving sisters, filed a petition in the probate proceeding on
behalf of Lynn’s estate, the Lynn Petrey Testamentary Trust, and Petrey Family Minerals, LLC,
successor to the Lynn Petrey Testamentary Trust. Appellants sought declaratory judgment that
“the Texas anti-lapse statute protects the gifts made to [Lynn], who is a descendant of [Ronald’s]
mother” 1 and asked the trial court to construe the will to prevent lapse of the gift to Lynn.
1
Although appellants’ petition alleged Lynn is a “descendant of Ronald’s mother,” appellants do not dispute that
“[Ronald] and [Lynn] shared the same grandparents, . . . the ‘Poindexter Grandparents’[.]”
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Alternatively, appellants asked the trial court to find the will ambiguous and declare Ronald’s
intent was to pass specific and residual gifts “to Susan Lynn Petrey, her heirs and successors.”
Sharon and Travelers filed a motion to dismiss appellants’ “entire lawsuit,” asserting that
because all gifts to Lynn failed due to her predeceasing Ronald, appellants (as representatives of
Lynn’s estate) are not persons interested in the estate with standing to assert claims in the probate
proceeding. The trial court held a hearing and granted the motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
Appellants appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing their petition.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s order on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing like an order on
a plea to the jurisdiction. In re Estate of Forister, 421 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2013, pet. denied) (citing Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 n.3 (Tex. 2001)). Whether the party
asserting a claim in the probate proceeding has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. See id. (citing Tex. Dep’t
of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)).
Where the motion to dismiss challenges the pleadings, we construe the pleadings liberally
in favor of the pleader and look to her intent. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. If the pleadings do
not affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate
incurable defects in jurisdiction, the pleader should be afforded the opportunity to amend. See id.
at 226–27. Otherwise, if the pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction, the motion to dismiss
should be granted without any opportunity to amend. See id. at 227.
Where the motion to dismiss challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider
the relevant evidence in the record. See Forister, 421 S.W.3d at 178 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
at 227). If the relevant evidence in the record creates a fact question, the trial court must deny the
motion to dismiss. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28. If the relevant evidence is undisputed or
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fails to raise a fact question, the trial court may rule on the motion to dismiss as a matter of law.
See id. at 228.
Discussion
In two issues, appellants raise four arguments: (1) the motion to dismiss was not the proper
vehicle to challenge standing; (2) the trial court erred in dismissing appellants’ entire petition
because the motion to dismiss did not challenge all of appellants’ claims; (3) the pleadings
demonstrate appellants have a justiciable, pecuniary interest in Ronald’s estate (i.e., standing); and
(4) the trial court should have afforded appellants an opportunity to cure any jurisdictional defect
by repleading. We address each argument separately and not necessarily in the order appellants
raised it.
A. Propriety of the motion to dismiss
Appellants argue the motion to dismiss was not the proper vehicle to challenge appellants’
standing. Rather, appellants contend Sharon and Travelers should have filed a “motion in limine”
in lieu of a “motion to dismiss” to challenge standing.
While a proceeding challenging standing in probate may be referred to as an “in limine
proceeding” because it is a preliminary, pre-trial proceeding, a motion to dismiss a claim in a
probate proceeding for lack of standing is properly called a “motion to dismiss for lack of
standing,” rather than a “motion in limine.” 2 In re Estate of Chapman, 315 S.W.3d 162, 164 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). An order granting a “motion to dismiss” for lack of standing is a
type of appealable order this court has reviewed before. See, e.g., In re Estate of Perez-Muzza, 446
S.W.3d 415, 419 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied); Forister, 421 S.W.3d at 177.
2
We note that in a guardianship proceeding, the Estates Code provides: “The court shall determine by motion in limine
the standing of a person who has an interest that is adverse to a proposed ward or incapacitated person.” TEX. EST.
CODE ANN. § 1055.001(c). There is no similar provision applicable to probate proceedings.
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Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ second issue to the extent appellants argue the “motion to
dismiss” was an improper vehicle to challenge appellants’ standing in the trial court.
B. Extent of the motion to dismiss
Appellants argue the trial court erred in dismissing their entire petition because the motion
to dismiss only addressed one of appellants’ two requests for relief.
Under the heading “Request for Declaratory Relief/Construction,” appellants’ petition
asked the trial court to: (1) “declare that the Texas anti-lapse statute protects the gifts made to
[Lynn]” as a “descendant” of Ronald’s mother, and (2) “construe the provisions of the Will
liberally to prevent lapse of any gifts, apply all presumptions in favor of [appellants], and therefore
to favor the specific and residual gifts to [Lynn].” In other words, appellants sought construction
of the anti-lapse statute and construction of Ronald’s will itself. On appeal, appellants argue the
motion to dismiss only addressed their request for statutory construction and, therefore, was
inadequate to support dismissal of their request for construction of the will.
The motion to dismiss asked the trial court to dismiss appellants’ “entire lawsuit” because
“[t]he undisputed evidence already on file in this Cause shows there is no factual or legal basis for
[appellants’] claims; therefore, they have no standing[.]” Specifically, the motion argued: (1) the
anti-lapse statute is inapplicable here because Ronald and Lynn were first cousins; and (2)
appellants “failed to show they have met the statutory requirement they are ‘interested persons’ or
‘persons interested’ in this Estate as required by Texas Estates Code Section 22.018[.]” The motion
to dismiss, therefore, is not a partial motion to dismiss. Rather, the motion to dismiss challenged
appellants’ standing to assert any claim in the probate proceeding. Accordingly, we turn to the
primary issue in this appeal—whether appellants had standing to assert a claim in the trial court.
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C. Standing
Any “person interested in an estate” has standing to assert claims in a probate proceeding.
Perez-Muzza, 446 S.W.3d at 419 (citing TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 55.001). A party has an interest
in an estate if she is an heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other person with a property right in
or claim against the estate. Id. (citing TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 22.018). The party whose standing
is challenged bears the burden of proving standing. Id. (citing Womble v. Atkins, 331 S.W.2d 294
(Tex. 1960)).
Here, appellants argue they have standing as representatives and beneficiaries of the estate
of a devisee under Ronald’s will (Lynn). Appellants’ standing, therefore, depends on whether the
gift to Lynn survives despite her predeceasing Ronald.
At common law, a bequest or devise to someone who predeceased the testator lapsed unless
the will identified a substitute devisee. Lacis v. Lacis, 355 S.W.3d 727, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Chadwick v. Bristow, 208 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.
1948)). The anti-lapse statute, however, provides an exception to the common law rule. Id. The
statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If a devisee who is a descendant of the testator or a descendant of a testator’s
parent . . . fails to survive the testator . . . the descendants of the devisee who
survived the testator by 120 hours take the devised property in place of the
devisee.
TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 255.153(a) (emphasis added). The anti-lapse statute, therefore, only
applies where the devisee who predeceased the testator is a descendant of the testator or a
descendant of the testator’s parent. See id.
On appeal, appellants concede that because Lynn is not a descendant of Ronald or Ronald’s
parents, the anti-lapse statute does not save the lapsed gift to Lynn. Instead, appellants argue the
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will itself should be construed to permit the gift to Lynn to pass to the beneficiaries of and
successors to Lynn’s estate. Alternatively, appellants argue the will is ambiguous.
When construing a will, we must ascertain the testator’s intent from the language contained
within the four corners of the will. San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.
2000). We do not focus on what the testator intended to write, but rather the words he actually
used. Id. We may not re-draft the will to vary or add provisions “under the guise of construction”
in order to produce the testator’s presumed intent. Id. (quoting Shriner’s Hosp. for Crippled
Children of Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. 1980)). If the will is unambiguous, we will
not go beyond the specific terms used in the will and will not consider any extrinsic evidence. Id.
Appellants argue this court should: (1) presume Ronald did not intend to die intestate, and
(2) presume that by making a gift to Lynn, Ronald intended to exclude all others from that gift
except the beneficiaries of and successors to Lynn’s estate. Indeed, we have recognized there is a
presumption that a testator intends to dispose of all his estate rather than die intestate. Wilkins v.
Garza, 693 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ) (citing Briggs v. Peebles,
188 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. 1945)). “Where the will contains a residuary clause the presumption
against intestacy is especially strong.” Id. (citing Stahl, 610 S.W.2d at 151).
Ronald’s will contains a residuary clause designating Lynn the only residual beneficiary:
If any of my above three named [former step-]children should not survive me by at
least ten (10) days, I hereby give, devise and bequeath all property left to said
persons to my cousin, SUSAN LYNN PETREY.
The will, however, contains no similar provision addressing the possibility that Lynn would
predecease Ronald. 3 “Absent words of survivorship or substitution, or the application of [the anti-
lapse statute], a bequest to a residuary beneficiary who predeceases the testator will lapse and pass
3
We note Lynn predeceased Ronald by approximately 5 years.
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to the testator’s heir-at-law.” Block v. Edge, 608 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, no writ) (citing Swearingen v. Giles, 565 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1978,
writ ref’d n.r.e.); Tabor v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce of San Antonio, 351 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1961, no writ)).
Accordingly, because the will does not designate an alternate residuary beneficiary, the
specific gifts to Lynn and the residuary estate pass to Ronald’s heirs rather than to the beneficiaries
of and successors to Lynn’s estate. See id. There is no language within the four corners of the will
compelling a different result, nor is there any relevant ambiguity in the will. Because the will itself
does not provide that the gift to Lynn survives despite her predeceasing Ronald, appellants are not
devisees and lack standing to assert claims in the probate proceeding. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 22.018; Perez-Muzza, 446 S.W.3d at 419. Appellants’ first issue is overruled.
D. Leave to amend
Finally, appellants argue the trial court should have afforded them an opportunity to cure
any jurisdictional defect by repleading. As noted above, where a motion to dismiss challenges the
pleadings and the pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the
party whose standing is challenged should be afforded the opportunity to amend. See Miranda,
133 S.W.3d at 226–27. Here, however, the motion to dismiss explicitly challenged the existence
of jurisdictional facts, arguing: “The undisputed evidence already on file in this Cause shows there
is no factual or legal basis for [appellants’] claims; therefore, they have no standing[.]” Appellants
bore the burden of responding with evidence sufficient to create a fact question regarding their
standing to contest the will. See Perez-Muzza, 446 S.W.3d at 419. Because they failed to do so,
the trial court was authorized to rule on the motion to dismiss as a matter of law without affording
appellants leave to amend. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; see also Scarbrough v. Metro. Transit
Auth. of Harris Cnty., 326 S.W.3d 324, 339 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)
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(“Because the jurisdictional facts upon which we rely were largely uncontested and because
[appellant] has otherwise failed to indicate that there is any genuine fact issue to be resolved, and
thus her lack of standing cannot be changed by merely repleading her case, we need not remand.”).
Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ second issue to the extent appellants argue the trial court
erred in denying them leave to amend their pleadings before dismissing their petition.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellants’ issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
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