Angela Carol Spivey-Washington v. State ( 2017 )


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  • AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed April 28, 2017.
    S    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-16-00476-CR
    ANGELA CAROL SPIVEY-WASHINGTON, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 8
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. MA-1243270-J
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Lang, Fillmore, and Schenck
    Opinion by Justice Schenck
    Angela Carol Spivey-Washington appeals from a conviction of criminal trespass of a
    habitation. Appellant’s sole issue is whether the judgment is supported by legally sufficient
    evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue
    this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
    FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 2012, the complainant lived with her boyfriend Eugene Washington and her two
    children: C.S. and a son. Mr. Washington was divorced from appellant. On November 6, 2012,
    at approximately 5:00 a.m., appellant entered the complainant’s residence where complainant
    and her children were asleep in their respective bedrooms. Mr. Washington had already left for
    work that day.   Appellant went into C.S.’s bedroom, woke her, and asked her where the
    complainant was. C.S. took appellant to the complainant’s room upstairs where appellant began
    to chastise the complainant for sleeping with a married man. The complainant told appellant she
    needed to leave, and appellant did so. That same day, the complainant filed a criminal trespass
    report. Detective Kevin Smiley was assigned to the case.
    A couple of days later, appellant went to the complainant’s house to talk to Mr.
    Washington. Mr. Washington was at home and went outside to speak with appellant. The two
    had a verbal confrontation, and appellant left. The complainant contacted appellant and told her
    that C.S. had been affected by the incident between appellant and Mr. Washington. Appellant
    left a note on the complainant’s front door, stating as follows.
    Please let your daughter know that I’m sorry for the incident that happened
    between my husband and I. He’s very disrespectful and was out of line being
    over here. Also, I will adhere to your request you and I discussed. Again, sorry.
    On November 11, 2012, the complainant and C.S. went to the police station and provided
    Detective Smiley with additional information and affidavits. The complainant also provided him
    with a copy of a note appellant left on the complainant’s front door.         Detective Smiley
    interviewed appellant over the phone, and appellant admitted to the confrontation with Mr.
    Washington but denied being in the complainant’s house before then.
    The State charged appellant by information and affidavit with the offense of criminal
    trespass of a habitation. Appellant waived a jury and proceeded to a trial before the court. The
    trial court found appellant guilty of criminal trespass. The judge assessed punishment at 180
    days’ confinement in the county jail and a fine of $100, but suspended the sentence and placed
    appellant on community supervision for a period of six months. She timely filed this appeal, in
    which she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding appellant actually
    entered the complainant’s home on November 6, 2012.
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    STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
    When conducting a legal-sufficiency review, a court must ask whether any rational trier
    of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
    v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318–19 (1979). In so doing, we assess the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution. 
    Id. This same
    standard applies equally to circumstantial and direct
    evidence. Burden v. State, 
    55 S.W.3d 608
    , 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We defer to the
    responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence,
    and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Isassi v. State, 
    330 S.W.3d 633
    , 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). After giving proper deference to the factfinder’s role, if any
    rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a
    reasonable doubt, we will uphold the verdict. See Cary v. State, 
    507 S.W.3d 761
    , 766 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2016).
    A person commits criminal trespass if the person enters the habitation of another without
    effective consent and the person had notice that the entry was forbidden. TEX. PENAL CODE
    ANN. § 30.05(a), (d)(3)(A)(i) (West 2011). “Entry” means the intrusion of the entire body. 
    Id. § 30.05(b)(1)
    (West 2011).
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Evidence of Entry
    The State presented three witnesses: C.S., the complainant, and Detective Smiley. C.S.
    testified at about 5:00 a.m. in November of 2012, appellant entered the complainant’s home
    through the patio door without knocking on the door or being invited. Appellant then went into
    C.S.’s room and woke her. C.S. stated appellant asked her where the complainant was, so C.S.
    took her upstairs to the complainant’s room where appellant told C.S. the complainant was
    –3–
    sleeping with a married man and that appellant and Mr. Washington were still married. C.S.
    testified she had never met appellant before that day, and appellant had never been a guest in the
    complainant’s home before. She also testified the only other occupants, Mr. Washington and the
    complainant’s son, were out of the house or asleep, respectively.
    The complainant testified that on November 6, 2012, appellant entered her home through
    the patio door, went to C.S.’s room, and woke C.S. She then followed C.S. to the complainant’s
    room and told C.S. the complainant was “messing with a married man.” The complainant said
    she had never invited appellant to her home in the past and she had not heard a knock at the door
    or the doorbell ring. She said she had never met appellant before that morning.
    Detective Smiley testified the complainant contacted the police department on November
    11, 2012, to report the appellant’s trespass. He stated the complainant and C.S. came to the
    police station where they told him appellant came into their home at approximately 5 a.m. on
    November 6, 2012, without invitation and told the complainant she was sleeping with appellant’s
    husband and appellant wanted her to stop. He spoke with appellant on the phone, and she
    admitted to getting into a confrontation with Mr. Washington but denied going into the
    complainant’s home a few days before.
    II.    Analysis
    Appellant raises multiple arguments regarding the credibility of the witnesses. First,
    appellant argues the complainant was not a credible witness. During the same proceeding as the
    bench trial on the criminal trespass charge, the trial court heard a second charge against appellant
    of criminal mischief. The complainant was a witness in both cases, but the trial court found
    appellant not guilty of criminal mischief. Appellant contends that the trial court’s verdict in the
    second matter was a rejection of the complainant’s credibility. Second, appellant contends that
    the testimony of all of the State’s witnesses—the complainant, C.S., and Detective Smiley—is
    –4–
    inconsistent such that the witnesses’ credibility is damaged and the testimony of all three does
    not lead to a reasonable inference that appellant entered the complainant’s home on November 6,
    2012. Appellant notes discrepancies between the complainant’s and C.S.’s testimony regarding
    whether the back door of the home was usually locked and whether appellant exited their home
    through the back door or the front door. She further notes that Detective Smiley testified the
    complainant and C.S. told him the “confrontation” occurred inside C.S.’s room instead of the
    complainant’s as the complainant and C.S. testified.                                      Third, appellant points to her own
    testimony in which she denied having been to the complainant’s home before her confrontation
    with Mr. Washington. Finally, appellant argues evidence of financial ties between appellant, the
    complainant, and Mr. Washington cast the complainant’s credibility into question. On cross-
    examination, the complainant testified she received money from Mr. Washington because they
    were living together, that she had access to Mr. Washington’s bank account, and that appellant
    was constantly trying to get money from Mr. Washington for their children. Appellant testified
    that the complainant had access to an account that was Mr. Washington’s business account to
    which appellant also had access. 1
    As factfinder, the trial judge was entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses and
    could choose to believe all, some, or none of the their testimony. See Chambers v. State, 
    805 S.W.2d 459
    , 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). The trial judge could also reconcile the
    above conflicts in the witnesses’ testimony, judge the witnesses’ credibility, and conclude that all
    three of the State’s witnesses testified appellant was in the complainant’s home without effective
    1
    Finally, appellant argues that the trial testimony regarding the note appellant left on the complainant’s front door is inconsistent with the
    text of the note. Detective Smiley testified that he believed the note referred to appellant’s entry of the complainant’s home despite the fact that
    the note refers to “the incident that happened between my husband and I” and both the complainant and C.S. testified Mr. Washington was not
    home at that time. The complainant at first denied that appellant wrote the note to apologize for the confrontation a few days after the trespass,
    but she later admitted that could have been the intent. Even assuming the note did not refer to the events of November 6, 2012, there was
    sufficient evidence from the witnesses’ testimony to conclude appellant entered the complainant’s home that morning.
    –5–
    consent and that the complainant and Detective Smiley both specified the offense occurred on
    November 6, 2012. See 
    Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638
    .
    We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /David J. Schenck/
    DAVID J. SCHENCK
    JUSTICE
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47
    160476F.U05
    –6–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    ANGELA CAROL SPIVEY-                                   On Appeal from the County Criminal Court
    WASHINGTON, Appellant                                  No. 8, Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. MA-1243270-J.
    No. 05-16-00476-CR         V.                          Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck,
    Justices Lang and Fillmore participating.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered this 28th day of April, 2017.
    –7–