Candace Leann Prentice Hodge v. State ( 2020 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-18-00397-CR
CANDACE LEANN PRENTICE HODGE, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 100th District Court
Childress County, Texas
Trial Court No. 5965, Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding
February 27, 2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
Appellant, Candace Leann Prentice Hodge, appeals the trial court’s judgment
adjudicating her guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation,1 and sentencing her to
eighteen years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice.2 Appellant challenges her sentence as being disproportionate to the
gravity of the offense. We affirm.
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West 2019).
2 Burglary of a habitation is a second-degree felony, punishable by imprisonment for any term of
not more than twenty years or less than two years and a fine not to exceed $10,000. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 12.33 (West 2019), 30.02(c)(2).
Background
In December 2016, appellant was placed on deferred adjudication community
supervision for two years for the offense of burglary of a habitation. As part of her
community supervision, appellant was required to complete three hundred hours of
community service, pay a $250.00 fine, and pay court costs of $269.00. Eight months
later, the State moved to revoke appellant’s community supervision and adjudicate her
guilty of the original offense based on allegations that appellant had committed multiple
violations of the terms and conditions of her community supervision, including committing
a new offense of possession of a controlled substance. At a hearing on the State’s
motion, appellant entered a plea of true to violating three of the terms and conditions of
her community supervision, including reporting monthly in person, paying a monthly
community supervision fee, and paying $50 per month toward the court-ordered fees.
She pleaded not true to violating other terms and conditions, including committing no new
offense, abstaining from illegal drug use, and completing community service.
The trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision, adjudicated her guilty
of the offense of burglary of a habitation, and sentenced her to eighteen years’
incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
Appellant timely appealed the resulting judgment. By her appeal, appellant contends that
the eighteen-year sentence is disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
Law and Analysis
In order to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly
disproportionate and thereby constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must
present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds
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for the ruling requested.3 Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497-98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(en banc) (failure to make specific objection at trial waives Eighth Amendment claim of
cruel and unusual punishment). Because appellant failed to make any objection
regarding her punishment during sentencing or in a motion for new trial, she failed to
preserve any error. Goley v. State, Nos. 07-18-00145-CR, 07-18-00302-CR, 2019 Tex.
App. LEXIS 6699, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 2, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). Accordingly, appellant’s sole issue is overruled.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Judy C. Parker
Justice
Do not publish.
3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). The complaining party must object at the earliest possible opportunity
and obtain an adverse ruling and, on appeal, the arguments must comport with the objection at trial or the
error is waived. Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Even constitutional errors
may be waived by a failure to object at trial. Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Although appellate courts may take notice of error affecting rights so fundamental to the judicial process
that they are granted special protection and cannot be waived by inaction alone, Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d
129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc), a cruel and unusual complaint does not constitute fundamental
error. Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 927-28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref’d).
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