Dwight Lamar Wooten Jr. v. State ( 2020 )

NUMBER 13-18-00335-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DWIGHT LAMAR WOOTEN JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 18th District Court
of Johnson County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Tijerina1
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina
Appellant Dwight Lamar Wooten Jr. appeals from his conviction of two counts of
failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco pursuant to a
docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.
arts. 62.001, 62.101(a). For each count, Wooten received a sentence of twenty years’
incarceration to be served concurrently. By two issues, Wooten contends that the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict on both counts. We affirm.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
By his first issue, Wooten contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not living
at the address he listed on his sexual offender registration form. By his second issue,
Wooten contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict because the State
did not prove that he failed to provide his online identifiers.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational fact finder could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the
evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d
159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses,
and the weight to be given their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We resolve any
evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the judgment. Id.
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “Such a
charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s
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theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327; see Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
Pursuant to Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a person who
commits a reportable sexual offense must register as a sex offender with the local law
enforcement authority. See TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.051. Here, Wooten
committed the offense of indecency with a child, which constitutes a reportable offense.
See id. art. 62.001. As applicable here, a sex offender who intends to make a change of
address must, within seven days of the intended change, report in person to the relevant
local law-enforcement authority with the person’s anticipated move date and new
address. Id. art. 62.055. In addition, a sex offender must report any changes to any online
identifier included on the person’s registration form or the establishment of any new online
identifier not already included on the person’s registration form. Id. art. 62.0551. A sex
offender who fails to comply with any requirement of Chapter 62 commits a criminal
offense. Id. at art. 62.102(a).
B. Pertinent Facts
The evidence showed that Wooten stated on his registration form that he lived with
his sister Courtney Clark. Clark testified that in July 2017, she lived at her residence with
her mother, her husband, and her three children. Clark agreed with the prosecutor that
on July 14, 2017, “some police officers” came to her house investigating whether Wooten
lived at her residence. Clark testified that she told the officers that Wooten was not living
there and that “as far as [she] knew he had been staying in some hotels,” but in previous
months, he had spent “a few nights” at her house when their mother could not pay for the
hotels. However, according to Clark, Wooten had not stayed at her residence longer than
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“a week-and-a-half,” and he had not been staying at her house for at least one week. On
re-direct examination, Clark clarified that Wooten was not physically living at her
residence in July 2017 when the officers visited her residence.
Lieutenant Robert Shawn Cambron, an officer in charge of the sex offender
registration program with the Cleburne Police Department, testified that Wooten signed
his registration form on April 20, 2017 and listed his registered address as Clark’s
residence. According to Lieutenant Cambron, Cleburne police officers went to verify
whether Wooten lived at Clark’s residence on July 14, 2017, but Wooten was not there;
and on July 20, 2017, the officers went back to Clark’s residence, and again, Wooten was
not there.
Lieutenant Cambron testified that he discovered that Wooten had completed a
financial application in municipal court wherein he provided an email address that he had
not registered. The financial application, admitted into evidence, includes Wooten’s full
name, date of birth, driver’s license number, cell phone number, mother’s information,
father’s information, and place of employment, which all match the information in
Wooten’s sex offender registry. However, Wooten’s sex offender registry does not include
the email address that was included on the financial application.
C. Discussion
First, Wooten argues that the evidence shows that he lived at Clark’s residence,
and therefore there is no evidence supporting a finding that he failed to report a change
of address as required by Chapter 62. See TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.051.
Specifically, Wooten argues that all evidence indicates that he lived at Clark’s residence,
there was no “actual testimony from any officer that went to the residence to confirm that
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[he] was living there,” Clark “who clearly doesn’t like [him] stated that he was living there
until he allegedly pulled a knife on her husband a few days before the police arrived,” 2
and there was evidence that his “belongings including his mail [were] there.” However,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed
Wooten did not reside at Clark’s residence during the month of July 2017 when the
officers went to her residence. Therefore, Wooten was required to report his change of
address within seven days of the intended change, which Wooten did not do. See id. art.
62.055.
Next, Wooten argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he failed to
register an online identifier because the State “never proved that [his] signature was on
the registration notice form nor did they prove that [he] filled out a financial application
with a different email address.” Wooten states that the witness who testified concerning
the documents admitted into evidence “had no basis for testifying as to the authenticity of
the signature as he neither witnessed [Wooten] reviewing or signing any form nor did [he]
testify that he recognized what [Wooten’s] signature looked like.” Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence provided that the financial application,
which had an email address for Wooten that had not been registered, included Wooten’s
full name, date of birth, driver’s license number, mother and father’s information, and his
place of employment.
Accordingly, we conclude that a rational fact finder could have found that Wooten
2 Assuming Clark had testified that Wooten lived at her residence until a few days before police
officers arrived, he was required to, within seven days of his intended move, notify the local law enforcement
authority of his anticipated move date and new address. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.055. It is
undisputed that Wooten did not do so. Moreover, as previously stated, Clark testified that Wooten did not
reside at her residence during the month of July 2017 when officers visited her home.
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failed to comply with the registration requirements by not registering with the local law
enforcement authority his change of address and anticipated move date within seven
days of his intent to move and by not reporting the identification of an online identifier to
the local law enforcement authority beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence
and reasonable inferences from that evidence. 3 Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166; Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 898–99. We overrule Wooten’s first and second issues.
II. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JAIME TIJERINA,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
30th day of January, 2020.
3 “Online identifier” is defined as
electronic mail address information or a name used by a person when sending or receiving
an instant message, social networking communication, or similar Internet communication
or when participating in an Internet chat. The term includes an assumed name, nickname,
pseudonym, moniker, or user name established by a person for use in connection with an
electronic mail address, chat or instant chat room platform, commercial social networking
site, or online picture-sharing service.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001(12).
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