in Re Eloise and Ruben Guzman ( 2021 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-20-00589-CV
IN RE Eloise and Ruben GUZMAN
Original Mandamus Proceeding 1
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: February 17, 2021
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED
The underlying proceeding involves relators Eloise and Ruben Guzman’s appeal to the
county court at law from a forcible detainer judgment obtained in justice court. Before
commencement of the trial de novo, the county court at law abated the underlying proceeding
pending the full and final resolution of a separate title dispute against relators filed in the district
court. In this original proceeding, relators seek a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to
vacate the order of abatement to allow the parties to proceed to trial de novo on the forcible detainer
action before the county court at law. We conditionally grant the petition.
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This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2020-CV-0212, styled Ruben Guzman and Eloise Guzman v. Mary A.
Derrick and All Other Occupants, pending in the County Court, Guadalupe County, Texas, the Honorable Bill Squires
presiding.
04-20-00589-CV
BACKGROUND
Relators purchased the property at issue from Eloise Guzman’s parents, Servando and
Eloise Arizpe, in 2000. Relators allowed the Arizpes to live in a mobile home on the property rent
free. Subsequently, the Arizpes allowed Mary Derrick to live with them to assist them as they
aged. On February 12, 2020, Servando Arizpe filed a lawsuit against relators in district court,
arguing relators had obtained the deed to the property in dispute by way of fraud.
On August 6, Servando Arizpe died, and relators subsequently initiated a forcible detainer
action in justice court to evict Derrick from the property. Relators contend that they own the
property and that Derrick’s authorization to occupy the property has expired. The justice court
granted judgment in favor of Derrick and relators appealed to the county court at law for a trial de
novo. Before trial, the county court abated pending full and final resolution of the title contest
filed in district court. Relators filed a motion to unabate the case, which the county court denied.
Relators filed their petition for writ of mandamus challenging the county court’s order of
abatement. The real party in interest did not file a response. In their petition, relators argue the
county court abused its discretion by abating the forcible detainer action where proof of title is not
a prerequisite to demonstrating a superior right of immediate possession, and hence the district
court’s jurisdiction to determine the question of title is not disturbed by the forcible detainer action.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, to obtain mandamus relief, a relator must show both that the trial court clearly
abused its discretion, and that relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d
833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court has no discretion in determining what
the law is and applying it to the facts and abuses its discretion if it fails to analyze or apply the law
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correctly. In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
APPLICABLE LAW
A forcible detainer occurs when a person, who is a tenant at sufferance, refuses to surrender
possession of real property after his right to possession has ceased. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 24.002(a)(2); Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 915–16 (Tex.
2013); Smith v. Beneficial Fin. I Inc., No. 05-14-00497-CV, 2015 WL 6777828, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Nov. 6, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). A forcible detainer action is “a summary, speedy, and
inexpensive” procedure for determining the right to immediate possession of real property where
no claim of unlawful entry exists. Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 926–27 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). The only issue to be determined in a forcible detainer action is the
right to actual possession of the premises; the trial court may not adjudicate questions of title. TEX.
R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); cf. Shutter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 318 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (stating defects in foreclosure process or with purchaser’s title to
property may not be considered in forcible detainer action).
The jurisdiction of forcible detainer actions is expressly given to the justice court of the
precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to county courts for a trial de novo. TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(b). Forcible detainer actions are cumulative of
any other remedy a party may have in the courts of this state, and the displaced party is entitled to
bring a separate suit in the district court to determine questions of title. Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro,
LLC, 264 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
A question of title may be so intertwined with the issue of possession, however, as to
preclude adjudication of the right to possession without first determining title. Williams v. VRM-
Vendor Res. Mgmt., No. 01-14-00272-CV, 2015 WL 3915636, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
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Dist.] June 25, 2015, no pet.) (citing Chinyere v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 440 S.W.3d 80, 83 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.)). In such cases, the county court is deprived of
jurisdiction if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to the determination of the right to
immediate possession. In re Gallegos, No. 13-13-00504-CV, 2013 WL 6056666, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 13, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing Rice v. Pinney, 51
S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)).
On the other hand, if the issues of title and possession are not so intertwined, “a forcible-
detainer suit in justice court may run concurrently with another action in another court—even if
the other action adjudicates matters that could result in a different determination of possession
from that rendered in the forcible-detainer suit.” Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d
415, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Matters relating to possession may even
overlap in the two proceedings without affecting a county court’s jurisdiction to determine
immediate possession because “a judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is a
determination only of the right to immediate possession and does not determine the ultimate rights
of the parties to any other issue in controversy relating to the realty in question.” Id. (emphasis
added in original) (quoting Lopez v. Sulak, 76 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002,
no pet.)).
DISCUSSION
In response to relators’ motion to unabate in the county court, Derrick argued the county
court does not have jurisdiction to hear the forcible detainer action while a title dispute is ongoing
because the right to immediate possession of the property is intrinsically linked to title. We
disagree. The issues of title and possession in this case are not so interconnected as to preclude
the county court from determining the right to immediate possession. See In re Catapult Realty
Capital, L.L.C., No. 05-19-00109-CV, 2020 WL 831611, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 20, 2020,
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orig. proceeding). Servando Arizpe initially filed the title dispute in district court arguing that
relators obtained the property in dispute by fraud. Relators subsequently initiated a forcible
detainer action in justice court to evict Derrick from the property because relators contended that
Derrick’s permission to occupy the property had terminated. When doing so, relators provided the
deed by which they believe to have acquired ownership of the property.
This deed represents prima facie evidence of title until it is set aside by a court. See Ford
v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. 2007) (“Deeds obtained by fraud are
voidable rather than void, and remain effective until set aside”). On this record, there is a deed,
effective until set aside. The county court has jurisdiction to determine the right of immediate
possession in the forcible detainer action. See Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d at 437 (providing that a forcible
detainer action may run concurrently with another action even if the other action adjudicates
matters that could result in a different determination of possession from that rendered in the
forcible detainer suit); cf. Cook v. Mufaddal Real Estate Fund, No. 14-15-00651-CV, 2017 WL
1274118, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 4, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that
challenges to the validity of a foreclosure sale do not deprive the justice or county court of
jurisdiction because plaintiffs in a forcible detainer action need only present sufficient evidence of
ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession to prevail).
The mere existence of a title dispute in district court did not divest the county court of
jurisdiction over the forcible detainer action. See Catapult Realty Capital, 2020 WL 831611, at
*9. Absent from the record is any specific evidence that meets Derrick’s burden to demonstrate
that the title dispute is so intertwined with the issue of immediate possession as to defeat the
jurisdiction of the county court. See Hawkins v. Jenkins, No. 05-18-01017-CV, 2019 WL
4051830, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (providing that a defendant
must provide specific evidence of genuine title dispute intertwined with issue of immediate
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possession in order to defeat county court jurisdiction). We therefore conclude the granting of the
order to abate until final disposition of the title dispute was an abuse of discretion. See Meridien
Hotels, Inc. v. LHO Fin. P’ship I, L.P., 97 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).
We also conclude that relators have no adequate remedy at law. Relators are effectively
denied any alternative method of challenging immediate possession during the county court’s
abatement. See Catapult Realty Capital, 2020 WL 831611, at *9 ([W]hen an abatement order
vitiates another party’s ability to prosecute and present a viable claim or defense, ordinary appeal
may not provide an adequate remedy for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we conclude the county court abused its discretion by abating
the forcible detainer action, and relators do not have an adequate remedy at law. See Walker, 827
S.W.2d at 843. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct
the county court, no later than fifteen days from the date of this opinion, to vacate its October 12,
2020 Order on Abatement.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
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