Shaun Ruiz Puente v. State ( 2020 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-18-00310-CR
Shaun Ruiz PUENTE,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 218th Judicial District Court, Atascosa County, Texas
Trial Court No. 14-01-0040-CRA
Honorable Donna S. Rayes, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 18, 2020
AFFIRMED
Shaun Ruiz Puente appeals his conviction for capital murder. He argues the trial court erred
by denying his motion to suppress, admitting evidence in violation of Texas Rules of Evidence
403 and 404(b), and erroneously charging the jury as to the elements of the offense. We affirm the
judgment of conviction.
04-18-00310-CR
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
Puente was indicted for the capital murder of Robert Deckard, a police officer. The alleged
offense occurred on or about December 8, 2013, as Officer Deckard was attempting to detain
Puente for suspected robbery. The trial court denied Puente’s pre-trial motion seeking to suppress
statements he made during three interviews, as well as evidence obtained from a traffic stop he
contends was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The case was tried to a jury. The trial court
admitted, over Puente’s Rule 403 and 404(b) objections, testimony that Puente fired a gun at the
officer who conducted the traffic stop. The jury found Puente guilty, and he was sentenced to life
in prison. Puente appeals.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his first two issues, Puente argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. Carmouche
v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We review a trial court’s conclusions of law
de novo. Id. at 328. We afford a trial court’s fact findings almost total deference if they are
supported by the record, especially when they are based on the evaluation of witness credibility
and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “The trial judge is
the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony.” Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When the trial court
makes express findings of fact, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the ruling and
1
Puente’s appellant’s brief does not describe the facts surrounding the capital murder offense in this case. The State
accepts Puente’s statement of the facts, and also does not describe the facts surrounding the capital murder. The
reporter’s record in this case consists of over 60 volumes and over 40 exhibit files. Because the parties have not
directed this court to the relevant evidence objectively describing the factual background of this case, and have
described only those facts relevant to each legal issue, we will do the same. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.4. “As this is
a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we only recite those facts necessary to the
disposition of the case.” Hodges v. State, No. 10-18-00263-CR, 2019 WL 1187431, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar.
13, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see, e.g., Campbell v. State, No. 03-17-00515-CR, 2019
WL 964169, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).
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determine whether the evidence supports the findings. Id.; see Rodriguez v. State, 968 S.W.2d 554,
558 n.8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
A. Suppression of Puente’s Statements
In his first issue, Puente argues the trial court should have suppressed video recordings of
and testimony about statements he made during three different interviews.
1. Relevant Facts
The facts relevant to this issue are set out in the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law, which we summarize as follows:
 Puente challenged the voluntariness of statements he made during three
interviews with law enforcement.
 The first interview was conducted on December 8, 2013, by Detective Cardenas
and Ranger Wilson. The second interview was also conducted on December 8,
2013, by Detectives Luna and Orozco. The third interview was conducted on
December 12, 2013, by Detectives Barrera and Ochoa.
 Puente was in custody during each interview.
 Before questioning Puente in each of the three custodial interrogations, law
enforcement gave Puente the admonishments contained in Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure 38.22.
 At the times he was read his rights, Puente acknowledged verbally in the
affirmative that he understood the rights that were given to him in each instance.
 Puente did not acknowledge verbally that he waived the rights read to him.
 Puente’s responses to the questions asked were lucid and appropriate.
 At no time did Puente indicate he did not understand or was unable to
comprehend what was asked of him.
 Puente was able to guide and correct the false impressions of the interviewing
officers and provide them with correct information.
 Puente appeared to understand the nature of the interview and that it involved
criminal charges against him and his co-actor.
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 Puente had spent hours in hiding outdoors in cold weather within twenty-four
hours of the first two interrogations.
 Puente had been taken to the hospital immediately after being taken into
custody.
 Puente was treated for minor injuries at the hospital and released into the
custody of law enforcement.
 Puente was addicted to methamphetamine at the time of the interrogations.
 Puente was deprived of methamphetamine at the time of the interrogations.
 There were no observable effects of the methamphetamine deprivation during
the interrogations.
 There was no observable evidence that Puente was under the influence of any
drugs during the interrogations.
 The testing of the intellectual ability of Puente resulted in an IQ score of 79.
 The IQ score of Puente indicates he was intellectually capable of understanding
and waiving his rights.
Puente does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support these findings. Instead, he
argues the facts establish the inadmissibility of evidence about statements he made during those
interviews. During the December 8, 2013 interview by Detective Cardenas and Ranger Wilson,
Puente admitted he had shot Officer Deckard.
2. Applicable Law
Texas law establishes procedural safeguards for securing a suspect’s Miranda rights.
Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 23–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “The State has the burden of
showing that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.” Id.
at 24. A waiver need not be express, and “in some cases, may be clearly inferred from the actions
and words of the person interrogated.” Id.
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3. Discussion
Puente contends he did not waive his rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently for
two reasons. First, he complains about “the failure of the police to ask [him] whether he waived
his Miranda rights.” Puente suggests this court should adopt a position urged in a concurring
opinion by Judge Cochran in Joseph v. State, and require the police to specifically ask a suspect in
custody whether he will waive his Miranda rights and to obtain an express waiver before an
interrogation. Second, Puente argues the evidence he presented shows he did not voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly waive his Miranda rights.
We decline to adopt Puente’s position to require police departments to obtain an express
waiver by expressly asking a suspect in custody whether he will waive his Miranda rights. Puente
cites no legal authority, and we are aware of none, supporting such a requirement. Instead, waivers
may be implied. See id. at 24 n.5 (rejecting the imposition of an express waiver requirement).
Moreover, in the Joseph concurrence, Judge Cochran recommended that police departments
voluntarily adopt a policy of obtaining express waivers because such a policy would eliminate
having to litigate implied waivers once in court. See id. at 30 (Cochran, J., concurring) (“[L]aw-
enforcement officers are well advised to expressly ask a suspect to waive his Miranda rights so as
to avoid later, protracted litigation”).
Similarly, we disagree the evidence favorable to Puente’s position establishes he did not
voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waive his Miranda rights. Puente relies on his own
statements during the interview and an expert opinion that was based on his statements and the
expert’s observations of Puente on the video recordings. However, the trial judge, who was able
to observe Puente on the video recording, was the sole trier of fact, and the sole judge of the
credibility of the evidence and the weight to be given to the evidence. See Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d
at 447. Based on the unchallenged findings of fact, we cannot say the evidence on which Puente
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relies establishes the implied waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntary, intelligent, or
knowing. We therefore overrule Puente’s first issue.
B. The Traffic Stop
In his second issue, Puente argues the trial court should have suppressed evidence obtained
from the traffic stop.
1. Relevant Facts
A dispatch call reported the shooting of Officer Deckard to police officers in surrounding
areas. Deputy Sanchez, of the Wilson County Sheriff’s Office, heard the call at approximately 2:00
a.m. The call described a car connected with the shooting as a green Dodge Neon with white racing
stripes, a spoiler, 2 and license plate number of DRN365. Dispatch revised the description of the
car as a grey Mercury Tracer. Approximately thirty to forty minutes later, Deputy Sanchez saw a
black car with white stripes, a spoiler, and a license plate number of DR1N635. Deputy Sanchez
followed the car until the driver turned on the car’s hazard lights and pulled over. Deputy Sanchez
activated the lights on his patrol car to conduct a “welfare check.” The passenger, later identified
as Puente, exited the car and started shooting at Deputy Sanchez’s car. The driver and Puente then
fled on foot.
2. Applicable Law
Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may stop a car and detain the driver if the
officer has reasonable suspicion for the stop. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). “A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific,
articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him
reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal
2
Deputy Sanchez testified a spoiler is “a fin they put on the trunk. It’s suppose[d] to be aero dynamic.”
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activity.” Id. “This standard is an objective one that disregards the actual subjective intent of the
arresting officer and looks, instead, to whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the
detention.” Id. Furthermore, a stop of a car may be justified based on a local police officer’s
community caretaking function. Byram v. State, 510 S.W.3d 918, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
3. Discussion
Puente does not challenge the traffic stop as an improper caretaking function, which could
independently support the traffic stop. See id. Instead, Puente argues Deputy Sanchez lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop the car. Puente relies on Deputy Sanchez’s testimony that he (1) was
looking for a car based on the description dispatch provided, which arguably differed from the car
he stopped; and (2) did not observe a traffic offense that would independently justify the stop.
Although Deputy Sanchez testified he did not observe a traffic offense that would independently
justify the stop, he testified the car he stopped matched the description dispatch provided in that
the car had racing stripes, a spoiler, and a nearly identical license plate. Deputy Sanchez also
testified he was familiar with the shape of a Mercury Tracer, and the shape of the car he stopped
was similar to the shape of a Mercury Tracer. Given these similarities, the differences in the models
of the car and between the colors grey and black are not substantial because the car substantially
matched the description provided by the dispatcher. See State v. Mercer, No. 05-02-01359-CR,
2003 WL 1878951, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 16, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for
publication) (holding officer had reasonable suspicion when the car substantially matched the
description provided by the dispatcher). Deputy Sanchez did not need to have been certain the car
he stopped was the same car reported by dispatch; he merely needed to have had reasonable
suspicion. See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914. We hold the evidence admitted at the
suppression hearing supports the trial court’s denial of Puente’s motion to suppress as it relates to
the traffic stop. We therefore overrule Puente’s second issue.
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ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
In his third and fourth issues, Puente argues the trial court erred by admitting Deputy
Sanchez’s testimony that Puente shot at him during the traffic stop. Puente objected to the
testimony as inadmissible under Texas Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). We review a trial court’s
ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Gittens v. State, 560 S.W.3d 725,
731 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if its ruling
is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
A. Applicable Law
Under Rule 403, a trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. Under Rule
404(b), “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character
in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”
Id. R. 404(b)(1). Such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.” Id. R. 404(b)(2).
B. Analysis
Puente argues Deputy Sanchez’s testimony was inadmissible under Rule 403 for being
unfairly prejudicial and Rule 404(b) for being improper character evidence. The Court of Criminal
Appeals has set out the analysis for such issues in Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995). “An extraneous offense must be shown to be relevant apart from character conformity
before it may be admitted into evidence.” Id. at 585. “If relevant, then the extraneous offense must
be shown to have more probative value than prejudicial impact.” Id. “[F]light is admissible as a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.” Id. at 586. “So long as the
extraneous offense is shown to be a necessarily related circumstance of the defendant’s flight, it
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may be admitted to the jury.” Id. When a Rule 404(b) objection is accompanied by a Rule 403
objection, “the decision on admissibility lies within the discretion of the trial court.” Id.
The evidence showed there was a robbery and a suspect shot Officer Deckard to avoid
apprehension. The evidence also showed a description of the suspect’s vehicle was reported over
dispatch. Deputy Sanchez testified he was following the car because it matched the description of
a car involved in the shooting of Officer Deckard earlier that evening. He testified the traffic stop
occurred within a couple hours of when it was known Officer Deckard was shot. When Deputy
Sanchez stopped the car, Puente shot at him and fled. This evidence shows Puente’s attempts to
shoot Deputy Sanchez necessarily related to the shooting of Officer Deckard. See id. This evidence
connected Puente to the charged offense and established the identity of the suspect who shot
Officer Deckard, and the prejudicial effect of the evidence cannot be said to be undue because it
related to the circumstances of flight from the original offense. See id.; see also Hall v. State, No.
04-02-00562-CR, 2004 WL 86138, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 21, 2004, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion and overrule
Puente’s third and fourth issues. See Alba, 905 S.W.2d at 585.
CHARGE ERROR
In his fifth issue, Puente argues the trial court erred by overruling his objection that the jury
charge did not require the jury to find he intentionally killed Officer Deckard, and allowed the jury
to find him guilty if he knowingly killed Officer Deckard. According to Puente, the charge was
erroneous because the law required the jury to find he intentionally killed Officer Deckard.
“In resolving a challenge to the jury charge, we first determine whether error exists.”
Torres v. State, 560 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.). A jury charge that
tracks the language of a particular statute generally is a proper charge. Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d
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870, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury found Puente guilty of capital murder. The application
section of the jury charge for capital murder reads as follows:
[I]f you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about
December 8, 2013, in Atascosa County, Texas, the defendant Shaun Ruiz Puente,
did intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Robert Deckard by shooting him
with a firearm, and Robert Deckard was a peace officer who was acting in the lawful
discharge of this official duty, to-wit: attempting to lawfully detain said defendant
and the said defendant knew Robert Deckard was a peace officer, then you will find
the defendant guilty of capital murder. (emphasis added).
The State argues there is no error because the indictment tracks the language of the particular
statute. We agree.
The offense of capital murder is provided for in section 19.03 of the Texas Penal Code.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a). “A person commits an offense if the person commits murder as
defined under Section 19.02(b)(1) and . . . the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is
acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or
fireman.” Id. § 19.03(a)(1). Section 19.02(b)(1) defines the offense of murder as follows, “A
person commits an offense if he . . . intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual.”
Id. § 19.02(b)(1) (emphasis added). Consequently, capital murder under section 19.03(a)(1) of the
Texas Penal Code may be committed intentionally or knowingly. The indictment alleged both
mental states, and the jury charge correctly tracked the language of the capital murder statute.
Puente argues specific intent to kill is necessary for attempted murder and when the death penalty
is assessed, but this is not an attempted murder or a death penalty case. We hold there is no charge
error and overrule Puente’s fifth issue. See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 297; Torres, 560 S.W.3d at 372.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Puente’s issues, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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