in the Interest of J.M.C., P.A.S.M., J.A.M A/K/A J.M., Jr., Children ( 2021 )


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  •                                Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-21-00029-CV
    In the Interest of J.M.C., P.A.S.M., and J.A.M. a/k/a J.M., Jr., Children
    From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2019-PA-01268
    Honorable Peter Sakai, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Sitting:          Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
    Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: June 30, 2021
    MOTION TO WITHDRAW DENIED; AFFIRMED
    The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed this suit for protection of
    the children J.M.C., P.A.S.M., and J.A.M. a/k/a J.M. Jr. 1, in June 2019. The Department sought
    temporary managing conservatorship and, in the event the children could not safely be reunified
    with either parent, a relative, or other suitable person, it sought permanent managing
    conservatorship of the children and termination of the parents’ rights. The case was tried to the
    court in December 2020. After a trial to the bench in December 2020, the court terminated the
    rights of the children’s parents and designated the Department the children’s permanent managing
    conservator. The trial court found the children’s mother, L.S., knowingly placed or knowingly
    1
    To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the parties by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE
    § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
    04-21-00029-CV
    allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or
    emotional well-being and that she engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with
    persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.
    See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D),(E). The court also found that termination of L.S.’s
    parental rights is in the best interest of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). L.S. filed a timely
    notice of appeal.
    Appellant’s court-appointed appellate attorney filed a brief in which she concluded there
    are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967);
    In re P.M., 
    520 S.W.3d 24
    , 27 n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (stating that Anders procedures
    protect indigent parents’ statutory right to counsel on appeal in parental rights termination cases
    and apply in those cases). Counsel certified that she sent L.S. a copy of the brief, a letter advising
    her of her rights to review the record and to file a pro se brief, and a form motion to be used to
    request the appellate record.
    This court issued an order setting deadlines for appellant to request access to the record
    and to file a pro se brief. Counsel’s motion to withdraw was held in abeyance. L.S. did not request
    access to the record and has not filed a pro se brief. The Department waived its right to file a brief.
    We have thoroughly reviewed the record and counsel’s Anders brief. We conclude clear
    and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings and there are no nonfrivolous grounds
    for appeal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s termination order.
    Counsel filed a motion to withdraw in conjunction with her Anders brief. We deny
    counsel’s motion to withdraw because it does not assert any ground for withdrawal apart from
    counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27; In re A.M., 
    495 S.W.3d 573
    , 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Counsel’s duty to her client
    extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals, including the filing of a petition for review
    -2-
    04-21-00029-CV
    in the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.016(3); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27-28
    & n.14 (“Once appointed by the trial court, counsel should be permitted to withdraw only for good
    cause and on appropriate terms and conditions. Mere dissatisfaction of counsel or client with each
    other is not good cause. Nor is counsel’s belief that the client has no grounds to seek further review
    from the court of appeals’ decision. . . . In [the Supreme Court], appointed counsel’s obligations
    can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.”).
    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-21-00029-CV

Filed Date: 6/30/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/6/2021