Paul Bethany v. Stephen Charles Bethany, of the Estate of Mildred Louise Bethany ( 2020 )


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  •        TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-19-00532-CV
    Paul Bethany, Appellant
    v.
    Stephen Charles Bethany, Executor of the Estate of Mildred Louise Bethany, Appellee
    FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF CALDWELL COUNTY
    NO. 10303, THE HONORABLE BARBARA MOLINA, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Paul Bethany appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying his
    motion to remove appellee Stephen Charles Bethany as independent executor of the estate of
    Mildred Louise Bethany, their mother.1 Stephen has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
    want of jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court’s judgment is not final. We agree and will
    dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
    On May 29, 2018, Stephen admitted to probate Mildred’s Last Will and
    Testament. In the will, Mildred had appointed Stephen as the independent executor of her estate
    upon the death of Mildred’s husband, who had predeceased her. Mildred had appointed Paul as
    successor independent executor if, for whatever reason, Stephen became unable to serve.
    On April 11, 2019, Paul filed a motion to remove Stephen as independent
    executor. Paul also moved for costs and expenses incurred by him incident to removal, including
    1
    Because the parties share the same surname, we will refer to them using their first names.
    reasonable attorney’s fees. In his response to the motion, Stephen similarly moved for costs and
    expenses in defending against removal, including reasonable attorney’s fees. Following a hearing,
    the trial court denied Paul’s motion and ordered that Stephen be continued as executor. In its
    written judgment denying relief, the trial court did not address the issue of attorney’s fees.
    In his motion to dismiss, Stephen asserts that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal
    because the trial court’s judgment is not a final order. Stephen argues that there are claims that
    remain pending, including his claim for attorney’s fees. Paul asserts in response that “there are
    no further issues or parties not disposed of” by the trial court’s judgment. However, Paul does
    not address the issue of attorney’s fees.
    “Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments.” Brittingham-Sada
    de Ayala v. Mackie, 
    193 S.W.3d 575
    , 578 (Tex. 2006) (citing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.,
    
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001)). “Probate proceedings are an exception to the ‘one final
    judgment’ rule; in such cases, ‘multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered
    on certain discrete issues.’”
    Id. (quoting Lehmann,
    39 S.W.3d at 192). However, “[n]ot every
    interlocutory order in a probate case is appealable.”
    Id. The test
    is whether the order “dispose[s]
    of all parties or issues in a particular phase of the probate proceedings.”
    Id. This phase
    of the probate proceedings involved Paul’s motion to remove Stephen
    as independent executor. That motion and Stephen’s response to the motion included claims for
    costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incident to the removal proceedings.
    See Tex. Estates Code § 404.0037(a) (authorizing recovery of costs and expenses incurred by
    independent executor defending against removal), (b) (authorizing recovery of costs and expenses
    incurred by party seeking removal). However, the trial court’s written judgment did not dispose
    of those claims or address them in any manner. It is well established that an order that does not
    2
    dispose of all pending claims, including attorney’s fees, is not a final order. See Farm Bureau
    County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 
    455 S.W.3d 161
    , 164 (Tex. 2015); McNally v. Guevara,
    
    52 S.W.3d 195
    , 195 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam); In re Estate of Rhoades, No. 02-15-00081-CV,
    2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5945, *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.);
    Haluska v. Haluska-Rausch, No. 03-11-00312-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 744, *6–7 (Tex.
    App.—Austin Jan. 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Melton v. CU Members Mortg.,
    
    586 S.W.3d 26
    , 36 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied) (concluding that “the remaining issue
    of attorney’s fees” rendered judgment interlocutory rather than final). Accordingly, we grant
    Stephen’s motion to dismiss the appeal and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We
    dismiss as moot Stephen’s motion for extension of time to file his appellee’s brief.
    __________________________________________
    Gisela D. Triana, Justice
    Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Triana
    Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
    Filed: March 20, 2020
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-19-00532-CV

Filed Date: 3/20/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/23/2020