Ricky Lee Murray v. State ( 2020 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-18-00567-CR
Ricky Lee Murray, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 20TH DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY
NO. CR25,509, THE HONORABLE JOHN YOUNGBLOOD, JUDGE PRESIDING
OPINION
Ricky Lee Murray was convicted by a jury of sexual assault for intentionally or
knowingly causing the penetration of the complainant’s female sexual organ without her consent.
See Tex. Penal Code § 22.011(a)(1)(A). The trial court sentenced Murray to twelve years in prison
and entered a conforming judgment. In four issues, Murray contends that the trial court should
have excluded testimony from two Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners (“SANE”s). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Murray was indicted for sexual assault for digitally penetrating Samantha
Tolleson’s sexual organ without her consent. Tolleson died before the trial. At trial, the State
presented testimony from several witnesses at the RV park in Rockdale, where the charged conduct
took place; the lead investigator in the case; and two SANEs.
The evidence at trial established that on March 17, 2017, Samantha Tolleson was
living in the RV park, and Murray was one of her neighbors. During the day she borrowed a phone
from Murray and was coherent, could form words, and did not seem intoxicated. Later that
afternoon, Murray went by himself to retrieve his phone. That evening, Rockdale police responded
to a call from the RV park and arrived at Tolleson’s RV. The manager of the RV park, Billie
LeFevre, also arrived at the scene. According to LeFevre’s testimony, Murray had called her and
told her that Tolleson had fallen on the floor in her RV. As LeFevre and Murray entered the RV,
Tolleson remained inside and looked scared. LeFevre testified that she and Murray helped
Tolleson to the couch, that Tolleson was not saying “any words that [LeFevre] could recognize”
and was speaking in “gibberish,” that she noticed water on the floor and a pill bottle on a table
next to Tolleson, and that Tolleson was wearing a long white t-shirt and no pants. LeFevre
retrieved some pants for Tolleson, but she grabbed LeFevre, mumbled some more at her, and
would not let LeFevre help her put on the pants. Tolleson was taken to the hospital for a suspected
Benadryl overdose.
Tolleson stayed in the hospital for several days. Two days after she was admitted,
ER nurse and certified SANE Jennifer Midgette conducted a SANE exam. At trial, Midgette told
the jury that when she examined Tolleson, she first took a patient history, as she would do with any
other patient. This included asking Tolleson about her allergies, medications, and last menstrual
cycle. Midgette testified that she needed the history “for diagnosis and treatment”—it was her
“map” for what she “need[ed] to look for and . . . address.” According to Midgette’s examination
notes, which were admitted over Murray’s Confrontation Clause objection, Tolleson told Midgette
that Murray had sexually assaulted her. In addition, the examination notes said:
[Nurse] asked [patient] what was her concern today? [Patient] states “I was
raped” . . . “[Murray] was knocking on the door” . . . “He comes in the house” . . .
“He made me a drink with a foil pack.[”] [Patient] continues “I said I need to go to
the bathroom so I can throw up” . . . “He said [‘]no stay here.[’] He was holding me
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back.” . . . He was sitting on the love seat and said [“]sit next to me”. [Patient]
states “He said [‘]aww Sam[,’] and he kisses me and starts rubbing me on the
outside of my clothes.” [Patient] clarifies “he used the three fingers (held up her
index finger, middle finger, and ring finger) to touch my clit area in a circular[-]type
motion.” [Patient] states “I pushed him away[,] and he did it again inside my
panties” . . . “I hit him on his right cheek.” . . . “He gave me this really mad look.”
[Nurse] asks “Then what happened?” [Patient] states “It kinda blacks out” . . .
[Murray] was at my house from between 1 & 2 and 6:30pm” . . . “my jeans and
panties were around my ankles when [LeFevre] got there.” [Patient] states [“]He
took my knife[,] and he checked the guns.”
(Ellipses in original.) Tolleson also explained to Midgette that what Murray did hurt her. Midgette
considered what Tolleson relayed to her to be an instance of “digital penetration.”
After taking the history, Midgette then did a head-to-toe assessment, looking over
Tolleson’s entire body and documenting any injuries. Midgette did so “to know what kind of trauma
to address as a nurse[,] and also there may be forensic evidence.” Midgette noted 12 injuries: a
painful, purple, “fairly new” bruise to Tolleson’s head; a couple of bruises on her arm; and many
more “fairly recent” bruises “at the knee or below.” These injuries, according to Midgette’s
testimony at trial, were consistent with Tolleson’s account of trying to get up and go to the
bathroom but Murray “pull[ing] her back.”
Midgette did not see any genital injuries, but she did collect two pairs of underwear
from Tolleson that both had similar blood staining. One pair was what Tolleson came to the
hospital with, and the other was gauze underwear that the hospital issued to her. Midgette said
that the blood could have resulted from either Tolleson’s menstrual cycle or genital trauma.
Tolleson told Midgette, however, that her last cycle was during the first of March. The assault
and the SANE exam happened on March 17 and 19, respectively, suggesting to Midgette that the
blood resulted from trauma. Midgette testified that injuries like Tolleson’s could suggest either
consensual sexual contact or non-consensual sexual contact.
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Another SANE, Deborah Kleypas, reviewed the records of Midgette’s work and
testified at trial about her review, over another defense Confrontation Clause objection. Like
Midgette, Kleypas testified that the blood in the gauze underwear suggested that there was an
injury that was bleeding, rather than menstruation. Kleypas also told the jury that Tolleson’s
injuries were consistent with both consensual sexual contact and non-consensual sexual contact.
Before speaking with law enforcement, Murray called a friend and told him that
she “was hollering . . . when she came into the hospital” about having been raped. Murray denied
sexually assaulting Tolleson and said that he went to check on her and that, when he saw that
she was unresponsive, he “kind of panicked[,] and that’s when he went and got” LeFevre.
Subsequently, Sergeant Jody Tillery of the Rockdale Police Department investigated the March 17
incident in Tolleson’s RV. Sergeant Tillery spoke with Tolleson, contacted hospital personnel,
and reviewed the SANE exam records. Then Sergeant Tillery contacted Murray and took his
statement. Murray said several times that he never had any sort of physical contact with Tolleson,
admitting to only one “side hug” ever with her. Murray also gave Sergeant Tillery conflicting
accounts of going to Tolleson’s RV on the day of the assault: “he had said first he only went one
time,” but “[t]he next time it was more than once.”
A Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) investigator conducted a second,
video-recorded interview of Murray, entered in evidence at trial. During the second interview,
Murray first told the investigator that “nothing ever happened between” him and Tolleson but later
said that, four days before the assault, he “grabbed [her] ass” when she hugged him. As for what
happened on March 17 in Tolleson’s RV, Murray gave the investigator a new account, describing
the encounter as locking eyes and then kissing. Murray said that he started rubbing her vagina
outside her underwear and that he did so for about a minute before she told him to stop. He said
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that he touched her breasts too. He admitted that it was possible that his fingers went inside her
vagina while he was rubbing her. The investigator asked Murray whether he tried to force himself
on her while “she could barely stand up, couldn’t talk, and didn’t know what she was doing.”
Murray responded that “anything is possible.” And he agreed that she “wasn’t coherent,” “was
pretty wasted,” and “kept falling off the couch” while he was in her RV.
Murray testified and said that he was unsure if he had penetrated Tolleson because
he was “rubbing her pretty good.” He also testified on direct examination that she was coherent
while he was in her RV but, on cross-examination, admitted that what he told the DPS investigator
was the truth—Tolleson was not coherent.
The jury found Murray guilty. The trial court sentenced him to 12 years in prison,
and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. SANEs’ testimony was admissible under Rule of Evidence 702
In his first and second issues, Murray challenges the trial court’s admission of
Midgette’s and Kleypas’s expert testimony under Rule of Evidence 702. We review the admission
of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011); Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A trial court does
not abuse its discretion if its ruling is within the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Tillman,
354 S.W.3d at 435. We consider the trial court’s ruling against the backdrop of what was before
the trial court when it made the ruling. Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009).
Rule 702 conditions the admission of testimony by a qualified expert witness on
whether “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
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to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Thus, the proponent of expert testimony
must prove that (1) the expert is qualified as an expert by reason of his knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education; (2) the subject matter of the testimony is an appropriate one
for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the factfinder
in deciding the case. Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). These
requirements—commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance—raise
distinct questions that must be evaluated independently. Id. Here, Murray challenges the relevancy
of the expert testimony of Midgette and Kleypas on the issue of consent.1
As an initial matter, to the extent that Murray suggests that the entirety of
Midgette’s and Kleypas’s testimony should have been excluded because it was not relevant to the
disputed issue of consent, we note that their testimony was not limited to this issue. Penetration,
an element of the offense charged by the State, was also in dispute. In fact, Murray’s counsel
recognized this in his opening statement:
And what you will see is the evidence shows[] that [Murray]’s statement, even to
the police[,] says he’s not sure if he actually penetrated her or not. Her statement
to the SANE nurse, she’s not clear whether he actually penetrated her or not. And
I want to remind you that the law that you have to follow in this case, there has to
be penetration. So that in and of itself, there is reasonable doubt in this case.
1
In two issues, Murray asserts that the testimony fails to satisfy either prong of the
relevance inquiry. See Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (stating that
“the relevance inquiry is whether the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact and is sufficiently
tied to the facts of the case” (internal quotation omitted)). In his first issue, Murray contends that
Midgette’s and Kleypas’s testimony “did not assist the jury in understanding the evidence or a fact
in issue.” In his second issue, Murray contends that “the State failed to show that the [the expert
testimony] was applied or connected to the facts of [Murray]’s case.” In both issues, Murray
asserts that he admitted, and therefore there was no dispute at trial, that he and Tolleson had sexual
contact. Therefore, in Murray’s view, the “operative issue” for the jury to decide was whether the
contact was consensual.
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Both Midgette’s and Kleypas’s testimony bore on the penetration element. They testified about
their qualifications and experience as SANEs as well as the anatomy of the female sexual organ.
They also explained what “penetration” means by reference to anatomical structures and testified
that Tolleson’s description of Murray’s rubbing her clitoris would constitute a penetration because
it requires a touching beyond the labia minora.
Second, to the extent Murray challenges the portions of Midgette’s and Kleypas’s
testimony that bore on the issue of consent, we conclude that their testimony on this issue was
relevant. The relevance inquiry is whether the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact and is
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case. Tillman, 354 S.W.3d at 438. A trial court may admit
expert testimony “when the general subject matter is within the comprehension of the average
juror, as long as the witness has some specialized knowledge on the topic that will ‘assist’ the
jury.” Id. (quoting Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). “Thus, ‘[t]he
question under Rule 702 is not whether the jurors know something about this subject, but whether
the expert can expand their understanding in a relevant way.’” Id. (quoting Coble, 330 S.W.3d
at 288). In addition, expert testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts of a case when its “[takes]
into account enough of the pertinent facts to be of assistance to the trier of fact on a fact in issue.”
Id. (quoting Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
Midgette and Kleypas testified about the blood stains in the two pairs of Tolleson’s
underwear. They testified that the blood could have come from either her menstrual cycle or
a traumatic event, but they later excluded her cycle as a possible cause based on Tolleson’s
statements during the exam, leaving only trauma. Finally, Midgette and Kleypas explained to
the jury, based on their specialized knowledge, why the blood stains suggested that a traumatic
event had happened to Tolleson. See Owens v. State, 381 S.W.3d 696, 705–06 (Tex. App.—
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Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (holding admission of SANE’s expert testimony not to have been abuse
of discretion because testimony assisted jury because it helped explain other witnesses’ testimony
and helped explain physical evidence about complainant’s body). Midgette developed the facts
underlying her testimony by conducting an exam in accordance with her training and experience,
and both Midgette and Kleypas interpreted those facts through the prism of their qualifications
and experience.
The record shows that Midgette’s and Kleypas’s testimony assisted the jury and
was sufficiently connected to the facts of the case on the issue of whether the sexual contact
between Murray and Tolleson was consensual. See Tillman, 354 S.W.3d at 441; Nations v. State,
944 S.W.2d 795, 798–99 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref’d). We hold the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in overruling Murray’s relevancy objections to the testimony of Midgette
and Kleypas.
We overrule Murray’s first and second issues.2
II. Murray failed to preserve a hearsay complaint about the SANEs’ testimony.
In his third issue, Murray contends that “the trial court erred in [not] excluding
expert testimony that was no more than a conduit for inadmissible hearsay.” He argues that
Tolleson’s statements during the SANE exam “are testimonial and should not have been allowed
to come in through either Kleypas or Midgette.” He also argues that her statements were testimonial
2
Although not raised as a separate issue, Murray also argues that “the testimony by
Kleypas and Midgette was no more than the State attempting to bolster [Tolleson]’s credibility
about whether the sexual contact was consensual.” Murray does not cite any authority to support
this argument and, thus, has waived this issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
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under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and other Confrontation Clause precedents,
but we will address that contention below, under his fourth issue.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the
complaint was made to the trial court in a manner that “stated the grounds for the ruling that the
complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court
aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” Tex. R. App.
P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). “The point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”
Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A hearsay objection generally does
not preserve a Confrontation Clause complaint for appeal. See Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664,
671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);
Bunton v. State, 136 S.W.3d 355, 368 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref’d). It therefore stands to
reason that a Confrontation Clause objection generally does not preserve for appeal a complaint
that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay.
The State argues that Murray failed to make a hearsay objection to Tolleson’s
statements made during the SANE exam, and Murray does not direct us to any such request,
objection, or motion in the record. Although the record shows that Murray objected to the
admission of Midgette’s examination notes and of Tolleson’s statements on the ground that the
testimony violates the Confrontation Clause, and the trial court overruled that objection, nothing
in the record reveals that Murray objected to the examination notes or to Tolleson’s statements as
hearsay. We therefore hold that Murray did not preserve error on his complaint that Tolleson’s
statements to Midgette constitute inadmissible hearsay. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Golliday,
560 S.W.3d at 671; Holland, 802 S.W.2d at 700; Bunton, 136 S.W.3d at 368. As a result, we
overrule his third issue.
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III. Tolleson’s statements to Midgette during the exam were not “testimonial” under the
Confrontation Clause.
In his fourth issue, Murray contends that “the trial court erred by allowing the expert
to testify to statements about the assault in violation of the Confrontation Clause.” He argues that
Tolleson’s statements during the exam were inadmissible because they were “testimonial”
statements by a declarant whom he did not have a chance to cross-examine, under Crawford and
Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In support of his argument, he points
out that the exam took place two days after Tolleson was admitted to the hospital, suggesting the
lack of any emergency medical need for the exam, and that Tolleson was admitted because of a
suspected Benadryl overdose instead of as a result of potential injuries from a sexual assault.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions . . . the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” “In accordance with this constitutional right, out-of-court statements offered against the
accused that are ‘testimonial’ in nature are objectionable unless the prosecution can show that the
out-of-court declarant is presently unavailable to testify in court and the accused had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine him.” Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 575–76 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 59, 68). There are (at least)
“three kinds of [out-of-court] statements that could be regarded as testimonial:”
▪ ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, materials
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the accused
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;
▪ extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; and
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▪ statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.
Id. at 576 (quoting Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 735–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52)).
Whether an out-of-court statement is testimonial is a question of law. Id. “Although
we defer to the trial court’s resolution of credibility issues and historical fact, we review de novo
the ultimate constitutional question of whether the facts as determined by the trial court establish
that an out-of-court statement is testimonial.” Id. “In making that judgment, we look to determine
whether ‘the surrounding circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the
interview or interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.’” Id. (quoting De La Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
The “primary purpose” is the “‘first in importance’ among multiple, potentially competing purposes”
for an interview. Id. at 579 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826–32 (2006)).
Medical reports created for treatment purposes generally are non-testimonial.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312 n.2 (2009); Berkley v. State, 298 S.W.3d 712,
715 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d). “A statement is more likely to be testimonial if
the person who heard, recorded, and produced the out-of-court statement at trial is a government
officer.” Davis v. State, 169 S.W.3d 660, 667 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005), aff’d, 203 S.W.3d 845
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). By contrast, “statements to individuals who are not law enforcement
officers . . . are much less likely to be testimonial.” Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015).
Midgette described for the jury the “two primary purposes of a SANE exam”:
“diagnosis and treatment.” She explained to the jury that, “[a]s with any other patient,” she took a
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patient history from Tolleson, including asking about her allergies, medications, and last menstrual
cycle. Midgette testified that she needed the history “for diagnosis and treatment,” to guide
what she “need[ed] to look for and . . . address.” After taking the history, Midgette then did the
“head-to-toe assessment,” “looking over [Tolleson’s] entire body and documenting any injuries.”
She did so “to know what kind of trauma to address as a nurse[,] and also there may be forensic
evidence.” Midgette’s testimony establishes that the primary purpose of Tolleson’s statements
during the patient history was for medical treatment, making the statements non-testimonial. See
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 312 n.2; Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 576; Berkley, 298 S.W.3d at 715.
To support his argument that the statements were instead testimonial, Murray points
to (1) Tolleson’s identifying him as her assailant, (2) her signing a release that the records could
be sent to the police, (3) the fact that Kleypas has testified in many prosecutions because of her
role as a SANE, and (4) the fact that the SANE exam was not for emergency medical treatment.
None of these factors dissuade us from concluding that the SANE exam was for the primary
purpose of medical treatment.
When she identified Murray, Tolleson was responding to Midgette’s question,
“what was her concern today?” According to Midgette’s notes about Tolleson’s statements: “[Nurse]
asked [patient] what was her concern today? [Patient] states ‘I was raped’ . . . ‘[Murray] was
knocking on the door’ . . . ‘He comes in the house’ . . . ‘He made me a drink with a foil pack,’”
and Murray “‘used the three fingers (held up her index finger, middle finger, and ring finger)
to touch my clit area in a circular[-]type motion.’ [Patient] states ‘I pushed him away[,] and he
did it again inside my panties.’” (Ellipses in original.) Midgette’s simple question does not
“objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interview . . . [wa]s to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” See Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 576.
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Instead, it is more consistent with Midgette’s stated goal of learning what happened to Tolleson so
she could diagnose and treat her.
So too with the records release. Tolleson’s ability to control release of the records
from the exam suggests that medical treatment was the exam’s primary purpose. Were a patient
to refuse to release the records to the police, it would make little sense to think of the records as
therefore purposeless. The records, though unavailable to police, would still serve the purpose of
documenting the medical treatment provided. Nor does the record anywhere reflect that Midgette’s
taking of Tolleson’s history depended on, or even followed in time, Tolleson’s signing the release.
Kleypas’s experience testifying as an expert witness because of her role as a SANE
also does not change the reasons that Midgette gave as underpinning the exam. The exam was for
the primary purpose of medical treatment despite Kleypas’s background. See United States v.
Barker, 820 F.3d 167, 172 (5th Cir. 2016) (“LaFrance’s SANE certification did not convert the
essential purpose of her conversation with A.M. from medical evaluation and treatment to
evidence-collection, though it may have tended to lead to Barker’s prosecution. Like all good nurses,
LaFrance would have acted with the principal purpose to provide A.M. with medical care—
whether or not she possessed the SANE certification.”). Murray’s view would require that we take
a categorical approach to patient statements during SANE exams—that they are always testimonial
because the statements so often appear later in in-court testimony or exhibits. Yet Confrontation
Clause precedents counsel us not to take a categorical approach to deciding what statements are
testimonial. See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181 (declining “to adopt a categorical rule excluding”
“statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers” “from the Sixth Amendment’s
reach”); Wall, 184 S.W.3d at 741–42 (rejecting “any per se or categorical approach” to determining
whether excited utterances are testimonial hearsay); Davis, 169 S.W.3d at 667 (describing “the
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grueling job of applying Crawford on a case-by-case basis” that “[c]ourts across the nation have
been confronted with”).
Finally, Murray cannot rely on the lack of a medical emergency—that the exam
was conducted two days post-assault. While an emergency may often suffice to show that a
statement is non-testimonial, one is not necessary. “‘[T]he existence vel non of an ongoing
emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry.’ Instead, ‘whether an ongoing emergency
exists is simply one factor . . . that informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the “primary purpose”
of an interrogation.’” Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Michigan v.
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 366, 374 (2011)). As a result, although Midgette conducted the exam two
days after Tolleson was admitted to the hospital, the end of any emergency does not make Midgette
and Tolleson’s later conversation testimonial or any less for the purpose of medical treatment.
Midgette’s testimony was that the exam was still for medical treatment when conducted, and the
trial court did not err by relying on that testimony.
For all these reasons, we overrule Murray’s fourth issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
__________________________________________
Chari L. Kelly, Justice
Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Kelly
Affirmed
Filed: February 27, 2020
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