Jerome Jordan v. State ( 2020 )


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  • AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed January 27, 2020
    S   In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-18-01118-CR
    JEROME JORDAN, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F-1675605-J
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Evans
    Opinion by Justice Reichek
    Jerome Jordan appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. Bringing two issues,
    appellant contends the trial court erred by submitting a jury charge that did not require a unanimous
    verdict and the judgment should be reformed to reflect the correct offense for which he was
    convicted. We agree the judgment should be reformed as appellant requests. We disagree,
    however, that the court’s charge was erroneous. Accordingly, we reform the judgment to reflect
    the correct offense and, as modified, we affirm.
    Factual Background
    In early 2016, appellant was a passenger on a Greyhound bus being driven by Brandon
    Patterson. Both Patterson and appellant lived in Dallas and they discussed getting together to
    smoke marijuana. The two men sent text messages to each other for several weeks until Patterson
    sent appellant a message on April 20, 2016 asking if they could meet. Appellant sent Patterson
    his address.
    Patterson drove to appellant’s apartment complex and appellant invited him inside.
    Appellant suggested they go get some “weed” and Patterson responded that he only had $20 with
    him. Appellant asked “Why would you come over here with only $20 and we were talking about
    getting high?”
    At that point, appellant went into his bathroom and came out with an assault rifle.
    Appellant pointed the gun at Patterson and told him to hand over his phone and keys, take off his
    shoes, and get on the ground. Appellant said, “I know you’re not gonna make me kill you over
    some money.” When Patterson refused to get on the ground, appellant shot him in the leg.
    Once Patterson was laying on the floor, appellant began circling around, ranting about
    money. He then picked up some cables and Patterson thought appellant was going to use the cables
    to tie him up. When appellant placed the gun against the wall, Patterson crawled towards it and
    he and appellant grabbed the gun at the same time. As they struggled over control of the gun, it
    discharged. Appellant shouted that his brother was in the other room and Patterson had forced
    him to shoot through the wall. Appellant then stabbed Patterson in the chest with a knife Patterson
    had earlier seen lying on a nearby table. Patterson testified he remembered being stabbed twice.
    Patterson heard someone come to the apartment door, bang on the outside, and ask if
    everything was okay. Patterson yelled back that appellant was trying to kill him and asked the
    person to call the police. Appellant became more upset and tried to stab Patterson in the neck, but
    the knife either “folded” or broke. Appellant then fled the apartment. Police found appellant the
    next day in a truck parked in the apartment complex parking lot. Patterson’s wallet was recovered
    from the truck. Appellant was arrested and indicted for aggravated robbery. The indictment
    alleged that appellant used and exhibited both a gun and a knife during the course of the offense.
    –2–
    Appellant was tried before a jury. After the evidence was presented, the trial court
    submitted a jury charge to which appellant did not object. The abstract portion of the charge
    instructed the jury that “[a] person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing
    theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of property of another, he intentionally or
    knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.” It further
    instructed that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated robbery if the person committing
    robbery uses or exhibits a deadly weapon.” “Deadly weapon” was defined as “a firearm or
    anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of causing death or serious bodily
    injury, or anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or
    serious bodily injury.” The application portion of the charge read as follows:
    Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the
    20th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, JEROME
    JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, while in the course of
    committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said
    property, threaten or place BRANDON PATTERSON in fear of imminent bodily
    injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a
    firearm, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as charged
    in the indictment.
    Alternatively, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or
    about the 20th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant,
    JEROME JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, while in the
    course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control
    of said property, threaten or place BRANDON PATTERSON in fear of imminent
    bodily injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-
    wit: a knife, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as
    charged in the indictment.
    The jury was instructed that its verdict was required to be by a unanimous vote of all members and
    the verdict form returned by the jury stated it unanimously found appellant guilty of aggravated
    robbery. Appellant brought this appeal.
    –3–
    Analysis
    I. Unanimity of Verdict
    In his first issue, appellant contends the jury charge erroneously allowed the jury to convict
    him without requiring it to agree unanimously on all essential elements of the offense. Appellant
    argues the jury was required to make a unanimous decision regarding the type of deadly weapon
    used and submission of different theories of the offense in the disjunctive allowed for an
    impermissible non-unanimous verdict. We note that appellant does not challenge the sufficiency
    of the evidence supporting a finding on either weapon.
    It has long been held that, when the State alleges differing methods of committing an
    offense in the conjunctive, it is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive. See Kitchens
    v. State, 
    823 S.W.2d 256
    , 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Further, where alternative
    methods of committing the same offense are submitted to the jury in the disjunctive, it is
    appropriate for the jury to return a general verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding
    under any of the theories submitted. 
    Id. There is
    no requirement that the jury reach an agreement
    on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict. 
    Id. Although the
    jury must
    unanimously agree that the defendant committed one specific crime, the jury need not find
    unanimously that the defendant committed the crime in one specific manner or using the same
    specific means. Landrian v. State, 
    268 S.W.3d 532
    , 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Russell v. State,
    No. 05-17-00124-CR, 
    2018 WL 525559
    , at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 24, 2018, pet. ref’d) (jury
    need only agree unanimously as to fact that appellant committed murder, not as to specific manner
    and means of how appellant committed murder).
    The element of the offense at issue here is the jury’s finding that appellant used or exhibited
    a deadly weapon. As stated above, appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support a finding that a knife and/or gun was used in the offense. Nor does he dispute that both
    –4–
    were deadly weapons under the facts of this case. Because the element of the offense on which
    the jury had to agree was only that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, and both weapons
    alleged by the State qualified as such, there was no need for the jury to unanimously agree on
    which weapon was used. See 
    Landrian, 268 S.W.3d at 535
    ; see also Ruiz v. State, No 03-97-
    00051-CR, 
    1998 WL 644299
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 17, 1998, pet. ref’d) (proper to
    submit in disjunctive the nature of the deadly weapon used or exhibited during commission of
    offense). We conclude the court’s charge on the issue was proper. We overrule appellant’s first
    issue.
    II. Judgment Modification
    In his second issue, appellant requests this Court modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect
    the correct offense for which he was convicted. The State agrees. Appellant was tried and
    convicted for the offense of aggravated robbery. The judgment, however, states appellant was
    convicted for the offense of “AGGRAVATED ASSALT [sic] WITH A DEADLY WEAPON –
    TO WIT: A FIREARM/KNIFE.” We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth
    when we have the necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State,
    
    865 S.W.2d 26
    , 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Asberry v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 526
    , 529
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Because the record affirmatively shows appellant was
    convicted for aggravated robbery, we modify the trial court’s judgment by striking the word
    “ASSALT” from the space provided for “Offense for which Defendant Convicted” and replace it
    with the word “ROBBERY.”
    –5–
    As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /Amanda L. Reichek/
    AMANDA L. REICHEK
    JUSTICE
    Do Not Publish
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    181118F.U05
    –6–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    JEROME JORDAN, Appellant                           On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
    No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-18-01118-CR         V.                      Trial Court Cause No. F-1675605-J.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                       Justices Molberg and Evans participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED
    as follows:
    The word "ASSALT" in the space provided for "Offense for which Defendant
    Convicted” is STRUCK and REPLACED with the word "ROBBERY."
    As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered January 27, 2020
    –7–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-18-01118-CR

Filed Date: 1/27/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/28/2020