Robert Darren Duvall v. State ( 2020 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00446-CR
___________________________
ROBERT DARREN DUVALL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 432nd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1511886D
Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Robert Darren Duvall, appearing pro se, pleaded guilty in July 2018
to violating a protective order. Duvall appears to attempt to appeal from the trial
court’s denial of his “Motion To Reverse Final Judgment” based upon new evidence
and his “Petition To Reverse Final Judgment.” These motions, which Duvall filed in
June 2019, appear to attack his 2018 conviction and constitute untimely motions for
new trial.
On December 10, 2019, we sent Duvall a letter explaining our concern that we
lack jurisdiction over his appeal because the trial court’s order does not appear to be
an appealable order. We further explained that
[w]e generally have jurisdiction to consider an appeal in a criminal case
only from a judgment of conviction. See McKown v. State, 915 S.W.2d
160, 161 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no pet.). Article 11.07 of the
code of criminal procedure is the exclusive means for challenging a final
felony conviction, and this court has no jurisdiction over matters relating
to postconviction applications under article 11.07. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 11.07; Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of
Appeals, 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
We stated that unless any party desiring to continue the appeal filed on or before December
20, 2019, a response showing grounds for continuing this appeal, we could dismiss it for
want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f), 44.3. Duvall filed a response, but it does
not show grounds for continuing the appeal.1
1
On January 16, 2020, Duvall filed a motion for extension of time to respond
to our jurisdiction letter. We deny that motion as moot.
2
Because we have no jurisdiction over this appeal from the trial court’s denial of
Duvall’s untimely motions that are in the nature of a motion for new trial, we dismiss
this appeal for want of jurisdiction.2 See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f), 44.3.
Per Curiam
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: January 23, 2020
2
The trial court likewise lacked jurisdiction to entertain Duvall’s “Motion To
Reverse Final Judgment” based upon new evidence and his “Petition To Reverse
Final Judgment.” Article 40.001 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that motions for new trial shall be granted when material evidence favorable to the
accused surfaces after trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 40.001. However, Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.4 requires that a motion for new trial be filed no later
than thirty days after the date the trial court imposes or suspends sentence in open
court. Tex. R. App. P. 21.4. Thus, even motions based on newly discovered material
evidence must be filed within thirty days of the trial court’s imposition or suspension
of sentence in open court. See Williams v. State, Nos. 02-17-00249-CR, 02-17-00250-
CR, 02-17-00251-CR, 2017 WL 4819417, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 26,
2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (per curiam) (collecting
cases). A trial court lacks jurisdiction to rule on an out-of-time motion for new trial.
Id. (citing State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals of Tex., 860 S.W.2d 873, 876 n.2
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993), and Beathard v. State, 767 S.W.2d 423, 433 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989)). The trial court therefore had no jurisdiction to rule on Duvall’s motions that
were in the nature of late-filed motions for new trial. See id.
3