in Re Anthony Chatmon ( 2020 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-20-00003-CR
IN RE ANTHONY CHATMON
Original Proceeding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this original proceeding,1 Relator Anthony Chatmon seeks a mandamus from
this Court directing the Honorable Trent D. Farrell, presiding judge of the 52nd Judicial
District Court of Coryell County, to rule on two motions he claims are pending in the trial
court: (1) a “Motion for Time Credit, Discharge and Release”; and (2) a “Nunc Pro Tunc
Motion for Credit Toward Pecuniary Costs.”
1
Chatmon's petition for writ of mandamus has several procedural deficiencies. It does not include the
certification required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(j). See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(j). The petition also
lacks proof of service on the Respondent trial judge. See id. 9.5, 52.2. Because of our disposition and to
expedite it, we will implement Rule 2 and suspend these rules. Id. 2.
In order to be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show that he has no
adequate remedy at law and that he seeks to compel a purely ministerial act. In re Powell,
516 S.W.3d 488, 494-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); see also In re Flanigan, 578 S.W.3d 634, 635
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019) (orig. proceeding). Consideration of a motion
properly filed and before the court is ministerial. State ex rel. Hill v. Ct. of Apps. for the 5th
Dist., 34 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (orig. proceeding).
A trial judge has a reasonable time to perform the ministerial duty of considering
and ruling on a motion properly filed and before the judge. In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225,
228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding). What is a reasonable time depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. “Determining whether the trial court has
had a reasonable time may involve consideration of criteria such as the trial court’s actual
knowledge of the matter, whether it has overtly refused to act on the matter, the state of
the trial court’s docket, and the existence of more pressing judicial and administrative
matters.” In re Howard, No. 05-19-01196-CV, 2019 WL 5615163, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Oct. 30, 2019, no pet.) (orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). The burden is on the relator to
provide the appellate court with evidence related to the foregoing criteria to enable it to
determine the reasonableness of any alleged delay. Id.; Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228-29.
Additionally, the trial judge’s duty to rule on a party’s motion generally does not
arise until the movant has brought the motion to the judge's attention. Chavez, 62 S.W.3d
at 228. Mandamus will not lie unless the relator establishes that he has done so and that
the trial judge then fails or refuses to rule within a reasonable time. Id.
In re Chatmon Page 2
Chatmon does not provide us with the actual dates his motions were filed, but we
will assume the dates of filing are the dates he has placed on his cover letters to the district
clerk—November 18, 2019 and November 23, 2019. Chatmon does not contend, and
provides no evidence, that he has brought the motions directly to the trial court’s
attention or specifically requested a ruling from the trial court. The cover letters Chatmon
provides as exhibits are both addressed to the Coryell County District Clerk, not the trial
court. Additionally, approximately two months have passed since Chatmon’s motions
were filed. We conclude that Chatmon has not shown that he is entitled to mandamus
relief. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
In the event Chatmon requests a ruling from the trial court on his motions, and the
trial court fails or refuses to act upon his request after a reasonable time has transpired,
Chatmon may then file for mandamus relief.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting with opinion)
Petition denied
Do not publish
Opinion delivered and filed January 29, 2020
[OT06]
In re Chatmon Page 3