in the Matter of F.R. ( 2020 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00216-CV
No. 02-19-00217-CV
___________________________
IN THE MATTER OF F.R.
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. JV-2018-00422, JV-2018-00423
Before Birdwell, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Wallach, J.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
These are appeals from a juvenile court’s orders modifying its prior dispositions
placing appellant F.R. on intensive community supervision and committing F.R. to
the Texas Department of Juvenile Justice. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05. F.R.’s
court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and supporting brief
in which he states that he has reviewed the record and believes the appeals are
frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by
presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no
arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967); In re D.A.S., 973
S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (holding that Anders procedures apply
to juvenile appeals).
Although we notified F.R. and his mother of the right to request a copy of the
record and file a response to counsel’s Anders brief, neither responded. The State
declined to file a brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files an Anders brief on the
ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is
obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to determine if any
arguable grounds for appeal exist. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 1995, no
pet.). When analyzing whether any grounds for appeal exist, we consider the record,
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the Anders brief, and any pro se response. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
We have carefully reviewed the appellate record and counsel’s brief. Finding no
reversible error, we agree with counsel that the appeals are without merit, and we
affirm the trial court’s orders. See, e.g., In re K.C., No. 2-09-150-CV, 2010 WL 323532,
at *1 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Jan. 28, 2010, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). We
also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.101(e)
(providing that counsel appointed for modification proceeding continues to represent
the child until “the court rules on the motion or petition, the family retains an
attorney, or a new attorney is appointed”); In re K.G., No. 02-15-00318-CV, 2016 WL
1714144, at *1 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Apr. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).1
Per Curiam
Delivered: February 27, 2020
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But cf. In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order) (holding that
Family Code Section 107.013 requires appointed counsel to represent client through
all proceedings in the supreme court unless good cause other than the existence of a
frivolous appeal is shown); In re D.T., No. 02-17-00061-CV, 2017 WL 2806323, at *1
(Tex. App.––Fort Worth June 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying reasoning of
P.M. to Family Code Section 51.101(a) regarding appeals from non-modification
dispositions, which is similar to Section 107.013 and requires attorney to represent
child until “the case is terminated” or new counsel is appointed or retained).
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