Carolyn R. Dawson and Charley Hunter v. Liberty Mutual Insurance ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • Opinion issued January 28, 2020
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-19-00418-CV
    ———————————
    CHARLEY HUNTER, Appellant
    V.
    LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 268th District Court
    Fort Bend County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 19-DCV-258885
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Charley Hunter attempts to appeal from the trial court’s no-
    answer default judgment signed on June 7, 2019. However, Hunter never filed a
    notice of appeal. Instead, his alleged common-law wife, Carolyn Dawson, signed
    and filed a notice of appeal on Hunter’s behalf. But Dawson is not an attorney (and
    does not hold herself out to be). Like Hunter, Dawson is a pro se litigant in the
    proceedings below.
    Under Texas law, if a person is not a member of the state bar or otherwise
    granted special permission, that person may not practice law on behalf of another
    person—even if the two persons are related or married. See TEX. GOV’T
    CODE § 81.102(a) (“[A] person may not practice law in this state unless the person
    is a member of the state bar.”); Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Am. Home
    Assur. Co., 
    261 S.W.3d 24
    , 29 (Tex. 2008) (“To practice law in Texas, one must
    either be licensed by the Court or have special permission.”); Pham v. Harris Cty.
    Rentals, L.L.C., 
    455 S.W.3d 702
    , 710 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
    pet.) (holding that property owner who appeared pro se and was not attorney could
    not represent wife in action brought by equipment rental subcontractor against
    owner and owner’s wife to foreclose mechanic’s lien); Magaha v. Holmes, 
    886 S.W.2d 447
    , 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (per
    curiam) (holding that plaintiff’s mother could not act as his attorney because she
    was not licensed to practice law).
    This prohibition includes filing a notice of appeal on behalf of another
    person. See Premier Assocs., Inc. v. Louetta Shopping Ctr. Houston, L.P., No. 01-
    12-00369-CV, 
    2012 WL 4243802
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 20,
    2012, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (“[A] person proceeding pro se cannot file a
    2
    notice of appeal on behalf of another person.”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 9.1(b) (“A
    party not represented by counsel must sign any document that the party files . . .
    .”).
    Because Dawson is not a member of the state bar and has not otherwise
    received special permission to practice law on Hunter’s behalf, she lacked the
    authority to sign and file Hunter’s notice of appeal. Accordingly, no timely notice
    of appeal has been filed on Hunter’s behalf. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1 (setting
    deadlines for filing notice of appeal). Without a timely filed notice of appeal, we
    lack jurisdiction over Hunter’s appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(a) (“An appeal is
    perfected when a written notice of appeal is filed with the trial court clerk.”).
    On November 14, 2019, we gave notice that Hunter’s appeal was subject to
    dismissal for want of jurisdiction. No meritorious response was filed showing
    grounds for continuing Hunter’s appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss Hunter’s appeal
    for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Goodman, and Countiss.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-19-00418-CV

Filed Date: 1/28/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/29/2020