Seth Griffith v. State ( 2020 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-18-00701-CR
Seth Griffith, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 427TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-DC-17-207070, THE HONORABLE TAMARA NEEDLES, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Seth Griffith of the offense of family-violence assault
by strangulation, see Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1), (b-3), and assessed his punishment at four
years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Griffith challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
The jury heard evidence that Griffith and Tammie Delgado were in a dating
relationship and lived together in a van in Austin. In October 2017, Delgado called police to
report that Griffith had assaulted her earlier that day. Officer Matt Holloway responded to the
call and interviewed Delgado. Delgado did not testify at trial, but the district court allowed
Holloway to testify as to her statements. Delgado told him that she had been sleeping in the van
when Griffith woke her up and demanded sex. She refused, and Griffith “became upset and
grabbed her by the throat, punched her and threw her out of the van.” Delgado told Holloway
that she could not breathe while Griffith had his hand around her throat.
Holloway called emergency medical services because Delgado had visible
injuries: “[r]edness and fresh bruising to her throat”; “scratches, redness to her stomach and
back”; and petechiae in her left eye. Petechiae, Holloway explained, are blood vessels that burst
under pressure and are frequently a sign of strangulation. Tammy Mezayek, a paramedic who
examined Delgado, testified that she observed similar injuries. She also confirmed Holloway’s
testimony regarding the significance of the petechiae. The district court admitted photographs of
Delgado’s injuries. Holloway further testified that Griffith returned to the scene while the
examination was in progress, banged on the side of the ambulance, and demanded to know
Delgado’s location. Holloway exited the ambulance and engaged Griffith in conversation.
Holloway did not mention Delgado’s accusations, but Griffith told him, “I didn’t do anything
to her.”
Linda Galvan, a certified forensic nurse, testified for the State as an expert on
injuries caused by strangulation. Galvan testified that she examined the photographs and opined
that Delgado’s injuries were consistent with strangulation.
Dennis Garvey testified that he was sleeping in the van at the time of the incident.
Garvey told the jury that he woke up to see a “fight between” Griffith and Delgado, but he did
not see Griffith’s hand around her neck. However, he admitted to having earlier given a
statement to police that Griffith “beat the hell out of [Delgado]” and put his hand around
her neck.
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DISCUSSION
Due process requires the State to prove every element of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. Lang v. State, 561 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to
determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Applying this standard requires us to presume that the jury
“resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict” and to defer to
that resolution because “jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony.” Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Our role on appeal is limited to ensuring that “the evidence presented
actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.”
Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Williams v. State,
235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against “the elements of the offense
as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234,
240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict
the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.” Id. The hypothetically correct charge for this case required the State to
prove that Griffith impeded Delgado’s normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying
pressure to her throat or neck or by blocking her nose or mouth. See Tex. Penal Code
§ 22.01(a)(1), (b-3).
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Griffith’s principal argument is essentially that the jury could not rationally credit
Delgado’s statements because Garvey is more credible. However, we must presume the jury
reached the opposite conclusion and defer to that determination. See Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572
(explaining that “jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and
the weight to be given to the testimony”). In addition to Delgado’s statements to Holloway, the
jury heard evidence from Holloway, Mezayek, and Galvan that Delgado’s injuries, especially the
petechiae, were consistent with strangulation, and the jury reviewed photographs taken during
Delgado’s examination by paramedics. Griffith asserts that those images are inconsistent with
strangulation because they depict only “small, subtle markings” on her neck. He also notes that
Delgado denied losing consciousness or suffering any of the other common symptoms of
strangulation, such as numbness, vision or hearing loss, or tingling in her extremities. But the
State was required to prove that Griffith impeded Delgado’s normal breathing or circulation of
the blood by applying pressure to her throat or neck—proof of bodily injury per se—not that
she suffered loss of consciousness or any other specific symptom. See Marshall v. State,
479 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (explaining that jury “only needed to determine
whether the evidence supported a finding that [appellant] impeded [victim’s] breathing, thereby
finding bodily injury per se”). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, we conclude it rationally supports the jury’s verdict. We overrule Griffith’s sole issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment of conviction.
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__________________________________________
Edward Smith, Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Triana and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: April 22, 2020
Do Not Publish
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