Pape Partners, Ltd, Glenn R. Pape and Kenneth W. Pape v. DRR Family Properties LP and Louise W. Champagne ( 2020 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-17-00180-CV
PAPE PARTNERS, LTD,
GLENN R. PAPE AND
KENNETH W. PAPE,
Appellants
v.
DRR FAMILY PROPERTIES LP
AND LOUISE W. CHAMPAGNE,
Appellees
From the 74th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017-1724-3
OPINION
In one issue, Appellants Pape Partners, Ltd., Glenn R. Pape, and Kenneth W. Pape
(collectively “the Papes”) challenge the trial court’s order granting Appellee DRR Family
Properties, LP’s1 (“DRR”) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We
will affirm.
1
Appellee Louise W. Champagne was dismissed by agreement.
I. Background
Appellants’ pleadings maintain that the Papes purchased a tract of land from Lola
Robinson and Swirl Investments, Inc.2 in 2014. The purchase included irrigation water
rights recognized by the State of Texas in Certificates of Adjudication (“COA”) Nos. 12-
4341 and 12-4344, as amended and consolidated in COA No. 12-4344A. The COA’s were
initially issued to Lola Robinson and her late husband in 1986 as part of a judgment in a
lawsuit brought under the Texas Water Rights Adjudication Act. The amended COA
authorized use of the permitted water for irrigating an additional 250 acres that was
subsequently purchased by DRR.
In 2015, the Papes attempted to record their purchase of the water rights with the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”). The TCEQ notified DRR and
other potentially interested landowners that they might own an interest in the water
rights. DRR filed a change of ownership form, and the TCEQ eventually concluded that
DRR owned a portion of the water rights. The TCEQ changed its records to reflect DRR’s
ownership.
The Papes moved to reverse the TCEQ’s decision, and the motion was overruled
by operation of law. The Papes did not pursue an administrative appeal, but brought the
present suit seeking a declaration that it owns all of the water rights in the tract purchased
from Robinson and Swirl. The Papes further asserted claims against DRR for trespass to
2
Lola Robinson, Swirl Investments, Inc., Timothy Kingrey, Donna Kingrey, Theresa A. Spinks, Johnny W.
Spinks, Roman Cineros, and Sabrina Cisneros are also named as defendants in the Papes’ lawsuit. The trial
court severed the Papes’ claims against DRR and Champagne after granting both parties’ motions to
dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Pape Partners v. DRR Page 2
try title – adverse possession and to quiet title. DRR moved to dismiss the Papes’ claims
against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the Papes had failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies. The trial court granted DRR’s motion.
II. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss based on the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is the
functional equivalent to a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the trial court’s authority to
determine the subject matter of a cause of action. Wallingford v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.,
253 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. denied); Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d
119, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The absence of subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction, as well as by other procedural
vehicles. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Whether a plaintiff
has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction
is a question of law reviewed de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
III. Issue Presented
In its sole issue, the Papes assert that the TCEQ’s ruling was in effect a
determination of the legal ownership of the water rights and that the trial court erred in
granting DRR’s motion to dismiss because: (1) the question of property ownership is
within the sole jurisdiction of the courts; (2) the legislature did not vest the TCEQ with
exclusive jurisdiction over the Papes’ claims; and (3) the ruling violates the separation of
powers clause in the Texas Constitution.
Pape Partners v. DRR Page 3
IV. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction. Generally, the power to determine controverted rights to property
by means of binding judgment is vested in the courts. Barshop v. Medina Cty. Underground
Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 635 (Tex. 1996). Courts of general jurisdiction
in Texas are presumed to have subject matter jurisdiction absent a showing that the Texas
Constitution or some other law confers jurisdiction on another court, tribunal, or
administrative body. Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212,
220 (Tex. 2002); see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 24.007-.008.
Administrative bodies may exercise only those powers the law confers upon them in clear
and express language. Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 220. Courts will not imply the existence of
additional authority for administrative bodies, nor may these bodies create for
themselves any excess powers. Id. If an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, the Legislature
grants the agency the sole authority to make an initial determination in a dispute. Id. at
221. A party must then exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial
review of an agency’s action. Id. “Until then the trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and must dismiss the claims within the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Id.;
see also In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 235 S.W.3d 619, 625 (Tex. 2007).
The Papes argue that the Water Code does not expressly grant exclusive
jurisdiction to the TCEQ. In deciding whether an administrative body has exclusive
jurisdiction, we look to its authorizing legislation for either an express grant of exclusive
jurisdiction or for a “pervasive regulatory scheme” indicating an intent to confer
exclusive jurisdiction. Emp’s Ret. Sys. of Tex. v. Duenez, 288 S.W.3d 905, 908-09 (Tex. 2009).
Pape Partners v. DRR Page 4
The Texas Constitution provides:
The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this
State, . . . including the control, storing, preservation and distribution of . .
. the water of its rivers and streams, for irrigation, power and all other
useful purposes, . . . are each and all hereby declared public rights and
duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate
thereto.
TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 59.3 In keeping with this authority, the Legislature enacted the
Water Code, granting the TCEQ the “primary authority to establish surface water quality
standards, which it implements, in part, in its permitting actions.” Tex. Comm’n on Envtl.
Quality v. City of Waco, 413 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2013). See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §
26.023. Although the statute does not expressly grant exclusive jurisdiction over water
rights to the TCEQ, the regulatory scheme behind surface water permits is pervasive and
indicative of the Legislature’s intent that jurisdiction over the adjudication of surface
water permits is ceded to the TCEQ. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.023; see also id. §
5.013(a)(1) (“The commission has general jurisdiction over . . . water and water rights
including the issuance of water rights permits, water rights adjudication, cancellation of
water rights, and enforcement of water rights. . . .”); § 11.021, et seq. (rights in state water);
§ 11.121, et seq. (permitting process); and § 11.301, et seq. (Water Rights Adjudication Act).
The same enabling legislation has been determined to grant the TCEQ exclusive
jurisdiction over other matters involving water rights. See Sierra Club & Pub. Citizen v.
Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-14-00130-CV, 2016 WL 1304928, at * 3 (Tex. App.—
3
For a history of water rights legislation in Texas, see City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain, 206 S.W.3d 97
(Tex. 2006).
Pape Partners v. DRR Page 5
Austin Mar. 31, 2016, no pet.) (wastewater discharge permits); City of College Station v.
Wellborn Special Util. Dist., No. 10-04-00306-CV, 2006 WL 2067887, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco
July 26, 2006, pet. denied) (water and sewer utility rates, operations, and services).
Once it is determined that an agency has exclusive jurisdiction over an issue, then
the party injured by agency action must follow the review process set up in the statute.
“’An appeal from an administrative agency is not a matter of right, it is set out by statute
and must be strictly complied with in order to vest the district court with jurisdiction.’”
Jones v. State Bd. of Educator Certification, 315 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010,
pet. denied) (quoting Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Sfair, 786 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1990) (per curiam (writ denied))). See also Walter West, P.E., v. Tex.
Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 260 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied)
(failure to comply with statutory prerequisites under Water Code deprived trial court of
jurisdiction). It is undisputed that the Papes did not follow the administrative review
process.
The Papes identify four opinions that they assert establish that water rights
ownership disputes are excepted from the TCEQ’s jurisdiction under § 5.013(a)(1).
However, the two oldest cases were decided before the current text of § 5.013(a) went into
effect in 1985. See Clark v. Briscoe Irr. Co., 200 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1947,
no writ); City of Corpus Christi v. Nueces Cty. Water Control and Imp. Dist. No. 3, 540 S.W.2d
357 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The other cases do not address
the TCEQ’s jurisdiction. Wilson v. New Braunfels Util.’s, 536 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.—Austin
2013, pet. dism’d) involves governmental immunity, not whether the appropriate
Pape Partners v. DRR Page 6
administrative procedures were followed, while Graham v. Kuzmich, 876 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.) involves a determination of whether water rights
passed with a deed—the jurisdiction of the TCEQ is not addressed.
Because the Legislature has vested the TCEQ with the exclusive jurisdiction to
determine water rights, the Papes were required to exhaust their administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts.
B. Separation of Powers. Separation of powers is expressly guaranteed by the
Texas Constitution, which provides:
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into
three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate
body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one; those which
are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no
person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall
exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the
instances herein expressly permitted.
TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
The separation of powers doctrine is violated “when one branch of government
assumes or is delegated a power ‘more properly attached’ to another branch.” Salinas v.
State, 523 S.W.3d 103, 106-07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10,
28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (opinion on rehearing)). However, the Texas Constitution, as
noted above, permits a transfer of powers from one branch to another when expressly
permitted by another provision of the Constitution. In the present case, the Texas
Constitution specifically authorizes the authority given to the TCEQ. See TEX. CONST. art.
16, § 59.
Pape Partners v. DRR Page 7
The Papes rely on Bd. of Water Engr’s v. McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 86, 229 S.W. 301, 301
(1921), which struck down previous statutory provisions authorizing the Board of Water
Engineers to determine “the relative rights of the various claimants” to use State waters.
However, art. 16, § 59 had not been adopted when the statutes involved in McKnight were
considered. Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 512, 186 S.W.2d 961, 963 (1945).
Additionally, the Water Rights Adjudication Act passed in 1967, authorizing the
administrative processes used by the TCEQ, is constitutional and not a violation of
separation of powers. In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segment of
Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Tex. 1982).
The legislative scheme giving jurisdiction to the TCEQ to determine water rights
does not violate the separation of powers clause in the Texas Constitution.
V. Conclusion
After a de novo review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting
DRR’s motion to dismiss. We overrule the Papes’ sole issue and affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting with opinion)
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed January 29, 2020
[CV06]
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