Enael Gonzalez-Leyva v. State ( 2021 )

Opinion issued January 26, 2021
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-19-00871-CR
NO. 01-19-00872-CR
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ENAEL GONZALEZ-LEYVA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 461st District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case Nos. 86923-CR, 87547-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Enael Gonzalez-Leyva, pleaded guilty, with an agreed punishment
recommendation from the State, to one count of the third-degree felony offense of
possession of a prohibited substance in a correctional facility and two counts of the
third-degree felony offense of harassment by persons in certain facilities.1 The trial
court accepted appellant’s guilty plea; followed the plea bargain agreement reached
by appellant and the State; and assessed appellant’s punishment at five years
confinement for the possession offense and five years confinement for the
harassment offense, to run concurrently. In the certification of defendant’s right to
appeal, the trial court certified that these cases are plea bargain cases, appellant has
no right to appeal, and appellant has waived the right of appeal.
We dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction.
Background
In 2018, appellant was serving a sentence for aggravated robbery in the
Clemens Unit in Brazoria County. A grand jury indicted him for the third-degree
felony offense of possession of a prohibited substance in a correctional facility. The
indictment alleged that on or about July 11, 2018, appellant intentionally or
knowingly possessed a controlled substance, 5-fluoro ADB, while in a secure
correctional facility, the Clemens Unit. The grand jury also indicted him for two
counts of the third-degree felony offense of harassment by persons in certain
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.11(d)(1) (possession of prohibited substance in
correctional facility), § 22.11(a)(1) (harassment by persons in certain facilities). The
offense for possession of a prohibited substance in a correctional facility was tried
in trial court cause number 86923-CR and resulted in appellate cause number 01-
19-00871-CR. The offense for harassment by a person in a correctional facility was
tried in trial court cause number 87547-CR and resulted in appellate cause number
01-19-00872-CR.
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facilities, alleging that on or about May 20, 2018, appellant, while imprisoned in the
Clemens Unit, and with the intent to assault, harass, or alarm, caused A. Onyedim
and O. Nzeribe to contact appellant’s saliva.
Appellant and the State reached a plea agreement. Appellant agreed to plead
guilty to each of the charged offenses, and the State agreed to recommend that
appellant’s punishment be five years confinement for each offense, to run
concurrently, and to begin after appellant finished serving the sentence imposed for
his prior aggravated robbery offense. The plea agreement also stated, “Defendant
hereby waives appeal on guilt/innocence and punishment.” The plea agreement was
signed by appellant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor.
For each offense, appellant also signed a document containing written
admonishments, waivers, and a judicial confession. This document stated:
Where your plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) is voluntarily
and understandingly entered with a plea bargain agreement and the
punishment assessed does not exceed the agreement between you and
the prosecutor, the Court must give permission before you can appeal
on any matter in the case except for those matters raised by written
motion filed and ruled on prior to trial.
In this document, appellant waived numerous rights, including his right to a jury trial
and his right to an appeal. Appellant confessed to committing each element of both
of the charged offenses alleged in the indictments, and he stipulated “that the facts
contained in the indictment or information are true and correct and constitute the
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evidence in this case.” This document was signed by appellant, defense counsel, the
prosecutor, and the trial court.
The trial court held separate plea hearings for the charged offenses. At each
hearing, appellant stated that he had reached a plea agreement with the State
concerning the charged offense. The State informed the trial court of the agreement
it had reached with appellant concerning punishment, and appellant confirmed.
Appellant pleaded guilty to both of the charged offenses. The trial court accepted
appellant’s guilty pleas. The trial court assessed appellant’s punishment in
accordance with the plea bargain agreement between appellant and the State: the
trial court assessed punishment at five years confinement for each of the charged
offenses, to run concurrently, and to begin after appellant finished serving his
aggravated robbery sentence.
The trial court completed a certification of defendant’s right of appeal for each
offense. The trial court certified that the case “is a plea bargain case, and the
defendant has NO right to appeal” and that “the defendant has waived the right of
appeal.” Appointed defense counsel filed a notice of appeal in each case on
appellant’s behalf.2 Counsel subsequently filed, in this Court, a motion to withdraw
2
See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744, 746 (2019) (noting, in ineffective assistance
of counsel case, that defendant has “ultimate authority” to decide whether to appeal
and holding that courts presume prejudice when counsel’s deficient performance
deprives defendant of appeal that he otherwise would have taken “even when the
defendant has signed an appeal waiver”).
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and an Anders brief stating that there are no meritorious issues and appellant’s
appeals are wholly frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967);
Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Discussion
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2 requires the trial court to certify a
criminal defendant’s right of appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); Jones v. State,
488 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Terrell v. State, 245 S.W.3d 602, 604
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (per curiam). Rule 25.2(a)(2) states:
A defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal under Code of
Criminal Procedure article 44.02 and these rules. The trial court shall
enter a certification of the defendant’s right of appeal each time it enters
a judgment of guilt or other appealable order . . . . In a plea bargain
case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty or nolo
contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment
recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a
defendant may appeal only:
(A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and
ruled on before trial,
(B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or
(C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by
statute.
TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). A certification that is contrary to the record before the
appellate court is defective. Jones, 488 S.W.3d at 804–05. An appellate court has an
obligation to review the appellate record to determine if the certification is contrary
to the record and is therefore defective. Id. at 805; Terrell, 245 S.W.3d at 604 (“An
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appellate court that has an appellate record is ‘obligated to review that record in
ascertaining whether the certifications were defective.’”) (quoting Dears v. State,
154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
An appellate court has jurisdiction to determine whether an appellant who
entered into a plea bargain is permitted to appeal under Rule 25.2(a)(2), but if the
appeal is not permitted under that rule, the appellate court must “dismiss [the]
prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”
Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Terrell, 245 S.W.3d
at 604. If an appeal does not fall within the limited circumstances stated in Rule
25.2(a)(2) in which a plea-bargaining appellant may appeal a judgment of
conviction, the appellant has no right of appeal, and “no inquiry into even possibly
meritorious claims may be made.” Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680; Terrell, 245 S.W.3d
at 605–06 (dismissing appeal in which appointed counsel filed Anders brief because
defendant entered into plea bargains, defendant had no right to appeal under Rule
25.2(a)(2), and court was required to dismiss appeal without examining merits of
appeal).
Appellant pleaded guilty to both charged offenses pursuant to an agreement
with the State that he receive certain punishments, namely, five years confinement
for each offense, to run concurrently. The plea paperwork also included statements
that appellant waived his right to appeal both the guilt/innocence and punishment
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phases. The trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea and assessed punishment in
accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. The trial court did not rule on any
written pretrial motions, it did not give its permission to appeal any matters, and no
statute expressly authorizes these specific appeals. The trial court certified that these
cases are plea bargain cases, that appellant does not have the right to appeal, and that
appellant waived his right to appeal. The trial court’s certification is supported by
the appellate record. We therefore conclude that appellant does not have the right to
appeal under Rule 25.2(a)(2). See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeals. See Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680; Terrell, 245 S.W.3d at 606.
Conclusion
We grant counsel’s motions to withdraw and dismiss appellant’s appeals for
want of jurisdiction.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Countiss, and Farris.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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