in the Interest of A.H. and C.A.H., II, Children ( 2012 )


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  •                                    IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-11-00141-CV
    IN THE INTEREST OF A.H. AND C.A.H., II, CHILDREN
    From the 220th District Court
    Bosque County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 06-01-00806-BCFM
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Christopher Holmes appeals from an order naming his parents joint managing
    conservators with the right to establish the domicile of his two children, A.H. and
    C.A.H., II. Holmes was also named a joint managing conservator with possession and
    access to the children pursuant to the standard possession order so long as he
    participated in counseling with his current wife. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. Ch. 153, Subch. F
    (West 2011). Holmes complains that the trial court erred by giving his parents the right
    to establish the children’s domicile rather than placing the children with him. We
    affirm.
    Procedural History
    Christopher and Mitzi are the parents of A.H. and C.A.H., II, children born
    during their marriage. In 2006, Christopher and Mitzi divorced and they were named
    joint managing conservators of the children, with Mitzi having the right to establish the
    children’s residence without regard to geographic location.        Christopher’s parents,
    Shawn and Barbara Holmes, were given limited possession and access to the children in
    the divorce decree.
    The children had lived with Shawn and Barbara off and on throughout their
    lives, with either or both parents at different times. In September of 2009 Barbara, who
    had been listed as an emergency contact, was called by the school to pick up C.A.H.
    because he needed to go to the doctor. Mitzi left the children with Shawn and Barbara
    permanently approximately a week later. Mitzi picked the children up from school one
    day in November of 2009 for lunch and returned them to school, which was the last
    time the children saw her.             Shawn and Barbara had possession of the children
    continuously until the final hearing other than a few visits when Christopher had the
    children. In August of 2010, Christopher filed a motion to modify the divorce decree
    seeking primary custody of the children. In October of 2010, Shawn and Barbara filed a
    petition seeking primary custody of the children as well.
    After a bench trial, the court determined that the parties would be named joint
    managing conservators of the children and that Shawn and Barbara would have the
    In the Interest of A.H. and C.A.H. II, Children                                    Page 2
    right to establish the children’s domicile without a geographical restriction.
    Christopher was awarded possession and access to the children in accordance with the
    standard possession order so long as he and his current wife attended counseling
    sessions together.       The trial court found that the appointment of either parent as
    managing conservator would not be in the best interest of the children because it would
    significantly impair the children’s health or emotional development.1
    Appointment of Managing Conservator
    In his sole issue, Christopher complains that the trial court erred by awarding his
    parents the right to establish the children’s residence rather than him because there was
    insufficient evidence of his lack of fitness as a parent as required by the United States
    Supreme Court and the Texas Supreme Court.2 Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2054
    , 
    147 L. Ed. 2d 49
    (2000); In re Scheller, 
    325 S.W.3d 640
    (Tex. 2010); In re Chambliss,
    
    257 S.W.3d 698
    (Tex. 2008). Presumably Christopher is complaining that the evidence
    was insufficient to establish that his appointment as managing conservator would
    significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional well-being. However,
    none of the cases cited by Christopher are comparable to this situation. The cases cited
    above, Troxel, Scheller, and Chambliss, all involve situations in which grandparents were
    seeking visitation with their grandchildren who were currently residing with a parent.
    1Mitzi filed an answer but did not appear at the final hearing and has not appealed the judgment.
    Therefore, we will not discuss the portions of the order relating specifically to her.
    2Christopher does not set forth whether he is challenging the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence;
    however, it is not necessary to make that distinction here.
    In the Interest of A.H. and C.A.H. II, Children                                                     Page 3
    None were modification proceedings. Here, A.H. and C.A.H., II were not residing with
    either parent at the time of the final hearing, but had been residing with Shawn and
    Barbara for well over a year.
    There is a presumption that a parent should be appointed as a managing
    conservator unless that appointment would not be in the best interest of the child
    because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or
    emotional development, generally referred to as the “parental presumption.” TEX. FAM.
    CODE ANN. § 153.131(a). However, this presumption does not apply to modification
    proceedings. In re V.L.K., 
    24 S.W.3d 338
    , 342 (Tex. 2000).
    Further, it was not necessary for the evidence to demonstrate Christopher’s lack
    of “fitness” as a parent or significant impairment because the parental presumption did
    not apply.      In re 
    V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d at 341
    .   Rather, the standard for granting the
    modification is set forth in section 156.101 of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
    § 156.101 (West 2011) (petitioner need only demonstrate that modification would be in
    the children’s best interests and that the children were voluntarily relinquished to
    another person for at least six months). Therefore, it is not necessary for us to address
    the evidence relating to any significant impairment of the children.
    Christopher does not argue that the evidence was insufficient regarding the
    statutory grounds in section 156.101. Nor does he challenge the constitutionality of the
    In the Interest of A.H. and C.A.H. II, Children                                    Page 4
    statutory provisions.        The trial court’s judgment was not erroneous.   We overrule
    Christopher’s sole issue.
    Conclusion
    Having found no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed February 29, 2012
    [CV06]
    In the Interest of A.H. and C.A.H. II, Children                                    Page 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-11-00141-CV

Filed Date: 2/29/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021