in the Interest of D.R.J., a Minor Child ( 2021 )


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  •                                   Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-20-00423-CV
    IN THE INTEREST OF D.R.J., a Minor Child
    From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2018PA01665
    Honorable John D. Gabriel Jr., Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Sitting:          Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Irene Rios, Justice
    Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: February 17, 2021
    MOTION TO WITHDRAW DENIED; AFFIRMED
    The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed this suit, seeking to
    terminate the rights of the parents of D.R.J. 1 After a bench trial, the trial court terminated the
    rights of both parents and designated the Department to be the child’s permanent managing
    conservator. The trial court found three independent grounds 2 to terminate the parental rights of
    the mother, T.R., and found that termination of her rights is in D.R.J.’s best interest. T.R. timely
    appealed the trial court’s order.
    1
    To protect the identity of the minor child, we refer to appellant and the child by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE
    § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
    2
    The court found termination of T.R.’s parental rights warranted under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O). See
    TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1). The court also terminated the parental rights of D.R.J.’s father; however, he did
    not appeal the trial court’s order.
    04-20-00423-CV
    Appellant’s court-appointed appellate attorney filed a brief in which she concluded there
    are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967);
    In re P.M., 
    520 S.W.3d 24
    , 27 n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (stating that Anders procedures
    protect indigent parents’ statutory right to counsel on appeal in parental rights termination cases
    and apply in those cases). Counsel certified she sent T.R. a copy of the brief and a letter advising
    her of her rights to review the record and to file a pro se brief. Counsel also provided T.R. a form
    to use to request access to the record. In addition, counsel filed a motion to withdraw. Appellant
    did not request access to the appellate record, and this court then set a deadline for appellant to file
    a pro se brief. Appellant has not filed a pro se brief.
    We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the attorney’s Anders brief and we conclude
    there are no arguably meritorious grounds for appeal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
    termination order.
    Counsel filed a motion to withdraw in conjunction with her Anders brief. We deny
    counsel’s motion to withdraw because it does not assert any ground for withdrawal apart from
    counsel’s conclusion the appeal is frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27; In re A.M., 
    495 S.W.3d 573
    , 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Counsel’s duty to her client
    extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals, including the filing of a petition for review
    in the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.016(3); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27-28
    & n.14 (“Once appointed by the trial court, counsel should be permitted to withdraw only for good
    cause and on appropriate terms and conditions. Mere dissatisfaction of counsel or client with each
    other is not good cause. Nor is counsel’s belief that the client has no grounds to seek further review
    from the court of appeals’ decision.”).
    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-20-00423-CV

Filed Date: 2/17/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021