Daniel T. Brashear v. Joy A. Dorai ( 2020 )


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  • Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed September 29, 2020.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-19-00194-CV
    DANIEL T. BRASHEAR, Appellant
    V.
    JOY A. DORAI, Appellee
    On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 466138
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Daniel T. Brashear appeals from the summary judgment order
    disqualifying him from serving as the executor of decedent Anne Moreland’s
    estate.     Brashear, who is pro se, makes numerous arguments interspersed
    throughout his appellate briefing making it difficult to discern his exact issues on
    appeal.      However, liberally construing his opening brief, we conclude that
    Brashear has raised the following issues on appeal.1 In his first issue Brashear
    argues that the trial court erred when it considered and then granted appellee Joy
    A. Dorai’s motion for summary judgment because Joy did not have standing to
    challenge his qualifications to serve as the executor of Moreland’s estate.2
    Brashear argues in his related second issue that the trial court violated his due
    process rights because it refused to consider his motion arguing that Joy did not
    have standing and refused to admit his evidence addressed to Joy’s standing.
    Finally, in his third issue, Brashear asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
    when it denied his “motion for hearing denovo [sic].” Because we conclude that
    Joy had standing to challenge Brashear’s appointment as executor, the record
    establishes that the trial court considered Brashear’s arguments, court filings, and
    evidence prior to ruling, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
    denied his motion to reconsider its summary judgment ruling, we overrule
    Brashear’s issues and affirm the trial court’s order disqualifying him from serving
    as the executor of Moreland’s estate.
    BACKGROUND
    Moreland died on March 11, 2018 in Harris County, Texas. About a month
    later, Brashear, a resident of Maryland who is not related to Moreland, filed an
    application to probate a purported will Moreland allegedly signed on August 15,
    1
    Brashear is limited to the issues raised in his opening brief because “the Texas Rules of
    Appellate Procedure do not allow him to add a new issue in his reply brief that was not discussed
    in his original brief.” Marsh v. Livingston, No. 14-09-00011-CV, 
    2010 WL 1609215
    , *4 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] April 22, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). This rule applies even
    when an appellant appears pro se. See Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. Of Med., 
    271 S.W.3d 928
    ,
    930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (stating that pro se litigants are held to the
    same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with all applicable laws and rules of
    procedure).
    2
    Because there are two persons mentioned in this opinion with the last name of Dorai,
    we refer to appellee Joy A. Dorai by her first name.
    2
    2015. Brashear asked the probate court to appoint him the independent executor of
    Moreland’s estate.
    On August 6, 2018, Suri Dorai, Moreland’s former husband, filed a “Motion
    to dismiss the Will & Testament & also investigate the person(s) involved in the
    creation of this false Will & Testament for Anne Moreland.”                   Among other
    allegations, Suri Dorai alleged that Brashear was a convicted felon. He also
    asserted that the signature on the purported will did not match Moreland’s
    signature. Suri Dorai further asserted that Moreland “was losing her mind,” and
    that she “suffered from serious mental issues and wasn’t organized.”3 Suri Dorai
    believed the purported will was fraudulent and he asked the probate court to
    “dismiss the Will & Testament and investigate the parties in question for
    perpetrating the fraud.”
    A few months later Joy, Moreland’s biological daughter,4 filed a “Will
    Contest and Objections to Probate and Objection to Applicant’s Request for
    Appointment.” Joy alleged that in 2015 Moreland “was suffering from mental
    health issues and was highly susceptible to outside influence.” Of concern here,
    Joy alleged that Brashear was disqualified from serving as the independent
    executor of Moreland’s estate because he was a convicted felon and also that he
    was otherwise unsuitable to serve as an independent executor. Joy eventually filed
    a motion for partial summary judgment on those issues. In response, Brashear
    filed a “Motion to Strike Filing for Cause,” arguing that Joy did not have standing
    to contest Moreland’s purported will nor to file any objections in the probate
    3
    Other documents filed in the probate proceeding initiated by Brashear indicate that
    Moreland resided for some period of time in Maryland. They also indicate that, while living in
    Maryland, Moreland owned property but “lived out of a van” and washed “herself from a
    bucket.”
    4
    Brashear does not dispute that Joy is Moreland’s daughter.
    3
    proceeding. While Brashear did attach evidence to his response, he did not dispute
    that he was a convicted felon. In fact, Brashear admitted in open court during the
    hearing on Joy’s motion for partial summary judgment that he had been convicted
    of first-degree murder. The trial court granted Joy’s motion for partial summary
    judgment and signed an order disqualifying Brashear from serving as the
    independent executor of Moreland’s estate because he was a convicted felon and
    also because “he is highly unsuitable.” Brashear filed this appeal challenging that
    order. See Eastland v. Eastland, 
    273 S.W.3d 815
    , 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“A probate court order determining who may serve as an
    independent executor is appealable because it finally adjudicates a substantial
    right.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    ANALYSIS
    I.    Joy has standing to object to Brashear’s appointment as executor of
    Moreland’s estate.
    We begin by pointing out that the merits of Joy’s will contest are not before
    us. Instead, the only matter before us relates to the trial court granting Joy’s
    motion for partial summary judgment and thereby disqualifying Brashear from
    serving as executor of Moreland’s estate.
    Brashear argues that the trial court erred when it granted Joy’s motion
    because Joy did not have standing to challenge his qualifications to serve as the
    executor of Moreland’s estate. Brashear bases his argument on his belief that Joy
    does not have standing to contest the probate of Moreland’s purported will even
    though she is Moreland’s biological daughter, because the purported will
    disinherits Joy. In a related issue, Brashear argues that the trial court violated his
    due process rights because it refused to consider his motion challenging Joy’s
    standing to object to his appointment as executor and also refused to admit his
    4
    evidence addressed to Joy’s standing. We address these issues together.
    A.     Standard of review and applicable law
    Standing, a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, is a constitutional
    prerequisite to maintaining suit under Texas law. Tex. Ass’n. of Bus. v. Tex. Air
    Control Bd., 
    852 S.W.2d 440
    , 444–45 (Tex. 1993); Sherman v. Boston, 
    486 S.W.3d 88
    , 94 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). In statutory
    standing cases, we analyze the construction of the relevant statute to determine
    upon whom the Texas legislature conferred standing and whether the person in
    question falls within that group. See Tex. Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory
    Servs. v. Sherry, 
    46 S.W.3d 857
    , 859–61 (Tex. 2001). Standing cannot be waived
    and can be raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. Ass’n. of 
    Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444
    –45.    Whether a party has standing to bring a claim is a question of law
    reviewed de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 
    964 S.W.2d 922
    , 928 (Tex.
    1998).
    We review a trial court’s order granting a traditional summary judgment de
    novo. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Ademaj, 
    243 S.W.3d 618
    , 621 (Tex. 2007). In
    reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider all of the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the nonmovant. Ron v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 
    397 S.W.3d 785
    , 788 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). When a party with the
    burden of proof moves for summary judgment on its claim, it must conclusively
    prove all essential elements of its claim as a matter of law. Cullins v. Foster, 
    171 S.W.3d 521
    , 530 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). Evidence
    is considered conclusive if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions.
    Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 
    214 S.W.3d 672
    , 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). In the present case, the relevant evidence is undisputed.
    The Estates Code provides that “a person interested in an estate may, at any
    5
    time before the court decides an issue in a proceeding, file written opposition
    regarding the issue.” See Tex. Estates Code § 55.001. An interested person is an
    “heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in or claim
    against an estate being administered.” Tex. Est. Code § 22.018(1). The person’s
    “interest” must be a pecuniary interest in the estate that will be affected by the
    outcome of the proceeding. Ferreira v. Butler, 
    575 S.W.3d 331
    , 334–35 (Tex.
    2019); see Logan v. Thomason, 
    202 S.W.2d 212
    , 215 (Tex. 1947) (“[T]he burden
    is on every person contesting a will, and on every person offering one for probate,
    to allege, and, if required, to prove, that he has some legally ascertained pecuniary
    interest, real or prospective, absolute or contingent, which will be impaired or
    benefited, or in some manner materially affected, by the probate of the will.”); In
    re Estate of Adams, No. 14-12-00064-CV, 
    2013 WL 84925
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 8, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The burden is on every
    person contesting a will to allege and, if required, to prove that she has some
    legally ascertainable pecuniary interest, real or prospective, absolute or contingent,
    that will be impaired or benefited, or in some manner materially affected, by the
    probate or defeat of the will.”). “In the absence of such an interest, a contestant is
    a mere meddlesome intruder, and it is not the policy of the State of Texas to permit
    those who have no interest in a decedent’s estate to intermeddle therein.” Estate of
    Adams, 
    2013 WL 84925
    , at *3.
    B.     Joy established that she has standing.
    In the present case, Brashear sought to probate a purported will of Moreland.
    Joy in turn filed a will contest alleging that the purported will was invalid. It is
    undisputed that Joy is Moreland’s biological daughter. It is also undisputed that
    Moreland had one other biological child. It is also undisputed that, at the time of
    her death, Moreland did not have a spouse.         If the trial court sustains Joy’s
    6
    challenge to the purported will, Moreland would then have died intestate and her
    estate would pass to her heirs, her two children. See Tex. Estates Code §§ 22.015
    (stating that an heir is a person who is statutorily entitled to a part of an intestate
    decedent’s estate); 201.001 (providing that if a person dies intestate without
    leaving a spouse, that person’s estate passes to the decedent’s children). We
    conclude therefore that Joy qualifies as a person interested in Moreland’s estate
    and has standing to object to Brashear serving as executor of Moreland’s estate.
    See
    id. at
    §§ 22.018(1) (defining “interested person” or “person interested” as
    including heirs); 55.001 (authorizing “a person interested in an estate” to file a
    “written opposition” in probate proceedings); Jones v. LaFargue, 
    758 S.W.2d 320
    ,
    323 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (concluding that nieces
    and nephews of decedent were persons interested in estate and had standing to file
    will contest because they would be heirs if will determined to be invalid).
    To the extent Brashear argues that because the purported will disinherits Joy,
    Joy does not have standing, we disagree. Here, the inquiry is not whether Joy has
    an interest in the purported will. The inquiry is instead focused on whether Joy has
    an interest in the decedent’s estate. Evans v. Allen, 
    358 S.W.3d 358
    , 364 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see In re Estate of Holley, No. 11-15-
    00173-CV, 
    2017 WL 549009
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 10, 2017, pet.
    denied) (mem. op.) (stating that “whether one is indeed entitled to a share of the
    estate depends upon the validity of the wills in question, which is a matter to be
    decided by trial on the merits of the will contest.”). Because Joy would be one of
    Moreland’s heirs if the will contest is successful, she has standing regardless of the
    content of the purported will. See 
    Evans, 358 S.W.3d at 364
    (“In a contest of a
    will already admitted to probate in which the contestant claims that an earlier will
    is the last valid will, a beneficiary under the prior will qualifies as a person
    7
    interested in the estate and thus has standing to maintain the will contest.”); 
    Jones, 758 S.W.2d at 323
    (concluding that nieces and nephews were potential heirs, were
    interested in estate, and had standing to file will contest). Further, there is no
    requirement that, as Brashear argues, Joy must first be declared Moreland’s heir by
    a court hearing an heirship proceeding before she has standing to file a will contest.
    Instead, as stated above, Joy’s standing to file a will contest is determined by
    whether she has a justiciable interest in the litigation. Estate of Holley, 
    2017 WL 549009
    at *4; see 
    Logan, 202 S.W.2d at 215
    (“The burden is on every person
    contesting a will, and on every person offering one for probate, to allege, and, if
    required, to prove, that he has some legally ascertained pecuniary interest, real or
    prospective, absolute or contingent, which will be impaired or benefited, or in
    some manner materially affected, by the probate of the will.”); Estate of Adams,
    
    2013 WL 84925
    , at *3 (“The burden is on every person contesting a will to allege
    and, if required, to prove that she has some legally ascertainable pecuniary interest,
    real or prospective, absolute or contingent, that will be impaired or benefited, or in
    some manner materially affected, by the probate or defeat of the will.”).
    C.     The trial court did not violate Brashear’s due process rights.
    Next Brashear argues that the trial court violated his due process rights when
    it refused to consider his motion challenging Joy’s standing and refused to admit
    his evidence addressed to Joy’s standing. “Due process requires notice and an
    opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” In re
    G.X.H., 
    584 S.W.3d 543
    , 553 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. filed).
    We conclude that no violation of Brashear’s due process rights occurred here.
    First, the record includes Brashear’s pleadings and attached exhibits challenging
    Joy’s standing.   Second, the record also includes the reporter’s record of the
    hearing on Joy’s motion for partial summary seeking to disqualify Brashear from
    8
    serving as the executor of Moreland’s estate. Brashear attended and participated in
    that hearing.   During the hearing, Brashear was able to argue his position.
    Brashear specifically argued to the trial court:
    In the Court’s discretion, Your Honor. If the Court is listening to the
    evidence, I’m the only one that’s been working on Mrs. Moreland’s
    case. Right now you have a motion pending in front a [sic]
    emergency cease and desist order that he mentioned. At that time that
    was filed Mrs. Dorai is not even a party to this case because she hasn’t
    gone through the heirship proceeding. If she is not declared as an
    heir, she doesn’t have the authority to take and file a motion like this
    because she does not have standing under the Texas law. She has no
    pecuniary interest in this case if she is not declared an heir.
    The trial court responded that he would “look at it all.” Finally, the trial court’s
    order granting Joy’s motion for partial summary judgment states that “[a]fter
    consideration of the summary judgment evidence, including affidavits, discovery,
    documentary evidence and Non-Movant’s pleadings, and the arguments of counsel,
    this Court finds that Contestant’s motion is due to be GRANTED and SUSTAINS
    her objections and makes the following findings . . . .” Because the trial court
    considered Brashear’s pleadings and evidence, and Brashear participated in the
    hearing, we hold Brashear’s due process rights were not violated.
    To the extent Brashear complains that the trial court violated his due process
    rights because it did not expressly rule on his challenge to Joy’s standing, we
    conclude any error is harmless because the question of standing and subject matter
    jurisdiction cannot be presumed and cannot be waived. See Continental Coffee
    Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 
    937 S.W.2d 444
    , 448, n.2 (Tex. 1996). Additionally,
    standing can be raised for the first time on appeal and the standard of review is de
    novo. 
    Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928
    ; Tex. Ass’n. of 
    Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444
    –45.
    Brashear has been able to raise the issue of Joy’s standing in this court and we
    9
    have determined that Joy established her standing to object to his appointment as
    executor of Moreland’s estate.           We overrule Brashear’s consolidated first and
    second issues.
    II.   The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Brashear’s
    motion to reconsider the granting of Joy’s motion for partial summary
    judgment.
    In his final issue on appeal Brashear argues that the trial court abused its
    discretion when it denied his motion to reconsider its order granting Joy’s motion
    for partial summary judgment.5 We disagree.
    Once a trial court grants a summary judgment motion, it generally has no
    obligation to consider further motions on the issues adjudicated by the summary
    judgment order. Bridgestone Lakes Cmty. Improvement Assoc., Inc. v. Bridgestone
    Lakes Dev. Co., Inc., 
    489 S.W.3d 118
    , 125 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2016, pet. denied). The standard of review for a motion to reconsider a prior
    summary judgment is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
    Id. A trial court
    abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable, or when it acts
    without reference to any guiding rules or principles.
    Id. An abuse of
    discretion
    will not be found if the movant cites no additional evidence beyond the evidence
    available to him when the first summary judgment was granted. Macy v. Waste
    Mgmt., Inc., 
    294 S.W.3d 638
    , 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet.
    denied).
    Here, Brashear repeated the same arguments he had made in his initial
    opposition to Joy’s motion for partial summary judgment. In addition, Brashear
    did not attach any evidence to his motion to reconsider. In that situation, we
    5
    Brashear titled his motion “Motion for Hearing Denovo [sic].”
    10
    cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Brashear’s
    motion for rehearing. Bridgestone Lakes Cmty. Improvement Assoc., 
    Inc., 489 S.W.3d at 125
    . We overrule Brashear’s third issue on appeal.
    CONCLUSION
    Having overruled Brashear’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
    summary judgment order disqualifying Brashear from serving as the executor of
    Morehead’s estate.
    /s/    Jerry Zimmerer
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Wise, and Zimmerer.
    11